风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
习近平正在重塑国家资本主义，不要小看它
August 15th 2020
中国强人领导人制定了新的经济议程
美国与中国的对抗正在危险地升级。 过去一周，白宫宣布可能即将禁止 TikTok 和微信（两款中国应用程序），对香港领导人实施制裁，并向台湾派出一名内阁成员。 这种压力的加大在一定程度上反映了竞选活动：对中国采取强硬态度是唐纳德·特朗普总统竞选的一个关键支柱。 这在一定程度上是意识形态的，凸显了政府鹰派在各方面反击日益自信的中国的紧迫性。 但这也反映了特朗普政府从贸易战一开始就对中国采取的态度的一个假设：这种做法会产生结果，因为中国的类固醇国家资本主义比看起来要弱。
逻辑非常简单。 是的，中国实现了增长，但只是依靠债务、补贴、任人唯亲和盗窃知识产权等不可持续的模式。 如果施加的压力足够大，其经济可能会崩溃，迫使其领导人做出让步，并最终放开国家主导的体系。 正如国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥所说，“世界上热爱自由的国家必须促使中国改变。”
简单，但错误。 中国经济受到关税战的损害小于预期。 它对新冠肺炎 (covid-19) 大流行的抵御能力要强得多——国际货币基金组织 (IMF) 预测 2020 年经济增长 1%，而美国则下降 8%。 深圳是今年全球表现最好的大型股市，而不是纽约。 而且，正如我们的简报所解释的，中国领导人习近平正在 2020 年代重塑国家资本主义。 忘记钢铁厂和配额吧。 习近平的新经济议程是让市场和创新在严格界定的边界内更好地发挥作用，并接受共产党的全方位监控。 这不是米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman），但这种独裁、技术和活力的无情结合可能会推动经济增长多年。
低估中国经济并不是什么新鲜事。 自 1995 年以来，尽管西方国家提出了一波又一波的怀疑，中国按市场价格计算的 GDP 占世界的份额已从 2% 上升至 16%。 硅谷高管斥中国科技公司为模仿者； 华尔街卖空者表示，空置公寓的“鬼城”将带来银行业崩溃； 统计学家担心GDP数据被篡改，投机者警告资本外逃将引发货币危机。 中国无视了怀疑论者，因为其国家资本主义已经适应并改变了形态。 例如，20年前，重点是贸易，但现在出口仅占GDP的17%。 在 2010 年代，官员们给了阿里巴巴和腾讯等科技公司足够的空间来成长为巨头，并以腾讯为例，创建了一款消息应用程序微信，这也是政党控制的工具（见文章）。
现在，中国国家资本主义的下一阶段正在进行——称之为“新经济学”。 自2012年上台以来，习近平的政治目标一直是加强党的控制并镇压国内外的异见人士。 他的经济议程旨在增强秩序和抵御威胁的能力。 有充分的理由。 自 2008 年以来，公共和私人债务飙升至 GDP 的近 300%。 商业活动分为古板的国有企业和狂野西部的私营部门，后者富有创新精神，但面临着掠夺性的官员和模糊的规则。 随着保护主义蔓延，中国企业面临着被排除在市场之外、无法获得西方技术的风险。
新经济学具有三个要素。 首先，严格控制经济周期和债务机器。 大规模财政和贷款狂欢的时代已经结束。 银行被迫承认表外活动并建立缓冲。 更多的贷款正在通过清理后的债券市场进行。 与2008-09年金融危机的反应不同，政府对covid-19的反应一直很克制，刺激金额约为GDP的5%，不到美国规模的一半。
第二条是更高效的行政国家，其规则统一适用于整个经济体。 尽管习近平利用党强加的法律在香港散布恐惧，但他在内地建立了一个对企业更加敏感的商业法律体系。 破产和专利诉讼曾经很少见，但自他 2012 年上任以来已增加了五倍。繁文缛节已得到简化：现在成立一家公司只需 9 天。 更可预测的规则应该能让市场更加平稳地运转，从而提高经济的生产率。
最后一个因素是模糊国有企业和私营企业之间的界限。 国有企业被迫提高财务回报并吸引私人投资者。 与此同时，国家对私营企业实施战略控制
，通过他们内部的党支部。 信用黑名单制度会惩罚行为不当的公司。 习近平不再采取一视同仁的产业政策，例如2015年推出的“中国制造2025”运动，而是将重点转向供应链的瓶颈，在这些瓶颈上，中国要么容易受到外国胁迫，要么可以在海外施加影响力 。 这意味着建立半导体和电池等关键技术的自给自足。
新组学短期内表现良好。 在covid-19爆发之前，债务的积累已经放缓，贸易战和大流行的双重冲击并未导致金融危机。 国有企业的生产力正在逐渐提高，外国投资者正在向新一代的中国科技公司注入资金。 然而，真正的考验将随着时间的推移而到来。 中国希望其新的以技术为中心的中央计划形式能够维持创新，但历史表明，分散决策、开放边界和言论自由才是神奇的成分。
有一点是明确的：希望先对抗然后投降的想法是错误的。 美国及其盟友必须为开放社会与中国国家资本主义之间的长期竞争做好准备。 遏制是行不通的：与苏联不同，中国庞大的经济非常复杂，并且与世界其他地区融为一体。 相反，西方需要增强其外交能力（见文章）并制定新的、稳定的规则，允许在某些领域与中国开展合作，例如应对气候变化和流行病，以及继续开展商业活动，同时加强对人权和人权的保护。 国家安全。 中国 14 万亿美元的国家资本主义经济的实力是无法凭空消失的。 是时候摆脱这种幻想了。
本文发表在印刷版的领导人部分，标题为“习近平的新经济”
Xi Jinping is reinventing state capitalism. Don't underestimate it
August 15th 2020
China's strongman leader has a new economic agenda
AMERICA’S CONFRONTATION with China is escalating dangerously. In the past week the White House has announced what may amount to an imminent ban on TikTok and WeChat (two Chinese apps), imposed sanctions on Hong Kong’s leaders and sent a cabinet member to Taiwan. This ratcheting up of pressure partly reflects electioneering: being tough on China is a key strut of President Donald Trump’s campaign. It is partly ideological, underscoring the urgency the administration’s hawks attach to pushing back on all fronts against an increasingly assertive China. But it also reflects an assumption that has underpinned the Trump administration’s attitude to China from the beginning of the trade war: that this approach will yield results, because China’s steroidal state capitalism is weaker than it looks.
The logic is alluringly simple. Yes, China has delivered growth, but only by relying on an unsustainable formula of debt, subsidies, cronyism and intellectual-property theft. Press hard enough and its economy could buckle, forcing its leaders to make concessions and, eventually, to liberalise their state-led system. As the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, puts it, “Freedom-loving nations of the world must induce China to change.”
Simple, but wrong. China’s economy was less harmed by the tariff war than expected. It has been far more resilient to the covid-19 pandemic—the IMF forecasts growth of 1% in 2020 compared with an 8% drop in America. Shenzhen is the world’s best-performing big stockmarket this year, not New York. And, as our briefing explains, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is reinventing state capitalism for the 2020s. Forget belching steel plants and quotas. Mr Xi’s new economic agenda is to make markets and innovation work better within tightly defined boundaries and subject to all-seeing Communist Party surveillance. It isn’t Milton Friedman, but this ruthless mix of autocracy, technology and dynamism could propel growth for years.
Underestimating China’s economy is hardly a new phenomenon. Since 1995 China’s share of world GDP at market prices has risen from 2% to 16%, despite waves of Western scepticism. Silicon Valley chiefs dismissed Chinese tech firms as copycats; Wall Street short-sellers said ghost towns of empty apartments would bring a banking crash; statisticians worried that the GDP figures were fiddled and speculators warned that capital flight would cause a currency crisis. China has defied the sceptics because its state capitalism has adapted, changing shape. Twenty years ago, for example, the emphasis was on trade, but now exports account for only 17% of GDP. In the 2010s officials gave tech firms such as Alibaba and Tencent just enough space to grow into giants and, in Tencent’s case, to create a messaging app, WeChat, that is also an instrument of party control (see article).
Now the next phase of Chinese state capitalism is under way—call it Xinomics. Since he took power in 2012 Mr Xi’s political goal has been to tighten the party’s grip and crush dissent at home and abroad. His economic agenda is designed to increase order and resilience against threats. For good reason. Public and private debt has soared since 2008 to almost 300% of GDP. Business is bifurcated between stodgy state firms and a Wild West private sector that is innovative but faces predatory officials and murky rules. As protectionism spreads, Chinese firms risk being locked out of markets and denied access to Western technology.
Xinomics has three elements. First, tight control over the economic cycle and the debt machine. The days of supersized fiscal and lending binges are over. Banks have been forced to recognise off-balance-sheet activity and build up buffers. More lending is taking place through a cleaned-up bond market. Unlike its reaction to the financial crisis of 2008-09, the government’s response to covid-19 has been restrained, with a stimulus worth about 5% of GDP, less than half the size of America’s.
The second strand is a more efficient administrative state, whose rules apply uniformly across the economy. Even as Mr Xi has used party-imposed law to sow fear in Hong Kong, he has constructed a commercial legal system in the mainland that is far more responsive to businesses. Bankruptcies and patent lawsuits, once rare, have risen fivefold since he took office in 2012. Red tape has been trimmed: it now takes nine days to set up a company. More predictable rules should allow markets to work more smoothly, boosting the economy’s productivity.
The final element is to blur the boundary between state and private firms. State-run companies are being compelled to boost their financial returns and draw in private investors. Meanwhile the state is exerting strategic control over private firms, through party cells within them. A credit blacklisting system penalises firms that misbehave. Instead of indiscriminate industrial policy, such as the “Made in China 2025” campaign launched in 2015, Mr Xi is shifting to a sharp focus on supply-chain choke-points where China is either vulnerable to foreign coercion or where it can exert influence abroad. That means building up self-sufficiency in key technologies, including semiconductors and batteries.
Xinomics has performed well in the short term. The build-up of debt had slowed before covid-19 struck and the twin shocks of the trade war and the pandemic have not led to a financial crisis. State-run firms’ productivity is creeping up and foreign investors are pouring cash into a new generation of Chinese tech firms. The real test, however, will come over time. China hopes that its new techno-centric form of central planning can sustain innovation, but history suggests that diffuse decision-making, open borders and free speech are the magic ingredients.
One thing is clear: the hope for confrontation followed by capitulation is misguided. America and its allies must prepare for a far longer contest between open societies and China’s state capitalism. Containment won’t work: unlike the Soviet Union, China’s huge economy is sophisticated and integrated with the rest of the world. Instead the West needs to build up its diplomatic capacity (see article) and create new, stable rules that allow co-operation with China in some areas, such as fighting climate change and pandemics, and commerce to continue alongside stronger protections for human rights and national security. The strength of China’s $14trn state-capitalist economy cannot be wished away. Time to shed that illusion.
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Xi’s new economy"
Leaders August 15th 2020
Xi Jinping is reinventing state capitalism. Don’t underestimate it
Belarus’s election was a sham. The West’s response has been feeble
