国家如何思考：外交政策的合理性

How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy 

https://www.amazon.ca/How-States-Think-Rationality-Foreign/dp/0300269307

John J. Mearsheimer、Sebastian Rosato 2023年9月5日

对国际关系中的一个核心问题的开创性考察：国家是否理性行事？

要了解世界政治，您需要了解国家如何思考。国家是理性的吗？许多国际关系理论都假设国家是理性的。但许多学者认为，政治领导人很少理性行事。这个问题对于国际政治的研究和实践都至关重要，因为只有国家理性，学者和政策制定者才能理解和预测他们的行为。

John J. Mearsheimer 和 Sebastian Rosato 认为，国际政治中的理性决策取决于关于世界如何运作的可靠理论，并源于审议决策过程。使用这些标准，他们得出结论，大多数国家在大多数时候都是理性的，即使它们并不总是成功的。米尔斯海默和罗萨托为他们的立场辩护，研究了包括乔治·W·布什和弗拉基米尔·普京在内的过去和现在的世界领导人是否在重大历史事件的背景下采取了理性的行动，包括两次世界大战、冷战和后冷战时代。

通过以新颖而全面的方式研究这一基本概念，米尔斯海默和罗萨托展示了领导者的思维方式，以及如何制定与其他国家打交道的政策。

评论者：扎卡里·约斯特
这篇书评是《独立评论》 2024 年春季刊的网络独家内容。

https://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?id=1974

作者：约翰·米尔斯海默和塞巴斯蒂安·罗萨托
耶鲁大学出版社，2023 年

毫无疑问，约翰·米尔斯海默是当今国际关系领域最杰出、最具争议的思想家之一。他最重要的作品《大国政治的悲剧》（2014 年，纽约：诺顿）仍然是进攻性现实主义理论的事实手册，这种理论视角在有关俄罗斯和乌克兰之间持续战争的根本原因的辩论中发挥了非常重要的作用。合著者塞巴斯蒂安·罗萨托是圣母大学政治学教授，和米尔斯海默一样，他是一位来自广泛现实主义国际关系学派的思想家。

然而，《国家如何思考：外交政策的合理性》并非植根于现实主义。相反，米尔斯海默和罗萨托试图捍卫整个国际关系领域所依赖的认识论基础，捍卫国家（或具体地说是个别政策制定者）??在国际政治中通常大多数时候都采取理性行动的立场。虽然乍一看这似乎不是一个有争议的命题，但它经常受到质疑或公开否认。作者在谈到俄罗斯和弗拉基米尔·普京的行为时引用了许多这种论点的例子，关于伊朗领导层及其所谓的希望迎来末世启示录的愿望也经常有人提出类似的论点。

米尔斯海默和罗萨托对这一说法站不住脚的含义直言不讳：“如果非理性是常态，国家行为就无法理解或预测，研究国际政治就是徒劳的”（第 xiv 页）。

这当然引出了一个重要的问题：什么是理性行为？对于作者来说，理性是一个“为了追求期望的目标而理解世界”的过程（第 20 页）。世界是通过一种关于现实如何运作的理论来解释的，其中可能存在相互冲突的观点。作者将理论分为可信理论和不可信理论，其中很多内容将在后面讨论。最终，如果决策者参与“审议过程”以在不同的行动理论之间进行选择，并且最终决策植根于可信理论，那么一个国家就是理性的。

如果国家的决策者未能做到其中之一或两者，那么它就被认为是非理性的。他们还很快指出，一个国家的行动方针不需要成功才能被视为理性，事实上，许多符合他们定义的行动有时最终会以灾难性的失败告终。

在对植根于政治心理学和理性选择理论的理性替代定义进行简短批评之后，作者们带着他们的定义转向历史记录，以确定他们关于国家大多数时候是理性的论点在多大程度上是正确的。为此，他们借鉴了十个历史案例研究，其中五个是重大战略决策，五个是应对危机的决策。他们认为，这些案例通常被当作国家非理性的例子，因此通过证明国家在这些“关键时刻”确实采取了理性行动，他们得出了以下结论：通过使用“艰难的案例”，他们可以令人信服地论证他们的主张是有根据的。

这些案例本身非常有趣，时间跨度从十九世纪末到二十一世纪初。然而，回想一下，作者并不认为国家总是理性行事，而是大多数时候都是理性的，为此，他们用一章来研究四个历史案例研究，两个涉及大战略，两个涉及危机情况，他们得出结论，既没有采用公开的审议决策过程，也没有采用可信的理论。

虽然所有这些案例研究都非常有趣，作者也很好地证明了现代历史上的国家通常会在行动中深思熟虑，但他们的框架最终并不令人满意。

首先，整个体系都建立在关于现实如何运作的“可信理论”这一不牢固的概念上。作者指出，一种理论是否可信取决于该理论的“假设、逻辑或经验依据（或三者兼有）”（第 8 页）。

然而，归根结底，如果理论的逻辑不是通过理论的结果客观确定的，谁又能说它是否有缺陷呢？在选择行动方案的审议过程中，许多争论无疑与一种行动理论是否可信有关。

作者列出了他们认为可信和不可信的理论。毫不奇怪，进攻性和防御性现实主义都进入了“可信”行列，但有点令人惊讶的是，自由国际主义和社会建构主义也进入了“可信”行列。自由主义的加入有些令人惊讶，因为米尔斯海默在他最近的著作《大妄想：自由主义梦想与国际现实》（2018 年，康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社）中对自由主义进行了批判。一个所谓的妄想理论真的可信吗？

显然，那些支持作者标记为不可信的理论的人会强烈反对这一标签，许多自由主义者也会认为现实主义是可信的，反之亦然。

作者指出，理论的可信度最终取决于历史，并引用了多米诺骨牌理论的例子，该理论在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代是可信的，但后来显然变得不可信。但是，许多事后看来荒谬的理论在历史上得到了大力支持。颅相学曾经得到“受人尊敬的人”的广泛支持，优生学也是如此，但作者将“种族理论”标记为从一开始就不可信，他们承认这些理论在学术界、国际关系学者中很受欢迎。自由主义的观点认为，历史已随着苏联的解体而“终结”，这种观点也得到了大力支持，尽管这一观点似乎每周都越来越不可信，但这一观点一经提出，就有许多关于人性的理论，可以追溯到几百年甚至几千年前，这些理论认为这一观点是无稽之谈。

归根结底，一种理论是否可信是一个个人判断，可能永远不会得到广泛的共识。

除了这个问题之外，还有类似的问题，即理性本身的定义。正如作者在整整一章中提到的那样，他们拒绝接受理性的其他定义。不管是什么，“非理性”通常被认为是不好的，但这对不同人来说究竟意味着什么却大相径庭。

还有另一种理性的替代定义，米尔斯海默和罗萨托没有提到：“从定义上讲，行动总是理性的。”读者可能已经猜到了，理性的这一定义来自路德维希·冯·米塞斯的《经济学的认识论问题》（2003 年，阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究所，第 36 页）。

我在此（简要地）主张，这一定义及其伴随的认识论（米塞斯将其定义为人类行为科学的两个分支（人类行为学和历史学））是人们可以证明国家理性的更好基础。

从米塞斯对理性的定义来看，米尔斯海默和罗萨托不能说，作为德国海军首脑，海军上将冯·提尔皮茨实施海军建设的“风险战略”是非理性的。他们只能说，如果他们掌管德意志帝国海军，他们不会出于 x、y 和 z 原因这样做。正如米塞斯在《社会主义》（1981 年，印第安纳波利斯印第安纳州：自由基金，第 405 页）中指出的那样，“如果一个人喝酒而不喝水，我不能说他的行为不理性。我最多可以说，换做是我，我不会这么做。”

这种混乱的部分原因在于米尔斯海默和罗萨托将指导国家的政策制定者的目标定为一个固定的结局：生存。他们指出，“与为所有者赚钱而存在的商业公司不同，政治实体的存在是为了生存。因此，合并成一个新的实体对公司来说可能是一个有吸引力的选择，但对国家来说是不可能的”（第 215 页）。

在他们的定义下，他们声称“只有一条不可侵犯的规则。一个国家如果不能首先作为一个国家生存下来，就无法实现任何其他目标，这是一个不容置疑的逻辑和证据”（第 213 页）。然后他们继续声称，在历史记录中，只有一个例子表明目标非理性，即德国在二战结束时面临必败无疑的失败和大规模伤亡和破坏的情况下继续战斗。

然而，这一说法很好地说明了为什么米塞斯的认识论理性概念更可取。历史记录表明，一个国家的最终目标永远是生存，这根本不是真的。

考虑许多国家领导人在武力或武力威胁下投降的案例（想想 1939 年的捷克斯洛伐克），或者领导人和/或公众都支持吞并的案例（想想 1938 年的奥地利德奥合并或德克萨斯共和国）。同样，鉴于生存的必要性，作者认为纳粹德国在战争结束时的持续抵抗是非理性的，这一点也同样不明晰。无论是通过失败还是投降，纳粹德国这个国家都必将不复存在，因此，按照他们的定义，抵抗到最后似乎是理性的。

然而，米尔斯海默和罗萨托的框架已经很好地与米塞斯的人类行为框架相兼容。虽然对理性行为的必然性存在分歧，但在理论方面却达成了一致。作者指出，“寻求理解世界的理性政策制定者采用可信的理论；我们称他们为理论人”（第 7 页）。

米塞斯同意人类是理论人，并详细论证了历史是人类发展未来理论以采取行动的方法。米塞斯甚至创造了“人文科学”一词（见《经济科学的终极基础》，2006 年，印第安纳波利斯印第安纳州：自由基金会，第 41-46 页；《理论与历史》，2007 年，阿拉巴马州奥本市：米塞斯研究所，第 264-84 页），专门处理米尔斯海默和罗萨托试图捕捉的现象，他们试图表达如果没有理性行动，整个国际关系的努力将毫无结果。

米尔斯海默和罗萨托无疑通过这本书提供了宝贵的服务。他们正确地认识到，如果人类不是理性的行为者，社会科学本身将是一项不可能完成的任务。他们的案例研究提供了宝贵的见解，让我们了解人类通过历史经验形成对未来的期望。仅这些案例研究就为进一步研究提供了一个宝贵的起点。最终，由于对理性的定义有缺陷，他们的框架在认识论上存在不足，但鉴于他们对理论在人类行为中发挥的重要作用的理解，他们已经成功了一半，并为任何希望进一步充实和将米塞斯的人类行为框架应用于国际关系领域的人提供了一个宝贵的起点。

扎卡里·约斯特
《战争、经济和国家》播客

How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy 

https://www.amazon.ca/How-States-Think-Rationality-Foreign/dp/0300269307

by John J. Mearsheimer, Sebastian Rosato Sept. 5 2023

A groundbreaking examination of a central question in international relations: Do states act rationally?
 
To understand world politics, you need to understand how states think. Are states rational? Much of international relations theory assumes that they are. But many scholars believe that political leaders rarely act rationally. The issue is crucial for both the study and practice of international politics, for only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behavior.
 
John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato argue that rational decisions in international politics rest on credible theories about how the world works and emerge from deliberative decision?making processes. Using these criteria, they conclude that most states are rational most of the time, even if they are not always successful. Mearsheimer and Rosato make the case for their position, examining whether past and present world leaders, including George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, have acted rationally in the context of momentous historical events, including both world wars, the Cold War, and the post–Cold War era.  
 
By examining this fundamental concept in a novel and comprehensive manner, Mearsheimer and Rosato show how leaders think, and how to make policy for dealing with other states.

Reviewed by: Zachary Yost 
This book review is a web exclusive for the Spring 2024 issue of The Independent Review.

https://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?id=1974
By John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato
Yale University Press, 2023

There is little doubt that John Mearsheimer is one of the most prominent, and controversial, thinkers in the field of international relations alive today. His most important work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2014, New York: Norton), continues to be the de facto handbook to the theory of offensive realism and this theoretical lens has played a very prominent role in the debate over the underlying causes of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Coauthor Sebastien Rosato, a professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, is, like Mearsheimer, a thinker from the broadly realist school of international relations.

However, How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy is not rooted in realism. Rather, Mearsheimer and Rosato are seeking to defend the epistemological basis upon which the entire field of international relations is founded; to defend the position that states (or specifically the individual policymakers) in international politics generally act rationally most of the time. While this may not seem to be a controversial proposition at first glance, it is often called into question or openly denied. The authors cite many examples of this argument when it comes to the behavior of Russia and Vladimer Putin in particular, and a similar argument has often been made regarding the leadership of Iran and their supposed desire to usher in an eschatological apocalypse.

Mearsheimer and Rosato are quite frank about the untenable implications of this claim: “If nonrationality is the norm, state behavior can neither be understood nor predicted, and studying international politics is a futile endeavor” (p. xiv).

This, of course, leads to the important question of what is rational behavior? For the authors, rationality is a process of “making sense of the world for the purpose of navigating it in the pursuit of desired goals” (p. 20). The world is interpreted via a theory about how reality works, of which there can be conflicting ideas. The authors divide theories into credible and non-credible theories, of which there is much to address later. Ultimately, a state is rational if decision makers engage in a “deliberative process” to choose between differing theories of action and if the final decision is then rooted in a credible theory. If the state’s decision makers fail to do one or both of these, then it is considered to be nonrational. They are also quick to note that a state’s course of action need not be successful in order to be considered rational, and, indeed, many actions that fit their definition end up in sometimes disastrous failure.

After a brief detour to criticize alternative definitions of rationality rooted in political psychology and rational-choice theory, the authors turn to the historical record with their definition in mind to determine to what extent their thesis that states are rational most of the time is correct. To do this they draw upon ten historical case studies, five of which are grand strategic decisions and five of which are decisions made in response to a crisis. They argue that these cases are usually presented as examples of state non-rationality, so that by demonstrating that states did, in fact, act rationally in these “hard cases” they can persuasively argue that their claim is well founded.

The cases themselves are quite interesting, and range in time from the late- nineteenth to early- twenty-first century. Recall, however, that the authors do not maintain that states act rationally all of the time, but rather most of the time, and to that end they include a chapter examining four historical case studies, two regarding grand strategy and two regarding crisis situations, where they conclude that neither an open deliberative decision-making process, nor credible theories were utilized.

While all of these case studies are very interesting, and the authors do a good job of demonstrating that states throughout modern history generally put thought into their actions, their framework is ultimately unsatisfactory.

To begin with, the entire edifice rests upon the unsturdy concept of “credible theories” about how reality works. The authors state that whether a theory is credible or not rests upon that theory’s “suppositional, logical, or empirical grounds (or all three)” (p. 8). Yet, ultimately, who is to say whether or not a theory’s logic is flawed if this is not determined objectively via outcomes of the theory? Much of the debate that takes place during the deliberative process of choosing a course of action is no doubt concerned with whether or not one theory of action is credible or not.

The authors take an inventory of theories they consider to be credible and non-credible. Unsurprisingly, both offensive and defensive realism make the “credible” cut, though, somewhat surprisingly, so do liberal internationalism and social constructivism. Liberalism’s inclusion is somewhat surprising, given that Mearsheimer trashed it in his recent book The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). Is a supposedly delusional theory really credible?

Obviously, those who advocate for theories that the authors label as uncredible would sharply contest this label, as would numerous liberals in regard to realism as being credible and vice versa.

The authors state that ultimately a theory's credibility is historically contingent, citing the example of domino theory as being credible in the 1950s and ’60s but becoming clearly uncredible later on. But, numerous theories that in hindsight seem to be absurd enjoy great support historically. Phrenology once had widespread support among “respectable people” as did eugenics, yet the authors label “racial theories,” which they acknowledge were popular and well received among academic, international-relations scholars as being non-credible from the get-go. The liberal idea that history had “ended” with the collapse of the Soviet Union also enjoyed great support, and, though it seems to be discredited more and more by the week, as soon as it was proposed there were numerous theories regarding the nature of man dating back hundreds or even thousands of years that argued it was nonsense.

Ultimately, whether a theory is credible or not is a personal judgment call that will likely never enjoy widespread consensus.

Beyond this issue, there is the similar issue of the definition of rationality itself. As the authors address in a full chapter, there are alternative definitions of rationality that they reject. Whatever it is, it is generally considered bad to be “nonrational,” but what exactly that means to one person or another varies widely.

There is yet another alternative definition of rationality that Mearsheimer and Rosato do not address; that “Action is, by definition, always rational.” As readers might have guessed, this definition of rationality comes from Ludwig von Mises’ book Epistemological Problems of Economics (2003, Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, p. 36). I would here (briefly) contend that this definition and its attendant epistemology that Mises defines as the two branches of the science of human action (praxeology and history) are a better foundation upon which one could make the case for state-rationality.

From a Misesian definition of rationality, Mearsheimer and Rosato cannot say that as head of the German navy, Admiral von Tirpitz, was nonrational to implement the “risk strategy” of naval buildup. They can merely say that if they were running the Imperial German navy they would not do so for x, y, and z reasons. As Mises notes in Socialism (1981, Indianapolis Ind.: Liberty Fund, p. 405), “If a man drinks wine and not water, I cannot say he is acting irrationally. At most I can say that in his place I would not do so.”

Part of this confusion stems from Mearsheimer and Rosato adopting a fixed end as the goal of the policymakers that direct a state: survival. They state that “Unlike business firms which exist to make money for their owners, political entities exist in order to exist. Amalgamation into a new entity, which can be an attractive option for a firm, is thus off the table for states” (p. 215).

Under their definition of “goal rationality” they claim that “there is only one inviolable rule. It is a matter of incontrovertible logic and evidence that a state cannot achieve any other goal if it does not first survive as a state” (p. 213). They then go on to claim that in the historical record there is only one example of goal nonrationality, which they identify as Germany continuing to fight on in the face of certain defeat and mass death and destruction at the end of the Second World War.

However, this claim is a good example of why a Misesian epistemological conception of rationality is preferable. The historical record demonstrates that it is simply not true that a state’s ultimate goal is always survival.

Consider the numerous cases where leaders of states surrender under force or the threat of force (think Czechoslovakia in 1939) or where both the leaders and/or the general public favor annexation (think the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 or the Republic of Texas). It is similarly unclear why, in light of the imperative for survival, the authors consider the continued resistance of Nazi Germany towards the end of the war to be nonrational. Whether through defeat or surrender the state known as Nazi Germany would surely cease to exist, so resistance until the bitter ends seems to be goal rational, under their definition.

However, Mearsheimer and Rosato’s framework is already well on the way to compatibility with Mises’ framework of human action. While there is disagreement about the apodictic nature of rational action, there is agreement in regard to theory. The authors state that “Rational policymakers who seek to make sense of the world adopt credible theories; we call them homo theoreticus” (p. 7). Mises would agree with humans being homo theoreticus and argues at length that history is the method by which humans develop theories about the future in order to act. Mises even coined the term “thymological” (see The Ultimate Foundations of Economic Science, 2006, Indianapolis Ind.: Liberty Fund, pp. 41–46; and Theory and History, 2007, Auburn Ala.: Mises Institute, pp. 264–84) dealing with precisely the phenomenon Mearsheimer and Rosato try to capture when expressing how fruitless the entire endeavor of international relations would be in the absence of rational action.

Mearsheimer and Rosato have doubtlessly provided a valuable service with this book. They rightly recognize that if humans were not rational actors that social science itself would be an impossible endeavor. Their case studies provide valuable insight into the historical experience through which humans develop expectations about the future. These case studies alone provide a valuable jumping-off point for further study. Ultimately, their framework falls short on epistemological grounds due to a flawed definition of rationality, but given their understanding of the vital role that theory plays in human action they are already halfway there and provide an invaluable starting point for anyone who wishes to further flesh out and apply Mises’ framework of human action to the field of international relations.

Zachary Yost
The War, Economy, and State Podcast