澳大利亚和中国：与保罗·基廷的对话

2022 年 10 月 12 日
拉筹伯大学，悉尼校区
悉尼伊丽莎白街 255 号 1 楼

AUSTRALIA AND CHINA: A CONVERSATION WITH PAUL KEATING

12 October 2022
La Trobe University, Sydney Campus
Level 1, 255 Elizabeth Street, Sydney

发言人：
拉筹伯大学高级副校长（研究和行业参与）苏珊·多兹教授

澳大利亚第 24 任总理保罗·基廷阁下

悉尼大学现代史教授詹姆斯·柯伦教授

文字记录

苏珊·多兹教授：
大家好，我是苏珊·多兹教授，拉筹伯大学研究高级副校长。我很高兴今晚来到悉尼参加今晚的思想与社会活动——澳大利亚和中国：与保罗·基廷的对话。我想承认，Eora 民族的 Gadigal 人是我们正在广播的土地（拉筹伯大学悉尼校区）的传统守护者。我向过去和现在的长者致敬。

欢迎参加今年思想与社会计划的第四场活动。这是拉筹伯大学副校长研究员、名誉教授 Robert Manne 第 13 年发表思想与社会。思想与社会将杰出的澳大利亚人聚集在一起，共同思考我们国家和世界面临的重大问题。今年之前的活动探讨了俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争、澳大利亚养老院的危机以及澳大利亚对 COVID 19 疫情的处理。

今晚的讨论结束后，该系列的下一场活动将于 10 月 25 日举行，届时 Tim Flannery 将与 Ross Garnaut 讨论他的新书《超级大国转型：打造澳大利亚的零碳未来》，这本书恰好由拉筹伯大学出版社出版。您可以通过拉筹伯大学网站注册。今年 11 月的最后一场活动将讨论绿党和青色党独立人士在新当选的联邦议会中的作用，主持人是拉筹伯大学另一位校长研究员 Cathy McGowan；参加者包括绿党的 Adam Bandt 和 Max Chandler-Mather；青色党独立人士 Zoe Daniel 和支持几位青色党议员当选众议院议员的气候倡议创始人 Simon Holmes à Court。

现在开始今晚的活动，这个话题和我们的演讲者几乎不需要任何介绍。人们对这次活动非常感兴趣，事实上，我们已经有超过 3500 人报名，这是大学有史以来最受欢迎的讨论之一。澳大利亚位于大洋洲，介于印度洋和太平洋之间，这意味着我们不应该，也不能忽视我们地区的力量，特别是那些对我们的未来至关重要的力量。中国作为军事和经济强国的崛起就是其中一个因素。我们还发现自己陷入了中美外交关系恶化的境地。如果说有什么不同的话，那就是在疫情期间，问题只会升级，包括贸易禁运、双方被指控从事间谍活动，以及与台湾和新疆有关的新紧张局势。目前，这两个大国之间存在“新冷战”的威胁，而且显然，在拜登总统的领导下，两国关系不太可能有太大改善。这对我们地区意味着什么？对我们的贸易和安全意味着什么？这对人权考虑或全球应对气候变化的斗争有何影响？在莫里森政府缔结《澳大利亚与美国条约》之后，在阿尔巴尼斯的领导下，澳大利亚对华政策将发生多大变化？我们对中国的回应对我们与美国的关系意味着什么？

此外，华盛顿、北京和堪培拉之间的政策动态如何？我们很高兴这位经验丰富、专业知识渊博的澳大利亚前总理能与澳大利亚最敏锐的历史学家和外交事务评论员之一一起探讨这些问题和其他问题。我很荣幸地介绍我们的贵宾——尊敬的保罗·基廷，他于 1991 年至 1996 年担任澳大利亚第 24 任总理，并于 1983 年至 1991 年担任澳大利亚财政部长。他的政治遗产包括根本性的经济和社会改革，包括放松对澳大利亚金融、产品和劳动力市场的管制，建立澳大利亚的强制性退休金制度，制定原住民土地权立法，以及成立亚太经合组织领导人会议。基廷先生的著作包括《接触：澳大利亚面对亚太》，该书于 2000 年出版，并被翻译成中文和日文，以及《后记》一书，该书是澳大利亚总理卸任后的演讲集。基廷先生继续为澳大利亚和国际经济问题、地缘政治、外交政策和安全以及退休金的公开辩论做出贡献。他专门研究东亚的地缘战略环境。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授是悉尼大学的现代史教授，也是《澳大利亚金融评论报》的外交事务专栏作家。他为洛伊研究所和《中国事务》撰写了政策论文分析。詹姆斯曾担任都柏林大学学院基思·卡梅伦主席，并曾是富布赖特学者

乔治城大学。

在成为学者之前，他曾在总理和内阁部工作，并在国家评估办公室担任情报分析员。詹姆斯出版了许多关于澳大利亚政治文化和外交事务的书籍。他的书《澳大利亚的中国奥德赛：从欣喜到恐惧》由新南威尔士图书出版。我很高兴把发言权交给詹姆斯，开始讨论。谢谢。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

非常感谢多兹教授。我还要向拉筹伯大学思想与社会项目召集人名誉教授罗伯特·曼恩表示感谢和感激，并感谢在澳大利亚乃至世界各地的所有人，感谢你们今晚收听保罗·基廷的讨论。

我认为与中国和澳大利亚外交政策的辩论往往过于现实主义。当然，这其中有可以理解的原因，但问题之一是，历史和背景因素常常被牺牲。基廷先生和我在会前讨论中一致认为，这次对话应该围绕政治事件表面之下的历史构造力量展开。我们要努力辨别国际事务的根本模式，而不是挑剔不连贯的碎片。

几年前，美国前国家安全顾问兼国务卿亨利
基辛格表示，他担心当今的领导人不再有时间进行历史思考。他担心，目前的政客们正在努力“形成对世界和自己的认知”。基辛格接着说，我引用他的话：“我们应该将当前的认知活动深化到更适合概念思维的水平，而不是迎合当下的情绪。”
这就是我们今晚即将进行的讨论的内容。保罗·基廷是一位领导者，我认为这一点无需多言，他为政府带来了一些关于世界的理念。这些理念以历史观和领导者在历史中的作用为基础，并汲取了一生对身份和文化相互作用的思考。保罗·基廷，感谢您抽出时间。

保罗·基廷议员：

谢谢詹姆斯，很高兴来到这里。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

考虑到这个介绍，以及我们来这里的目的，我想带您回到今年 80 年前。新加坡沦陷，1942 年。您出生在两年后的 1944 年，第二年您的叔叔比利在山打根-拉瑙死亡行军中丧生。在您的整个职业生涯中，您一直说第二次世界大战“把我们拖入了亚洲”，因此，我们不应该像以前那样与强大而强大的朋友完全依赖对方。到那时，与英国的战略联盟显然已经破裂。

正如您多次指出的那样——我引用您的话说——“我们在这个地区孤身一人，无助地徘徊”。我们想要多少次被教导这个关于依赖的愚蠢的教训？

保罗·基廷议员：

好吧，我本以为，在 1942-1945 年一次重要的教训之后，我们就不必再学习了，一个继承了一块大陆的社会，我曾经在内阁中说过，当他们分发大陆时，没有多少人能得到。我们与其他国家没有边界。我们有一个大陆，因此我们有能力在这里过上体面的生活，维护我们公民的安全，在需要的时候能够合理地保卫国家，这些都是我们完全有能力做到的。如果你看看我们最近在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的经历，很明显我们能够做到这一点。

这并不是说我们告诉朋友我们不再需要他们，比如美国，或者我们不欣赏他们。但是，地缘战略上的纠缠问题意味着你妥协了你的外交政策行动，并将其外包给另一个国家。这就是纠缠的后果。
而例如，我作为总理做的最后一件事，我与印度尼西亚签订了一项共同防御协议。这是我与苏哈托总统签订的《维护安全条约》。我们2000万人，技术水平相当高，2.5亿人。如果你愿意的话，我们两人真的能够抵抗任何地区压力。

换句话说，如果我们自己做，我们可以做到这些事情。我从冷启动开始组织了亚太经合组织领导人会议，与乔治·赫伯特·布什、加雷思·埃文斯一起制定了柬埔寨和平协定和化学武器公约。我们能够做这些事情，并建造我们的潜艇。金·比兹利和我都是柯林斯级潜艇的推动者。关键是，如果你拥有一个大陆，就需要阻止其他人进入它。

你想要海上拒止能力，我们有能力做到

拒绝能力，执行

明智的外交政策，不受美国或任何其他人的控制。被控制并不明智。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

不，没错。我想带您回到 30 年前的 1992 年。您提到了您担任总理时发起的一些事情。1992 年初，您是澳大利亚新任总理，1991 年 12 月刚刚接替鲍勃·霍克。您上任时正值 20 世纪末，当时的地缘政治结构刚刚发生重大顿悟：冷战结束，苏联解体。

当时，像您这样的领导人，当然还有美国总统，面临着明智和审慎的治国之道。您当时是如何看待这个机会的？这与您上任时所持的特定历史观有何关联？您从年轻时就一直在思考这一历史观，您读过的一些书也与您有关：关于丘吉尔和罗斯福等领导人的书，这些书激发了您的想象力，并促使您投身政治生活。

保罗·基廷先生：

米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫小心翼翼地让苏联失望，乔治·赫伯特·布什总统和詹姆斯·贝克等人则刻意而毫不掩饰地让这些碎片脱离了苏联。事情发生了——戈尔巴乔夫在我担任总理五天后签署了这份文件。五天后，我在悉尼的 Kirribilli House 迎来了一位美国总统。

您可以看到，开放区域主义有巨大的机会。也就是说，冷战的两极化已经结束。电力供应中断，旧经互会集团中的各州逐渐疏远。苏联内部国家宣布独立。开放的区域主义有机会实现。

如果你环顾世界的这个角落，我们可以把中国、越南等纳入这里的国家大家庭，正是考虑到这一点，我向乔治·赫伯特·布什和当时与他一起担任国家安全顾问的布伦特·斯考克罗夫特将军建议，这是一个让美国更具战略性地参与亚洲事务的机会，而且是在总统层面，而不是国务卿或财政部长层面，这是亚太经合组织最初的目标。但通过将总统的权威带到那里，白宫每年每周都会有人担心东亚和太平洋问题。

我认为这就是我们可以做到的。每隔十年左右，美国就会与中国举行一次双边会谈；你知道，尼克松/毛泽东式的会谈；随着中国崛起，冷战结束，像印度尼西亚这样的国家的地位也随之上升。日本是与不结盟运动的领导者，日本一直在亚洲徘徊，而中国就在附近。我认为，这是一个将两者结合起来的机会。布伦特·斯考克罗夫特在会上对我说：“首相，你正在为美国和亚洲阐明一项我们自己尚未阐明的政策。”事实就是如此，我认为我们有这个后冷战时期的机会，但我认为这不仅仅是我看到的地区机会。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

你确实在那次会议上说过，你说总统，这是直接对乔治·H·W·布什总统说的，“总统现在有机会以自 1914 年以来前所未有的方式行使国际领导权；俄罗斯、其他前苏联共和国、中欧和东欧国家、中国和墨西哥都在这种背景下试图进入世界市场。建立与英国二战后布雷顿森林体系一样有影响力的机构至关重要”。

这又回到了罗斯福的世界观，不是吗？罗斯福的世界观深深地吸引了你——这是自由国际主义在世界体系中蓬勃发展的另一个机会吗？

保罗·基廷议员：

我一直……我没有英雄，但有两个最接近的英雄罗斯福和丘吉尔。丘吉尔是 19 世纪的政治家，罗斯福是 20 世纪的政治家，但他们都有自己的伟大之处。我们经常听到的美国自由国际主义实际上只持续了 30 年。它从 1915 年持续到 1945 年，直到富兰克林·罗斯福去世。伍德罗·威尔逊和第一次世界大战，富兰克林·罗斯福和第二次世界大战。两人都相信包容。伍德罗·威尔逊的国际联盟。富兰克林·罗斯福的联合国。他们在第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战的战火结束时看到了拥有更具代表性的世界权力结构的机会，那就是多极世界。不是一个由 1945 年的胜利者统治的世界，而是一个多极世界。当然，罗斯福在他实现这个梦想之前就去世了。问题在于

对他来说，联合国的梦想就是斯大林。正如乔治·凯南所说，斯大林有意识形态的观点。你看，苏联是一个寻求世界霸权的意识形态国家。但抛开苏联的思想，看看罗斯福的直觉。他的直觉是多极世界，这是真正具有代表性的，当然，随之而来的是殖民主义的终结。

那么战舰上是密苏里号吗？丘吉尔想保住印度，罗斯福说：“印度不再有英国人，印度尼西亚不再有荷兰人，印度支那不再有法国人”。他希望看到人民自由，他想背弃殖民主义，他希望代表权得到代表。这就是冷战结束时所缺失的东西。这就是比尔·克林顿的失败，乔治·W·布什的失败，也是巴拉克·奥巴马和特朗普的失败。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

这是美国未能在一个真正具有代表性的国际结构中为中国、印度、俄罗斯找到并为其提供一席之地，对吗？你会说，我们得到的是冷战后的混乱，对吗？

保罗·基廷议员：

认为你可以拥有一个单极世界。这是历史的终结。历史的终结并没有持续多久。这就是关键所在。你看，我很久以前就说过，从 1997 年左右开始，我就攻击北约的扩张，试图将旧俄罗斯、前苏联围起来，咬掉馅饼皮；你可以看到这给我们带来了什么。

我当时谈论的是代表性结构。我当时敦促比尔·克林顿为中国找到一席之地。当然，1996 年和 1997 年，中国在战略和经济上都没有什么作为。但我一直认为，只要我们有 G7 结构，就永远不会有一个运作良好、和平的世界……看看 G7。意大利和加拿大与英国并列，而世界另一端的中国，其 GDP 比美国还大，但它却不在其中。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

非常有趣的是，柏林墙倒塌时，当时美国政府内部显然有一种感觉，这不是在苏联共产主义的坟墓上跳舞的机会，但到了 1992 年 1 月，当 H.W. 布什发表国情咨文时，他说“感谢上帝，美国赢得了冷战”。他们有这种美国庆祝的感觉。

保罗·基廷议员：

基本上，当时我在一次谈话中对比尔·克林顿说：“你们要弄清楚 40 年后你们如何坐在最高位置，坐在最高位置的顶端”，而他们对美国说：“你是什么意思，我们总是坐在最高位置”，这等于说：“世界上还会有其他大国，显然俄罗斯仍是拥有核武器的国家，当然还有中国。”

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

在我们对今晚活动的初步讨论中，您提到了这一点……您说我们发动了两次世界大战，以解决德国在欧洲的地位问题。您回忆说，1871 年德国统一时，德皇在凡尔赛宫加冕，英国、俄罗斯和法国外交官可能正坐在那里的沙砾上等待，并说：“我们要怎么对待这个德国新贵？”现在，我们又有了一个新的对手——中国。这个教训告诉我们什么？我们是否必须再来一场全球战争来解决中国的地位问题？

保罗·基廷议员：

我们确实发动了两次世界大战来解决德国的地位问题。你可以经历这些战火，但最终还是会达成和解。为什么不在战火之前达成和解呢？你会认为，即使是纳粹，当他们看到自己的国家被美国和英国的地毯式轰炸摧毁时，他们也会说，“我们最好现在就做一笔交易”。所以你知道，这就是问题所在。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

这就是你所说的“愤怒的复仇”政策。地毯式轰炸。

保罗·基廷议员：

就是这样。愤怒的报复……我认为，美国和中国面临的真正巨大挑战是……我有自己的观点……其他人也认同我的观点。兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基就是其中之一。布热津斯基是冷战的终极斗士。希特勒和斯大林分裂波兰时，他还是个十几岁的少年。他成为了美国公民。他成为了吉米·卡特总统的首席美国战略顾问。他基本上是负责执行尼克松毛泽东协议的。布热津斯基是必须实施该协议的人。我保留了他在 2012 年说过的一些话。让我读一读。

“在美国，未来几十年的核心挑战将是振兴自身，同时推动更大的西方发展并适应中国不断上升的全球地位。”你注意到，“适应”不是竞争；适应。他谈到了更大的西方，包括俄罗斯和土耳其。一个更大的西方。然后他谈到了亚洲，美国应该成为该地区的平衡者和调解者。

美国是大西洋的担保人，也是东方的平衡力量。不是东方的担保人，不是等级制力量；而是平衡力量。他接着说：“美国应该尊重……能够也应该帮助亚洲国家避免争夺地区主导地位，同时调解冲突，抵消潜在竞争对手之间的权力不平衡。美国应该尊重中国在维护远东大陆稳定方面发挥的特殊历史和地缘政治作用。”

重复：“美国应该尊重中国在维护远东大陆稳定方面发挥的特殊历史和地缘政治作用。”他接着说：“美国还必须认识到，亚洲的稳定不能再由非亚洲国家强加，至少不能由美国直接运用军事力量。”他在这里假设……是我一直相信的，亚洲的平衡力量、稳定力量是中国。不是日本。日本已经对我们其他国家发动了攻击。你知道，第二次世界大战……日俄战争。如今人口不断减少，中国不太可能发动战争。但在此期间，中国没有攻击任何人。
中国没有攻击任何人。他们生活在那个碗状区域——北边是西伯利亚和蒙古，东边是喜马拉雅山。南边是印度支那，东边是太平洋。他们不攻击其他国家。所以布热津斯基说：“美国应该尊重中国特殊的历史和地缘政治角色。”你如何尊重他们的角色？鉴于中国按购买力平价计算的国内生产总值现在比美国大 20%——是一个比美国国内生产总值更大的国家。它有一支庞大的海军。你拥有 20% 的人类。

推断一下，布热津斯基的观点是美国可以与中国合作管理世界。换句话说，美国巩固了大西洋，这是我在演讲中反复使用的一个短语，美国巩固了大西洋，包括将俄罗斯带入欧洲，而在东方，稳定是由中国提供的。但美国仍然作为平衡力量存在。

我认为，这种模式对整个世界都是有利的，因为
中国人并没有试图推翻现有体系。让我们把这一点说清楚。中国不是旧苏联。它不是在输出意识形态。它是西方现有安排的一部分。它是世界贸易组织、世界卫生组织、国际货币基金组织、世界银行的成员，它希望加入跨太平洋伙伴关系协定，几年前，它的主席在达沃斯为全球化辩护。它不想颠覆现有体系。

但它不想成为一个“负责任的利益相关者”，用鲍勃·佐利克的话来说，这是一个由美国运营的专有体系。坦率地说，如此庞大的经济体量和占人类 20% 的经济体，为什么要这么做？

为什么要这么做？

你可以让意大利、加拿大、英国和澳大利亚等旗手加入 G7，并说“我们可以……统治世界……”

2011 年，我在堪培拉与外交和国防大臣进行了交谈。我当时说，最重要的是，美国不要将中国视为战略挑战者和全面反制力量……换句话说，将中国的崛起视为世界结构有序发展的必然结果。我们不希望重演 1892 年俄罗斯和法国缔结协约以平衡德国或英国于 1904 年加入协约的情形。

一旦出现两极分化和僵化，萨拉热窝王储的去世将使整个局面崩溃。在两极结构中，每个时刻都会被放大。

我认为……你看……十年前曾讨论过 G2。当然，G1 指的是美国，G2 指的是中国。换句话说，你需要了解其中的微妙之处。G2 是一个从属角色。但中国不再是 G2，中国想要的是 G1 和 G1，一个不攻击其他国家的国家，一个对世界经济做出重大贡献的国家，一个在 25 年内抑制通货膨胀、同时帮助 20% 的人类摆脱贫困的主要力量。美国是否无法在这里达成多极解决方案？

我可能会说，这样的解决方案包括印度等国家。我曾讨论过……和

印度尼西亚。但这种认为美国是超强国家的想法，作为民主的传播者，它有上帝的耳朵，其他国家必须跟随。这在 20 世纪是好的。20 世纪是美国的世纪。21 世纪不是美国的世纪。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

如果可以的话，我想谈谈这个问题。你提出了为什么我们不能在冲突之前达成和解的关键问题。问题是，你已经开始讨论这个问题了，美国人愿意吗？也就是说，当我们处于这种两极分化已经根深蒂固的境地时。华盛顿两党就这一问题达成了强烈的共识。

她的战略竞争或新冷战。美国甚至与中国达成妥协，甚至达成妥协，或多或少都会被描述为绥靖政策，或者让我们把慕尼黑神话抛在脑后。
这是美国能做的事情吗？放弃其主导地位的想法？

保罗·基廷议员：

如果领导得当，是的。詹姆斯，中国的野心在西方，而不是东方。美国和澳大利亚等国家存在一个很大的混淆，认为一切都围绕着东海和南海。那是中国的前门垫。他们只是不想让任何其他有台湾的国家在他们的海岸上。他们真正感兴趣的是“斯坦”国家。也就是中亚。作为“一带一路”倡议的结果，我认为你可以说，在未来 30 年里，从武汉到伊斯坦布尔的任何地方都将受到中国的巨大影响，而无需争论。他们已经在巴基斯坦西侧的瓜达尔港为那些“斯坦”国家——乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦修建了一个港口。

这些小国永远地失去了旧苏联。

现在，根据该计划，中国计划，他们可以通过格但斯克进入比斯开湾和波罗的海。你会看到德国人和法国人加入进来。中国人一直在担心马六甲海峡，以及他们如何通过陆路，穿过亚洲的大草原，将货物和材料运到中国。

“一带一路”基本上就是为了实现这一点。如果你看看中国的增长能力。另一点是——我们生活的城市社会，大约有 80% 到 90% 的城市化。美国、英国、德国、法国、澳大利亚……

中国有大约 60% 的城市化。它在国内还有很大的增长空间。它的增长
通过中亚。所以，你不需要成为人口统计学家或统计学家就能算出，如果根据国际货币基金组织的数据，中国经济的 GDP 已经比美国高出 20%，那么 25 年或 30 年之后，它会达到什么水平？如果美国不接受这个数字，那利润又在哪里？这就是现实。
因此，我们可以用“围堵中国”来保护自己的想法有点不合法。它并没有攻击任何人，但它仍然是不合法的。这是一派胡言。一个头脑好、思想开放、富有创造力的美国总统仍然可以发展出一个多极结构。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：我想知道，澳大利亚战略家和外交政策思想家是否难以面对这个问题。美国很可能不再相信自己。这是一个澳大利亚人不习惯的非常不同的美国。你看到了特朗普当选时的反应，特朗普不相信美国例外论，我的意思是，他不相信基于规则的秩序，他不相信联盟。

保罗·基廷议员：
没有基于规则的秩序。走进伊拉克，那是在什么规则下？或者阿富汗，那是在什么规则下？

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
我们能否直接讨论美国联盟，美国澳大利亚联盟，并更详细地回顾一下这段历史，当你在政府任职时，甚至在你任职之前。我只想引用我最近采访美国研究中心首席执行官迈克尔·格林时说的一句话作为开场白，他提到你、休·怀特和鲍勃·卡尔是“公开质疑联盟的人”，他说你显然“把中国的情况告诉澳大利亚人民，批评美国”。
他补充说：“这看起来不太好，确实让奥巴马政府和特朗普政府初期的人们有些紧张。”保罗·基廷，我能问一下你对这个评价有什么反应吗？

保罗·基廷议员：
嗯，现在美国和代表他们的人对有思想的盟友不感兴趣。他们基本上对那些没有思想的盟友的谄媚者一视同仁。就我个人而言，我在这里提出了几点。

美国对那些一生坚持下去的人特别忘恩负义。我就是其中之一。在工党的二十年里，我支持美国联盟，反对当时的亲共左派，温和的亲共左派。

当约翰·霍华德参加英国国教主日学校义卖会时，我在市政厅与共产党人作战。这是一场真正的战斗。当我和鲍勃·霍克一起去的时候，他邀请我在第一次旅行中会见里根总统……鲍勃一生都受到左派的支持，他希望对美国有一定的了解。
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我说：“鲍勃，如果我是你，我会积极拥抱里根总统，因为他是个快乐的人，而你的朋友乔治·舒尔茨在 83 年之后的关系。”特别是考虑到 70 年代惠特拉姆政府的问题，他们对此记忆犹新。
惠特拉姆和尼克松之间的问题。我说：“鲍勃，这是

黑白大军。他们对灰色不感兴趣。让我们热情地拥抱他们，让我们继续前进。”我不是说我是唯一一个对鲍勃有影响的人，但我对他有很大的影响。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
就在那时，鲍勃说——我们“永远在一起”，澳大利亚和美国。
保罗·基廷先生：
我要说的是，罗恩是一位很棒的主人。冷战后的第一个政策承诺是，在乔治·赫伯特·布什总统领导下的美国的支持下，联合国决定抵抗伊拉克和萨达姆·侯赛因对科威特的袭击，这被称为沙漠盾牌。
我目前是副总理，鲍勃·霍克叫我去开会。鲍勃说：“总统要打电话来，想知道我们对科威特的立场是什么。”我说：“鲍勃，你在加拿大的伙伴 [布莱恩] 马尔罗尼呢，你告诉我
他是个多么好的人，英国的约翰·梅杰呢？他们是北约成员国，
他们在做什么？为什么我们要第一个举手？”
鲍勃说：“你知道，自愿参加并不好。” 也就是说，自愿参加。所以我参加了这次会议。我控制了党派的权力。我不仅仅是副总理。我说，如果这是冷战后联合国的第一次行动，而美国想要支持这一承诺，我支持这样做。但我说：“如果你的伙伴马尔罗尼和梅杰在拖后腿，那我们就早点加入，但要低价。”

我们已经在海湾有一艘油轮，我们可以把一艘驱逐舰放在海湾的顶部。

鲍勃说“好的”。但我说，鲍勃，不要作战部队，不要飞机。他说“不，不，没关系”，他按了一个按钮，服务员进来了，我们都喝了一杯茶。

然后做出了决定。今天我们从美国那里得到了多少感谢？零感谢。

然后当我看到你提到乔治·赫伯特·布什和把亚太经合组织领导人会议聚集在一起时……美国是一场以欧洲为中心的表演。它没有亚洲政策，没有太平洋政策。
它一直由海军管理。太平洋政策由檀香山制定。没有国务院参与。我以澳大利亚总理的身份来到这里，我说“太平洋怎么办？”我接受了，得到了乔治·赫伯特的同意。乔治·布什说，“如果我们这样做，它就会爆炸”。保罗说“你来做”。我和日本首相、苏哈托总统、泰国总理、新加坡总理、加拿大总理和中国国家主席谈过。
在一段时间内，我为亚太经合组织领导人会议达成了共识。乔治·12·赫伯特·布什输掉了选举，比尔·克林顿得到了结果。我向比尔·克林顿提出了我已经制定的安排。他对我说：“你看，我是靠‘经济才是关键’这个竞选纲领击败乔治·布什的，我不想卷入科威特这样的外交事务。”

你要求我做的是加入一个战略机构。我告诉你我会怎么做——我会加入，只要你让它看起来像一个贸易机构。然后我和他就此展开了激烈的讨价还价，我们决定在西雅图会面。波音和微软的总部看起来好像是在讨论太平洋彼岸的就业问题。但你我都知道，美国总统与中国国家主席、日本首相、印度尼西亚总统坐在一起。在领导层面，这当然是一次战略会议。这是澳??大利亚外交政策的结果——这是我送给美国的个人礼物。他们不会为此感谢或感激你。这就是为什么我不太在意他们。詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
您是否对美国方面对这种批评的敏感性感到惊讶？
保罗·基廷议员：
他们想要傻瓜……作为对话者，作为盟友。他们说，让我们来思考。我们让他们思考，而这种思考并不是很好。这就是关键所在。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
我们稍后会回到这个问题上，因为我认为，在联盟问题和美国和澳大利亚军队的“可互换性”问题上，有很多最新进展值得一提。在此之前，我想问一个关于四方安全对话的问题。以及近年来人们对四方安全对话寄予的巨大希望。当然，四方安全对话现在已升格为领导人会议，近年来也更频繁地举行会议。
现在，这里的一个问题当然是，自俄罗斯入侵乌克兰以来，我们已经收到了许多印度就俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的立场的道歉。公平地说，这些道歉是在印度总统莫迪最近公开斥责弗拉基米尔·普京之前做出的。这是公开谴责。当然，与此同时，印度仍在派遣军队参加东方站与中国和俄罗斯军队的军事演习。澳大利亚国立大学著名的四方安全对话倡导者之一是罗里·梅特卡夫，他说，在乌克兰危机爆发之初，印度采取了“冷酷的基于利益的

解决乌克兰困境的策略是，但从长远来看，乌克兰的未来掌握在西方手中”。他说，四方安全对话和其他印度朋友成功说服印度改变这种策略，“不是通过勇敢地呼吁价值观来实现的，而是通过帮助印度改变其国家利益考量来实现的”。你觉得其他人可以改变印度的国家利益考量这个观点怎么样？
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保罗·基廷议员：这只是业余时间的胡说八道。四方安全对话是战略上的胡说八道。印度对澳大利亚很重要，因为它是南亚的关键国家，也是印度洋的主导者。我们应该以此为基础接近印度，但不是采用某种珍珠链式的想法，即我们可以联合起来遏制中国，这基本上是已故首相安倍晋三的想法。我们可以把美国和澳大利亚串在一起，利用印度来抵抗中国。你能想象一支由印度海军舰艇组成的舰队进入马六甲海峡，驶入中国海与中国军队作战，捍卫西方价值观吗？美国或澳大利亚的价值观。你永远都不会看到这种情况。我应该告诉你。基辛格和我一起参与了这项工作。我们通常会在晚些时候共进晚餐。在一次晚宴上，亨利用他那深沉的声音对我说：“你和我有一个重要的战略思想，很少有人认同。布热津斯基也认同这一点——我们三个人都认同。那就是印度永远不会成为东亚体系的一部分。”亨利这么说过，我一直都相信这一点。我认为，如果中国在印度洋上远离印度，你就不会在南海看到任何印度海军活动或军事活动。换句话说，认为美国人和莫里森之类的人可以在其周围建立某种防御结构的想法是一派胡言。我只想说……你提到了……罗里·梅德卡夫。我在这里引用了这句话。我在《澳大利亚人报》上找到了这句话。梅德卡夫说：“印度及其长期利益在于西方。”你认为有哪位印度政客认为他们的利益可能在于西方？印度的利益在于巴基斯坦和中东，在某种程度上，尽管喜马拉雅山有长城，但印度的利益在于中国人的所作所为。但事实并非如此。他说印度的利益在于西方。梅德卡夫说，说服印度改变这种做法将通过帮助印度改变其国家利益计算来实现。换句话说，我们现在在澳大利亚——有一个所谓的学者，谈论我们如何改变印度的国家利益。这个梅德卡夫家伙有一小瓶印度油，它就像农村集市上的蛇油一样有效。你喝一口印度油，它就能起作用。他是如何获得《悉尼先驱晨报》、《时代报》和《金融评论报》的专栏版面的？

澳大利亚国际辩论的不成熟之处在于，像梅德卡夫这样的普通人……无法理解基本的东西。任何一家报纸的编辑经理都不应该支持这种辩论。如果你经常容忍这种傻瓜……

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
我可以回到与美国的联盟问题上吗？但更具体一点，是关于主权问题。同样，一些前美国官员和其他人表示，他们对澳大利亚对其主权的敏感程度感到非常惊讶。但这一切与我们与美国和英国签署的协议（即 AUKUS）相比如何？它与美国和澳大利亚军队不仅日益增强的互操作性相比如何？正如国防部长理查德·马尔斯现在所说的那样，这些军队的“互换性”也是如此。这一切对我们的行动自由意味着什么？我们在这个国家是否就这些问题进行了充分的辩论？

保罗·基廷议员：

这一切都是天才莫里森与美国人秘密进行的。他们一定说：“真是一次政变！”美国人一直在吹嘘，我们已经让澳大利亚摆脱了困境，已经有 40 年了。你看，我所在的内阁建造了柯林斯级潜艇。如果我成功赢得第六次选举，我会再建造六艘柯林斯级潜艇。

12 号潜艇最终将成为下一代潜艇的第一号。

柯林斯级潜艇是一艘非常成功的潜艇。它在水下听不到声音。在与美国人的演习中，我们每次都在击沉美国潜艇。我不知道人们是否知道这一点，但这是事实。柯林斯级潜艇名声不好，因为他们的柴油发动机不对。但这不是潜艇的设计——澳大利亚有能力部署自己的潜艇。

这些潜艇的用途是什么呢？它们是为了保卫澳大利亚而实施海上拒止。

它们的设计目的不是攻击中国沿海大陆架上的中国核潜艇，而洛杉矶号潜艇的设计目的正是攻击中国核潜艇。

我们是猎杀者。中国人用潜艇给自己提供了核反应能力。如果一艘潜艇携带 12 或 16 枚导弹，那么它就是一艘穿越中国大陆架浅水区的大船。它可以被识别和摧毁。所以我们正在转移。当天才莫里森决定我们应该参与其中时，我确信这是受到安德鲁·希勒的怂恿，我得到可靠的消息，但我不确定，希勒在现任工党政府任职，我希望他们没有听从他，据我所知，他是击沉法国船只的人，可靠消息。我们已经放弃了用一类有能力的船只来保卫我们的岛屿大陆的能力，这些船只不需要在很远的地方待命，因为任何潜艇都需要在中国沿海待命。因此，当我们签署
AUKUS 协议时，我们实际上签署了猎杀潜艇的协议，该潜艇只有一个目的，那就是击沉中国潜艇。我们现在参与其中，但我们根本不应该参与其中。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
我认为你曾说过，它们的用途是“像中国大陆架上的牧羊犬一样”。
保罗·基廷先生：
在中国潜艇进入马里亚纳海沟之前。基本上，我认为我们应该放弃美国核潜艇的提议。当然，英国只是一个笑话。
去康沃尔寻找我们在亚洲的安全。我的意思是，那是詹姆斯·库克和亚瑟·菲利普 230 年前离开的地方。我们真的要回到那里吗？但我们有莫里森，超级思想家，带我们去那里。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：

另一方面……

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保罗·基廷议员：

我认为我们应该放弃 AUKUS 协议。我们应该自己建造潜艇。柯林斯的儿子或女儿。或者，正如休·怀特在最近的一篇文章中所写，以核潜艇的价格，你可以从德国、荷兰或西班牙购买 25 艘潜艇。换句话说，考虑到我们只能在海上部署大约四分之一，你更愿意拥有 24 艘潜艇，其中 6 艘在海上，还是 8 艘核潜艇，其中 2 艘在海上？而且因为它们是核潜艇，所以如果没有美国的支持，它们就无法投入使用——如果存在互操作性，就意味着我们的主权、我们的决策和行动自由将被彻底剥夺。任何有自尊心的澳大利亚人都不应该支持以这种方式侵犯我们的主权。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：莫里森达成这项协议时，工党反对派只收到不到 24 小时的通知来考虑这项协议及其影响。你认为他们真的用心在这件事上吗？
保罗·基廷议员：这项协议本应提供 20 个月的考虑时间。工党和反对派应该说的是，“谢谢你的简报，我们会考虑的。我们有 20 个月的时间来考虑。”那天早上，也就是宣布的早上，我很早就听说了这件事。我发表声明说我反对它，它会侵犯我们的主权。所以工党本可以在这一点上注意到我，但他们没有注意到。我没有和任何人交谈。当然，他们签署了协议。但这并不意味着他们必须继续签署。我在众议院的第一次演讲中谈到了第二次世界大战开始时，澳大利亚没有军事工业综合体，我们应该发展它。我从根本上支持与墨尔本的 Transfield 一起建造柯林斯潜艇和护卫舰。我本来会有 12 艘这样的潜艇。如果我们遵守 AUKUS 协议，对澳大利亚来说将是一场悲剧。你可以进行 AUKUS 信息交换——这很好——我们一直在与英国人和美国人交换信息。但我们应该放弃洛杉矶级潜艇。

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
然而，在国家安全辩论中，您是否认为现任政府在政治上受到反对党领袖达顿的阻碍……工党是否会真正担心，因为工党被视为联盟软弱、不值得信任。它会重演冷战时期的噩梦吗？保罗·基廷：
执政政府应该讲述自己的故事。鲍勃·霍克、我本人、加雷斯·埃文斯讲述的故事，以及我们在亚洲独立的故事……我们有能力做所有这些事情。陆克文后来在凯文的东亚峰会上……我与亚太经合组织领导人会议，加雷斯与许多地区外交关系，例如与印度尼西亚的阿里·阿拉塔斯的关系，我与苏哈托的关系，我与当时日本两位首相的关系……我们可以讲述我们的故事。我们不必被自由党的愚蠢故事所困扰。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
故事问题很好地引出了我现在想去的地方。这就是民族认同的问题。现在，回到政府时期，您担任总理期间，那段时期，澳大利亚在身份认同、民族自信和地区前景等方面发生了很多问题。您在 1992 年初的一次演讲中说，在那十年里，澳大利亚可以“以前所未有的方式独立”。当然，在惠特拉姆和弗雷泽的领导下，发生了一些变化，各种装饰、殖民主义的旧遗物都得到了修改，一些被抛弃了，但我们仍然感觉缺乏那种几乎从旧帝国时代心理上解脱的感觉。您当时提出的所有这些问题都以一种不同于以往任何一位总理的方式整合在一起，无论是原住民所有权问题，还是走向澳大利亚共和国的问题，还是亚太经合组织领导人会议等等。您提到了与印度尼西亚签署的条约。鉴于最近我们看到的伊丽莎白二世女王去世的事件，我确实想听听您对公众辩论走向的看法，当然，您会记得，当您担任总理时，仅在澳大利亚人民是否希望走向共和国的问题上，您的支持率就高达 73%。
您向自由党提供了这方面的股份。您明确表示，您将保留参议院的作用，参议院仍将能够阻止供应。总督的权力不会受到限制，您并没有提出这一点。霍华德放弃了这一点，并在问题中提出了一种他知道会击败它的方式。
保罗·基廷议员：
没错，您对历史的了解是正确的。我认为，如果我们要在后冷战时代，在东亚找到适当的位置。我们需要在亚洲找到我们的安全，而不是从亚洲，也就是试图与大国携手。然后你几乎抬不起头来说，“顺便说一句，我们的国家元首是英国君主。”我在一次选举中提出了这个问题，这是 1993 年的政策演讲。工党内部的人……都惊恐地认为我会在选举中提出这个问题。人们说，哦，好吧，基廷对共和国有看法，基廷对共和国没有看法，基廷在选举中提出了一项建议，那就是我们将就这个问题举行全民公投——你认为澳大利亚应该成为共和国吗？我们得到了 73% 的支持。因为总理，我——我在那里争论共和国的重要性，我总是说，这对我们来说比我们对别人说的更能说明我们自己。但我认为，在冷战后的世界，特别是在我与印度尼西亚苏哈托总统以及我每周都保持联系的所有其他地区领导人建立的新关系中，在发展和运营亚太经合组织领导人会议方面。与英国女王一起出现对我们来说是个笑话，当然，我对她怀有极大的敬意，但我指的是英国的君主制。与此同时，我们并没有承认我们对原住民和托雷斯海峡岛民所做的事情。除了弗雷泽政府的《北领地土地权利法案》外，原住民事务权力实际上没有得到任何实质性利用。我认为高等法院对马博案的裁决是一个真正的机会，可以以某种方式解决土地权问题，并承认我们所做的事情。因此，我发表了讲话，承认了过去所犯下的罪行——我说“我们带来了酒精和疾病，我们犯下了谋杀罪，并从母亲身边夺走了孩子”。
与此同时，尽管我们已经消除了悉尼、墨尔本和所有大都市地区任何残留的原住民所有权，但澳大利亚大片土地仍可根据原住民所有权法案提出索赔，而原住民所有权法案是我在 1993 年花了八个月时间在议会制定的。换句话说，我想为澳大利亚翻开新的一页。让一位澳大利亚人成为我们的国家元首。我们承认了我们对该国原住民所做的一切。我们试图以原住民所有权土地的形式进行赔偿。
并以此作为一种……对该国及其原住民和该地区的善意主旋律。以及该地区的居民。
我认为这是重要的。现在，约翰·霍华德在共和国问题上对国家造成了可怕的伤害。正如你正确指出的那样，我当时在电话里和他谈过这件事，我想做出改变。总督的权力不会受到限制或写下来，参议院仍然可以拒绝供应。这是自由党政府可以采用的模式。但霍华德总是在后视镜里开车，总是倒车，而且速度很快，他想保留君主制。所以他提出的问题不是“你想拥有一个澳大利亚共和国吗”，而是你认为我们应该

会由议会任命总统吗？他知道这个问题会失败，而霍华德作为首相甚至没有辩论这个问题。当然，这件事失败了。

那么，我们现在在哪里？嗯……女王伊丽莎白二世已经去世了。我见过她，告诉她我不会让她的家人参与其中。我和她关系很好，真的。我想王室会很高兴公投通过。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：这是1993年在巴尔莫勒尔宫吗？
保罗·基廷议员：是的，但现在……看看法国人。法国人为他们的共和国进行了革命。美国人为他们的共和国进行了革命。我们甚至不能从女王伊丽莎白二世手中夺走我们的头衔，她不想要。（笑）我们不能夺走这个头衔，即使君主很乐意授予它。事实上，如果澳大利亚国王查理三世不主动把主权交给我们，不放弃君主制对澳大利亚的主权，我一点也不会感到惊讶。
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换句话说，共和党运动告诉我，你现在应该站在那里，就此事发表讲话。你为什么要这么做？我们搞砸了。如果澳大利亚人对自己如此不自豪，如此不自豪，以至于他们很高兴由英国君主代表，那么为什么像我这样的人会争论改变他们对自己的悲惨看法？
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
所以，澳大利亚人未能夺取共和国，他们未能将其作为主权的典范。
保罗·基廷议员：
并非所有澳大利亚人都如此。事情很接近。如果当时的总理能够正确辩论，它就会成功。澳大利亚最优秀的本能在那场竞选中显而易见，在那些结果中也是如此。但当然，现在有些人……他们头脑清醒，会相信英国君主能够代表我们的愿望吗？无论是否多元文化。我们是多元文化的。但仅限于该地区。我们占据着地球上最古老的陆地之一，地球上最古老的大陆，也许拥有地球上最古老的社会。澳大利亚君主真是太可悲了。几乎不需要争论。我们有英国君主制，莫里森和另一个疯子鲍里斯·约翰逊一起逃到康沃尔……詹姆斯·柯伦教授：澳大利亚国王查理三世并没有真正吸引你。保罗·基廷议员：澳大利亚国王查理三世是宪法上的异常。就是这样。詹姆斯·柯伦教授：我可以问最后一个问题，也许可以把这一切联系在一起吗？在您第一次担任总理时，您在一次采访中说：“总理职位代表着国家的理想和抱负”。您认为，澳大利亚现在应该努力实现的理想是什么？这个国家的抱负又在哪里？

保罗·基廷议员：我认为澳大利亚现在对自己的认识很差。它的国家元首是另一个国家的君主。它的战略主权被外包给另一个国家——一个北大西洋国家，美国。它不知道它是什么，也不知道它应该是什么。然而，这片大陆的遗产和礼物是如此伟大的礼物。看看我们与中国之间的这些问题——中国从悉尼飞到澳大利亚要 13 个小时。我们在这里给自己制造问题。
我只想说，我们如此不加批判地与亚洲其他国家捆绑在一起，其问题在于美国不知道自己在亚洲该做什么，一点也不知道。没有连贯的计划。看看发生了什么。作为这方面的迹象。

我们让奥巴马总统谈论了转向。没有任何结果。他在东京发表了关于钓鱼岛的重要讲话——钓鱼岛是日本的一部分。它属于美日协议的条款。我们对此有何看法？中国现在拥有一支强大的海军。如果我们想跟在美国后面，他们的政策是什么？他们在亚洲的战略是什么？

詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
我们已经看到拜登总统至少四次几乎消除了战略模糊性——似乎每次都被收回了。如果真的存在台湾冲突，你能看到澳大利亚政府（无论政治派别）会说不的例子吗？

保罗·基廷议员：
如果我是总理，我肯定会说不。我再说一遍，台湾不是澳大利亚的重大利益。我们对台湾的政治制度的兴趣不应该超过对越南或哈萨克斯坦政治制度的兴趣。我们为什么要感兴趣？记住，台湾的民主始于 1996 年，不是 1906 年，而是 1996 年。当李登辉决定，哦，看看我们应该举行一系列市政选举时。他说，我们不能让国民党成为唯一的政党，让我们有几个多党派，以及一系列市政选举，看看谁来管理这个国家。而对于那些市政选举，我们有第三次世界大战，这是提议吗？对于台湾，对于它的市政选举，我们有第三次世界大战？对于美国人，如果我有什么建议给他们，那就是坚持战略

模糊性就像胶水一样。诺曼底之所以成为可能，是因为距离诺曼底 21 英里的地方是一个工业国家，英国。没有雷达，没有卫星。在恶劣天气的掩护下，盟军能够在诺曼底的奥马哈海滩登陆。

台湾 21 英里范围内没有西方国家。事实上，中国距离台湾 90 英里。因此，中国会看到每艘驶向台湾的两栖舰艇，无论是从关岛，还是从圣地亚哥或檀香山驶来，他们都会看到并击沉它们。所以在我看来，美国战胜台湾的机会为零。

我们为什么希望成为失败的一部分？我们为什么要这样做？最后，美国人最终离开了东亚。我们被抛在后面。我们不能在布鲁姆给澳大利亚装上舷外马达，启动马达，把大陆移到圣地亚哥——我们被困在这里，而美国人则回到太平洋的大陆。我们生活在一个华人世界，这就是事实。詹姆斯·柯伦教授：这是问题的一部分吗——我们如此紧密地依赖美国的政策，以至于如果美国政策突然改变，我们之前已经看到过这种情况，不管在目前的情况下，在华盛顿达成的共识下，这看起来多么不可能，澳大利亚都会像石头上的毛一样被抛弃吗？保罗·基廷议员：例如，如果台湾问题爆发战争，对日本和韩国的保证就会失去可信度，那么美国可能会一走了之。问题是我们不能一走了之，我们被困在这里。这就是为什么执行这种政策是如此愚蠢。正如我们在 80 年代和 90 年代所展示的那样，我们可以对中国实施非常明智的政策，但对该地区，对印度尼西亚，也是如此。我们的衣食父母依赖印度尼西亚群岛。东南亚对我们来说很重要。在一次电视采访中，我打了跷跷板的比喻。公园里的跷跷板。如果你认为跷跷板上西方和东方的运动是问题，那么在东方有日本和中国，在西方有印度和巴基斯坦，但在中心，在中心焦点，在支点，即印度尼西亚和东南亚，我们没有这些风险。所以，我们应该集中精力——我的意思是，理想情况下，我认为我们是东盟的一员。我与苏哈托总统达成的协议中，有澳新美安全条约的字眼，实际上是维护安全的协议，约翰·霍华德因庆祝科斯格罗夫将军而失去了这份协议。当他在墨尔本和悉尼举行盛大的游行，把科斯格罗夫带回来时，印尼总统哈比比说，你代表的是联合国代表团，但你却表现得像一支胜利的入侵部队，所以我暂停了基廷与苏哈托达成的协议。协议本质上是……如果印尼遭到袭击，我们会认为这是对我们的袭击。在印尼，对我们的袭击或多或少会被视为对他们的袭击。这意味着我们或多或少有一个共同防御协定——当然，这需要对话——但这是一个共同防御协定。作为工党总理，我与世界上最大的穆斯林国家、不结盟运动的领导人达成了一项澳新美安全条约的防御协定。你能想象自由党有人会做这样的事吗？你能想象他们中的任何一个人吗？
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：我想你说它就像一道横跨全国的钢圈围栏。
保罗·基廷议员：我们仍然在群岛上吃着黄油。想象一下，如果我们在过去 20 多年里一直在该协议的合作下工作，而不是把时间浪费在伊拉克、阿富汗、四方安全对话、美国对中国的希望等无稽之谈上。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：所以，澳大利亚新政府，只是为了把这件事联系起来，新政府已经开始改变语气，谈论稳定与中国的关系。它抛弃了莫里森政府的词汇，无论是“战鼓”还是其他。它谈论的是原住民的外交政策；它阐明了对东盟中心地位的承诺。这是否让您对……更加乐观了一点
21
保罗·基廷议员：
只有这一点。语气必须变成实质。语气是一回事，实质是另一回事。
我希望政府在这方面做得很好，时间会证明一切。至少这不是斯科特·莫里森实施的令人震惊的政策。
詹姆斯·柯伦教授：
我想我们就到此为止了。感谢保罗·基廷抽出时间。我们在那里讨论了很多领域。我们知道，历史如果重演，它不会完全重演，但
当然，对历史的更多了解可以帮助我们澄清论点并启发判断，让我们希望如此。非常感谢你今晚的发言。
保罗·基廷议员：
非常感谢您进行富有洞察力的讨论。

AUSTRALIA AND CHINA: A CONVERSATION WITH PAUL KEATING

12 October 2022
La Trobe University, Sydney Campus
Level 1, 255 Elizabeth Street, Sydney

Speakers:

Professor Susan Dodds, Senior Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research and Industry
Engagement), La Trobe University

The Honourable Paul Keating, 24th Prime Minister of Australia
Professor James Curran, Professor of Modern History, University of Sydney

Transcript

PROF SUSAN DODDS:
Hello, I'm Professor Susan Dodds and I'm the Senior Vice Chancellor for Research at La Trobe University. I'm delighted to be here tonight in Sydney for tonight's Ideas & Society event - Australia and China: A Conversation with Paul Keating. I would like to acknowledge that the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation are Traditional Custodians of the land on which we are broadcasting, La Trobe Sydney campus. And I pay my respects to the Elders past and present.

Welcome to the fourth event in this year’s Ideas & Society program. The 13th year that Emeritus Professor Robert Manne, La Trobe University’s Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow, has presented Ideas & Society. Ideas & Society brings together eminent Australians to consider the big issues facing our nation and the world. This year's previous events have
examined Russia's war on Ukraine, the crisis in Australia's aged care homes and
Australia's handling of the COVID 19 pandemic.

After tonight’s discussion, the next event in the series is on 25 October, where Tim
Flannery will talk with Ross Garnaut about his new book, The Superpower Transformation:
Making Australia's Zero Carbon Future which incidentally is published by La Trobe
University Press. You can register via the La Trobe website. The final event of the year in November will be a discussion on the role of the Greens and Teal independents in the
newly elected federal parliament, moderated by Cathy McGowan, another La Trobe
University’s Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow; with Adam Bandt and Max Chandler-Mather of the
Greens; Zoe Daniel, Teal independent and Simon Holmes à Court, the founder of the
climate initiative that supported the election of several Teals to the House of
Representatives.

Now to tonight's event, the topic and our speakers barely need any introduction. There’s 
been a huge interest in this event, in fact we’ve had well over 3500 registrations, which is one of the most popular discussions the University has ever held. Australia's location in Oceania, between the Indian and Pacific oceans, means we should not, and cannot ignore
the forces at play in our region, especially those fundamental to our future. China's rise as a military and economic power is one such factor. We also find ourselves caught up in the deterioration of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
If anything, problems only escalated during the pandemic, with trade embargoes,
accusations of espionage on both sides, and new tensions related to Taiwan and Xinjiang.
There is presently the threat of a ‘new cold war’ between these two powers, and it is
apparent that relations are unlikely to improve much under President Biden. What does
this mean for our region? For our trade and security? How does this affect human rights
considerations, or the global fight against climate change? After the AUKUS Treaty was
created by the Morrison government, how much will Australia's approach to China
change under Albanese? And what does our response to China mean for our relationship
with the United States?

Moreover, what is the policy dynamic between Washington, Beijing and Canberra? We
are delighted that the former Australian Prime Minister, with deep experience and
expertise, is here to consider these and other questions, with one of the nation's most
astute historians and foreign affair commentators. It's my honour to introduce our
distinguished guest – the honourable Paul Keating served as Australia’s 24th Prime
Minister from 1991 to 1996 and was Treasurer of Australia from 1983 to 1991. His
political legacy includes fundamental economic and social reforms including deregulation
of Australia's financial, product and labour markets, establishment of Australia's
compulsory superannuation system, Native Title legislation and the formation of the
APEC leaders meeting. Mr Keating's books include Engagement: Australia faces the Asia
Pacific which was published in 2000 and was translated into Chinese and Japanese, and a
collection of post-Prime Ministerial speeches, Afterwords. Mr Keating continues to
contribute to public debate on Australian and international economic issues, geopolitics,
foreign policy and security and superannuation. He specialises on the geostrategic
settings of East Asia.

And Professor James Curran is Professor of Modern History at Sydney University and a
foreign affairs columnist for the Australian Financial Review. He has written policy paper analyses for the Lowy Institute and China Matters. James served as the Keith Cameron Chair at University College Dublin and was a Fulbright scholar at Georgetown University.

Prior to becoming an academic, he worked in the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet and as an intelligence analyst at the Office of National Assessments. James has
published a number of books on Australian political culture and foreign affairs. His book,Australia’s China Odyssey: From Euphoria to Fear, is published by New South Wales
Books. I am very pleased to hand over to James, to get the discussion underway. Thank
you.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

Thanks very much Professor Dodds. I would also like to extend my thanks and gratitude to 
Emeritus Professor Robert Manne, convenor of the Ideas & Society program at La Trobe
University, and can I thank all of you who are in Australia and indeed around the world,
who have tuned in tonight to this discussion to listen with Paul Keating.

I think the debate with China and Australia’s foreign policy has tended to be overly
presentist. There are of course, understandable reasons for this, but one of the problems
with that is that historical and contextual ballast is often sacrificed. Mr Keating and I have agreed in a pre-event discussion that this conversation should be about the tectonic
forces of history that move beneath the surface of political events. And that we are about trying to discern the underlying patterns of international affairs, rather than picking at disconnected shards.

Now, a few years ago, former US national security advisor and secretary of state Henry
Kissinger said that he was concerned that today's leaders no longer have the time to think historically. He worried that the current crop of politicians is struggling he said, “to develop a perception of the world and of themselves”. Kissinger went on to say, and I quote him, "We should deepen the current cognitive exercise to a level that is more
compatible with conceptual thinking, and less geared to the immediate emotion."
That's what we are about tonight in this discussion which is about to follow. Paul Keating is a leader, and I don't think it needs any elaboration, who bought to office certain ideas about the world. Ideas which were grounded in view of history and the role of leaders in history, and which drew on a lifetime of thinking about the interplay of identity and culture. Paul Keating, thanks for making the time.

HON PAUL KEATING:

Thank you James, very glad to be here. 

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

With that introduction in mind, and our purpose here, I want to take you back 80 years
ago this year. The fall of Singapore, 1942. You were born two years later, in 1944, and the following year your uncle Billy died on the Sandakan-Ranau Death March. You’ve said
consistently throughout your career that the Second World War “dragged us into Asia”
and that as a result, there should have been no utterly dependent enmeshment with
great and powerful friends, as there had been before. The strategic alignment with Britain to that point had clearly broken down.

As you have pointed out on many occasions – and I quote you – “we were alone and
palely loitering” in this part of the world. How many times do we want to be shown this
lesson about the folly of dependence?

HON PAUL KEATING:

Well, I should’ve thought that having been shown once and importantly in 1942-1945, we
wouldn't have to learn it again, that a society which has inherited a continent, and I used to say in my cabinet, when they were giving out continents, not many people got one. We have no border with another state. We have a continent and therefore our capacity to 
lead decent life here, to maintain the safety of our citizenry, to be able to reasonably
defend the country if we need to, are all things that we are entirely capable of. If you look at our recent experience in the 1980s and 90s, it is clear that we were able to do that.

That is not to say that we told friends we don't need them anymore, like the United
States for instance, or we don't appreciate them. But the problem of enmeshment,
geostrategic enmeshment, means that you compromise your foreign policy action and
you outsource it to another state. That is what the enmeshment does.
Whereas for instance, the last thing I did as prime minister, I entered into essentially a mutual defence pact with Indonesia. This is the Treaty on Maintaining Security that I
entered into with President Suharto. 20 million of us, reasonably technically smart, 250
million of them. Between the two of us, really, able to resist any regional pressure, if you like.

In other words, left to ourselves, we can do these things. I put together the APEC leaders meeting from a cold start, with George Herbert Bush, Gareth Evans put together the Cambodian Peace Accords and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We were able to do
these things and build our submarines. Kim Beazley and I were the moving force behind
the Collins Class submarines. The key is, if you own a continent, the need is to keep other people’s feet from it.

You want sea denial capability, and we are able to do our own sea denial capability, run
an intelligent foreign policy, without being owned by the United States or anyone else. It's not intelligent to be owned.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

No, that's right. I want to take you back then 30 years ago to 1992. You mention some of the things you initiated as Prime Minister. In early 1992, you were a brand-new Australian prime minister and had just taken over from Bob Hawke in December 1991. You are coming to office at a period, towards the end of the 20th century, when a great epiphany has just taken place in terms of the geopolitical structure at the time: the end of the Cold War, and the Soviet Union is wrapping up.

An opportunity is presented at that time to leaders such as yourself and of course, the
president of the United States, for wise and prudent statecraft. How did you see the
opportunity at that point? And how did it relate to a particular view of history that you
brought with you to office, that you had been thinking about really since you were a
young man, with some of the books that you had been reading: about leaders like
Churchill and Roosevelt, that had captured your imagination and propelled you into
political life.

HON PAUL KEATING:

Well, Mikhail Gorbachev let the Soviet Union down carefully, and President George 
Herbert Bush, along with people like James Baker, studiously and unboastfully let those
pieces fall away from what was the Soviet Union. And this happened - Gorbachev signed
the document I think five days after I became prime minister. And five days after that, I
have an American president at Kirribilli House in Sydney.

You can see there was a massive opportunity for open regionalism. That is, with the
bipolarity of the Cold War switched off. With the electricity turned off, with the states in the old Comecon group drifting away. States within the Soviet Union declaring
independence. There was a chance for open regionalism.

If you look around this part of the world, where we could include say China, Vietnam, into the community of nations here, it was with that in mind, that I suggested to George
Herbert Bush and General Brent Scowcroft who was with him at the time as National
Security Advisor, that this was a chance to get the United States more strategically
engaged in Asia, and at Presidential level, not Secretary of State, or Treasury Secretary
level, which was what the first blush of APEC was about. But by bringing the authority of
the presidency there, with someone in the White House every year and every week
worrying about East Asia and in the Pacific.

And I thought that’s what we could put together. Bilateral meetings with the Chinese
were held every decade or so; you know, the Nixon/Mao type meetings; and with the rise
of China coming, and also, with the Cold War finished, the status of a country like
Indonesia. The leader of the non-aligned movement with Japan, which is always loitering
in Asia and with China nearby. There’s a chance, I thought, to bring that together. And
Brent Scowcroft said to me at the meeting, "Prime Minister, you’re articulating a policy
for the United States and Asia we have not articulated for ourselves.” And that was the
truth of it, I thought we had this post-Cold War opportunity, but I thought that extended
beyond just the regional opportunity which I saw.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

Well indeed you said in that meeting, you said that the President, and this is directly to President George H W Bush, “the President now had scope to exercise international
leadership in a way that hasn’t been precedented since 1914; Russia, other former Soviet
republics, the countries of central and eastern Europe, China and Mexico were all trying
to enter the world market against this background. It was crucial to put into place
institutions as influential as Britain's post-World War II Bretton Woods arrangements”.
This is getting back to, is it not, that Rooseveltian view of the world that gripped you -, was this another chance for liberal internationalism to flourish in the world system?

HON PAUL KEATING:

I’ve always been… I don’t have heroes, but the two that have come nearest are Roosevelt
and Churchill. Churchill was a 19th-century politician, Roosevelt a 20th-century one, but
they both had that greatness about them. American Liberal internationalism which we
hear so much of really only lasted 30 years. It lasted from about 1915 to 1945, with the
death of Franklin Roosevelt. It was Woodrow Wilson, and the first World War, and
Franklin Roosevelt with the second World War. Both believed in inclusion. Woodrow 
Wilson's League of Nations. Franklin Roosevelt's United Nations. They saw at the end of
the conflagration of the First World War and the conflagration of the Second World War
the opportunity to have a more representative of structure of world power, that is a
multipolar world. Not one just run by the victors of 1945 but a multipolar world.
And of course Roosevelt died before he could see that dream come true. The problem
with the UN dream for him was Stalin. As George Kennan remarked, Stalin had an
ideological view. You see the Soviet Union was an ideological state which was looking to
world domination. But take that Soviet thought out and look at Roosevelt's instincts. His
instincts were for a multipolar world, which was truly representative, and with it, of
course, the end of colonialism.

So on the battleship, was it Missouri? Churchill wanted to hang on to India and Roosevelt
said, "No more of the British in India, no more of the Dutch in Indonesia, no more French
in Indochina". He wanted to see people be free, he wanted to turn his back on
colonialism, and he wanted representative power to be represented. That's what went
missing at the end of the Cold War. That was the failure of Bill Clinton, the failure of
George W Bush, and the failure of Barack Obama and Trump.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

This is a failure of the United States to find and provide a place for China, India, Russia, in a truly representative international structure, right? You would argue that instead what we got was a post-Cold War confusion, would that be right?

HON PAUL KEATING:

The idea that you can have a unipolar world. That is some end of history. The end of
history did not last long. That was the point. Look, I was saying a long time ago, from
about 1997, I attacked the extension of NATO in 1997, trying to ring fence the old Russia, the former Soviet Union, biting off bits of the pie crust; you can see where that has got us.

I was talking about a representative structure then. And I was urging Bill Clinton then to find a place for China then. And of course, China strategically and economically, was
nowhere much in 1996, 1997. But it has always been my view, you will never have an
operative, peaceful world, while ever we have a G7 structure... Look at the G7. You've
got Italy and Canada sitting up there with Britain and on the other side of the world is
China with a bigger GDP than the United States but it's not in there.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

It's very interesting that as the Berlin wall fell, it was clearly a sense within the American administration at the time that this was not the opportunity to dance on the grave of Soviet communism but by January 1992, when H.W. Bush gives his state of the union address, he’s saying “by the grace of god America won the Cold War”. They have this
sense of American celebration.

HON PAUL KEATING:

Basically, At the very moment, I said to Bill Clinton in one conversation, "You guys are
going to work out how you sit at the top table, at the top of the top table in 40 years from now", and to America they were sort of saying “What do you mean, we’re always on the
top table”, And that was trying to say, "There will be other powers in the world and an
obvious one is still Russia, having nuclear weapons, and of course, China.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

In our preliminary discussion about tonight’s event, you made the point... You said we
had two world wars to settle the status of Germany in Europe. You recalled that at the
point of German unification in 1871, the Kaiser was crowned at the Palace of Versailles
with British, Russian, and French diplomats presumably cooling their heels on the gravel
there and saying, "What are we going to do with this German upstart?" Now, we’ve got a
new upstart with China. What does this lesson tell us? Have we got to have another
global war to settle the status of China?

HON PAUL KEATING:

Well it’s true we had two world wars to settle the status of Germany. You can have these
conflagrations but in the end, there is a settlement to be had after. Why not have the
settlement before the conflagration. You would have thought, even the Nazis, when they
saw their country wiped out by the carpet bombing by the US and Britain, that they
would have said, "We'd better do a trade now". So you know, that's the thing.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

This is the policy of what you call “exasperated vengeance”. The carpet bombing.

HON PAUL KEATING:

That’s what it was. An exasperated vengeance... I think that the big challenges, really, to US and China… I had views… I had views that are shared and enjoyed by others. Zbigniew
Brzezinski was one other. Brzezinski was the ultimate Cold War warrior. He was a
teenager when Hitler and Stalin split Poland. He became an American citizen. He became
chief US strategic adviser to President Jimmy Carter. He was left basically to do the Nixon Mao Accord. Brzezinski was the person who had to put it into place. I’ve kept some things he said in 2012. Let me read them.

“In the United States, the central challenge of the next several decades will be to
revitalise itself while promoting a larger West and accommodating China's rising global
status." You notice, ‘accommodating’, not competing; accommodating. He talks about a
larger west which includes Russia and Turkey. A bigger west. And then he talks about
Asia, that the United States should be the regional balancer and conciliator. The US is the guarantor in the Atlantic, but the balancing power in the East. Not the guarantor in the East, not the hierarchical power; but the balancing power He does go on to say, "The US should respect... Can and should help Asian states avoid a struggle for regional domination while mediating conflicts and offsetting power imbalances between potential rivals. The US should respect China's special historic and geopolitical role in maintaining stability on the far eastern mainland."

Repeat: “The US should respect China's special historic and geopolitical role in 
maintaining stability on the far eastern mainland. He goes on to say, "The US must also
recognise stability in Asia can no longer be imposed by non-Asian power, least of all by
the direct application of US military power." What he is postulating here... is saying what I've always believed, that the balancing power, the stabilising power in Asia is China. It's not Japan. Japan has already had a go at the rest of us. You know, the Second World War… the Russo-Japan War. It is unlikely to be doing it these days with a diminishing population. But in this period, China was not attacking anyone.
China is attacking nobody. They live in that bowl - they've got Siberia and Mongolia to the north and the Himalayas to the east. They've got Indochina to the south, and they have the Pacific Ocean to the east. They do not attack other states. So Brzezinski says, "The US should respect China's special historic and geopolitical role." How do you respect their role? Given the fact that China's GDP on a purchasing power parity basis is now 20% larger than the United States - is a country larger than the US in GDP. It's got a big navy.You've got 20% of humanity.

Extrapolating, Brzezinski’s point is that the US could run the world co-operatively with
China. In other words, the US consolidates the Atlantic, a phrase I’ve used over and over
in speeches, the US consolidates the Atlantic, which includes bringing Russia into Europe,and in the East, stability is provided by the Chinese. But still with the US present as a balancing power.

And that model would, I think, be advantageous for the whole world, because the
Chinese are not trying to overturn the existing system. Let's get this clear. China is not the old Soviet Union. It's not exporting an ideology. It's part of the existing arrangements in the West. It's in the WTO, the WHO, the IMF, the World Bank, it wants to join the TPP and its President was in Davos a couple of years ago arguing for globalisation. It doesn't want to up end the existing system.

But it doesn't want to be - as big and important as it is, a “responsible stakeholder”, to use the Bob Zoellick expression in a system, a proprietary system run by the United
States. And frankly, with an economy this large and 20% of humanity, why should it? And
why would it? The idea that you can have the G7 with Italy and Canada and Britain and
flag wavers like Australia on the side and say, "We can sort of...run the world..."
I spoke to the foreign affairs and defences secretaries in Canberra in 2011. I said at the time, above all, for the US to not see China's as a strategic challenger and a full counter force... In other words, to see China's rise as simply the orderly development of the world structure. We don't want a repeat of 1892 when Russia and France enter into an entente to balance out Germany or when Britain joined it in 1904.
Once you have bipolarities and rigidities, the death of the Crown Prince in Sarajevo, blows the whole thing up. Every moment is magnified in a bipolar structure.

I thought … you see... A decade ago there was a discussion about the G2. And the G1 was
of course the United States, the G2 was China. In other words, you needed to understand
the subtleties. The G2 was a subordinate role. But the Chinese are not going to be G2
anymore, what the Chinese want is a G1 and G1, with a state which is not attacking other
people, which is a major contributor to the world economy and a major force for keeping
down inflation for 25 years while lifting 20% of humanity out of poverty. Is it beyond the wit of let's say the United States to come to a multipolar solution here?

I might say, such a solution includes states like India. Which I have argued… and
Indonesia. But this idea that the United States is the exceptional power, and as the
proselytiser of democracy, it has God's ear and the rest have got to follow along. That wasfine in the 20th century. The 20th century was the century of the United States. The 21st century is not the century of the United States.

PROF JAMES CURRAN:

I wanted to just pick up on that if I could. You made the key point about why we can't
have a settlement before the conflict. The question is, you’ve already started to discuss it,– are the Americans up for it? That is, when we are in a situation where this bipolarity is already fairly deeply entrenched. Where there is a strong bipartisan consensus in Washington on either strategic competition or a new Cold War. Where even the thought of America reaching an accommodation with China, or even a modus vivendi is, more or less, quickly depicted as appeasement or let’s throw the Munich myth all over it.
This is something that America can do? Give up its idea of primacy?

HON PAUL KEATING:

If it was led properly yes. James, China's ambitions are in the West, not the East. There is a great confusion with countries like US and Australia, that it's all about the East and the South China Sea. That’s the Chinese front door mat. They just don't want anyone else with Taiwan on their coast. What they’re really interested in is the ‘‘Stan’ countries. That is, central Asia. And as a result of the Belt and Road initiative, I think you could say, without building the argument, that everywhere between Wuhan and Istanbul, in the next 30 years, will have huge Chinese influence. They have already built a port for those 'Stan countries – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, at Gwadar on the western side of Pakistan.

These little states were forever lost to the old Soviet Union.

Now under that plan, the Chinese plan, they have access to the Bay of Biscay and Baltic by way of Gdańsk. You will see the Germans and the French come on. The Chinese have
always been worrying about the Straits of Malacca and how they get goods and material
by land, across the great steppes of Asia, into China.
And the Belt and Road will basically up for doing that. If you look at the capacity of China to grow. The other point to be made is this – the urban societies of the kind we live in, are about 80 to 90% urbanised. That’s the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Australia…

China has about 60%. It has a lot of growth to go at home, at home. And it has the growth
through central Asia.
So, you wouldn't need to be a demographer or a statistician to work out that in 25 or 30 
10
years, if the Chinese economy is already 20% larger in GDP, according to the IMF, than the
United States, where will it be? And what is the profit in the US not coming to terms with
that mathematics? That is the reality.
So, the idea that we can ring fence China, on the basis that it is kind of illegitimate. It is
not attacking anyone, but still it is illegitimate. It's a piece of strategic nonsense. And a
good mind, and open-minded, creative American president could still develop a
multipolar structure.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
I wonder if this is a question that Australian strategists and foreign policy thinkers have a
certain difficulty in facing up to. An America that may well stop believing in itself. This is a
very different America that Australians would not be used to. You saw the reaction when
Trump was elected, and Trump was not a believer in American exceptionalism I mean he
didn’t believe in the rules-based order, he didn’t believe in alliances.
HON PAUL KEATING:
There is no rule-based order. Walking into Iraq, what rule was that under? Or
Afghanistan, what rule was that under?
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Can we just move on to the US alliance actually, the US Australia alliance, and talk about
that in a little bit more detail go back to some of that history as well, when you were in
government, and even before you were in government. I just want to open it by
mentioning a quote from a recent interview that I did with the CEO of the US Studies
Centre Michael Green, who mentioned you along with Hugh White and Bob Carr as being
“those who openly questioned the alliance”, and he said that you were apparently “taking
China's case to the Australian people in criticising the United States”.
And he added, he said, "this is not a good look and it did make people a bit nervous in the
Obama Administration and at the beginning of the Trump administration." Paul Keating,
can I ask what your responses is to that appraisal?
HON PAUL KEATING:
Well, the United States and the people who represent them these days, they are not
interested in thinking allies. They basically have an open book for sycophants not thinking
allies. In my own case, I made a few points here.
The US is exceptionally ungrateful for people who have stuck to it for a lifetime. I am one
of them. For two decades within the Labor Party, I supported the United States alliance
against what was then the pro-Communist Left, the soft pro-Comm Left.
While John Howard would be at the Church of England Sunday school bazaars, I was
fighting the Communists at the Town Hall. This was the real battle. When I went with Bob
Hawke, he invited me to meet President Reagan on the first trip… Bob had been
supported by the left all his life, and he wanted to have certain qualifications with the US. 
11
I said, “Look, if I were you Bob, I would positively embrace President Reagan as a jolly sort
of a guy and your friend George Shultz in a post ’83 relationship.” Particularly with the
problems with the Whitlam Government in the ‘70s, so fresh in their mind.
The problem that Whitlam had with Nixon. And I said, "Bob, this is the black-and-white
brigade. They are not interested in greys. Let’s embrace them enthusiastically and let’s
get on with it.” I’m not saying that I was the sole person who was influential on Bob, but I
was a big influence on him.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
That is when Bob said – we are “together forever”, Australia and the United States.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Ron was a great host, I’ll say that. And the first policy commitment after the Cold War
was when the United Nations, supported by the United States under the presidency of
George Herbert Bush, decided to resist Iraq and Saddam Hussein in his attack on Kuwait
which was called Desert Shield.
I am Deputy Prime Minister at this stage, I get called by Bob Hawke to a meeting. Bob
says, "The President is going to call and wants to know what our position on Kuwait is
going to be." I said, "Bob, what about your mate, [Brian] Mulroney in Canada, you tell me
what a good fellow he is, what about John Major in Britain? They are members of NATO,
what are they doing? Why would we be the first to put our hand up?”
And Bob said, "It wouldn't be good… you know." That is, to volunteer. So I sat through
this meeting. I controlled the right of the party. I wasn't just Deputy Prime Minister. I said
that if this was the first action by the United Nations after the Cold War and the US wants
to support that commitment, I'm for doing it. But I said, "If your mates Mulroney and
Major are dragging the chain, let's get in early but at a low price."
We already have a tanker in the Gulf and we can put a Destroyer at the top of the Gulf.
And Bob said “okay”. But I said Bob, no combat troops, no aircraft. And he said “no no,
that’s okay” and he pressed a button and the waiter came in and we all had a cup of tea.
And the decision was taken. How many thanks today do we get from the United States
from that? Zero thanks.
And then when I saw you mentioned George Herbert Bush and putting the APEC leaders
meeting together... The US was a Eurocentric show. It had no Asia policy, no Pacific policy.
It was always run by the Navy. Pacific policy was run out of Honolulu. There was no State
Department involved. I came along as Australian Prime Minister I said “what about the
Pacific?” I take it on, with George Herbert's agreement. George Bush said, “if we do it, it
will blow up”. Paul, he said “you do it”. I talked to the Japanese Prime Minister, President
Suharto and the Prime Minister of Thailand, the Prime Minister of Singapore, the Prime
Minister of Canada and the President of China.
Over a period of time, I put together a consensus for the APEC Leaders meeting. George 
12
Herbert Bush loses the election, and Bill Clinton gets the thing. I offered to Bill Clinton the
arrangements I’d already put together. He said to me, "Look, I won the election against
George Bush on a platform of ‘it’s the economy stupid” and I did not want to be in foreign
affairs escapades like Kuwait."
What you are asking me to do is to go into essentially a strategic body. I tell you what I'll
do – I will be in it, if you make it look like a trade body. And he and I then argy-bargied
that and we decided to meet in Seattle. The home of Boeing and Microsoft to look like it
was about jobs across the Pacific. But you and I both know when the American President
sits down with the President of China, the Prime Minister of Japan, the President of
Indonesia. At a leadership level, it is of course a strategic meeting. This came out of
Australian foreign policy – this was my personal gift to the United States. for which they
will give you no thanks or gratitude.
That is why I don't take much notice of them.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Are you surprised of the sensitivity on the American side to this kind of criticism?
HON PAUL KEATING:
They want dummies… as interlocutors, as allies. Let us do the thinking, they say. We have
let them do the thinking and the thinking is not very good. This is the point.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
We will come back to that question, because there’s a lot of more recent developments
on the question of the alliance and the “interchangeability” of the US and Australian
forces that I think is worth picking up. Before we do that, I wanted to ask a question
about the Quad. And the great hopes that have been invested in the Quad over recent
years. Of course, it's been elevated to a leaders meeting now and has met more regularly
in recent years.
Now, one of the issues here of course is that since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we
have had a number of apologias delivered for India's position on that. Now those
apologies, to be fair, were given before India's President Modi gave Vladimir Putin a
public clip over the ear recently. A public rebuke.
This is, of course, at the same time that India is still sending troops to military exercises
with Chinese and Russian forces in Vostok. One of the prominent Quad advocates from
the ANU is Rory Metcalf, he said that at the outset of the Ukrainian crisis, India was taking
“a cold interest-based approach to the plight of Ukraine but in the long-term, its future
lay with the West”. He said that the success of the Quad, and other friends of India in
persuading India to change that approach is “not going to come through some valiant
appeal to values it’s going to come through helping India change its national interest
calculations”. What do you think about that idea that others can change the national
interest calculations of India?
13
HON PAUL KEATING:
This is just amateur hour nonsense. The Quad is a piece of strategic nonsense. India is
important to Australia as the key state in South Asia and the dominator, if you like, of the
Indian Ocean. We should be approaching India on that basis, but not in some sort of
string of pearls idea that we can get together to contain China, which basically is the idea
of the late Prime Minister Abe. The idea that we can string together US and Australia to
sort of resist China using India. Could you imagine a flotilla of Indian naval vessels
entering the Straits of Malacca and exiting into the China Sea to fight the Chinese military
in defence of Western values? US or Australian values. You will never see this, ever. I
should say this to you. Kissinger and I served on this together. We would mostly have a
dinner later. And at one of the dinners, Henry said to me in that deep voice of his, "You
and I share one important strategic idea that few share. That Brzezinski shares – the three
of us share. That India will never be part of the East Asian system." Henry said that and
I’ve always believed that.
I think if China stays away from India in the Indian Ocean, you won't see any Indian naval
activity or military activity in the South China Sea. In other words, the idea that the
Americans and the likes of Morrison can string together some sort of defence structure
around it is a piece of high nonsense.
Let me just say… You mentioned… Rory Medcalf. I’ve got the quote here. I found this in
The Australian. Medcalf says, "India and its long-term interests lay with the West." You
think there is one Indian politician who thinks their interest might lay with the West?
India’s interest lays with Pakistan and the Middle East and to some extent,
notwithstanding the great wall of the Himalayas with what the Chinese are up to. But no.
He says its interest lay in the West. Medcalf says, persuading India to change that
approach is going to come through helping India to change its national interest
calculations. In other words, here we are in Australia – with a so-called academic, talking
about how we can change India's national interests. This fellow Medcalf has got his little
bottle of Indo oil and it works like snake oil at a rural fair. You have a sip of the Indo oil
and it does everything. How does he get column inches in the Sydney Morning Herald,
The Age and the Financial Review?.
The immaturity of the Australian international debate is that people as ordinary as
Medcalf... fail to understand basic things. It should not be supported by editorial
managers in any of the newspapers. If you put up with these sort of fools regularly…
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Can I come back to the question of the alliance with the United States but more
particularly on the question of sovereignty. Again, this is something that some former
American officials and others have said that they are quite surprised by how sensitive
Australia is about its sovereignty. But how does that all stack up with the agreement we
signed with the United States and Britain which is known as AUKUS, how does it stack up
with the increasing not only interoperability of the United States and the Australian forces
but as Defence Minister Richard Marles now calls it the ‘interchangeability’ of those
forces. What does all this mean for our freedom of movement? Have we had a sufficient 
14
debate in this country about those issues?
HON PAUL KEATING:
It was all done secretly by that genius Morrison with the Americans. They must have said,
"What a coup!" Americans have been boasting we’ve now got Australia off the fence for
40 years. Look, the Cabinet I belonged to built the Collins Class Submarine. If I had of
succeeded in winning the sixth poll, I would have built another six Collins Class boats.
Boat number 12 would have ended up being boat number one of the next generation.
The Collins Class boat was a completely successful boat. It could not be heard under the
water. In exercises with the Americans, we were sinking American boats every time. I
don't know if people know that but that is the truth of it. The Collins got a bad name
because they had the wrong diesel engine. But that wasn't the design of the submarine -
Australia had the capacity to field its own submarine.
And what were the submarine's for, they were for sea denial in the defence of Australia.
They were not designed to be picking off Chinese nuclear submarines on the continental
shelf off the Chinese coast which is what those Los Angeles boats are designed to do.
There are hunter-killers. The Chinese give themselves a nuclear response capability by
submarines. If a submarine is carrying 12 or 16 missiles, it is a big boat going across the
shallow waters off the continental shelf of China. It can be identified and destroyed.
So we are shifting. When the genius, Morrison, decided...that we should be in this and
this is I’m sure egged on by, I am told this reliably but I'm not certain of this, by Andrew
Shearer who’s serving in the current Labor Government I hope they’re not listening to
him, he's the one who sunk the French boats from what I understand, reliably told. We’ve
moved away from the capacity to defend our island continent with a class of boats which
are competent at it, that didn't need to have standby capabilities a long way away, as any
submarine would need to have off the coast of China. And so, when we signed up to
AUKUS, what we’ve done is sign up to a hunter-killer submarine which has got one
purpose and that is to sink Chinese submarines. We are party to that now when we
shouldn't be party to it at all.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
I think you said at one point they’re use would be “like sheepdogs along the Chinese
continental shelf”.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Before Chinese submarines get in the Mariana Trench. Basically, I think we should walk
away from the US nuclear submarine proposition. The British, of course, is just a joke.
Going to Cornwall to find our security in Asia. I mean that’s where James Cook and Arthur
Phillip left 230 years earlier. Do we really to go back there? But we had Morrison, the
super thinker, taking us there.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
The flipside of the…
15
HON PAUL KEATING:
I think we should walk away from the AUKUS agreement. We should build the submarines
ourselves. The sons of Collins or the daughters of Collins. Or as Hugh White wrote in a
recent article, for the cost of the nuclear submarines, you could buy 25 submarines from
the Germans or the Dutch or the Spanish. In other words, what would you rather – given
the fact that we can only have about a quarter of them at sea – would you rather have 24
submarines with six at sea or eight nuclear submarines but with two at sea? And because
they’re nuclear submarines, they cannot be fielded without the support of the United
States – if there’s interoperability it means our sovereignty, our freedom of decision and
movement is simply swept away. No self-respecting Australian should ever put their
hand up for our sovereignty being subjugated in this way.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
The Labor Opposition at the time that Morrison made this deal was given less than 24
hours’ notice to consider the deal and its implications. Do you think their heart’s really in
it?
HON PAUL KEATING:
The deal was supposed to provide 20 months of consideration. What the Labor Party and
opposition should have said was, "Thank you for the briefing, we will think about it.
We've got 20 months to think about it." That morning, the morning of the
announcement, I heard about it early. I put out statement saying I was opposed to it and
that it would subjugate our sovereignty. So the Labor Party could have taken notice of me
on this point but they took no notice. I had no conversations with anybody. Of course,
they signed up. But it doesn’t mean they have to stay signed up. And in my first speech at
the House of Representatives, I talked about how at the beginning of the Second World
War, we were left with no military industrial complex in Australia, that we should develop
it. I fundamentally supported the building of the Collins submarines and frigates with
Transfield in Melbourne. I would have had 12 of these. It would be a tragedy for Australia
if we keep to the AUKUS agreement. You can have the AUKUS exchange of information –
that’s fine - we've been exchanging information with the Poms and with the Americans
forever. But we should walk away from the Los Angeles class submarine.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Is the national security debate, though, do you think the current government is politically
wedged by the opposition leader Dutton... Would this be a real concern for Labor as being
seen as weak on the Alliance, untrustworthy. Will it repeat those nightmares from the
Cold War?
HON PAUL KEATING:
Governments in office should make their own stories. The stories that Bob Hawke, myself,
Gareth Evans, the stories we made about our independence in Asia... Our ability to do all
these things. Kevin Rudd later with the Kevin's East Asia Summit... Me with the APEC
Leaders’ Meeting, Gareth with a great lot of regional foreign relations for instance with Ali
Alatas in Indonesia My relationship with Suharto, my relationship with two Prime
Ministers of Japan at the time... We can tell our story. We don't have to be caught with 
16
the Liberal party's dumb story.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
The question of stories provides a nice introduction to where I wanted to go now. And
that is the question of national identity. Now, going back to the period of government
where you were Prime Minister, there is a lot going on in that period about questions of
identity and Australia's national self-confidence and its regional outlook. You said in a
speech in early 1992 that in that decade, Australia could be “independent in ways that it
had never been”. Of course, there had been some changes under Whitlam and Fraser, to
the various trappings, the old relics of colonialism, these had been modified and some
were tossed out, but it was a feeling that still, we were lacking that sense of almost
psychological release from that old imperial era. And that all of these issues that you are
putting forward at the time were integrated in a way that is unlike any previous Prime
Ministership, whether it be Native Title, whether it be the question of moving towards an
Australian Republic, whether it be the APEC leaders meeting and so forth. You mentioned
treaty you signed with Indonesia. Given the recent events we've seen in terms of the
passing of Queen Elizabeth II, I did just want to get your views on where the public debate
is headed and of course, you would recall that when you were Prime Minister, you had a
73% approval rating just on the question about whether Australian people wanted to
move towards being a Republic.
And you offered the Liberal Party a stake in this. You made it clear that you would
maintain the Senate’s role, the Senate would still be able to block supply. The powers of
the Governor General would not be circumscribed, you weren’t proposing that. Howard
walked away from it and put a modality in the question that he knew would defeat it.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Exactly, you have the history right. The thing is that I believe that if we were to, in a postCold War world, take our place appropriately in East Asia. We needed to find our security
in Asia, not from Asia, that is by trying to hold hands with great powers. Then you can
hardly lift your head and say, "By the way, our head of state is the monarch of Great
Britain."
I took this issue on at an election, this was in the policy speech of 1993. I had people in
the Labor Party… with horror, thinking that I would put this at an election. People say oh
well, Keating had views about the Republic, Keating didn’t have views about the Republic,
Keating put a proposal at an election and it was that we would hold a plebiscite around
the question – do you think Australia should become a Republic? Of which we had 73%
support. Because the Prime Minister, me - I was out there arguing the importance of the
Republic, which I always said would say more to us about ourselves than we would ever
say to anybody else.
But I thought in the post-Cold war world, particularly in the new relationship I had
personally invested with President Suharto in Indonesia and all the other regional leaders
I was in touch with weekly, in terms of developing that APEC leaders meeting and
operating it. Turning up with the Queen of Great Britain for whom, of course, I had 
17
enormous respect, but I’m talking about the monarchy of Great Britain, was a joke for us.
At the same time, we didn't own up to the things that we had done to the Aborigines and
Torres Strait Islanders.
Apart from the Northern Territory Land Rights Act under the Fraser governments, there
was really nothing for which the Aboriginal Affairs power was used in any substantial way.
I saw that the High Court decision of Mabo was a real opportunity to settle, in some way,
the question of land rights and own up to what we had done. So I made the reference
speech and to the owning up - I said that “we brought the alcohol and diseases and we
committed the murders and took the children from their mothers”.
At the same time, even though we have wiped out any residual native title in Sydney,
Melbourne and all the metropolitan areas, large tracts of Australia were open to a claim
under the Native Title Act which I spent eight months of 1993 putting into place, in the
Parliament. In other words, I wanted to turn over a new leaf for Australia. Have an
Australian as our head of state. We fessed up about what we had done to the original
inhabitants of the country. We try to make reparations in terms of land with native title.
And use this as a sort of… a leitmotif of goodwill towards the country and its original
inhabitants, and the region. And the inhabitants of the region.

This is what I thought was important. Now, John Howard did the country a dreadful
disservice in this on the Republic. As you correctly say, I spoke to him on the telephone
about this at the time, I wanted to make that change. Where the powers of the Governor
General would not be circumscribed or written down where the Senate could still refuse
supply. It was a model that the Liberal government could have adopted. But Howard,
always driving in the rear-view mirror, always driving backwards and at speed, wanted to
keep the monarchy. So he put the question not of ‘do you want to have an Australian
Republic’, but rather, do you think that we should have a president appointed by the
parliament? He knew that that question would fail, and then as Prime Minister, Howard
didn't even argue that case. Of course, the thing failed.

So, where are we now? Well… Queen Elizabeth II has died. I met her and told her that I
would not involve her family in any of this. I had a great relationship with her, really. I
think the royal family would have been so glad for the referendum to have passed.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
This is at Balmoral in 1993?
HON PAUL KEATING:
Yes, but now… look at the French. The French had a revolution for their Republic. The
Americans had a revolution for their Republic. We could not even pinch ours off Queen
Elizabeth II, who didn't want it. (Laughs) We couldn't take the title, even if the monarch
was happy to give it.
In fact, I wouldn’t be at all be surprised of King Charles III, the King of Australia, doesn't
volunteer to give it to us, to renounce the monarchy’s claim on Australia.
18
In other words, the Republican movement say to me that you should be up there right
now, speaking to this. Why would you? We fluffed it. If Australians have so little pride in
themselves, so little pride that they are happy to be represented by the monarch of Great
Britain, why would somebody like me argue to shift their miserable view of themselves?
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
So, Australians have failed to seize the Republic, they’ve failed to claim it as an example of
the sovereignty.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Not all Australians. The thing was close run. If properly argued by the then Prime Minister
it would have succeeded. The best instincts of Australia were visible in that campaign, and
in those results. But of course, you’ve got people now… who in their right mind would
believe that the monarch of Great Britain could represent our aspirations? Whether
multicultural or not. And we are multicultural. But just in the region.
We occupy one of the oldest landmasses on earth, the oldest continent on earth, with
perhaps the oldest society on earth. It is so pathetic, an Australia monarch. It barely
needs an argument. We have the monarchy of Great Britain and there is Morrison
running off to Cornwall with that other fruitcake, Boris Johnson…
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Charles the III, King of Australia doesn’t exactly grab you.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Charles the third, King of Australia, is a constitutional aberration. That’s what it is.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Can I just ask a final question to perhaps tie this all together? In an interview when you
first became Prime Minister, you said, "In the Prime Ministership is vested the ideal of the
nation and its aspirations”. What is the ideal now of this place, Australia, to strive towards
in your view? And where are the aspirations for this country?
HON PAUL KEATING:
I think Australia has a very poor idea of itself now. It's head of state is the monarch of
another country. Its strategic sovereignty is being outsourced to another state - a North
Atlantic state, the United States.
It doesn't know what it is or what it should be. And yet, the inheritance, the gift of the
continent is such a great gift. Look at these issues that we have with China – China’s 13
flying hours from Sydney. Here we are, manufacturing a problem for ourselves.
And I just say that the problem we have in tying ourselves in other states in Asia so
uncritically, is that the United States has no idea what to do with itself in Asia, none. It has
no coherent plan about what to do. Have a look at what has happened. As indications of 
19
this.
We had President Obama talking about the pivot. Nothing came of it. He made the big
speech in Tokyo about the Senkaku Islands - a part of Japan. It came under the articles in
the US/Japan agreement. What did we think about that? China now has a big navy. If we
want to be hanging around behind the Americans, what is their policy? What is their
strategy in Asia?
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
We have seen President Biden virtually unpick strategic ambiguity on no fewer than four
occasions – it seems to be walked back every time. Can you see any instance in which an
Australian Government of either political persuasion would say no, if there was in fact a
conflict over Taiwan?
HON PAUL KEATING:
If I were Prime Minister, I would certainly say no. Taiwan, I repeat, is not a vital Australian
interest. We should be no more interested in the political system of Taiwan then the
political system of Vietnam or Kazakhstan. Why should we be interested? Remember
this, Taiwan's democracy started in 1996, not 1906, 1996. When Lee Teng-hui decided,
oh look what we should have is a bunch of municipal elections.
He said, we can't have the KMT as the sole party, let's have some multi parties, and a
bunch of municipal elections to see who would run the place. And for those municipal
elections, we have World War III is that the proposition? For Taiwan, for its municipal
elections, we have World War III?
For the Americans, if I’ve got any advice for them, it’s to stick to strategic ambiguity like
glue. Normandy was possible because 21 miles from Normandy was an industrial state,
Britain. There was no radar, there were no satellites. And under the cover of bad
weather, that allies were able to make the landings at Omaha Beach at Normandy.
There is no Western state within 21 miles of Taiwan. In fact, China is 90 miles from
Taiwan. So China would see every amphibious vessel coming towards Taiwan, whether
it’s from Guam, or whether it’s from San Diego or Honolulu, they would see them and
sink them. So the chances of the Americans having a victory over Taiwan is nil, in my
opinion.
And why would we wish to be part of that defeat? Why would we? In the end, finally the
Americans walk away from East Asia. And we are left behind. We can't put an outboard
motor on Australia at Broome, start the motor and move the continent off to San Diego -
We are stuck here, as the Americans take off back to their continent back in the Pacific.
We live in a Chinese world, that's the truth of it.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
Is that part of the problem – we have mortgaged ourselves so closely to US policy that if
there was for example, if there was a sudden change in US policy, and we’ve seen this 
20
happen before, however unlikely it may seem in the current circumstances and with the
kind of consensus in Washington, that Australia could be left like a shag on a rock?
HON PAUL KEATING:
If, for instance, it came to a fight over Taiwan, where the guarantees to Japan and Korea
would fall in credibility and then possibly the US would walk away. The thing is that we
can't walk away, we are stuck here. And that’s why it’s so unintelligent to be running this
sort of a policy. And as we showed in the 80s and 90s, we can run very intelligent policy
with China but also with the region, with Indonesia. Our bread is buttered on the
Indonesian archipelago. It’s South-East Asia that matters to us. In a television interview, I
provided the seesaw analogy.
The park see-saw. If you regard West and East movements in the seesaw as problems
let’s say, in the East with Japan and China, in the West with India and Pakistan but at the
centre, at the central focal point, the fulcrum point that’s Indonesia and South East Asia
we don't have these risks. So, we should be concentrating – I mean ideally, I’d see us as a
member of ASEAN. In the agreement I had with President Suharto with the ANZUS words,
in what was effectively the agreement for maintaining security which John Howard lost
owing to his celebration of General Cosgrove. When he brought Cosgrove back with his
tickertape parade in Melbourne and Sydney, President Habibie of Indonesia said you
were representing a UN mission and yet you’re conducting yourself like some sort of
victorious, invading force, so I’m suspending the agreement that Keating made with
Suharto.
The agreement was essentially... If there was an attack on Indonesia, we would regard it
as an attack on us. An attack on us would be regarded in Indonesia as more or less an
attack on them. That would mean we had, more or less, a mutual defence pact – this
would require conversation, of course – but a mutual defence pact. As a Labor Prime
Minister I put together an ANZUS-worded defence pact with the largest Muslim state in
the world, the leader of the non-aligned movement. Can you imagine anyone in the
Liberal Party doing such a thing? Could you imagine any one of them?
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
I think you said it was like a steel ring fence across the top of the country.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Our bread is still buttered in that archipelago. Imagine if we’d spent the last 20 odd years
working under the cooperation of that agreement Instead of wasting our time on
nonsense like Iraq, Afghanistan, the Quad, American hopefulness about China.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
So the new government of Australia, just to tie this up, the new government has started
of change its tone, it’s talked about stabilising the relationship with China. It’s poured
away the vocabulary of the Morrison government whether it be ‘drums of war’ or so
forth. It's talking about a First Nations foreign policy; it's enunciating its commitment to
ASEAN centrality. Does this give you a bit more optimism about where…
21
HON PAUL KEATING:
Only this. Tone has got to become substance. Tone is one thing and substance is another.
I wish the government well in this and time will tell. At least it's not the appalling policy
which was conducted by Scott Morrison.
PROF JAMES CURRAN:
I think we will leave it there. Thank you, Paul Keating for your time. We covered a lot of
territory there. History, as we know it, if it repeats it doesn’t repeat exactly the same, but
certainly a greater knowledge of history can help us clarify the argument and enlighten
the judgement, let’s hope. Thank you very much for that tonight.
HON PAUL KEATING:
Thank you very much for conducting an insightful discussion.