Jeffrey Sachs 在新的多极时代实现和平

Jeffrey Sachs: Achieving peace in the new multipolar age

杰弗里·萨克斯 | 2024 年 8 月 9 日 | 新世界经济
https://www.manilatimes.net/2024/08/09/opinion/columns/achieving-peace-in-the-new-multipolar-age/1962778

随着 1991 年苏联的解体，美国认为自己将以无与伦比的霸主地位主宰世界。然而，事实证明，美国的“单极”时刻是短暂的。随着中国的崛起、俄罗斯从苏联解体时期的复苏以及印度的快速发展，美国的地缘政治主导地位结束了。我们已经进入了一个新的多极时代。

美国仍在为保持世界霸权而战，但这是妄想，注定会失败。即使世界其他国家想要领导世界，美国也没有能力领导世界，但事实并非如此。美国占世界??产出的份额（按国际价格计算）为 16%，且呈下降趋势，低于 1950 年的 27% 和 1980 年的 21%。中国占 19%。中国制造业产出大约是美国的两倍，中国在尖端技术领域与美国不相上下。

美国在军事上也过度扩张，在 80 个国家设有约 750 个海外军事基地。美国在也门、以巴、乌克兰、叙利亚、利比亚等地卷入了旷日持久的战争。美国的战争和霸权追求是通过债务来融资的，包括欠中国等竞争对手的债务。

此外，美国的预算政治陷入瘫痪。为政治运动提供资金的富人希望降低税收，而穷人则希望增加社会支出。结果是僵局，预算赤字长期存在（目前已超过 GDP 的 5%）。公共债务从 2000 年占 GDP 的 35% 左右飙升至今天的 100%。

美国在人工智能和微芯片设计等领域保持着技术活力，但中国通过传播其开创的技术和进步，迅速赶上了美国的突破。世界上大多数绿色和数字硬件——包括先进的太阳能电池组件、风力涡轮机、核电站、电池、芯片、电动汽车、5G 系统和长距离输电——都是在亚洲制造的，其中很大一部分来自中国或中国主导的供应链。

鉴于预算赤字，美国逃避了全球领导地位的财政负担。美国要求北约盟国自掏腰包支付军事防御费用，而美国对联合国气候和发展融资系统的贡献却越来越吝啬。

简而言之，虽然美国自欺欺人地认为它仍然是世界霸主，但我们已经处在一个多极世界。这就提出了一个问题：新的多极化意味着什么。有三种可能性。

第一种可能性是我们当前的轨迹，即大国之间继续争夺主导地位，美国与中国、俄罗斯和其他国家对立。美国著名外交政策学者约翰·米尔斯海默教授提出了“进攻性现实主义”理论，根据该理论，大国不可避免地会争夺主导地位，但其后果可能是悲剧性的，以毁灭性的战争形式出现。我们的任务当然是避免这种悲剧性的结果，而不是接受它作为命运的安排。

第二种可能性是通过大国之间的力量平衡实现不稳定的和平，有时被称为“防御性现实主义”。由于美国无法打败中国或俄罗斯，反之亦然，大国应该通过避免直接冲突来维持和平。美国不应不顾俄罗斯的强烈反对，试图将北约强行推进乌克兰，也不应不顾中国的强烈反对，向台湾提供武器。

简而言之，大国应该谨慎行事，避免触及彼此的红线。这无疑是个好建议，但还不够。权力平衡会变成不平衡，威胁和平。欧洲协调，即 19 世纪欧洲主要大国之间的权力平衡，最终在 19 世纪末屈服于权力平衡的转变，从而引发了第一次世界大战。

第三种可能性是大国之间实现真正的和平，过去 30 年来，美国领导人一直对此嗤之以鼻，但我们最大的希望就是实现真正的和平。这种和平将建立在共同认识到全球霸权是不存在的，共同利益需要大国之间的积极合作的基础上。这种方法有几个基础，包括理想主义（基于道德的世界）和制度主义（基于国际法和多边机构的世界）。

持久的和平是可能的。我们可以从 19 世纪西方列强到来之前东亚长期的和平中学到很多东西。哲学家项树臣在她的著作《中国世界主义》中引用了历史学家康大卫的话，康大卫指出：“从明朝建立到鸦片战争——即从 1368 年到 1841 年——中国、朝鲜、越南和日本之间只发生过两次战争。这是中国入侵越南（1407-1428 年）和日本入侵越南（1428 年）。

朝鲜统治时期（1592-1598 年）。”东亚的长期和平被英国在第一次鸦片战争（1839-1842 年）中对中国的攻击以及随后的东西方（以及后来的中日）冲突所打破。

项教授将东亚长达半个世纪的和平归功于儒家和谐规范，这种规范支撑了中国、朝鲜、日本和越南之间的治国之道，与欧洲治国之道的争霸形成鲜明对比。在这一漫长时期，中国是该地区无可争议的霸权，但并没有利用其主导力量威胁或伤害朝鲜、越南或日本。

中国外交政策制定专家董建玲博士在其著作《变化世界中的中国治国之道：揭开持久传统和动态约束的神秘面纱》中对中国和欧洲治国之道的差异提出了类似的观点。

我最近提出了“21 世纪永久和平十项原则”，以中国和平共处五项原则为基础，加上五项切实可行的进一步措施，因此，这是儒家伦理与制度主义的结合。我的想法是利用合作的伦理和国际法及联合国宪章的实际利益。

9 月，世界各国将齐聚联合国未来峰会，关键信息如下。我们不需要也不想要霸权。我们不需要权力平衡，因为权力平衡很容易变成武力不平衡。我们需要建立在伦理、共同利益以及国际法和制度基础上的持久和平。

Achieving peace in the new multipolar age

Jeffrey D. Sachs   |   August 9, 2024   |   New World Economy
https://www.manilatimes.net/2024/08/09/opinion/columns/achieving-peace-in-the-new-multipolar-age/1962778
 
With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US assumed that it would dominate the world as the unrivaled hegemon.  Yet the US “unipolar” moment proved to be short-lived.  US geopolitical dominance ended with the rise of China, the recovery of Russia from the period of Soviet collapse, and the rapid development of India.  We have arrived at a new multipolar age. 

The US still fights to remain world hegemon, but this is delusional and doomed to fail. The US is in no position to lead the world, even if the rest of the world were to want it, which is not the case. The US share of world output (at international prices) is 16% and declining, down from around 27% in 1950, and 21% in 1980.  China’s share is 19%.  China’s manufacturing output is roughly twice that of the US, and China rivals the US in cutting-edge technologies. 
 
The US is also militarily overextended, with some 750 overseas military bases in 80 countries. The US is engaged in protracted wars in Yemen, Israel-Palestine, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere.  The US wars and quest for hegemony are financed through debt, including debt owed to rival powers such as China.
 
Moreover, America’s budget politics is paralyzed. The rich, who fund the political campaigns, want lower taxes, while the poor want more social outlays.  The result is a standoff, with chronic budget deficits (now above 5% of GDP).  The public debt has swelled from around 35% of GDP in 2000 to 100% of GDP today.   

The US sustains technological dynamism in areas such as artificial intelligence and microchip design, yet US breakthroughs are quickly matched in China through the spread of knowhow and advances pioneered by China.  Most of the world’s green and digital hardware -- including advanced solar modules, wind turbines, nuclear power plants, batteries, chips, electric vehicles, 5G systems, and long-distance power transmission – is manufactured in Asia, with a large share in China or Chinese-dominated supply chains. 
 
In view of its budget deficits, the US shirks the financial burdens of global leadership. The US demands that NATO allies pay their own way for military defense, while the US is increasingly stingy in its contributions to UN system for climate and development finance.
 
In short, while US deludes itself that it remains the world’s hegemon, we are already in a multipolar world.  This raises the question of what the new multipolarity should mean.  There are three possibilities. 
 
The first, our current trajectory, is a continued struggle for dominance among the major powers, pitting the US against China, Russia, and others.  The leading US foreign policy scholar, Professor John Mearsheimer, has put forward the theory of “offensive realism,” according to which the great powers inevitably struggle for dominance, yet the consequences can be tragic, in the form of devastating wars.  Surely our task is to avoid such tragic outcomes, not accept them as a matter of fate. 
 
The second possibility is a precarious peace through a balance of power among the great powers, sometimes called “defensive realism.”  Since the US cannot defeat China or Russia, and vice versa, the great powers should keep the peace by avoiding direct conflicts amongst themselves.  The US should not try to push NATO into Ukraine, against Russia’s strenuous objections, nor should the US arm Taiwan over China’s vociferous opposition.    
 
In short, the great powers should act with prudence, avoiding each other's red lines.  This is surely good advice, but not enough.  Balances of power turn into imbalances, threatening the peace.  The Concert of Europe, the balance of power among the major European powers in the 19th century, eventually succumbed to shifts in the power balance at the end of the 19th century, which led onward to World War I.
 
The third possibility, scorned in the past 30 years by US leaders, but our greatest hope, is true peace among the major powers.  This peace would be based on the shared recognition that there can be no global hegemon and that the common good requires active cooperation among the major powers.  There are several bases of this approach, including idealism (a world based on ethics), and institutionalism (a world based on international law and multilateral institutions).
 
Sustained peace is possible.  We can learn much from the long peace that prevailed in East Asia before the arrival of Western powers in the 19th century.  In her book Chinese Cosmopolitanism, philosopher Shuchen Xiang cites historian David Kang, who noted that “from the founding of the Ming dynasty to the opium wars – that is, from 1368 to 1841 – there were only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. These were the China’s invasion of Vietnam (1407-1428) and Japan’s invasion of Korea (1592-1598).” East Asia’s long peace was shattered by Britain’s attack on China in the First Opium War, 1839-1842, and the East-West (and later Sino-Japanese) conflicts that followed.
 
Prof. Xiang attributes the half-millennium of East Asian peace to Confucian norms of harmony that underpinned the statecraft among China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, in contrast to the struggle for hegemony that characterized Europe’s statecraft. China, during this long period, was the region’s uncontested hegemon, but did not use its predominant power to threaten or harm Korea, Vietnam, or Japan. 
 
Dr. Jean Dong, an expert in China’s foreign policymaking, makes similar points about the differences between Chinese and European statecraft in her book Chinese Statecraft in a Changing World: Demystifying Enduring Traditions and Dynamic Constraints. 
 
I have recently proposed 10 Principles for Perpetual Peace in the 21st Century, building on China’s five principles for peaceful co-existence, plus five practical further steps, hence, a mixture of Confucian ethics and institutionalism.  My idea is to harness the ethics of cooperation and the practical benefits of international law and the UN Charter.
 
As the world assembles in September at the UN Summit of the Future, the key message is this.  We don’t want or need a hegemon.  We don’t need a balance of power, which can too easily become an imbalance of force.  We need a lasting peace built on ethics, common interests, and international law and institutions.