单极之后：亚洲区域秩序将走向何方，我们应该怎么做？

After Unipolarity: Where is the Asian regional order heading, and what should we be doing about it?  7 August 2024. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuWtYtuYRIU

从本质上讲，澳大利亚对 AUKUS 的承诺是投票帮助维护亚洲以美国为首的单极战略秩序。但替代方案是什么？如果无法保留旧秩序，会出现什么样的新区域秩序来取代旧秩序？我们将如何应对这些新秩序？

休·怀特教授的演讲探讨了这些问题，着眼于乌克兰战争和中俄结盟所塑造的全球背景。它问，如果全球基于规则的秩序失败，取而代之的是什么——独裁霸权还是政治多元化的多极化？这对亚洲，尤其是对澳大利亚和新西兰意味着什么？

怀特教授演讲之后，新西兰-中国理事会主席、惠灵顿维多利亚大学战略研究中心高级研究员约翰·麦金农 (John McKinnon) 进行了专家讨论。
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mcdou 大家好，我是新西兰国际事务研究所的执行主任，我敢打赌，在惠灵顿一个温和的冬天的晚上，我会非常热烈地欢迎你们，特别是如果我可以欢迎国会议员，包括过去和现在的反对党领袖和前部长和前总理，尊敬的海伦·克拉克，阁下，使团团长，以及外交使团的其他成员，新西兰国际事务研究所的成员和所有其他来宾，我向你们问好，我只是想祝贺你们有远见，提前预定了你们在这里的位置，因为我们已经预定了你们在这次活动中的位置，因为我们周一必须把门票卖光的牌子挂在这里和奥克兰，我们还有休·怀特的演讲，我想这反映了人们对少数白人声誉的兴趣或认可。塔斯曼，当然，我们正处于一场相当直率和高调的公开讨论之中，讨论这个国家未来的对外防务和安全政策，这场辩论主要（但绝不仅限于）集中在新西兰与美国、英国和澳大利亚的 Orcus 安全伙伴关系问题上，特别是参与所谓的 Orcus 支柱 2 下的先进军事战略共享问题，任何人只要关注一下媒体报道，过去几天休的采访，显然已经看到并清楚休斯对 Orus 的看法，他经常被问到这个问题，但我想今晚我们最好关注一个稍微更广泛的问题，所以我们在研究亚洲的区域秩序及其演变，以及澳大利亚和新西兰作为独立国家可以（也许应该）如何应对这种演变非政府组织我们的研究所当然不会就这些问题发表意见，但是我们可以在鼓励公众理解和讨论这些问题方面发挥重要作用，特别是允许专家提供背景细节和灰色地带，也许公众辩论可能容易出现黑白二元性，嗯，这次活动当然是我们在研究所进行的长期对话的一部分，我们每年举办 80 多个活动，嗯，我会像以前多次请求的那样，如果您对这些活动感兴趣，请注册成为研究所的成员，并继续参与这些讨论，这对新西兰的未来非常重要，考虑到这一点，我真的很高兴欢迎休·怀特教授今晚在这里发言，多年来，他一直是澳大利亚战略和防御政策方面的领军实践者、学者和思想家，在亚太安全问题和全球战略方面事务呃，他是澳大利亚国立大学战略研究的梅里图斯教授，曾任澳大利亚高级国防和情报官员和部长顾问，是澳大利亚战略政策研究所的第一任主任，他还是一位多产的书籍和文章作家，其中最新的一篇是呃如何保卫澳大利亚呃，休当然对这些海岸并不陌生，他曾多次在研究所发表演讲，我在新西兰国际评论中读到，我们认为第一次是在 2002 年，在杰拉尔德麦基的领导下，他今晚在这里，当时他发表了关于需要加强对澳大利亚和新西兰国防政策的相互理解呃的演讲呃，他还作为战略研究中心的基恩伯格客座主席发表了一系列著名的演讲呃，所以我们很快就会请休就这个问题讲大约 20 分钟左右之后，我很高兴地宣布，今晚我们有约翰·麦金农（John McKinnon）担任讨论嘉宾，约翰是新西兰最杰出的外交官和公务员之一，曾在北京外交部任职三次，其中两次担任大使，此外还曾在华盛顿和纽约任职，还曾分别担任对外援助局局长、外交部副部长、国防部首席执行官和亚洲新西兰基金会执行主任，他目前是新西兰中国理事会主席，也是惠灵顿维多利亚大学哈卡战略研究中心的高级研究员，因此，我们也非常期待休在这个话题上分享他的专业知识和经验，我们将请他讲大约 10 分钟，然后我们将进入问答环节，请大家提出一些非常好的问题嗯，所以不用多说，我想邀请教授，谢谢，非常感谢，谢谢你的介绍和听众，让我有机会回到新西兰，再次分享一些观点。我还要感谢海伦·克拉克和唐·布拉什，他们邀请我来这里，他们为我组织了一个很棒的节目，让我可以和人们交谈，倾听人们关于这一系列问题的意见。我可能会说，能和约翰·麦金农分享这个平台是一种特别的荣幸，除了他的其他资历之外，他还是一位非常老的朋友和同事，我们在政府中以不同的方式一起做了很多工作，能和他分享这个平台是一种荣幸，其实这不是我们第一次分享这个平台，我也想说，我的意思是，感谢观众的到来是一种传统，但在这种情况下，有这么多的老朋友和同事这是我在新西兰以不同身份长期和非常愉快的经历，很高兴看到你们都在这里，我非常感谢你们的到来，今晚我将冒昧地使用代词我们的和我们，来同时指澳大利亚和新西兰，这并不是因为我认为我们两个国家对外交和国防政策的态度是相同的，不需要区分，相反，40 年的漫长经验，你们中的许多人会记得我提到的周年纪念日，教会我，事实恰恰相反，尽管我们在国家生活的许多方面都非常接近，但我们在某些方面非常不同，包括我们处理外交和国防政策的方式，他们也教会了我，我的一些老师也在房间里，澳大利亚人认识到这一点是多么重要，我要说的是，我们澳大利亚人并不总是这样做，但我将要描述的情况和他们施加的压力我们的外交和国防政策意味着，我认为，尽管差异始终存在，但随着我们面对一个世界和一个地区，我们将更加孤独，共同努力对我们来说将变得更加重要，过去就像老布尔什维克曾经说过的那样，澳大利亚和新西兰都面临着关于 orcus 的选择，这并非巧合，因为全球和我们更本地的区域秩序都陷入了深刻危机，您可能会说中东、欧洲和亚洲的区域秩序同时出现了危机，这些危机共同构成了全球秩序的重大历史性危机，而我们关于 orus 的决定与此相吻合并非巧合的原因是，orcus 不仅仅是一项在澳大利亚购买新潜艇的计划，也不是一项参与第二支柱下高科技研究国防研究和开发计划的计划，它是一种声明，它是一种强烈一致和支持特定方法的声明，用于管理和解决该全球和区域问题国际秩序危机是支持区域和全球秩序愿景的声明，这些愿景是管理国际秩序的方法的基础，任何关于国际秩序的讨论都必须高度重视，首先要关注这一愿景和方法的优点，以及这一愿景是什么，简而言之，我们面临的全球和区域法律危机唯一可接受的结果是重新确立冷战后美国主导的单极秩序，过去 30 年来，我们都享受了如此多的秩序，我想首先就国际秩序问题提出一些一般性观点，因为国际秩序问题实际上对我们社区来说有点陌生，当然不是对学者来说，而是对我们其他人来说，因为我们所处的国际体系长期以来一直非常稳定和良性，后冷战秩序已经持续了 35 年，后冷战秩序的基础是二战后秩序，后冷战秩序是一种延续和扩展，已经持续了 80 年，我们对自己在世界上的地位所采取的整个态度都是由这些非常持久的秩序所决定的，我们认为这种秩序是自然而正确的，我们倾向于认为它也会是永久的，现在这是一件很正常的事情，卡尔是我目前正在阅读的一个人，我记得他在 1939 年 7 月写了一本名为《20 年危机》的书，讲述了 20 年的国际秩序危机，这场危机导致了第二次世界大战，就在那个可怜的家伙把这本书放到书店几周后，这本书实际上持续了很长时间，嗯，幸存了下来，但他指出，嗯，人们将一个如果他们从中受益，我们自然会认为我们所了解和热爱的秩序不仅仅是一个好的秩序，而且是一个大写的“R”的正确秩序，因此，我们倾向于非常保守或非常积极地应对对它的挑战，因此，我们给予那些挑战现有秩序的人道德上的认可，我们指责邪恶的领导人，特别是德皇和希特勒，因为德国在上个世纪连续挑战欧洲秩序，而日本在20世纪中叶挑战国际秩序，但卡提出的一个观点是，更深层次的力量总是在发挥作用，这绝不仅仅是总统府里有坏人，还有更多的事情需要解决，德国在欧洲的地位，日本和亚洲的地位，任何人想象旧制度会在第一世界长期运行良好都是愚蠢的战争可以继续处理正在发生的事情，尽管那里存在需要解决的紧张局势，国际秩序需要适应 ajp Taylor，他是我目前正在阅读的另一个人，希望能够滋养和改善我的悲观情绪，呃呃写了一部名为《第二次世界大战爆发的历史》，我强烈推荐给你，他在书中写道，他讲述的故事是一个没有英雄甚至没有恶棍的故事，顺便说一句，他因为写这个而被英国学院开除，所以要小心，但这是一个值得思考的问题，因为他的观点恰恰是，每个人都应该为 1930 年代的国际体系没有以某种方式适应以防止第二次世界大战而受到指责，所以我认为这些见解对我们今天很重要，我们倾向于认为，我谈到的全球、国际和区域秩序面临的挑战是由习近平和弗拉基米尔·普京以及那些统治伊朗的人造成的，但更深层次的因素在起作用你，特别是亚洲，正如历史上经常发生的那样，主要的深层因素是巨大的，在我们的情况下，财富和权力的分配发生了巨大的变化，事实上，财富和权力的分配发生了几乎前所未有的变化，没有什么能推动国际秩序的变化，没有什么能推动对现有秩序的压力，而改变的压力和财富和权力分配的变化，随着权力的转移，关系也会发生变化，这在人类事务的每个层面都是如此，所以捍卫现状并不是唯一或必然正确的政策，有时它是，但不一定是唯一或正确的政策，我们真正需要做的是问自己，什么样的结果对我们最有利，什么样的秩序最符合我们的利益，在我们面临的新情况下，这种新情况正在对旧秩序施加压力，现在让我重点谈谈这对亚洲意味着什么，亚洲的后冷战秩序，维护这一秩序意味着维护我们的首要地位，特别是在东亚和西太平洋，这是一个事实上，从某些方面来看，中国在亚洲的主导地位可以追溯到 100 年前，如果我可以选择，我更希望得到这样的结果，我实际上是汽车时代保守派中的一员，我希望看到旧秩序得以保留，但我认为在面临压力的情况下，特别是在亚洲，随着权力的新分配，这是不可能的，我之所以这么说，是因为在我看来，目前亚洲危机的驱动因素是，随着中国实力的增长，中国的目标是重新夺回其作为东亚太平洋地区大国的地位，它的目标是将美国赶出该地区，取代美国成为该地区的主导力量，我们需要反思这意味着什么呢？这意味着我们正处于世界历史上最大的战略竞争之一之中，世界上两个最强大的国家正在竞争，看谁将成为世界上最具活力和最繁荣地区的主导力量，没有比这更大的了，他的历史也发生在我们身上，这是真实的历史，当然，这是因为亚洲如此之大，所以这不仅仅是关于亚洲，全球秩序的命运将在很大程度上取决于亚洲结果如何解决，台湾当然是这场竞争的主要焦点，我的意思是还有其他民间的华南 SE 第二汤姆摩尔等等，但嗯，但台湾是主要的，我会关注这一点，我只是要记住，我也可以对南海说同样的话，这不是因为台湾本身的内在意义，我不想说台湾本身不重要，当然，它是一个拥有 2500 万人口的了不起的国家，但它因为华盛顿和北京几十年来做出的选择，它已经成为双方在亚洲竞争中的力量和决心的考验，它是这样运作的，美国在西太平洋的地位，它行使领导权的事实，它行使了这么长时间的首要地位，至少在1945年以来，主要是它的联盟的产物，美国的联盟使它成为亚洲的主导力量，这些联盟反过来又取决于美国对盟友的信誉，不管发生什么最坏的情况，他们都会保护他们，如果你去首尔，你去东京，或者去CRA，说到底这是怎么回事，这就是它的全部意义所在，所以美国在西太平洋地位的维持绝对取决于这些联盟信誉的维持，而台湾是中国可以测试我们信誉的地方，如果发现有缺陷，如果美国未能通过这些信誉测试，那么它的联盟就会失败，如果它的联盟失败了，它的地位就会我认为，在亚洲的地位将不只是受到侵蚀，而是遭到破坏。相反，只要美国能够阻止中国在台湾问题上测试其决心，测试其可信度，或者其他测试，那么它在亚洲的地位就完好无损。这就是台湾今天如此重要和危险的原因。因此，当我们观察亚洲正在发生的事情时，我们面临的关键问题是，美国的威慑力有多强。我将给你一个悲观的答案。我将抵制住继续谈论这个问题的诱惑。美国在乌克兰的威慑失败了，这是非常重要的。你知道，无论人们想到什么，这都是美国威慑力的失败。它在亚洲非常薄弱，这是因为长期以来，美国在常规能力上对中国的压倒性优势一直在不断丧失，特别是在海域，美国长期以来一直占据着这种优势。美国已经无法再指望在台湾问题上与中国打赢常规海战了。他们会输，但他们赢不了，而且不赢也不够好，而长期以来，在我看来，美国战略家们似乎认为，如果常规平衡对他们不利，他们可以依靠核武器来阻止中国尝试，因为美国在必要时会首先使用核武器，而这正是美国首先使用原则所要求的，这种预期已经越来越不可信，因为中国自身的威慑力和其反威慑能力已经增强，现在，这是美国在亚洲对台湾的威慑态势的一个非常重大的转变，而且就这一点而言，在其他地方，很难说服某人你将打一场他们知道你赢不了的战争，现在美国试图通过建立联盟来弥补其 DET Terence 态势的下降，这就是奥库斯的目的，这就是四方安全对话的目的，这就是许多美国战略家例如，与日本和韩国的外交关系一直很好，但我在这里要说的是，美国在亚洲或其他地区的盟友和伙伴，例如美国试图让北约加入，都没有承诺明确支持美国，以增强美国的侦察能力，部分原因是他们没有说过他们会这样做，也是因为他们没有做过，他们中没有一个人有能力，即使是日本人，也可以对西太平洋中美冲突的结果产生真正重大的影响，你知道，通过对比，我只是想指出，真的没有什么比这更好的了亚洲版北约 北约实际上承诺美国的北约盟友将与美国并肩作战，当气球升起时，这是一个真正坚定不移的承诺，我们在亚洲没有这样的承诺，因此，尽管美国决策者经常说他们有一个新兴联盟正在做同样的事情，但我认为这不是现实，这反过来又表明了一个更深层次的现实，那就是虽然美国，或者至少我应该说美国决策者，华盛顿内部的人
想要保护隐私，但他们不会接受所涉及的成本和风险，他们不再准备为台湾而打第一次世界大战，他们准备为乌克兰而打第三次世界大战，部分原因是
特别是在亚洲，对中国采取有效威慑态势所涉及的成本和风险非常高，因为中国是美国有史以来面临的最强大的对手，原因很简单，中国是相对于美洲最大的经济体，美国曾经面临过，你知道这是一个非常关键的立场，但另一方面，这不仅成本和风险非常高，而且这样做的必要性，承担这些成本和风险以支持美国在亚洲的旧领导秩序的必要性是薄弱的，它们太弱了，无法证明这些成本和风险是合理的。现在，让我们通过将当前局势与冷战，以及第二次世界大战和第一次世界大战进行比较来思考这个问题，但只关注冷战，因为在冷战期间，美国确实有决心，确实面临着必须付出巨大代价并接受难以置信的风险以遏制苏联的必要性，但苏联和中国之间的区别在于，苏联确实威胁到，特别是在冷战初期，如果不加以遏制，它能够主宰整个欧亚大陆，然而，这意味着任何权力，这是一个可以追溯到 19 世纪的美国古老观念，即任何能够主宰整个欧亚大陆都可能威胁到西半球的美国本土，苏联在 40 年代和 50 年代确实能够做到这一点，如果它没有被美国遏制的话，而中国则处于不同的境地，因为尽管中国相对于美国的力量要比苏联强大得多，但中国在欧亚大陆的邻国，与它共享欧亚大陆的国家，或者至少其中一些国家相对于中国的力量要比苏联相对于其邻国的力量要强大得多，比如印度、俄罗斯，不要轻视俄罗斯，它仍然是一个非常强大的地方，还有欧洲，这是一个非常奇怪的战略实体，但无论如何，它仍然是一个清晰的战略实体，所以我认为，我们看到的是一个中国能够在欧亚大陆建立像苏联那样威胁美国本土的态势的可能性非常低的世界，因此，美国阻止中国主宰东亚和西太平洋的必要性要比美国当时的必要性低得多。防止苏联主宰西欧，所以你知道，曾经驱使美国采取冷战期间非同寻常举措的因素今天已经不复存在了，更广泛地说，这意味着人们经常表达的担忧是，如果我们放弃旧的冷战美国主导的单极秩序，那么它将是什么样？它将被中国主导的单极威权秩序所取代，我认为这是一个非常不可能的结果，更有可能的是，我将说，几乎可以肯定的是，将取代的将是，我甚至会说，已经取代了后战时单极美国秩序的是一个多极全球秩序，目前至少由五个大国组成，也许以后还会有更多大国，嗯，这将像历史上多极秩序经常发挥作用的方式一样，现在我们对多极秩序有点陌生，我要快速环顾一下房间，因为我们都不记得多极秩序是什么样子的，因为自 1948 年左右以来，只有两极秩序然后是单极秩序，但多极秩序在历史上其实很常见，它们相当复杂，但可以很好地发挥作用，我们可以看看欧洲五大国的多极秩序是如何运作的，已经持续了许多个世纪，这对我们来说也不陌生，上次包括我们各国在内的国际社会着手建立新的国际秩序，我们在 1945 年旧金山第二次世界大战结束时就这样做了，当时我们集体建立了世界，或者至少是联合国。他们当时被召集起来，着手设计联合国，作为战后世界全球秩序愿景的表达，它是什么，它的核心是什么，安理会五个常任理事国，五个大国，他们被赋予特殊地位，正是因为他们似乎是大国，他们实际上并没有完全正确地列出名单，但这是一个细节，嗯，英国或法国在我的五大国名单上，让我说清楚，现在值得探讨的是，在亚洲，多极秩序将产生的将反映在一个多极区域秩序中，如果我们把亚洲作为一个整体来看，因为重要的是要记住，虽然我们经常谈论中国，但亚洲没有一个正在崛起的大国，有两个，印度，或者可能有三个，因为有印度尼西亚，印度尼西亚将在本世纪中叶之前成为世界第四大经济体，没有人确切知道那时印尼会是什么样子，但我们至少需要认识到，我们不仅要生活在多极全球秩序中，我们也要生活在多极区域秩序中，这对我们来说其实是个好消息，这意味着我们不再生活在这些大国的霸权之下，至少对于我们这些生活在所谓中国势力范围和印度势力范围边界上的人来说，中国和印度在那里，我们这些生活在边界上的人，也就是缅甸人、马来人、新加坡人、印尼人、澳大利亚人，你们，我们将在每一边都有强大的力量，我们可以玩我所说的蒙古游戏，你知道蒙古之所以存在，是因为它利用中国人来控制俄罗斯人，中国人会控制俄罗斯人，这对我们来说是真正的机会，对外交官来说，这一定有点令人兴奋，是个好时机，但你知道这个这是我们未来的一个模型，我认为我们现在不需要争论，我不想，我不想
给人留下这样的印象，我认为这会有点麻烦，在那种多极秩序下工作会比在由我们的伙伴主导的单极秩序下工作要困难得多，但我们没有太多的选择，也许更重要的是，这不仅会让我们更加困难，对一些国家来说，这将是灾难性的，还会有一些悲剧发生，我认为乌克兰的未来非常暗淡，我所说的暗示是台湾的未来也非常??暗淡，但这就是现实主义者最终作为国际体系共同做出一些选择的地方，就像 1945 年在雅尔塔做出的选择一样，将东欧大片地区，特别是斯大林统治下的波兰这是一个非常艰难的决定，但这个决定避免了美国和苏联之间的第一次世界大战，当时苏联拥有世界上最庞大的军队，也是世界上最强大的军队。我可能会说，这是一场值得避免的战争，但我们不想忘记，一路上有很多非常艰难的选择，但我认为，对于我们这些幸运的人来说，我们在这方面很幸运，我们可以在这样的世界中生存，值得我们重新审视，如果我们不把这个根基扎根，如果我们不适应生活在多极秩序而不是我们所熟知和热爱的旧秩序中，会发生什么？历史强烈表明，如果我们不适应国际秩序的变化，我们将面临战争，当然在这个时代，这意味着核战争，我只想强调，我在这里谈论的战争风险不是假设的，它必须影响我们的判断。我们对未来国际秩序的愿景以及我们如何追求这一愿景所做出的决定，在很大程度上受到避免乌克兰战争的重要性的影响，值得记住的是，任何确保俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上失败的努力，我们现在很清楚，都需要北约的直接干预，直接面临核战争的风险，现在我可以就这种风险有多高展开一场引人入胜的辩论，但我想我的问题是，风险有多大，10% 20% 30% 我听到了吗？40% 这不是假设的，记住导弹在发射井里，武器就在发射井上面，在亚洲，中国试图以我所说的方式考验我们对台湾的决心，在我看来，这种诱惑非常大，中国人越觉得美国在虚张声势，说它会保卫台湾，他们就越有可能揭穿它的虚张声势，现在美国是在虚张声势，他们说布什在虚张声势，拜登已经四次表示他会这样做，他似乎知道他在做什么至少在那个场合我我认为美国人不知道他们是不是在虚张声势，这是一个非常危险的情况，但真正的问题是，中国有充分的理由认为他们在虚张声势，而为了戏剧化地表达或澄清这一点，你问问自己，美国必须做些什么才能让中国人完全清楚地知道他们不是在虚张声势，他们真的决心保卫台湾，这很简单，随着中国空中和海上能力的发展，美国也必须使其空中海上能力也如此，这样它才能保持巨大的优势，这种优势支撑了它在70年代、80年代和90年代成功遏制中国，举个例子，这对澳大利亚人来说相当具有现实意义，它必须再建两个船厂来建造弗吉尼亚级潜艇，开始建造的不是每年1.33艘弗吉尼亚级潜艇，而是每年4到5艘，这就是美国在上次冷战中所做的，他们就是这样遏制苏联的这正是他们现在没有做的事情，所以我认为，中国人很有可能会看看美国做了什么，或者更确切地说没有做什么，然后认为这些人是在虚张声势，他们不是认真的，我认为中国人在这一点上是对的，我认为这是一个非常重要的判断，当然，中国人很想揭穿虚张声势，因为出于我之前提到的原因，如果他们真的这么做了，如果他们对台湾采取行动，而美国在说了所有事情之后，却退缩了，说“不，对不起，我们要袖手旁观”，在东京、东南亚甚至坎拉，他们会说我们真的相信这些人吗？因为正如我之前所说，这是联盟的核心，这就是为什么如果虚张声势被揭穿，美国总统在凌晨 3 点发现自己在战情室面临必须立即做出的决定，决定美国将如何回应，他们可能会意外地决定他们并不是在虚张声势，那么它就不是为所有人准备的，这就是为什么战争风险很高，值得记住的是，只是重复一些强调我之前说过的话，战争风险很高，如果战争风险很高，那么核武士的风险也很高，因为双方都无法凭借常规力量取得决定性的结果，双方都拥有足够的核力量，现在让我总结一下，这可能看起来有点夸张，但我认为我们不能在思考像 orcus 这样的问题时，不仅仅是 orcus 问题，而是像 orcus 这样的问题，我们不能回避讨论我们我们的国家我的国家你的国家是否认为我们应该在必要时与中国开战，以试图维护美国在亚洲的领导秩序，因为这是我们可能面临的重大选择，这是历史时刻带给我们的，我们必须面对它，不是因为 orcus 我们签署了它，如果你们签署了它，我们就必须做这个有趣的问题，特别是对澳大利亚来说，但这不是因为这个，而是因为对 orcus 的承诺被美国视为一种强烈支持、认可和鼓励他们应该与中国开战的想法，如果这是维护美国在亚洲的秩序所必需的，因为这是今天美国似乎拥有的宣战政策或隐含的宣战政策，而获得这种支持就是我们的目标。美国并不真正关心澳大利亚是否有核潜艇，我认为它并不真正关心澳大利亚或新西兰是否签署了支柱二研究项目，它关心的是获得对整个问题方法的支持声明，我认为这是个坏主意的原因是，我认为支持这种方法不会成功，不仅仅是因为我们不会赢得战争，而是因为财富和权力分配的转变使美国不可能继续成为亚洲的主要力量，或者就此而言，单极警察或全球力量，无论我们多么希望它如此迅速地发展，那么替代方案是什么，我们还能做什么呢？我们要做的第一件事就是接受我们现在生活在一个多极世界，不再试图维护旧的单极世界，我们专注于建立一个秩序和机构，使单极世界为我们服务，就像我们在 1944 年 5 月努力尝试使单极世界成为我们在第二次世界大战后看到的多极秩序，然后它被冷战的 B 两极秩序劫持，就像我们努力工作一样，在澳大利亚的案例中，我们外交神话的一部分是 Doc 努力转向 1945 年在旧金山出现并完全出丑试图管理安理会的运作方式，但没有成功在所有事情上，他都做出了贡献。我们需要做的第二件事是接受这样一个事实：在亚洲，中国和印度将成为主导力量，我们需要塑造亚洲地区发生的事情，让这个体系尽可能地为我们服务。值得一提的是，我们也曾经历过这样的情况。1944 年，澳大利亚和新西兰坐在一起，谈判了所谓的《澳新军团条约》或《坎布拉条约》。这实际上是一项相当古怪的工作，而且再次出现了 EV 的名字，但这是我们两国认真尝试塑造我们的地区秩序以符合我们的利益的尝试。现在，我们需要再次抱有这种雄心壮志，因为没有其他人会为我们做到这一点。第三件事是认识到，无论发生什么，无论我们在这两项努力中取得多大成功，这个世界对我们来说都将是一个更难生存的世界，它将要求我们付出更多，但不会是灾难性的，所以我们需要为此做好准备，我们需要在外交上做好准备，这将改变我们外交的性质，你知道，只要问问就知道了蒙古人，但问题的核心是，我们的邻居对我们来说比我们的远方老朋友重要得多，我们不能对此感情用事，而且在军事上，我们需要做的是认识到，虽然亚洲大国在军事上没有威胁到我们，但中国在军事上没有威胁到澳大利亚或新西兰，但从长远来看，在新秩序中，我说的是，一个亚洲大国可能直接威胁我们的领土，而且军事上威胁到我们的风险将比我们自1945年以来任何时候都要高，但如果没有美国来援助我们，所以我们必须扪心自问，我们是否准备好在那种情况下独立保卫自己，这些都是非常大的问题，但话又说回来，这是自欧洲人定居我们各自国家以来，我们国际环境发生的最大转变，所以我们不应该感到惊讶，这要求我们回到一张白纸上，从头开始思考很多事情，我们能做的最糟糕的事情就是试图通过坚持我们所知道的事情来逃避这一点我的最后一点是回到我刚开始的地方，那就是有一件事我确实认为很清楚，那就是在这个新的世界里，在这个新的亚洲，我们将比以前更加孤独，但我们会在一起，我们对彼此的意义将比过去更大，非常感谢，谢谢 H，欢迎 John McKinnon，谢谢你的先生 K，非常感谢 Hugh，谢谢你的介绍，也感谢 Don 和 Helen 邀请 Hugh 来这里举办这次活动，Hugh 和我相识已久，我们第一次见面是在 1980 年代的 canra，我知道，因为那时我的女儿还是个蹒跚学步的孩子，现在她快要过零岁生日了，我不会提及，因为如果我这样做，她会非常尴尬，我们有一个长期的协会，我很荣幸能够分享这个平台，说我仍然不完全确定讨论者是什么，我想你会
发痒向 H 提问，也许我的角色只是提供一点时间来组织这些问题，这样你就可以以有力和简洁的方式提出问题，我相信 heish 会期待这一点，但请允许我针对新西兰对这些问题的看法发表一些看法，如果这似乎与你所说的没有完全联系，那么我相信你会理解，在听你说话之前我必须考虑一下这个问题，但我想谈的第一件事实际上是关于语言的，因为我认为在这个国家，我们通常不会像澳大利亚人那样讨论安全和战略问题，因此，我们听到的很多话语在塔斯马尼亚岛的回声中回荡，我们知道这些话语在澳大利亚以非常活跃的方式以非常澳大利亚的方式进行，但实际上在这里并没有引起共鸣，这并不是说澳大利亚的做法是正确的，我们是错误的，反之亦然，这只是我认为的一个事实我们不像澳大利亚那样考虑这些重大战略问题，可能是因为它们对我们的影响不大。现在你们很多人都知道已故的艾伦·吉内尔，他是一位经验丰富的澳大利亚外交官，我认为他也是这个组织的澳大利亚对应机构的主席，他写了一本名为《被抛弃的恐惧》的书，这是对澳大利亚外交政策的研究，我认为从 20 世纪 40 年代到现在，我认为没有人在新西兰写过类似的书，但我怀疑如果他们写了，那将是害怕被排除在外或害怕被遗忘之类的东西，这将是一套完全不同的命题，这只是另一种说法，即我们在新西兰的方式看待这些问题的方式往往与澳大利亚或其他国家的人看待问题的方式并不完全相同，但如果我可以解释一下你的一个观点，你可能对地缘政治战略竞争不感兴趣，但地缘政治战略竞争对你感兴趣，这对新西兰来说可能是一个警钟，我们实际上发现自己身处一个我们能够追求国家利益的世界，对我们许多人来说，国家利益就是增加出口价值和做其他事情，但事实上，这关乎我们如何生存和生活在一个与我们成长的世界不太一样的世界，但我也同意你的另一点，我确实同意你说的很多话，嗯，我们没有太多的选择，新西兰甚至澳大利亚都能够塑造其战略环境，换句话说，我们基本上会接受它带来的一切，所以如果这是关于美国的首要地位，那很好，如果这是关于中国的变得更强大，这就是我们要做的事情，如果是关于印度崛起，我们会找到处理这个问题的方法，我们不会，这并不是说我们可以影响很多事情，而是我们必须找到一种与各种国家打交道的方法，这样在某些方面，虽然我不会过分强调这一点，但我们可能更有能力，谢谢你，谢谢你同意我的观点，我们可能更有能力在你描述的这个世界上运作，事实上，呃，我们的一些其他朋友，因为实际上，作为外交官，我们中的许多人都知道，我们必须在这个世界上运作很多年，我们不会走出去，人们说，天哪，是新西兰大使来了，天哪，我最好把事情理清楚，说来奇怪，事情不是这样的，呃，和你在一起，是的，我确定我做到了，但我们必须提出理由，所以从这个意义上说，我认为，呃，虽然我认为我们可以，我可以同意，和和和你知道，关于你所说的
关于可能发生的事情的描述，我只是不知道这是否一定会给我们带来世界末日，就像对澳大利亚的某些人来说
可能很多很多澳大利亚人一样，嗯，我想说的另一点是，嗯，偏好，我认为这与新西兰在未来可能发生或可能不会发生的某些情况下的反应有关，那就是我们目前更喜欢外交解决方案而不是军事解决方案，现在你可能会说，这只是一种现实的说法，我们在外交方面有
东西可以提供，但在军事方面我们并没有那么多东西可以提供，但无论如何，我认为这是新西兰根深蒂固的东西，例如，如果谈到你关于台湾的问题，嗯，我可能比你更乐观一点，因为
中国人可能会在那里展示一些实力，嗯，我们当然
显然我们承认整个一个中国政策，台湾是其中的一部分同时，我们一直表示，我们不希望通过武力解决这个问题，我们希望通过协议解决，我想，不管从你所概述的事件发展来看，这看起来多么徒劳，我认为这在新西兰决策者的心中仍然会非常突出，他们不想卷入看起来非常混乱的冲突，最后，如果我能简要谈谈今天的主题，即 orus，因为我觉得如果我不谈它，有人会问我一个问题，所以我最好先说，我的意思是，对于任何这种重大决定，我总是认为将其分解，而不是将其变成一种黑白分明的东西是有好处的，我非常尊重我们这里的两位主持人，他们一直在争论这个问题，但我也采取了一种hsh 的评论中提到了一点避难所，你知道新西兰中国理事会不是一个发表政策声明的组织，所以我想坚持这一点，但我确实认为，如果你从什么样的运作互动互操作性的角度来看待它，这将带来什么，我们希望成为什么样的合作伙伴，如果你考虑一下，并从这些方面进行分解，那么思考正在呈现的问题会更容易一些，而不是简单地将其视为一个黑白是或否的问题，我们是否签署，我们是否签署，我想说的最后一点是，我们实际上并不是世界上唯一的，除了我们在塔斯曼海对岸有朋友之外，这是一种非常有趣的关系，非常有意义，非常重要，而且很可能变得更加重要，我说的是，随着我们的前进未来我们还必须考虑东南亚人民，以及您所描述的处于新兴大国之间的其他人，该地区的每个人，包括我们自己，都必须弄清楚我们将如何在这个新世界中运作，也许事情与过去不太一样，而从某种意义上说

After Unipolarity: Where is the Asian regional order heading, and what should we be doing about it?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuWtYtuYRIU
7 August 2024. 

In essence, Australia’s commitment to AUKUS is a vote to help preserve Asia’s US-led unipolar strategic order. But what are the alternatives?  What kinds of new regional order might emerge to take the old order’s place if it cannot be preserved?  And how would we fare in them?

Professor Hugh White’s presentation explores these questions, looking at the global context as shaped by the war in Ukraine and the alignment between China and Russia. It asks if the global Rules Based Order fails, what will take its place – authoritarian hegemony or politically diverse multipolarity? And what would it mean for Asia, and more particularly for Australia and New Zealand?

Professor White’s address is followed by additional expert discussion from John McKinnon, Chair of the New Zealand-China Council and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington.
<<<<<<>>>>>>
mcdou greetings everybody is the executive director of the New Zealand Institute of international Affairs I bet
you a very warm welcome on on quite a mild Wellington Winters
evening um uh particularly if I could welcome uh members of parliament uh past
and present including opposition leaders um and former ministers and former prime
minister right honorable Helen Clark um your excellencies heads of mission uh
and others in the Diplomatic Corps members of the New Zealand Institute of international Affairs and all other
guests know my hi of my uh just like to congratulate you for
having the the the foresight to uh book your place here early because we had uh book your place at this event because we
had to put the the sold out signs up both here and in Oakland on Monday where we we also had Hugh White speaking um
and I guess this this reflects uh an interest uh or recognition both of of few whites reputation uh on the side of
the Tasman and of course that we're sort of in the midst of a a rather forthright and high-profile public discussion on
the future of foreign defense and security policy in this country um and
this debate has largely although by no means only focused on the question of
New Zealand's involvement in orcus security partnership with the US United Kingdom and Australia and a particular
uh involvement in um the sharing of advanced military strategies uh uh under
the so-call orcus pillar 2 um and anyone has followed the media coverage a few um
uh Hugh interviews in in the past few days has obviously seen um and will be well aware of of Hughes uh views on on
orus which he has been uh frequently asked about but um I guess it's good for us tonight to be focusing on a slightly
wider issue so we're looking at the um the regional uh order in Asia and how it's evolving and how Australia and New
Zealand uh could and maybe should uh respond to that Evolution uh as an independent non
government organization our Institute doesn't take views on our positions on such matters of course but uh we can
play an important role in encouraging public understanding and discussion of the issues particularly allowing experts
to provide uh context nuance and Shades of Gray where perhaps the public debate
might be prone to a duality of of black and white um and this event is of course
part of a long running conversation uh on that we're having at The Institute we host over 80 events a year and and uh
I'll make my my plea as I have many times before that that you know if you're finding these events of interest
to um register as a member of The Institute and uh stay involved in that
um in these discussions which are really important to the future of New Zealand uh with that in mind I'm really
pleased to welcome Professor Hugh White uh to speak here this evening for many years he's been a leading practitioner
academic and thinker an Australian strategic and defense policy on asia-pacific security issues and Global
strategic Affairs uh he is Meritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian
National University a former uh senior Australian defense and intelligence uh
official and ministerial advisor and was the first director of the Australian strategic policy Institute he's also a
prolific writer of books and articles among the latest of which uh how to defend Australia uh Hugh of course is no
stranger to these uh Shores he's spoken at The Institute numerous times and I was reading in the New Zealand
international review that we think the first time was in 2002 under the stewardship of Gerald McGee who's here
here tonight um when he delivered a talk on on uh need for greater Mutual understanding uh of Australian and New
Zealand defense policies uh and he's also delivered uh a prominent series of lectures as the kienberger visiting
chair at the center for strategic studies here um so we'll shortly ask
Hugh to speak for about 20 minutes or so on on the issue at hand and then after
Hugh I'm very pleased to say we've got uh John McKinnon um acting as discussion tonight John is one of New Zealand's
most distinguished diplomats and public servants he served three postings in Beijing uh with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and trade including two as Ambassador uh with additional postings in camra washhington and New York and
was also for a Time respectively the director of external assist Ms Bureau
the deputy secretary of Foreign Affairs chief executive of the ministry of defense and executive director of the
Asian New Zealand Foundation uh and he's currently chair of the New Zealand China Council and
also a senior fellow at the center for strategic studies here at the Haka
Victoria University of Wellington so we're very much looking forward also to Hugh's uh expertise and experience
imparted on on the topic and we'll ask him to speak for about 10 minutes and then we'll we'll move into a a Q&A so
get some some really good questions uh formulated um so without further Ado I'd
like to invite uh Professor hu thank
you well thank you very much heish both for the introduction and for the
audience so to speak and giving me this opportunity to come back to NZ and share
some views again I also to thank Helen Clark and Don Brash who have uh invited
me here and uh done a wonderful job of uh putting together a program for me to
talk to people and listen to people about uh this set of issues and I might say it's a particular pleasure to be
sharing the platform with John McKinnon who apart from all his other credentials
is also a very old and dear friend and colleague we' did quite a lot of work together in different ways in their
respective roles in government and it's a great pleasure to share this platform with him it's actually not the first time we've shared a platform I'd also
just like to say I mean it's traditional to thank the audience for coming but particularly in this case there are so
many old friends and colleagues here from my long and very happy experience
of dealing with New Zealand in different capacities it's so nice to see you all here I really appreciate you
coming now I'm going to take a Liberty tonight of using the pronouns our and we
to mean both Australia in New Zealand together and that's not because I believe that our two approaches our two
countries approaches to foreign and defense policy are identical and don't need to be distinguished on the contrary
40 long years of experience and many would of you will recognize the anniversary I'm referring
to taught me that the opposite is the case that in
fact um despite our very closeness in so many
dimensions of our national life we are very different in some ways in including the way in which we approach foreign and
defense policy and they they also taught me and some of my teachers are here in the room how important it is for
Australians to recognize that which I'm going to allow myself to say we in the Australian sense don't always
do but the circumstances I'm going to describe and the pressures that they
impose on our foreign and defense policies means I think that the
differences whilst always there are going to be less important as we Face a world and a region in which we will be
more alone together and working together will become even more important for us
into has in the past now as the old Bolsheviks used to
say it is not a coincidence that Australia and New Zealand both face choices about
orcus uh at a time of Deep crisis in both the global and our more local
Regional order the simultaneous crisis you might say in Regional orders in the Middle East in Europe and in and here in
Asia which together constitute a major I think truly historic crisis in in Global
Order and the reason why it's not a coincidence that our uh decisions about
orus coincide with this is that orcus is much more than a plan to acquire new
submarines in Australia case or a plan to take part in a high-tech research
defense research and development program under pillar two it is a statement orcus
is a statement of strong alignment and support for a particular approach to the management and resolution of that Global
and Regional Crisis in international order it it's it's a statement of support for a vision of the regional and
Global orders that underpin that approach to managing it and any discussion about orus must pay a lot of
attention primary attention I would say to the merits of that vision and that
approach and what is that Vision well the shorthand version is pretty simple
that the only acceptable outcome of the crisis in global and Regional law do we face is the reassertion of the post Cold
War us-led unipolar order which we've all enjoyed so much for the last 30
years now I I want to just start by making a few General points about
questions of international order because questions about International order are in fact a bit unfamiliar to us to our
communities um not to the academics of course but to the rest of us because the
international system in which we've been operating has been so stable and so benign for so long the post Cold War
order has lasted for 35 years the post World War II order on which the post Cold War order is based which the post
Cold War order is sort of a continu U ation and expansion has lasted for 80 years and our whole approach to our
place in place in the world has been framed by those very durable orders and
we see this order understandably as natural and right and we kind of tend to
expect that it's going to be permanent too now this is a normal thing to
do eh car is one of the guys I'm reading at the moment was the bloke who in I
think July of 1939 wrote a book called the 20 years crisis about the 20 years
crisis of international order which led to World War II just a couple of weeks after the poor bloke got the thing out
into the bookshops actually the book lasted very well um survived that but he
made the point that um it's normal that people attribute a unique
moral legitimacy to the status quo if they've benefited from it that we
naturally think of the order we we know and love if we love it as being not just
a good order but the right order with a capital R which therefore inclines us to
be very conservative or very aggressive in response to challenges to
it um and we we therefore attach moral appro to those who do challenge the
existing order we blame evil leaders in particular you know the Kaiser and
Hitler for Germany's successive challenges to the European order in the last century hito and Tojo for Japan's
challenge the international order um in uh the middle years of the of the 20th
century but one of the points that car makes is that the deeper forces are always at Play It's never just that
there are bad guys in the presidential Palace there's always a lot more going
on the place of Germany in Europe the place place of Japan and Asia needed to
be resolved and and it was and it was foolish for anyone to imagine that the
old system which had worked so well for so long particularly in the case of the
first world war could keep on handling what was going on though there were tensions there that needed to be
resolved and addressed the international order needed to adapt ajp Taylor who's the other guy I'm
reading at the moment to nourish and I hope refine my pessimism uh uh wrote A History called
the outbreak of the second World War I strongly recommend it to you uh in which he wrote that the story
he was telling was a story without Heroes and perhaps even without
villains H he got thrown out of the British Academy for writing that by the way so be careful but it's a point wor
thinking about because what his point was precisely that that everyone was to blame that the International System in
the 1930s didn't adapt in ways which prevented the second world war
so um I think those insights matter to us today we tend to see the challenges to
the global and intern and Regional orders that I've talked about being caused by people like xiin Ping and
Vladimir Putin and the guys who run Iran but deeper factors are at work you
Asia in particular uh as so often in history the the primary deeper factor is a massive
in our case massive shift in the distribution of wealth and power indeed an almost unparalleled shift in the
distribution of wealth and power and nothing drives changes in the international order nothing drives pressure on an existing order and
pressures to change and a shift in the distribution of of wealth and power in
the and as as power shifts relationships change that's true at every level of
human Affairs um and
so defending message to draw from that is defending the status quo is not the
only or necessarily the right policy it is sometimes but not necessarily the only or the right policy what we really
need to do is to ask ourselves what outcome is going to work best for us what kind of order is going to best
serve our interests in the new circumstances that we we face which are
putting pressure on the old order now let me focus on what that means in Asia the post Cold War order here in
Asia and preserving that order means preserving us Primacy particularly in
East Asia and the Western Pacific that's a Primacy actually which on some measures goes back a 100
years uh and just to be absolutely crystal clear if I had my choice that's
the outcome I'd prefer I am actually one of those conservative of the age car was talking about I would love to see the
old order pers preserve I just don't believe that's going to be possible in the face of the pressures that face
faces particularly in Asia with the new distribution of power um
and the reason I say that is that it does seem to me that what's driving the
crisis in order in Asia at the moment is that China as its power is grown aims to
reclaim its status as the regions East Asia the Pacific's great power it aims
to push America out of the region and to take America's place as the Region's leading power and we need to just sort
of reflect on what that means it does mean that we are sitting right in the middle of one of the biggest strategic
contests of the world has ever seen the world's two strongest states are competing as to which of them will be the leading power in the world's most
dynamic and prosperous region it doesn't get any bigger than this his history happens to us too this is real history
with a capital H and and of course it's because that's so big in Asia then it's
not just about Asia the the fate of the global order will be in large measure
determined by how that Asian outcome is resolved now Taiwan is of course the
Prime Focus for this contest I mean there are other folky South China SE second Tom mols and
so on but um but Taiwan is the primary one and I'll focus on that and I'll just
ask to remember that I could have said the same thing about the South China Sea uh as well and that's not because of the
intrinsic significance of Taiwan itself I don't want to say that Taiwan itself is not important C certainly is
it's a remarkable country of entity of 25 million people but it's because it has become
because of choices that have been made over many decades both in Washington and Beijing it has become the test of each
side's power and resolve in their contest in Asia and it works like this
really the US position in the Western Pacific the fact that it exercises the leadership Primacy that it's exercised
for so long is at least in the era since 1945 primarily a product of its
alliances it's America's alliances that make it the leading power in Asia those
alliances in turn depend on America's credibility of credibility to its allies
that the worst comes to worst they'll defend them that's if you go to Soul or you go to Tokyo or for that matter you
go to CRA and say what's in the end this all about that's what it's all about
and and so the the the maintenance of the US position in the Western Pacific does absolutely depend on the
maintenance of The credibility of those alliances and Taiwan is where China can test us credibility and if it's found
faulty if America fails those tests of credibility then it's a alliances will fail and if its alliances fail its
position in Asia will be I would say not just eroded but destroyed conversely of course as long
as America can deter China from testing its resolve testing its credibility uh
over Taiwan or one of the other tests then its position in Asia is intact
that's what makes Taiwan such an important and such a dangerous place
today so the key question question for us as we look out at what's happening in Asia is to ask well how robust is us
deterence and I'm going to give you a gloomy answer
uh I'm going to resist the temptation to talk longer about this us deterence has failed in Ukraine that's a very
important you know whatever else one thinks about is happening in urine it was it was a failure of us deterence a
and it's very weak in Asia it's weak because of a long steady loss
of of the conventional of the overwhelming advantage in conventional capabilities over China particularly in
the maritime space that America had for so long H to the point where the United
States can no longer expect to win uh a conventional Maritime war with China
over Taiwan not to say they'd lose it but they can't win it and not not
winning is not good enough moreover whereas for a long time American uh strategists seem to me to
assume that if the that as the conventional balance went bad on them they could rely on their nuclear weapons
to deter China from trying when the expectation that the United States would use nuclear weapons first if necessary
which is what us first use Doctrine requires that has become less and less credible as China's own deterrent and
its capacity the counter deter the United States has grown now that that is a very
significant shift in the deterrent posture of the United States in Asia in
relation to Taiwan and for and for that for that matter elsewhere it's very hard to persuade someone that you're going to
fight a war that they know you know you can't
win now America has tried to make up for this decline in their DET Terence
posture by building a coalition um and that's what orcus is
all about that's what the quad is all about that's what a lot of American strategic diplomacy with Japan and South
Korea for example has been all about but I'm here to say that none of America's
allies and partners in or Partners in Asia or beyond for that matter America trying to bring nato in for
example have committed to support the United States clearly enough to enhance
America's Det to any significant degree that's partly because of what they say none of them have said they
will and it's also because of what they haven't done that is none of them have
capabilities even the Japanese that can make a really substantial difference to the outcome of a conflict between
America and China in the Western Pacific and you know by way of contrast I just
make the point that there there really is nothing like an Asian NATO for all the talk NATO really commits America's
NATO allies to go to war alongside the United States when the balloon goes up it's a it's a real deep unshakable
commitment we just don't have anything like that in Asia and therefore although US policy makers often talk as if that
em they have an emerging Coalition which is doing the same kind of thing I I just don't think that's a
reality and this in turn shows a deeper reality which is that whilst America or
at least I should say American policy makers the folks inside the Beltway do
want to preserve privacy they will not accept the costs and risks
involved they're not preparing to fight World War I over Taiwan anymore they are
prepared to fight World War III Over Ukraine and that's partly because
particularly in Asia the costs and risks involved in and
in an effective deterrence posture against China are very high because China is let's be clear about this the
most formidable rival the United States has ever faced for the simple reason that it's got the biggest economy
relative to Americas that the United States has ever faced uh and that's a you know that's a
really critical position but the other side of coin is that it's not just the cost and risks are very high but the
imperatives to do so the imperatives to shoulder those costs and risks to support uh the old us lead order in Asia
are weak and they're much too weak to justify those costs and risks now want
think about this by comparing the present situation with the Cold War and for that matter World War II and World
War I but just to focus on the Cold War what because during the Cold War the United States did have the resolve did
face the imperative to pay extraordinary costs and accept unbelievable risks in
order to contain the Soviet Union but the difference between the Soviet Union and China was that the Soviet Union
genuinely threatened particularly in the early phases of the Cold War to be able to dominate the whole of
Eurasia if it wasn't contained and yet uh and the the the
implications of that was that any power and this is an old American idea dating right back to the 19th century that any
power that that could dominate the whole of Eurasia could threaten the United States at home in the Western Hemisphere
and the Soviet Union really was in the 40s and 50s if it had not been contained by the United States capable of doing
that whereas China is just not in the same position because although China is much stronger relative to the United
States than the Soviet Union ever was China's Neighbors on Eurasia the countries it shares Eurasia with or
least some of them are much stronger relative to China than the Soviet Union was relative to its neighbors
there's India there's Russia and don't WR write Russia off it's still a very formidable place and there's Europe a
very strange strategic entity but a clearly clear strategic entity nonetheless and so I think what we we
we're seeing a world in which the chances of China being able to build the
posture in Eurasia that would threaten the United States at home the way the Soviet Union did is very low and
therefore the imperative for the United States to prevent China dominating East Asia and the Western Pacific are way lower than the imperatives the United
States had for example to prevent uh the Soviet Union dominating uh West Western
Europe so there's a you know the the the the the things that used to drive the
United States to the extraordinary steps that took during the Cold War are just not there
today and more broadly what that means is that the fears that are often
expressed that the alternative if we let the old po Cold War us lead unipolar
order go what will be what it will be replaced by is a unipolar authoritarian
order led by China I think that is a very unlikely outcome much much more
likely I'm going to say pretty near certain is that what will replace I
would even say what is already replacing the postco war unipolar us Le
order is a multipolar global order consisting at the moment at least of
five great Powers perhaps some more down the track um uh which will work the way
multipolar orders have often worked through history now we're a bit unfamiliar with multipolar orders going
to take a quick look around the room because none of us remember what a multi-polar order looked like because
since about 1948 there's only been a bipolar order and then a unipolar order but multipolar order is actually very
familiar to history um they're quite complicated ated but they can work quite
well and we can look for example at the examp at how the multi-polar order of
five great Powers as it happened functioned in Europe uh for for for many
centuries um and it's also not unfamiliar to us
from the last time that the International Community including our countries set out to build a new
international order we did that in 1945 at San Francisco the end of the second
world war when we collectively the the world or at least the United Nations as
they were then called set out to design the United the the the the UN and as an
expression of a vision of of global order in the post-war world and what it
was what it was right at the heart of it five permanent members of the security Council five great
Powers who were given a special status precisely because they were what seemed to be great Powers they didn't actually
get the list quite right but that's a that's a detail um rather in Britain or France
are on my list of five great Powers let me be clear so now in that just worth
exploring that for a minute in Asia that multi-polar order
would produce would would would be reflected in a multi-polar regional order if we look at Asia as a whole
because it's very important to remember that although we talk a lot about China there's there's not one Rising great
power in Asia there's two there's India or there's maybe three because there's
Indonesia and Indonesia will well before the middle of the century be the fourth biggest economy in the world nobody
quite knows what Indonesia is going to be like uh in that at that time but we
at least need to recognize that we're not just going to be living in a multi-polar global order we're going to
be living in multi-polar Regional order as well and that's actually good news
for us it means that rather than living under one or other of those Powers clear
hegemony at least for those of us who live on the boundary between what one might call a Chinese sphere of influence
and an Indian sphere of influence China and India there and those of us who live on the
boundary that's the Burmese ties the Malay I singaporeans
the Indonesians the Australians you guys we're going to have
a great power on each side of us and we can play what I call the Mongolian game you know Mongolia exists because it
keeps the Russians Bay using the Chinese and the Chinese would Bay keeping the Russians there are real opportunities
for us there got to be a bit exciting be a good be a good time for for for diplomats but um uh you know this is
this is a this is a model of our future which I don't think we need to dispar about now I don't want to I don't want
to give the impression I think this is going to be a dottle uh working in that kind of multi-polar order will be much
harder than working in a unipolar order dominated by our mates but we don't get
much choice about it it's also perhaps more important to say that it's not just going to be
harder for us for some countries it will be disastrous there will be some tragedies
involved uh I think the future for Ukraine is very Grim myself and the
implication of what I've said is that the future for Taiwan is very Grim in as well
but and this is where the realist imy comes out in the end we collectively as
an International System are going to have to make some choices just as at Yalta in 1945 the choice was made to
leave large slabs of Eastern Europe particularly Poland under Stalin's boot
which was a very tough decision but it was a decision that avoided World War I between the United States and the Soviet
Union at a time when the Soviet Union had the biggest army of the world had ever seen um best army of the world had
ever seen too I might say that that was a war worth
avoiding but we don't we don't want to forget that it's some very tough choices
along along the way but but I think for those of us who are lucky and
we are lucky in this respect we can survive in this kind of
World um and it's worth just turning the coin over and recognizing what happens
if we don't take that roote what happens if we don't adapt ourselves to living in a multi-polar order rather than the old
order that we know and love history strongly suggests that if we don't accommodate changes to the international
order we will face war and of course in this era that means nuclear war and I just want to stress
the point the risk of war that I'm talking about here is not hypothetical it must weigh on our judgments that the
sorts of decisions we make about the vision we have of future International order and how we pursue it is is has
been very strongly influenced by the importance of avoiding war in Ukraine is
worth remembering that any effort to ensure Russia's defeat against Ukraine
we now it's now clear would require Direct NATO intervention with a direct
risk of nuclear war now I can have an engaging debate about how high that risk is but I guess my question is well how
much risk is okay 10% 20% 30% do I hear
40% this is this is not hypothetical remember the missiles are there in the
silos the weapons are on top of them and in Asia well the Temptation for China to
test us resolve over Taiwan in the way I've talked about seems to me to be very
high and the more the Chinese think America is bluffing when it says it will defend
Taiwan the more likely they are to call its Bluff now is America
bluffing they say bush has Bush Biden has said four times that he would he
seems to have known what he was saying on that occasion at least um I I I don't think the Americans know
whether they're bluffing or not not and that is a very dangerous situation but the real point is that
China has very good reason to think that they are bluffing and to just dramatize that or
clarify that you ask yourself well what what would America have to have done to make it absolutely crystal clear to the
Chinese that they weren't fluffing that they really were determined to defend Taiwan well it's pretty simple as
China's air and Maritime capability went like that America would have had to make its air Maritime capability go like that
too so that it preserved the massive Advantage which had underpinned its successful deterence of China through
the 70s ' 80s and 90s it would have had to for example to take an example which is rather topical for Australians in
this context gone out and built another two yards to build Virginia class
submarines and start building not 1.33 Virginia class submarines a year but four or five a year that's the sort of
thing America did you not the last Cold War that's how they deterred the Soviet Union that's exactly what they haven't done now so I think there's a very real
chance that the Chinese look at what America has done or rather what it hasn't done and think these guys are
bluffing they're not serious and I and I think the Chinese are right about that that's I think it's a really important
judgment and of course the Temptation for the Chinese to call a bluff is high because for the reasons I mentioned before if they do if they move against
Taiwan and America after all the things have said stands back and says no sorry
we're going to sit this one out and in Tokyo and in
so and all through southeast Asia and even in canra they'll say really are we
trusting these guys because that is as I said before the heart of the the heart
of the alliance and that's why if the bluff is called and a US
president finds himself eles at 3:00 in the morning in The Situation Room facing
a decision that has to be made right now about how the United States
respond they might accidentally after all decide they weren't bluffing after all and then it's not for one and
all which is why the risk of war is high and it's worth bearing in mind just to
repeat some emphasize something I said before that the risk of war is high if
the risk of war is high than the risk of a nuclear Warrior is high because neither side can achieve a decisive
result with their conventional forces and both sides have plenty of nuclear forces
available now let me conclude this may seem a bit
melodramatic but I don't think we can in thinking about questions like orcus and
not just the orcus question but questions like orcus we cannot dis avoid a discussion of whether we our countries
my country your country believe we should go to war with China if necessary to try to preserve
the US lead order in Asia because that is the that is the big choice we potentially face this is what this
moment in history has delivered to us and we have to face that not because
orcus us having signed up to it if you guys sign up to it obliges us to do that
interesting question but particularly for Australia but it's not because of that it's because
commitment to orus is seen particularly seen by the us as a strong statement of support and
endorsement and encouragement to the idea that they
should go to war with China if that's necessary to preserve the US Le order in Asia because that is the declaratory
policy that the United States today seems to have or the implied declaratory policy that and and and securing that
kind of support is what orus is about America doesn't really care whether Australia has nuclear bad sub Ranch and
I don't think it really cares whether Australia or for that matter New Zealand sign up to the pillar two research
projects what it cares about is getting a statement of support for that approach
to the whole problem and the reason why I think that's a bad idea is that I don't think
that support that approach is going to succeed and not just because we won't win a war but because the shift in the
distribution of wealth and power AC impossible for America to remain the primary power in Asia or for that matter
the unipol or Global power no matter how much we like might like it to so very
quickly what's the alternative what else do we do well the first thing we do is
accept that we do now live in a multi-polar world and stop trying to preserve the old unipolar world we focus
on building an order and institutions that make that unipolar world work for us just as we
worked in 1944 5 to try and make the unip the multi-polar order that we saw
emerging after the second world war before it was hijacked by the B bipolar order of the Cold War just as we tried
worked hard in Australia's case part of our diplomatic mythology is Doc effort
turn ever turning up at San Francisco in 1945 and making a complete ass of himself trying to manage the way in
which the security Council was going to function didn't succeed in everything but he made a difference the second
thing we need to do is to accept that in Asia China and India are going to be the leading powers and we need to shape what
happens regionally in Asia to make that system work as well for us as possible
too and it's worth bringing mind we've been this way as well Australia and New Zealand sat down together in
1944 and negotiated What's called the Anzac pact or the Cambra pact which was
actually a pretty wacky piece of work and once again doc EV names all over it but but it was a serious attempt by our
two countries to try and shape our our regional order to to to suit our interests now we
need to have that ambition again because nobody else is going to do it for
us and the third thing to do is to recognize that whatever happens no matter how successful we are in those
two efforts this will be a harder world for us to live in is going to demand
more of us but not disastrously so what we need to do is to prepare for it we
need to prepare for it diplomatically and it will change the nature of our
diplomacy you know just ask the Mongolians but the heart of it is that
our neighbors will be much more important to us than our old distant friends and we can't be sentimental
about that but also militarily what we need to do is to
recognize that whilst Asia great Powers don't threaten us militarily yet China
doesn't threaten Australia militarily or New Zealand but in the longer term in the New Order I'm talking about the risk
that a great an Asian great power could threaten our territory us directly and militarily will be higher than we have
known at any time since 1945 but without the US coming to our Aid and so we do
have to ask ourselves whether we are prepared to do what's required to defend ourselves VES
independently in that situation now these are very big questions but then again this is the
biggest shift in our International circumstances since European settlement of our respective countries and so we
shouldn't be surprised this requires us to go right back to a blank sheet of paper and think out an think a lot of
things through from scratch and the the the worst thing we can do is to try and
evade that by just sticking to what we know and love
my final point is to go back to where I started almost started and that is that one thing I do think is clear is that in
this new world in this new Asia we will be we will be more alone
than we've been before but we'll be alone together and we'll mean more to one another than we have in the past
thank you very much
thanks H and welcome John McKinnon thank you was your
sir K and uh thank you very much Hugh uh thank you heish for your introduction
thank you also to Don and Helen for making this event possible by inviting Hugh over here uh Hugh and I go back a
long way we first met in the 1980s in canra I know that because the time my
daughter was a toddler and now she's approaching a zero birthday which I will not mention because she'd be deeply
embarrassed if I did so uh we have a long Association I'm very honored to be able to share this platform that said
I'm still not entirely sure what a discussant is um I imagine that you will
itching to ask questions of H and maybe my role is simply to provide a little bit of time for you to formulate those
questions so you can deliver them with the punchiness and the uh Bri brevity that I'm sure at heish will will be
looking for but let me just make a couple of um observations about what he
was said in terms of New Zealand's perspective on these issues and uh and if it does not seem entirely connected
here with what you said well I'm sure you'll you'll understand that I had to think about this before hearing you but
the first thing I want to talk about is actually about language because I think that in this country we don't normally
discuss security and strategic issues in the way that people do in Australia and
so that much of the discourse that we hear Echoes of across the tasma and that
we we know goes on in a very Lively manner in a very Australian manner in Australia doesn't actually have a
resonance here and that's not to say that how Australia does this right and we're wrong or vice versa it's simply I
think a a fact of the way that we don't think so much about these big strategic issues as Australia does maybe because
they're not quite so impactful on us now many of you will know the late lamented
uh Alan ginel who wrote uh he was a very experienced Australian Diplomat and I think also the president of the
Australian equivalent of this organization he wrote a book called fear of Abandonment which was a study of
Australian foreign policy I think from the 1940s through now I don't think
anybody's quite written an equivalent in New Zealand but I suspect if they did it would be something like fear of being
left out or fear of being forgotten it would be a rather different sort of set
of propositions and that is simply another way of saying that the way we in
New Zealand look at some of these issues often is not exactly the same as as uh as people look at it in Australia or in
other countries but if I can paraphrase one of your points you may not be
interested in geopolitical strategic competition but geopolitical strategic competition is interested in you and
this is a this is a since could be a bit of a wakeup call for New Zealand that we actually find ourselves in a world which
is not the world in which we have been able to pursue our national interests which for many of us has been about
increasing the value of our exports and doing such other things but it's about in fact how do we exist and live in a
world which isn't quite the world of which which we grew up but I would also
agree with you on another point I do actually agree with quite a lot of what you said um we don't get much choice in
this New Zealand even l and Australia is able to shape its strategic environment
in other words we are there basically we will take what it comes so if this is about the United States Primacy fine if
it's about China becoming more powerful well that's what we'll make our way with that if it's about India rising up we'll
find ways of dealing with that we don't it's not so much about we can influence
things but we have to find a way of managing relations with a great variety of countries so that in some ways
although I wouldn't over State this we may be better equipped thank you thank
you for agreeing with me we may be better equipped to operate in this in this world that you've described then in
fact uh some of our other friends because it's actually the world that as many of us as diplomats know we have had
to operate in for many many years we don't go out in the world and people say my goodness it's New Zealand Ambassador
coming my goodness I better sort things out strange to say it doesn't really happen like that and uh
with you yeah yeah I'm sure I did yeah but we have we have to make the case regardless and so in that sense I think
uh while while I think we can I can agree and and and you know with what you're saying in terms of the
description of what may lie head I just don't know that it could necessarily be as apocalyptic for us as it might seem
to be for certainly some people in Australia many maybe many many people in Australia um another point I'll just
make in terms of uh preferen and this is something which I think Bears on how New
Zealand might react in certain situations which may or may not occur in the future and that is we by far prefer
diplomatic solutions to military ones now you might say well that's simply a realistic way of saying well we have
something to offer in diplomacy and we don't have quite so much to offer in terms of the military but in any case
it's something that I think runs quite deep in New Zealand so for instance if to come to your point about Taiwan which
um I I probably a little more optimistic than you about the the the the fact that
the Chinese may have some exhibit some of strength there um we certainly
obviously we we recognize the whole One China policy and Taiwan as part of that at the same time we've always said quite
consistently we don't want this to be resolved by force we want it to be resolved by agreement and I imagine that
that would be however um vain that may seem in terms of the turn of events
which you were outlining uh that is something I think that will still be quite prominent in the terms of the
minds of New Zealand policy makers that they will not want to be involved in something which is uh looks to be a very
messy messy sort of conflict um finally if I can just touch very briefly on the
subject of the day namely orus uh because I feel if I don't touch on it somebody's going to ask me a question so
I may as well get in first I mean with any big decision of this kind I always
think there's a merit in breaking it down and in not making it a sort of a black and white and I say this with
great respect to our Two Hosts here who willough H hosts who have been arguing
the case about this but just I also take a little bit of Refuge in hsh's comment about you know the New Zealand China
Council as a is not a an organization which makes statements about policy so I
want to stick to that but I do think that if you look at it in terms of you know what sort of
uh operational interaction interoperability will this deliver what what who are the sort of Partners we
wish to be to if you think of it and break it down in those terms it makes it a bit easier to think about the issues
which are being presented than if it's simply a black or white yes or no issue do we or do we not uh do do we or do we
not sign up the final point I wish to make is simply that um we uh you know
we're not actually alone in the world in this uh apart from the fact that we have our friends across the Tasman which is a
very interesting relationship and a very significant one and a very important one and likely to become more important I Su
speak as as as we move ahead we also have to think of the people in Southeast Asia uh and the other people that you
described who sit in that area of zone between the emerging great Powers
everybody in that area including ourselves has to figure out how are we going to operate in this new world where
maybe things are not quite what they have been in the past and while that you know in a sense