John Mearsheimer | The elites play games with our plant and our lives

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I has several questions dealing with what kind of scenarios could be realistic for the war in Ukraine to end;  now given your distinctive positions how would you see that what would be a realistic scenario going forward for the war well.

I agree with Carl there when you ask Carl that question a slightly different form he basically said it's very hard to figure out where this train is headed I don't
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know how this one is going to end
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right I do want to go to Great Lengths
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to make sure we don't end up getting uh
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incinerated in a nuclear war but I don't
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know where it's going to end because
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what I hear you say also from your
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intervention is that there is no obvious
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end to this war because Russia is not
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going to back down and the ukrainians
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get the support for Europeans and the US
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is also not going to back down right I
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said that in my formal remarks
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go back to this Russia Putin Putin is
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not going to back down
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and there might be a difference I I I
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think there are a fair number of people
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in Moscow even in senior positions who
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would be interested in closing down this
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war tomorrow
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would they could would that include
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Crimea withdrawing from Crimea probably
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not probably not
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so then we will be back to where we were
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but uh prior to sort of February the
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24th where we did not have an agreement
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on Crimea and I think it could take
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quite some time to get some sort of
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solution to Crimea but I think the other
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issues I would not consider it entirely
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impossible that at some point in time we
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get the change that sort of they
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understand in Moscow that what they're
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heading into into something that's got
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to be danger for Russia not because we
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are going to invade Moscow that's not
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going to happen
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but it's going to implode
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and they will try to rescue what can be
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rescued and go for something that might
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be acceptable but that will only be
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possible if we can give and and I think
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we'll talk about the post Putin it's not
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going to happen with Putin and it's also
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going to be dependent us helping to
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secure and and give a new future to
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Ukraine because as I said if we don't
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get a stable Ukraine
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uh we will not get a stable Europe
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because then there will be a constant
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Temptation for I mean if you see some of
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the loonies that are paraded on Russian
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television these days they're truly
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dangerous loonies parading there but
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we'll give temptation to them but we do
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not know where this war will end we do
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not not know where Russia will end up
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what we do know is that there is a
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movement towards a geopolitical rivalry
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where you have the UF and China coming
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back to John's intervention and the U.S
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Russia now where is Europe in all this
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in the
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now where is excuse me where is Europe
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in that picture because the Rivalry is
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primarily the dyad between the UF and
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China on the one hand and you depicted
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to be the U.S and Russia on the other so
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it's a tripolar dynamic but where is
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Europe in that dynamic
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in that particular Dynamic I mean we are
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John mentioned the Taiwan issue uh as
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perhaps the most dangerous one which is
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really is a very very different issue
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because it's really done the resolve the
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Civil War from 1949 and and the Chinese
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want to sort of obey Jing once in some
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sort of way primarily prevent Taiwan
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from going independent they would
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consider that something completely
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unacceptable so we are distinctly in
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favor of one China principle we say
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however defined it somewhat differently
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and we are in favor of a peaceful
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resolution to it and we are distinctly
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against
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uh trying to resolve that by military
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means then Europe is not a military
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power in that part of the world we are
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trading power we are diplomatic power
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but we are not a military power with
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that part of the world
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yeah yeah uh I think uh the United
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States is deeply committed to containing
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if not uh rolling back Chinese power and
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that containment strategy has two
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Dimensions to it one is a military
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Dimension and the other is an economic
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Dimension and in terms of the military
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Dimension the Europeans are going to
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play hardly any role at all I think we
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agree on that
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where the Europeans are going to matter
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is on the economic front and this is a
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very tricky issue and they're of course
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now lots of articles in the media on
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this subject but the Europeans are going
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to want to trade extensively with China
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this is especially true given the
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negative Economic Consequences of the
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Ukraine war and it's no accident that
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early last month the German Chancellor
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went to Beijing and there's all sorts of
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evidence the Europeans are thinking
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about trading more and more with China
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and of course the Europeans because they
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have these sophisticated economies with
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all these sophisticated technologies
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will trade Technologies with the Chinese
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which will enrage the Americans the
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Americans are going to want the
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Europeans to help Washington throttle
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the Chinese economy you are not going to
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have any interest in throttling the
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Chinese economy you're going to have an
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interest in enhancing your prosperity
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facilitating economic growth and that
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means more trade with Europe so I think
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there is a potential
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for significant tension between the
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United States and Europe
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over the whole issue of trade between
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Europe and China
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now is this not the challenge because we
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have no good deterrent to prevent war
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and instability in a more multi-polar
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world and that means that we are moving
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over to more hybrid measures now the new
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U.S uh defense strategy talks about
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integrated deterrence which is not only
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military but which is also integrating
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all other kinds of of domains all the
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military domains but also sanctions and
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a number of other institutional measures
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now how does this look from the
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perspective of Europe is Europe is the
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EU ready for that world
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I think to some extent Europe is more
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ready than Americans are in the sense
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that I said
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um EU is very much a Hybrid Power if you
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talk talk about all of the different
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elements of hybrid Warfare they are
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elements where there are instruments in
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the hands of the European Union uh we
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are not a military power we don't have
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any armored divisions at all but we
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coordinate cyber policies we coordinate
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trade policies we coordinate migration
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policies to a certain extent not always
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a smashing success has to be said we
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coordinate uh security sort of domestic
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security Affairs that sort of thing that
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is necessary in order to meet hybrid
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threats we have I think more instruments
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than the Americans have for obvious
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reasons because the U.S continent has
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not been fake as you said you live in
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peace with the Canadians and the
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Mexicans uh while we have been uh
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exposed to these sorts of hybrid things
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and accordingly have more instruments
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so you think that Europe is well
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equipped I wonder why it's well equipped
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I mean shouldn't but but we are better
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equipped and we are equipping ourselves
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uh that I would argue but what do you
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think of my argument that the Europeans
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are going to trade with the Chinese in
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ways that's going to anger The Americans
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are we were going to trade with Chinese
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we do or also the Americans do America
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American yes exports you know what I'm
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saying here high technology yeah on high
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tech there's an element of tension
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sometimes uh we have this sort of Chip
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restrictions that came in the beginning
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of October that affects a couple of
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European companies that are less happy
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there will be talks as a matter of fact
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on Tuesday uh in Washington in the
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traded Technology Council and see if we
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can sort out these issues yeah yeah uh
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we have a trade relationship across the
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Atlantic that is not without its
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tensions growing tensions at the moment
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growing tensions due to certain
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protectionist tendencies in American
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politics but we normally sort them out
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um the relationship across the Atlantic
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uh we are allies whatever that means but
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that doesn't mean that we are 100 of the
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same view all the time never been the
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case uh not now either and and of course
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the difference I would say the the
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fundamental difference between the
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European View
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an American view on China is that
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for the U.S correct me if you think I'm
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exaggerating
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but for the U.S it's a fear of what I
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call 1870
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um 1870 was when
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U.S replaced Britain as the dominating
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power in the world in terms of economy
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and there was consequences coming out of
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that and and Americans of course feared
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that an increasingly economically
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powerful China
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will over time
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replace the Americans replace U.S as the
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dominant power in the world I think
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that's grossfully exaggerated I don't
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think it will happen
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but there's no question that that is
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driving a lot of the fears in American
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politics yeah but you know I think that
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you are right that that is the great
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fear that they will the Chinese will
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overtake us the United States and I also
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agree that it is probably greatly
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exaggerated but this gets to my earlier
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point that you never want to
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underestimate the extent to which great
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Powers assume worst case assumptions or
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make worst case assumptions about the
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other side so when you bring NATO
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up to Russia's borders even if there are
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no military forces American military
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forces on Ukraine's territory and even
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if it's going to take a long time for
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Ukraine to become a member of NATO from
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a Russian point of view they assume
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worst case and they get really scared
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because it's a security issue and the
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same thing is true with the Americans
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looking at China the Americans are
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scared stiff
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she pointed out that China is going to
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overtake them and great powers are just
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they get very nervous they get very
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antsy and then they pursue risky
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strategies that's the point I've tried
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to drive home yet I mean
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not quite the same thing but I'm in
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Norway as a border with Russia Norwegian
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Force which is very close to more months
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which is the most yes density's
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concentration of nuclear military power
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that's been fairly okay uh since the
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1940s I don't think the Russians were
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particularly happy about Russia about
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Norway joining NATO they were not but
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his work Estonia is a member of NATO
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um that is very close to Saint
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Petersburg I mean the the Border City of
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narva is closer to Saint Peters than to
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Talib
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um they live fairly harmoniously
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together that is not a threat it works
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but don't you see uh geopolitics leading
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to an escalation of tensions in the
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Arctic and in the north doesn't the fact
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that the Cold War was a bipolar
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situation that was relatively stable we
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are now in a situation that is fairly
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unstable because we do not know exactly
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where we are heading and we have major
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states that are uncertain about the
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capabilities and the intentions of the
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others and that brings us into a very
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dangerous territory
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it does but but but but the Arctic is
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essentially not another thing and that
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is of course the fact that the ice is
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receding
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and that means that for example now if
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you want to go with north of Siberia you
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can't go without the help of the
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Russians simply not doable
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um
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20 30 years down the road 40 50 years
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down the road you might have a lot of
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commercial traffic going to the north of
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Siberia and that will invite a lot of
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legal and political issues be that
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rivalry a bit something else I don't
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think war is going to break out in the
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Arctic but we're going to face a number
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of new questions primarily as a result
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of climate change I would argue but that
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is also more urgent because we have
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climate cooperation among the major
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Nations how does the geopolitical
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Rivalry influence our ability to move
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forward and climate if you look at what
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has happened over the past 10 months
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they didn't it didn't vary
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optimistic would you say
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no I wouldn't although
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Russia was never a big play on global
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climate they should have been because
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they're going to be performantly
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affected by it and it takes them a long
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time to understand that that's going to
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be the case China is a was the big one
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India to a certain extent we have I
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think is 28 to 29 of global emissions
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all from China and even if they are
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leaders in Lord of the Renewables and
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other things now they're also the
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leaders in Coal emissions which is the
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most dangerous thing so um one of the
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good things that came out of the meeting
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between Biden XI Xin ping in Bali was
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that they restarted
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the climate dialogue and the president
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of the European Council is invading
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today
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in order to discuss primarily we start
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in the climate dialogue with the Chinese
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Russia different thing but we know that
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war is a very very
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detrimental activity for climate and for
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uh focus on climate issues the emissions
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in Europe have certainly taken a
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different uh Road and so has the
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situation with coal in Asia and so forth
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so this is having very detrimental
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effects both on emissions but also on
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the economies that we need to turn it
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around so there are certainly some very
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unfortunate consequences for for for
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climate in the short to midterm
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I think to get in agreement on climate
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uh and to get agreements on how to deal
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with pandemics and to get arms control
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agreements unique cooperation among the
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great powers in the system the most
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powerful states
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as we remember we shut down
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proliferation in the second half of the
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Cold War because the United States and
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the Soviet Union decided to create the
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npt the nuclear suppliers group and so
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forth and so on the great Powers have to
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cooperate there's no question about that
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the problem that we face today is
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twofold first of all they're not two
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great powers in the system like there
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were during the Cold War there's not one
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great power which is really the ideal
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situation like there was in the unipolar
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moment there are three great powers
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second problem is
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a young woman named Eliza George who
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wrote
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article on proliferation during the Cold
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War and her argument is the more intense
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the security competition between great
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Powers the less likely it is you'll get
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cooperation on proliferation and
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assorted issues because the great Powers
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really don't want to cooperate they want
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to contest each other and she shows that
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you got very little
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cooperation between the United States
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and the Soviet Union on the nuclear
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proliferation front in the Hat first
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half of the Cold War it was with the
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coming of day taunt where you've got
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cooperation between more cooperation
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between the United States and the
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Soviets that led to cooperation on the
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proliferation front anyway all this is
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to say when you look at the fact that we
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have three great powers that you have to
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coordinate and that you have an intense
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security competition in East Asia
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between the United States and China you
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have an intense security competition
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almost a war between the United States
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and Russia and Europe it's no accident
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ladies and gentlemen the Xi Jinping
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recently told John Kerry that he was not
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interested in cooperating on climate and
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it's no accident that the Russians have
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just made it clear that they're not that
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interested in cooperating on arms
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control with the United States so I
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think we're going to have a lot of
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trouble
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garnering copyright cooperation on this
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set of issues moving forward because of
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the change in the structure of the
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system moving to multi-polarity and the
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intensity the Cooper of the competition