本文最初发表于2023年4月12日。
Farah Stockman 2020年加入时报编委会。她曾在时报担任记者四年,负责报道政治、社会运动以及种族议题。她此前供职于《波士顿环球报》,2016年曾获得普利策评论奖。欢迎在Twitter上关注她:@fstockman 。
He Made His Country Rich, but Something Has Gone Wrong With the System
By Farah Stockman April 12, 2023
Ms. Stockman is a member of the editorial board.
Do benevolent autocracies get better results than democracies? I’ve pondered this question since last summer, when I heard highly educated Kenyans tell me that democracy hadn’t brought the economic development they sorely need. They gushed about the way that Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of modern Singapore, transformed his impoverished city-state into one of the wealthiest societies on earth in just one generation.
Consider that in 1960, Singapore and Jamaica had roughly the same gross domestic product per capita — about $425, according to World Bank data. By 2021, Singapore’s G.D.P. had risen to $72,794, while Jamaica’s was just $5,181. It’s no wonder that Lee Kuan Yew has become a folk hero. It’s not hard to find people from South Africa, Lebanon and Sri Lanka praying for their own Lee Kuan Yew.
Last month, President Biden hosted his second democracy summit and gave a speech about the epic global struggle between democracy and autocracy. Singapore — a U.S. partner rated “partly free” by Freedom House — was not invited. But Washington’s talking points about the imperative of democracy ignore a simple fact: Some autocrats are admired because they get results.
While established democracies do better economically than autocracies overall, the handful of autocrats who have focused on economic growth — rather than their own Swiss bank accounts — have managed to outperform fledgling democracies, according to Ronald Gilson, professor emeritus of law and business at Columbia University, who co-wrote a 2011 paper, “Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies.” Chile under Augusto Pinochet, South Korea under Park Chung-hee and China under Deng Xiaoping stand out as countries that achieved wholesale economic transformation, while weak democracies stagnated.
The paper, which was co-written by Curtis Milhaupt of Stanford Law School, spells out why benevolent authoritarians have an easier time plugging their countries into the global economy. Elites tend to resist big changes that would cut into their own bottom lines, even if those changes are good for the country. Autocrats have more tools to get them on board. An autocrat’s word can convince job-creating investors that their businesses will be protected, filling the void of a shaky court system. In a benevolent autocracy, legitimacy often comes not from elections but from the ability to show material improvements in people’s lives. In a democracy, leaders are often too busy fending off political challenges to make grand economic plans. They are frequently voted out of office before they can see those plans through. To win elections, politicians make short-term promises — like cutting taxes while increasing benefits — that don’t always make economic sense in the long run.
But benevolent autocracies have fatal flaws, too. Benevolent dictators are hard to find. There’s no guarantee that they will stay benevolent or that their successors will be as competent. After a country successfully transitions its economy, the advantages of this system seem to fade. But by then, a system of nearly unchecked power at the top has become entrenched.