风萧萧_Frank
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英国：高级代表/副主席何塞普·博雷尔在牛津大学关于面临战争的世界的演讲
视频链接：https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256530
May 3 2024
[要点]
我看到冷战后我们习惯的国际体系已经不复存在。美国已经失去了霸主地位。1945年后的多边[世界]秩序正在节节败退。中国正在崛起为超级大国。过去40年，中国所做的事情在人类历史上是绝无仅有的。在过去的30年里，按购买力平价计算，中国占世界GDP的份额从6%上升到近20%，而我们欧洲人从21%降到14%，美国从20%降到15%。这是经济格局的巨大变化。中国正在成为我们和美国的竞争对手。不仅在制造廉价商品方面，而且作为一个军事强国，处于技术发展的最前沿，并构建将塑造我们未来的技术。中国已经与俄罗斯建立了“无限的友谊”—尽管所有的友谊都是有限度的—这标志着威权政权在民主国家面前日益结盟。
I see [that] the international system, that we were accustomed to after the Cold War, no longer exists. America has lost its status of a hegemon. And the post-1945 multilateral [world] order is losing ground.
I see – as you know - China rising to the super-power status. What China has done in the last 40 years is unique in the history of humankind. In the last 30 years, China’s share of the world’s GDP, at PPP, has gone from 6% to almost 20%, while we, Europeans, went from 21% to 14% and the United States from 20% to 15%. This is a dramatic change of the economic landscape.
China is becoming a rival for us and for the United States. Not just in manufacturing cheap goods, but also as a military power, at the forefront of the technological development and building the technologies that will shape our future. China has embarked on a “friendship without limits” - although all friendships have limits - with Russia, which signals a growing alignment of the authoritarian regimes in front of democracies.
May 3 2024 牛津 EEAS 新闻团队
发货时请核对！
尊敬的各位老师、亲爱的同学们、女士们、先生们：
亲爱的蒂莫西（牛津大学加顿·阿什），感谢您邀请我来牛津。我很荣幸能够在圣安东尼学院演讲。
我以前来过这所大学几次。我认识你们的一些教授。很高兴在这里见到一些美国学生——我们六年前在耶鲁大学见过面。
谢谢。感谢您的关注。
这所学院培养了许多杰出的作家，甚至还培养了世界各地相当多的外交部长。
因此，能够发表达伦多夫演讲是一种特别的荣幸。拉尔夫·达伦多夫是一位杰出的人物：德国和英国的政治家、欧盟专员、政治学家和开放社会的坚定捍卫者。
正如你所说，我努力成为一名学者。我人生的一部分是在大学度过的，另一部分则是在政治生活中度过的。我一直对将思想世界和政治世界结合在一起非常感兴趣。思考的人，行动的人。
这就是为什么我很高兴。我喜欢与那些深入思考这个充满争议和充满挑战的世界中正在发生的事情的人们一起度过这样的时刻。也许你比我有更多的时间思考，所以我需要你启发我们的决定。我希望，在这些话之后，我们将有机会与大家交流一些想法。
是的，我是外交与安全[政策]高级代表——感谢您强调“和安全政策”。站在这个优越的位置上，我有很好的机会观察世界。我看到了什么？
嗯，我看到对抗多了，合作少了。近年来，这种趋势越来越明显：对抗多了，合作少了。
我看到一个更加支离破碎的世界。我看到了一个不遵守规则的世界。
我看到更多的极性，更少的多边主义。
我看到依赖性如何成为武器。
我看到冷战后我们习惯的国际体系已经不复存在。美国已经失去了霸主地位。 1945 年后的多边[世界]秩序正在节节败退。
正如你所知，我看到中国正在崛起为超级大国。过去40年，中国所做的事情在人类历史上是绝无仅有的。在过去的30年里，按购买力平价计算，中国占世界GDP的份额从6%上升到近20%，而我们欧洲人从21%上升到14%，美国从20%上升到15%。这是经济格局的巨大变化。
中国正在成为我们和美国的竞争对手。不仅在制造廉价商品方面，而且作为一个军事强国，处于技术发展的最前沿，并构建将塑造我们未来的技术。中国已经与俄罗斯建立了“无限的友谊”——尽管所有的友谊都是有限度的——这标志着威权政权在民主国家面前日益结盟。
我说过世界更加多极化了——是的，确实如此。
[同时]中等强国，[例如]印度、巴西、沙特阿拉伯、南非、土耳其正在崛起。他们正在成为重要的演员。无论是金砖国家还是非金砖国家，除了渴望在世界上获得更高的地位和更强的话语权，以及为自身发展获得更大利益之外，没有什么共同点。
为了实现这一目标，他们正在最大限度地发挥自主权，不愿意选边站队，根据具体情况，根据具体情况，对某一方进行对冲。他们不想选择营地，我们也不应该强迫他们选择营地。
我们，欧洲人，想在我们的社区建立一个朋友圈。相反，我们今天拥有的是火环。一圈火环从萨赫勒地区传到中东、高加索地区，现在又来到了乌克兰战场。
法国国际关系研究所所长托马斯·戈马特一直在分析全球经济的瓶颈是什么。其中有几个地点离我们非常近：贸易的红海、石油和天然气的霍尔木兹海峡以及谷物出口的黑海。它们就在我们附近，在其中一些地区我们甚至参与了[欧盟]海军任务，就像在红海的情况一样。
并且有两场战争。两场战争。当我来到布鲁塞尔时，还没有战争。
有两场战争，人们为争夺土地而战。这表明地理又回来了。有人告诉我们，全球化使地理变得无关紧要，但事实并非如此。我们附近的大多数冲突都与土地有关，
他们是有领土意识的。就巴勒斯坦而言，这是一块许诺给两个人的土地；就乌克兰而言，这是一块位于两个世界十字路口的土地。 “这是我的土地”，“不，这是我的”。而这场土地之争更是流了很多血。
与此同时，我们看到全球趋势正在加速。气候变化不再是未来的问题。气候崩溃已经到来——不是为了明天，而是为了今天。技术变革——特别是每个人都在谈论人工智能——正在带来我们无法完全掌握的变化。人口结构也在迅速变化。当我谈论人口平衡时，我谈论的是移民，特别是在非洲，到 2050 年，世界上将有 25% 的人生活在非洲。到 2050 年，四分之一的人将生活在非洲。与此同时，我们看到不平等现象日益加剧，民主制度日趋衰落，自由受到威胁。
这就是我所看到的。我知道这不太好。在这种情况下，欧盟和英国的角色将被定义。我不知道我们将扮演哪个角色。但可以肯定的是，这将取决于我们对所面临挑战的反应——这并不是什么新鲜事。让·莫内已经说过：“欧洲将在危机中锻造”。但现在的紧迫性和严重性让我们听到了欧洲可能灭亡的警告。
欧洲，我们的罪孽。
哦，那好吧。我们需要做什么？
首先，我们需要对俄罗斯的危险进行清晰的评估——俄罗斯被认为是欧洲最大的生存威胁。也许并非欧洲理事会中的每个人都同意这一点，但大多数人都支持这个想法。俄罗斯对我们来说是一个生存威胁，我们必须对这种风险有清醒的评估。
第二，我们要讲原则、讲合作、讲实力。
但首先，关于俄罗斯。
在普京的领导下，俄罗斯又回到了帝国主义对世界的认识。普京梦想恢复昔日的规模和影响力，从而恢复了沙皇时代和苏联帝国时代的俄罗斯帝国。
这是2008年的格鲁吉亚。这是2014年的克里米亚。我们没有看到，或者我们不想看到俄罗斯在普京统治下的演变。尽管普京本人曾在2007年的慕尼黑安全会议上警告过我们。重读一下普京在2007年慕尼黑安全会议上所说的话很重要，恐怕没有人愿意听到或理解。
我们建立了一个模式——欧洲模式——基于我们内部的合作和经济相互依存——并且取得了巨大的成功。我们之间70年的和平。我们相信，相互依存将通过德国人所说的“Wandel durch Handel”带来政治趋同。这将给俄罗斯甚至中国带来政治变革。
好吧，这已被证明是错误的。但它并没有发生。面对俄罗斯独裁主义，相互依赖并没有带来和平。相反，它变成了依赖，特别是对化石燃料的依赖，后来，这种依赖变成了武器。
今天，普京对我们所有人构成了生存威胁。如果普京在乌克兰取得成功，他不会就此止步。欧洲人应该意识到基辅可能会出现像白俄罗斯那样的傀儡政府，俄罗斯军队驻扎在波兰边境，俄罗斯控制着世界粮食市场的 44%。
每个人都越来越意识到这一点。就连法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙一开始也说过：“我不能让俄罗斯感到羞辱。”现在，他是对俄罗斯胜利的全球后果发出更多警告的声音之一。但世界各地也有其他声音，比如几天前日本首相岸田文雄。
但我知道并非欧盟的每个人都同意这一评估。一些欧洲理事会成员表示：“不，俄罗斯不是生存威胁。至少不适合我。我认为俄罗斯是一个好朋友。”数量不多，但也有一些。
在一个一致执政的联盟中，我们对俄罗斯的政策总是受到一票否决的威胁——一票否决就足够了——正如[匈牙利总理]维克托·欧尔班推迟我们对乌克兰的最后一揽子援助计划所证明的那样。与此同时，在美国，政治两极分化导致军事援助计划推迟了半年。在战争中，半年的时间已经很长了。它可以决定战争的输赢。
普京以基辅“去纳粹化”为借口入侵乌克兰，认为我们无法做出反应。那是在喀布尔陷落之后。他坚信，我们对天然气的强烈依赖将使我们的反应像 2014 年克里米亚入侵时那样缓慢而温和。
2022 年 1 月，即入侵开始前几周，我在顿巴斯。我会永远记得我的谈话
[乌克兰，丹尼斯]总理什米哈尔。他问我：“当他们入侵我们时，因为他们会入侵我们——边境另一边有 15 万俄罗斯军队——你打算做什么？你要支持我们吗？我相信年轻的欧洲人不会为基辅而死。但是你会向我们提供我们抵抗入侵所需的武器吗？”这个问题，在那个时候，在一月份，在黑暗和寒冷的冬天里，我无法回答。我不确定答案是什么。
因为欧盟从未向处于战争状态的国家提供过武器。但随后，入侵来了，令人高兴的是，我们的回答是出色的，而且非常团结，以便为乌克兰提供抵抗所需的军事能力。
英国在我们之前就做??到了这一点。一开始我们说提供头盔，现在我们提供F-16[战斗机]。一件事和另一件事之间有很长的路要走。我们经历了如此漫长的道路，因为事实证明乌克兰人有能力抵抗。请记住，2014 年，[安吉拉]默克尔不想在俄罗斯入侵克里米亚之前支持乌克兰。当时的答案是“不”，因为它毫无用处。
现在答案是“是”，因为事实证明乌克兰人有能力抵抗。
现在普京将整个西方视为对手。他在多次演讲中都明确表达了这一点。俄罗斯电视台每天都在说和重复一切：“西方——整个西方，全球西方——是我们的敌人”。他们采取了相应的行动 - 通过虚假信息，毒害我们的信息环境，以及重要的谎言工厂：俄罗斯正试图干涉我们的民主进程，正如他们已经所做的那样 - 我相信 - 在接下来的日子里他们将会这样做欧洲选举。
是的，乌克兰正在困难的情况下进行抵抗，克服了美国和欧盟没有提供继续战斗所需的一切的事实。
然后，另一场战争来临了。 10 月 7 日哈马斯的可怕[恐怖]袭击和以色列的反应 — — 对许多人来说，反应过度 — — 使中东陷入了几十年来最严重的暴力循环。就在10月7日之前，许多人认为《亚伯拉罕协议》淡化了巴勒斯坦问题。好吧，他们没有。这是在阿拉伯人和以色列人之间建立和平的一种方式，但不是巴勒斯坦人和以色列人之间的和平。
杰克·沙利文在10月7日前一周表示，他认为中东从未如此平静。嗯，心情并不平静。不平静，看看约旦河西岸发生的事情就知道一点也不平静。
现在，我们有两场战争。而我们欧洲人还没有为世界的严酷做好准备。
但正如你，伊万[克拉斯特夫]所指出的，醒来是一回事——我们已经被吵醒了——而起床是另一回事。在某些情况下，我们仍然躺在床上。觉醒是显而易见的，但我们了解这一刻的严重性吗？我有我的疑问。我想利用这个机会传达这样的信息：是的，现在是一个严肃而紧迫的时刻，因为我们面临着地缘政治、经济和社会威胁。其中四个：地缘政治、经济、技术和民主。
欧洲，欧盟，但不仅仅是欧盟，欧洲人的生活方式，这种人类从未能够发明的政治自由、经济繁荣和社会凝聚力的最佳结合，肯定处于危险之中。为了应对这些挑战，我认为我们必须在三个维度上努力：原则、合作和力量。
让我们从原则开始。原则很重要，因为我们说欧盟是一个价值观联盟。这就是我们的条约中所说的内容。我们是一个价值观联盟，这些价值观都在条约中得到了列举。它们都是好的，很难不同意这些原则。
然后，还有《联合国宪章》所载的原则，以限制强者的行动。为了防范我们自己最坏的本能，[鉴于]我们欧洲人在半个世纪内让世界着火，不是一次而是两次。
用最简单的术语来说，这些原则禁止“使用武力侵犯任何国家的领土完整或政治独立”。
然后，还有国际人道主义法试图规范战争的进行方式并保障对平民的保护。这些原则应该是防止我们在世界各地看到的使用武力正常化的最佳保障。
然而，我知道，为了能够团结世界围绕这些原则，我们需要表明我们欧洲人无论何时何地都尊重这些原则。这就是我们正在做的事情吗？好吧，还没有达到我们应该的程度。和
对于欧洲来说，这是一个问题。
无论我走到哪里，我都会遇到双重标准的指责。我曾经对我的大使们说，外交是管理双重标准的艺术。当然，有些困难，但关键在于：管理双重标准。
但事实是，世界人民并没有忘记伊拉克战争。即使一些欧盟成员国没有参加，其他成员国也热情参与，还有一些国家迅速退出这场战争。这是我最了解的国家的情况。
加沙现在发生的事情以一种许多人根本无法理解的方式描绘了欧洲。他们看到了我们在支持乌克兰方面的快速参与和果断，并想知道我们处理巴勒斯坦正在发生的事情的方式。
是的，我可以尝试解释欧盟的决策过程是如何运作的：一致同意。我可以尝试解释我们成员国的不同历史经历——它们之间存在很大分歧。在联合国大会上，当决定停火的时刻到来时，一方投了 18 票，另一方投了 2 票，其他人投了弃权票。
但人们普遍认为，乌克兰平民的生命价值与加沙不同，那里有超过 34,000 人死亡，大多数人流离失所，儿童正在挨饿，人道主义支持也受到阻碍。
人们的看法是，我们不太关心联合国安理会决议是否被违反，就像以色列在定居点问题上的情况一样，[而不是]俄罗斯违反了这些决议。
是的，我们在二战后制定的原则是和平的支柱。但这要求我们的语言具有连贯性。如果我们在一个地方将某件事称为“战争罪”，那么当它发生在其他地方时，我们就需要用同样的名称来称呼它。
我们都同意，哈马斯的残暴袭击引发了新的暴力循环，我们必须一再谴责。但[接下来的]六个月加沙发生的事情又是另一场恐怖。一种恐怖无法证明另一种恐怖的合理性。
正如世界各地（尤其是美国）的激烈辩论和许多示威活动所表明的那样，我们的社会越来越感受到这一点。
第二行：合作。
合作需要一个基本要素：信任。如果我信任你，我愿意与你合作。如果我信任你，我就不会害怕依赖你。
但在一个依赖性日益武器化的世界里，信任是短缺的。这带来了与世界大部分地区脱钩的风险。技术脱钩、贸易脱钩、价值脱钩。
交易关系越来越多，但规则越来越少，合作也越来越少。但世界面临的巨大挑战——气候变化、技术、人口变化、不平等——需要更多的合作，而不是更少的合作。
所以，我们能做些什么？
首先，当然是减少过度的依赖。在大流行期间，我们意识到在欧洲，我们没有生产一克扑热息痛。不是一克扑热息痛。那是一个危机时刻，而在危机时刻，市场无法提供我们所需要的东西。因此，我们当然需要减少过度的依赖。
我们要推动贸易往来多元化，深化与亲密朋友的合作。英国是亲密朋友、亲密伙伴。我们拥有相同的价值观。我们在几乎所有地缘政治问题上都有共同利益。在任何我们可以合作的领域，这对我们双方都有好处。
但这还不够。如果我只与具有相同价值观的人交谈，我会在中午停止工作。不，世界上有很多人与我没有相同的价值观或有矛盾的利益。尽管如此，我还是必须寻找合作的方式。中国的情况就是如此。我们需要与不一定具有相同价值观或兴趣的人一起工作和合作。
然后，我们必须看看为什么世界对我们感到不满。是的，有一种怨恨的感觉，因为人们认为有不同的责任。让我仅举其中两个。
首先，气候变化。自工业革命开始以来，我们欧洲人产生的二氧化碳排放量约占全球累计二氧化碳排放量的 25%。 [撒哈拉以南地区] 非洲 3%，拉丁美洲 3%。撒哈拉以南非洲和南美洲几乎不承担任何责任，但他们却承担着最重要和最具破坏性的后果。
因此，当我们谈论应对气候变化时，我们必须理解他们的观点，以及他们的感受：这是某人造成的问题，而其他人则要为此付出代价。而唯一可能的答案就是提供更多的资源来面对这个问题。
更多资源——但事实并非如此。情况并非总是如此。
请记住，2009 年在哥本哈根开发了
各国承诺每年向受气候变化影响最直接的国家提供 1000 亿美元的支持 — — 而这一承诺需要很长时间才能兑现。
即使是现在，联合国仍然告诉我们，为了实现“公正转型”——我们每天都在谈论“公正转型”——我们每年需要 2.4 万亿美元来资助清洁能源和气候适应能力。这需要前所未有地增强全球团结。
这笔钱从哪里来？如果我们每年提供 1000 亿美元都这么困难，那么世界将如何提供联合国估计的 2.4 万亿美元？
这带来了行动的另一面，那就是财政正义。在加布里埃尔·祖克曼（Gabriel Zucman）的倡议下，如果不对某些财政规则进行强有力的改变，就没有出路。首先是对企业征收最低税，然后对世界上最富有的人征收最低财富税。这可以提供应对气候变化所需的资金，气候变化被认为是人类的生存威胁。
不满的另一个原因是疫苗。当大流行来临时，事关生死存亡，2021 年 12 月，富裕国家已经每 100 名居民使用了 150 剂疫苗。每 100 名居民中有 150 名。低收入国家只有 7 剂[每 100 名居民接种疫苗]。我们有 150 个，他们有 7 个。
他们记得这一点。我一直在与世界各地的一些领导人交谈，他们告诉我“在大流行期间，我想从你们那里购买疫苗，而不是索要疫苗。我准备付钱了，但你告诉我：抱歉，我们没有[疫苗]。然后，我去了俄罗斯和中国，他们也去了。”
是的，这一点并没有被忘记。我们可以说我们是最大的出口国和最大的捐助国。那是真实的。但在人命垂危的关键时刻，我们这边的答案并不好。人们提醒[我们]。气候和疫苗是发展中国家对我们不满的两个例子。
必须考虑到这一点，因为当我们与他们交谈并谈论价值观时，他们会说“是的，我们拥有相同的价值观，但我们没有相同的优先事项。根据您的发展水平，您有自己的优先事项。我有我的。”
如果你想把这两件事放在一起，不可避免地，必须转移大量资源，以便应对流行病和气候变化。
最后一个词是关于力量的，这将[我]带到我工作的安全方面。
独裁政权最欣赏的莫过于实力。他们喜欢力量。他们最不尊重的就是软弱。如果他们认为你是一个弱者，他们就会采取相应的行动。所以，让我们在与独裁者交谈时尝试[展示]力量。
这是我们欧洲已经忘记的教训。也许是因为我们一直依赖美国的安全保护伞。但这把保护伞可能不会永远打开，我相信我们不能让我们的安全依赖于每四年一次的美国大选。
因此，我们必须制定更多的安全和国防政策。我没想到我的投资组合的这一部分会花费这么多时间和精力，但事实就是如此。
我们必须增强我们的防御能力，并在北约内部建立强大的欧洲支柱。
过去，当我们谈论北约内部的欧洲支柱时，这被描述为削弱北约、离开北约或忘记北约的一步。但有趣的是，今天，是美国自己在鼓励我们前进，增强我们的能力，并以协调的方式做到这一点。
我认为，北约的欧洲支柱不能仅仅从欧盟的角度来理解，而应该从欧洲作为一个比欧盟更大的空间的地理角度来理解。不仅从机构的角度——27个[成员国]——而且从拥有“欧洲”理念的人们的角度来看。
因为你，你是英国，你离开了欧盟，但你仍然是欧洲的一部分。欧洲还有其他国家不是欧盟的一部分，因为他们从来不想成为欧盟的一部分，就像挪威一样，或者他们决定不再加入，就像你一样，或者他们仍在排队成为欧盟成员。因此，要从地理角度而不是仅仅从制度角度来看待安全问题。
我认为，在安全和国防领域，我们可以与英国建立更牢固的关系。我们可以建设更多，因为这是欧盟内部纯粹的政府间政策。扩大我们已有的双边条约——例如法国与英国的《兰开斯特宫条约》——应该不难，以便使安全成为更好、更强合作的一个组成部分。
在。
当然，我们必须考虑谁将为这种安全买单。我想知道欧洲人如何能够为更多的安全、更多地对抗气候变化、与世界其他国家更多的合作付出代价，同时履行所有财政约束规则。
我想回顾一下，当欧元危机来临时，我们发明了开箱即用的解决方案，以规避一致意见并寻找可以拯救欧元的方法。
今天，我们或多或少处于同样的境地。我们必须为欧洲人提供更多的安全、更多的财政能力，以便与我们世界各地的合作伙伴合作，[并]成为值得信赖的合作伙伴。这将需要更多的资源。
今天，在欧洲，在布鲁塞尔，关于如何做到这一点存在着一场激烈的辩论。我们是为了疫情才这么做的。我们发明了下一代欧盟，因为它是一种生存威胁。人们死在街上。
好吧，现在他们不会死在街头，但如果我们不能提供安全能力来阻止那些可能企图将战争扩大到我们领土的人，他们可能会死在街头。
这是欧洲人面临的重大挑战之一。
另一个——我现在要回到中东局势——是寻找和平计划。
我来自利雅得，在利雅得我遇到了阿拉伯人和许多欧洲人。
我认为阿拉伯人必须提出寻求政治解决局势的前景。我邀请阿拉伯国家外长来布鲁塞尔解释他们的建议。
我们必须让每个人都明白，没有军事解决方案，你无法扼杀一个想法。扼杀一个想法的唯一方法就是提供一个更好的想法。什么可能是“好主意”？
好吧，每个人都说他们想要两国解决方案。自奥斯陆以来，我们三十年来一直在重复这一点。
但在奥斯陆，两国解决方案并未成为协议的一部分。不是。他们说：“以后，也许，我们可以”，但文本中没有。
如果我们认为两国解决方案是唯一的解决方案，那么国际社会就必须更多地参与其中，而不是将此作为起点，而是作为终点。
我们必须问那些说他们不想要两国解决方案的人，他们想要什么？
是的，你不想要它，那么你的解决方案是什么？如果我们排除对巴勒斯坦人的灭绝或强迫移民，解决方案是什么？
当我们向内塔尼亚胡政府提出这个问题时，我们得到的唯一答案是：“我们不想要两国解决方案”。但那么，你想要什么？
这也是国际社会必须一次又一次地提出的问题，以寻求避免另一场人类悲剧并让两国人民在和平与安全中并肩工作的答案。
它发生在北爱尔兰，它发生在欧洲。昔日的敌人如今是好邻居，而且不仅仅是好邻居，更是最好的朋友。这应该是可能的，但为了成为可能，土地必须共享。他们不能生活在一起，他们必须和平与安全地毗邻生活，但每个人都有自己的家园、他们的土地、他们的政府、他们的领土和他们的政治能力。
这是欧洲人必须解决的最重要的事情之一，因为这是我们之间最具分歧的事情。我们在乌克兰面前团结一致，在俄罗斯面前仍然团结一致。我们没有一致给出答案，一个基本的答案，谴责哈马斯，要求人质自由，要求人道主义支持，要求政治解决。它必须在操作中进行转换，而不仅仅是在声明中。
从现在到今年年底，这将是欧洲政治议程上非常重要的事情。
我希望我们能够与英国共同努力，寻找解决方案，使我们成为安全方面的伙伴，成为努力尽快结束我们这个时代的地缘政治斗争的伙伴，因为我知道这不简单。这从来都不是一件容易的事，但我们有道德责任为此做出贡献，因为我们也是问题的一部分。我们以某种方式造成了这个问题，我们负有努力解决它的强烈责任。
乌克兰的存在取决于我们。我知道如何结束乌克兰战争。只要削减供应，我就可以在几周内结束乌克兰战争。如果我切断对乌克兰的武器供应，乌克兰就无法抵抗，他们将不得不投降，战争就会结束。
但这是我们希望战争结束的方式吗？我不希望这样，我希望欧洲的许多人也不希望这样。
相反，我们将尽一切努力为乌克兰人提供军事和政治支持，我们将为中东人民提供一切政治参与，以支持他们的发展。
好的，为了公平的和平。
与此同时，我们必须继续努力建立使欧洲成为现实的价值观和原则——我在一开始就说过：人类从未能够发明的政治自由、经济繁荣和社会凝聚力的最佳结合。
谢谢。
United Kingdom: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at Oxford University about the world confronted by wars
03.05.2024 Oxford EEAS Press Team
Check against delivery!?
Distinguished faculty, dear students, ladies and gentlemen,
Dear Timothy [Garton Ash, University of Oxford], thank you for inviting me to Oxford. It is a special honour for me to speak at Saint Antony’s.
I have been in this College a couple of times before. I know some of your professors. It is a great pleasure to find here some American students – we met six years ago in Yale [University].
Thank you. Thank you for your attention.
This College has produced many brilliant writers – and even quite a number of Foreign Ministers around the world.
So, it is a particular honour to deliver the Dahrendorf lecture. Ralf Dahrendorf was an exceptional human being: a politician both in Germany and in the United Kingdom, a European Commissioner, a political scientist and a staunch defender of open societies.
As you said, I try to be an academic. I have been in universities [for] part of my life, and in the political life - [for] the other part. I have always been very much interested in bringing together the world of ideas and politics. People who think, and people who act.
That is why I am very happy. I enjoy moments like this with people who think deeply about what is happening in this contested and challenging world. You have, maybe, more time to think than I have, so I need that you inspire our decisions. And I hope that, after these words, we will have the opportunity to exchange some ideas with you.
Yes, I am the High Representative for Foreign and Security [Policy] - thank you for stressing “and Security Policy”. From this privileged position, I have the great opportunity of looking at the world. And what do I see?
Well, I see more confrontation and less cooperation. This has been a growing trend in the last years: much more confrontation and much less cooperation.
I see a world much more fragmented. I see a world where rules are not being adhered to.
I see more polarity, and less multilateralism.
I see how dependencies become weapons.
I see [that] the international system, that we were accustomed to after the Cold War, no longer exists. America has lost its status of a hegemon. And the post-1945 multilateral [world] order is losing ground.
I see – as you know - China rising to the super-power status. What China has done in the last 40 years is unique in the history of humankind. In the last 30 years, China’s share of the world’s GDP, at PPP, has gone from 6% to almost 20%, while we, Europeans, went from 21% to 14% and the United States from 20% to 15%. This is a dramatic change of the economic landscape.
China is becoming a rival for us and for the United States. Not just in manufacturing cheap goods, but also as a military power, at the forefront of the technological development and building the technologies that will shape our future. China has embarked on a “friendship without limits” - although all friendships have limits - with Russia, which signals a growing alignment of the authoritarian regimes in front of democracies.
I said the world is much more multipolar - Yes, that is true.
[At the same time] middle powers, [such as] India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, are emerging. They are becoming important actors. Whether they are BRICS or not BRICS, they have very few common features, except the desire for getting more status and a stronger voice in the world, as well as greater benefits for their own development.
In order to achieve this, they are maximising their autonomy, not willing to take sides, hedging one side or the other depending on the moment, depending on the question. They do not want to choose camps and we should not push them to choose camps.
We, Europeans, wanted to create in our neighbourhood a ring of friends. Instead of that, what we have today is a ring of fire. A ring of fire coming from the Sahel to the Middle East, the Caucasus and now in the battlefields of Ukraine.
Thomas Gomart, the Director of the Institut français des relations internationales, has been analysing what are the chokepoints of the global economy. Several of these points are very close to us: the Red Sea for trade, the Strait of Hormuz for oil and gas, and the Black Sea for grain exports. They are in our immediate vicinity, and in some of them we are engaged even with [EU] navy missions, like it is the case in the Red Sea.
And there are two wars. Two wars. When I came to Brussels, there were no wars.
There are two wars where people are fighting for the land. This shows that geography is back. We were told that globalisation had made geography irrelevant, but no. Most of the conflicts in our neighbourhood are related to land, they are territorial. A land that has been promised to two people, in the case of Palestine, and a land at the crossroads of two worlds, in the case of Ukraine. “This is my land”, “No, it is mine”. And this fight for land is shedding a lot of blood.
At the same time, we see an acceleration of the global trends. Climate change is no longer a future problem. The climate breakdown is already here – it is not for tomorrow, it is for today. The technological transitions – in particular, everybody talks about Artificial Intelligence – are bringing changes that we cannot fully grasp. Demography is also changing rapidly. And when I am talking about demographic balances, I am talking about migration, in particular in Africa where 25% of the world will be living in 2050. In 2050, one out of four human beings will be living in Africa. And at the same time, we see inequalities growing, democracies declining and freedoms at risk.
This is what I see. It is not very nice, I know. In this landscape, the role of the European Union, and the role of the United Kingdom, is to be defined. I do not know which is going to be our role. But it is sure it will depend on our response to the challenges we are facing – nothing new. Jean Monnet already said: “Europe will be forged in crisis”. But now the urgency, and the gravity of the moment is such that we hear warnings that Europe could die, nothing less.
L’Europe peut mourir, nous venons d’entendre.
Well, okay. What do we need to do?
First, we need a clear assessment of the dangers of Russia – Russia [is] considered as the most existential threat to Europe. Maybe not everybody in the European Council agrees with that, but the majority is behind this idea. Russia is an existential threat for us, and we have to have a clear-eyed assessment of this risk.
Second, we have to work on principles, on cooperation and on strength.
But first, about Russia.
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has returned to the imperialist understanding of the world. Imperial Russia from the Tzar times and the Soviet empire times have been rehabilitated by Putin dreaming of a former size and influence.
It was Georgia in 2008. It was Crimea in 2014. We did not see, or we did not want to see, the evolution of Russia under Putin’s watch. Even though Putin himself had warned us at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. It is important to re-read what Putin said in 2007 at the Munich [Security] Conference that I am afraid that nobody wanted to hear or to understand.
We built a model – the European model - based on cooperation and economic interdependence inside us – and it has been a remarkable success. 70 years of peace among us. We believed that interdependence would bring political convergence through what the Germans call “Wandel durch Handel”. This would bring political change, in Russia and even in China.
Well, this has been proven wrong. It has not happened. Faced with the Russian authoritarianism, interpendence did not bring peace. On the contrary, it turned into dependence, in particular on fossil fuels, and later, this dependence became a weapon.
Today, Putin is an existential threat to all of us. If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will not stop there. The prospect of having in Kyiv a puppet government like the one in Belarus, and the Russian troops on the Polish border, and Russia controlling 44% of the world[‘s] grain market is something that Europeans should be aware of.
Everybody is becoming more and more aware of that. Even President [of France, Emmanuel] Macron who at the beginning said: “Il ne faut pas humilier la Russie.” Now, he is one of the voices which is warning more about the global consequences of a Russian victory. But [there are] other voices around the world, like some days ago, the Prime Minister of Japan [Fumio Kishida].
But I know that not everybody in the European Union shares this assessment. And some European Council’s members say: “Well, no, Russia is not an existential threat. At least not for me. I consider Russia a good friend.”. There are not many, but there are some.
In a Union governed by unanimity, our policies on Russia are always threatened by a single veto – one is enough - as [Prime Minister of Hungary] Victor Orbán proved by delaying our last assistance package to Ukraine. At the same time, in the United States, political polarisation has delayed the military assistance package for half a year. In the middle of a war, half a year is a lot of time. It can make the difference between winning or losing the war.
Putin invaded Ukraine under the pretext of the “de-Nazification” of Kyiv, believing that we would be unable to react. It was after the fall of Kabul. And he was convinced that our strong dependencies on their gas would make us to react as slowly and softly as we did in 2014 in front of the invasion of Crimea.
I was in [the] Donbas in January 2022, some weeks before the invasion started. And I will always remember my conversation with Prime Minister [of Ukraine, Denys] Shmyhal. He asked me: “When they invade us, because they will invade us – there are 150,000 Russian troops on the other side of the border – what are you going to do? Are you going to support us? I am sure that young Europeans will not go to die for Kyiv. But are you going to provide us with the arms that we need in order to resist the invasion?” That question, at that time, in January, in the middle of the darkness and the cold of the winter, I could not answer. I was not sure what was going to be the answer.
Because the European Union had never provided arms to a country at war. But then, the invasion came and happily, our answer was remarkable and very much united in order to provide Ukraine with the military capacity they need to resist.
The United Kingdom did that before us. At the beginning, we were talking about providing helmets, and now we are providing F-16 [fighter jets]. It is a long way between one thing and another. We went through this long way because Ukrainians have proved to be able to resist. Remember that in 2014, [Angela] Merkel did not want to support Ukraine in front of Russia’s invasion of Crimea. At that time the answer was “no”, because it was going to be useless.
Now the answer has been “yes”, because Ukrainians have proved to be able to resist.
Now Putin sees the whole West as an adversary. He made that clear in many of his speeches. Everything, every day is being said and repeated on Russian TV stations: “The West – the whole West, the global West - is our enemy”. And they act accordingly - through disinformation, poisoning our information environment, and the important factory of lies: [with] that Russia is attempting to interfere in our democratic processes, as they have already done and will do – I am sure - in the next European elections.
Yes, Ukraine is resisting in difficult circumstances, overcoming the fact that the United States and the European Union have not been supplying everything they need to continue the fight.
And then, another war came. The horrible [terrorist] attack by Hamas of 7 October and Israel’s response – for many people, the disproportionate response - plunged the Middle East into the worst cycle of violence in decades. Just before the 7th of October, many believed that the Abraham Accords had diluted the Palestinian issue. Well, they had not. It was a way of making peace between the Arabs and Israelis, but not between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Jack Sullivan considered that the Middle East had never been so calm, he said one week before the 7th of October. Well, it was not calm. It was not calm, just have a look at what happened in the West Bank to realise that it was not calm at all.
Now, we have two wars. And we, Europeans, are not prepared for the harshness of the world.
But as you, Ivan [Krastev], have pointed out, one thing is to be awake – and we have been woken up - and another thing is to get out of the bed. In some cases, we are still in bed. The awakening was clear, but do we understand the gravity of the moment? I have my doubts. And I want to use this opportunity in order to send a message that yes, the moment is a moment of gravity and urgency because we are facing a mix of geopolitical, economic and societal threats. Four of them: geopolitically, economically, technologically, and democratically.
Europe, the European Union, but more than the European Union, the way of living of the Europeans, this best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the humanity has never been able to invent, is certainly in danger. And in order to face these challenges, I think that we have to work on three dimensions: Principles, Cooperation and Strength.
Let’s start with the Principles. Principles are important because we say that the European Union is a Union of values. That is what is being said in our treaties. We are a Union of values, and those values are enumerated in the Treaties. They are everything that is good, it is difficult to disagree with these principles.
Then, there are the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, to put a limit to the actions of the stronger. To put safeguards against our own worst instincts, [given] that we Europeans put [the] world on fire, not once but twice, within half a century.
In the simplest possible terms, those principles outlawed “the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
Then, there is International Humanitarian Law to try to regulate how wars are fought and safeguard the protection of civilians. These principles should be the best safeguard against the normalisation of the use of force that we see all over the world.
I know, however, that to be able to rally the world around those principles, we need to show that we, Europeans, respect them always and everywhere. Is that what we are doing? Well, not to the extent we should. And for Europe, this is a problem.
Wherever I go, I find myself confronted with the accusation of double standards. I used to say to my Ambassadors that diplomacy is the art of managing double standards. Certainly, something difficult, but it is about [that]: to manage double standards.
But the fact is, people around the world have not forgotten the war in Iraq. Even if some EU Member States did not participate, others participated with a lot of enthusiasm and others withdrew quickly from this war. This is the case of the country I know best.
What is now happening in Gaza has portrayed Europe in a way that many people simply do not understand. They saw our quick engagement and decisiveness in supporting Ukraine and wonder about the way we approach what is happening in Palestine.
Yes, I can try explaining how the European Union’s decision-making processes work: unanimity. I can try to explain the different historical experiences of our Member States – very divided among them. At the United Nations General Assembly, 18 voted [on] one side, 2 on the other, and others abstained when the moment came to decide about the ceasefire.
But the perception is that the value of civilian lives in Ukraine is not the same than in Gaza, where more than 34,000 are dead, most others displaced, [where] children are starving, and the humanitarian support [is] obstructed.
And the perception is that we care less if United Nations Security Council resolutions are violated, as it is the case by Israel with respect to the settlements, [as opposed to] when it is violated by Russia.
Yes, the principles that we put in place after the World War II are a pillar of peace. But this requires that we are coherent in our language. If we call something a “war crime” in one place, we need to call it by the same name when it happens anywhere else.
We all agree that Hamas has sparked this new cycle of violence with their atrocious attack, that we have to condemn once and again. But what has happened in Gaza [in the following] 6 months is another horror. And one horror cannot justify another.
This is more and more what our societies are feeling, as the passionate debate and the many demonstrations around the world, and in particular in the United States, are showing.
Second line: Cooperation.
Cooperation requires an essential ingredient: Trust. If I trust you, I am ready to cooperate with you. I am not afraid to be dependent on you if I trust you.
But in a world where dependencies are increasingly weaponised, trust is in short supply. This brings the risk of decoupling with large parts of the world. Decoupling on technology, decoupling on trade, decoupling on values.
There are more and more transactional relationships, but less rules and less cooperation. But the great challenges of the world - climate change, technologies, demographic change, inequalities - require more cooperation, not less cooperation.
So, what can we do?
First, certainly, to reduce excessive dependencies. During the pandemic, we realised that in Europe, we were not producing a single gram of Paracetamol. Not a gram of Paracetamol. It was a moment of crisis, and in the moment of crisis, the market was not able to provide what we needed. So, we need to reduce excessive dependencies, for sure.
We need to diversify our trade links and deepen cooperation with our close friends. The United Kingdom is a close friend and a close partner. We share the same values. We have converging interests on almost all geopolitical questions. In any area where we can cooperate, it would be good for both of us.
But that is not enough. If I was only talking with people who share the same values, I would stop working at midday. No, there are many people around the world [with] whom I do not share the same values or have contradictory interests. In spite of that, I have to look for ways of cooperating. This is the case of China. We need to work and cooperate with people who [do] not necessarily share the same values or interests.
Then, we have to have a look at why the world is feeling some resentment about us. Yes, there is a feeling of resentment because people believe that there are different responsibilities. Let me cite only two of them.
First, climate change. We, Europeans, have produced about 25% of all cumulated global CO2 emissions since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. [Sub-Saharan] Africa 3%, Latin America 3%. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Americans [have] almost nothing of the responsibility, and they share the most important and damaging consequences.
So, when we talk about fighting climate change, we have to understand their views and the feeling that this is a problem that someone has created, and others pay the consequences. And the only possible answer is to provide more resources in order to face this problem.
More resources – but it has not been the case. Not always the case.
Remember, in 2009 in Copenhagen, developed countries committed to $100 billion per year of support to the countries most directly affected by climate change – and this promise took a long time to [be] realised.
And even now, the United Nations tell us that in order to go through a “just transition” - how we talk everyday about the “just transition” -, we need $2.4 trillion annually to fund clean energy and climate resilience. This will require an unprecedented increase in global solidarity.
Where is this money going to come from? If it has been so difficult for us to provide $100 billion per year, [how will] the world provide $2.4 trillion, which is the United Nations’ estimate?
And this brings another side of the action, which is fiscal justice. And at Gabriel Zucman’s initiative, there is no way out without a strong change in some fiscal rules. To start with the minimum tax on corporations and with a minimum wealth tax on the world’s richest people. This could provide the amount of money required to face climate change, which is considered an existential threat for humanity.
The other reason for resentment are vaccines. When the pandemic came, and it was a matter of life or death, in December 2021 rich countries had already used 150 doses of vaccines per 100 inhabitants. 150 per 100 inhabitants. Lower income countries had just 7 [doses of vaccines per 100 inhabitants]. We had 150, they had 7.
And they remember that. I have been talking with some leaders around the world who told me “during the pandemic, I wanted to buy vaccines from you, not ask for them. I was ready to pay for them, but you told me: Sorry, we do not have [vaccines]. Then, I went to Russia and China, and they had.”
Yes, this has not been forgotten. We can claim that we have been the biggest exporter and the biggest donor. That is true. But at that critical moment, when people were dying, the answer from our side was not a good one. People remind [us about it]. Climate and vaccines are two examples of resentment of [the] developing world towards us.
This has to be taken into consideration because when we talk with them and we talk about values, they say “yes, we share the same values, but we do not share the same priorities. You have your priorities according to your level of development. I have mine.”
And if you want to put both things together, unavoidably, there has to be a strong level of resources transferred in order to face pandemics when it comes, climate change when it comes.
The last word is about Strength, and this brings [me] to the security side of my job.
There is nothing that authoritarian regimes admire [as] much as strength. They like strength. And there is nothing for which they have less respect than weakness. If they perceive you as a weak actor, they will act accordingly. So, let’s try [to demonstrate] strength when talking with authoritarian people.
This is a lesson that we [in] Europe had forgotten. Maybe because we had been relying on the security umbrella of the United States. But this umbrella may not be open forever, and I believe that we cannot make our security dependent on the US elections every four years.
So, we have to develop more our Security and Defence policy. I did not expect this part of my portfolio to take [up] so much time and effort, but this is the way it is.
We have to increase our defence capabilities and to build a strong European pillar inside NATO.
In the past, when we talked about the European pillar inside NATO, this was portrayed as a step towards weakening NATO, or leaving NATO, or forgetting about NATO. But the funny thing is [that] today, it is the United States themselves who are encouraging us to forge ahead, to increase our capacities, and to do that in a coordinated manner.
I think that the European Pillar of NATO has to be understood not from the point of view of the European Union alone, but from the geographical approach of Europe as a space which is bigger than the European Union. Not only from an institutional point of view – the 27 [Member States] - but from the point of view of the people who share what it is to be “European”.
Because you, you are the United Kingdom, you left the European Union, but you are still part of Europe. And there are other people in Europe who are not part of the European Union, because they never wanted to be, like Norway, or they decided to stop being, as you, or they are still queuing to become members of the European Union. So, look at that security issue from a geographical perspective, and not only [from] an institutional one.
And I think that there, in Security and Defence, we can have with the United Kingdom a stronger relation. We can build more because this is a pure intergovernmental policy inside the European Union. It should not be difficult to expand the bilateral treaties that we already have - like France with the United Kingdom, the Lancaster House Treaties – in order to make security an integral part of a better and stronger cooperation.
Certainly, we have to think [about] who will pay for this security. I wonder how the Europeans can be able to pay for more security, more fight [against] climate change, more cooperation with the rest of the world, and at the same time to fulfil all the rules of fiscal constraint.
I want to recall that when the euro crisis came, we invented out of the box solutions in order to circumvent unanimity and look for something that could save the euro.
Today, we are more or less in the same situation. We have to provide to the Europeans more security, more financial capacity, to work with our partners around the world, [and] to be a trusted partner. This will require more resources.
Today, in Europe, in Brussels, there is a great debate about how to do it. We did it for the pandemic. We invented the Next Generation EU because it was an existential threat. People were dying on the streets.
Well, now they are not dying in the streets but they could die in the streets if we cannot offer a security capacity in order to deter those who could have the tentation to expand the war into our territories.
This is one of the big challenges that Europeans are facing.
The other one - I am coming back to the situation in the Middle East – is to look for a peace plan.
I am coming from Riyadh, and in Riyadh I met the Arabs and many Europeans.
I think that the Arabs have to present their prospects for looking for a political settlement of the situation. I invited the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Arab countries to come to Brussels and explain which are their proposals.
We have to make everybody understand that there is not a military solution, that you cannot kill an idea. The only way of killing an idea is to provide a better one. And what could be “the good idea”?
Well, everybody says that they want the two-state solution. We have been repeating that for 30 years, since Oslo.
But in Oslo, the two-state solution was not part of the agreement. It was not. They said: “Later, maybe, we could”, but it is not in the text.
If we believe that the two-state solution is the only solution, then the international community has to engage much more, taking this not as a starting point but as the endgame point.
And we have to ask to the ones who say that they do not want the two-state solutions, what do they want?
Yes, you do not want it, what is your solution then? If we exclude extermination or forced migration of the Palestinians, what is the solution?
When we ask this question to the Netanyahu government, the only answer we get is: “We do not want the two-states solution”. But then, what do you want?
And this is what the international community has to ask, once and again, in order to look for an answer that could avoid another human tragedy and make these two people work side by side in peace and security.
It happened in Northern Ireland, it happened in Europe. The old enemies are today good neighbours, and more than good neighbours, they are best friends. It should be possible, but in order [for it] to be possible, the land has to be shared. They cannot be living together, they have to live side by side, in peace and security but each one with their home, their land, their government, their territory, their political capacity.
This is one of the most important things that the Europeans have to solve, because it is the most divisive thing among us. We have been united in front of Ukraine, we remained united in front of Russia. We have not been united in giving an answer, a basic answer condemning Hamas, asking for the freedom of the hostages, asking for humanitarian support, asking for a political solution. It has to be converted in actions, not just in declarations.
This will be something that - from now until the end of the year - will be very high on the agenda of the European politics.
And I hope that we can work together with the United Kingdom in order to look for a solution, and to make us partners on security, to be partners on trying to look for the geopolitical battles of our time to finish as soon as possible knowing that it is not easy. It has never been easy, but we have the moral responsibility of contributing to it because we are part of the problem. We created this problem one way or another, and we have a strong responsibility in trying to solve it.
The Ukrainian existence depends on us. I know how to finish the war in Ukraine. I can finish the war in Ukraine in a couple of weeks just by cutting the supply. If I cut the supply of arms to Ukraine, Ukraine cannot resist, they will have to surrender, and the war will finish.
But is this the way we want the war to finish? I do not want [that], and I hope that many people in Europe do not want [that] either.
On the contrary, we will do whatever we can in order to provide the Ukrainians with the military and political support, and we will provide the people in the Middle East all our political engagement to look for a fair peace.
In the meantime, we have to continue fighting to make the values and principles that make Europe what it is - I said it at the beginning: the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that humanity has never been able to invent.
Thank you.
Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256530
