Most of China’s biggest and most powerful companies, including all of its major banks, are state-owned, and executives are usually members of the Communist Party, which controls top-level corporate appointments. Party committees within corporations further ensure that many important business decisions align with government policy. Even healthy and influential private companies can be ordered to undergo painful restructuring or curtail certain business operations, as a government crackdown on the e-commerce leader Alibaba and other Chinese tech giants that began in 2020 made clear.
Ultimately, all of this serves the party’s absolute priority of maintaining social stability; there is zero tolerance for financial distress or major corporate failures that could trigger street demonstrations. And government control of the business sector is only increasing.
Even the makeup of China’s high debt levels has a silver lining for regulators. China’s aggregate ratio of debt to gross domestic product was almost 300 percent (or around $52 trillion) in September 2022, compared to 257 percent for the United States. But less than 5 percent of China’s debt is external, amounting to $2.5 trillion, one-tenth of the U.S. level. When nearly every renminbi borrowed is domestic — lent by a Chinese creditor to a Chinese borrower — it gives regulators a degree of control over debt problems that their Western counterparts can only dream of.
China has encountered its share of financial distress during its decades-long transition to a modern industrial economy, but regulators have used their considerable powers to repeatedly prevent catastrophe. When the percentage of nonperforming loans at Chinese state-owned commercial banks hit an alarming 30 percent in 1999 (the U.S. rate, by comparison, has remained in single digits for decades), authorities formed asset management companies to take over those bad loans. During the 2008 financial crisis, China implemented a massive stimulus package to protect its economy.
Still, warnings of a Chinese financial reckoning resurface now and again. In 2014, when a Chinese solar-panel manufacturer defaulted on bonds, some intoned that this could be China’s “Bear Stearns moment,” referring to another U.S. investment bank that collapsed in 2008. But can anyone even remember the name of that Chinese company anymore? (Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science and Technology, for the record.)