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Graham Allison 中国与美国 地缘政治奥运会

(2024-08-17 17:25:53) 下一个

Graham Allison 中国与美国 地缘政治奥运会

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-vs-america-geopolitical-olympics-212259

美国和中国的政治家能否找到一种既是竞争又是伙伴关系的关系?拜登政府认为,其“竞争共存”战略是朝着这个方向迈出的一大步

作者:Graham Allison 2024 年 8 月 9 日

观看巴黎奥运会上运动员的非凡表现是一种令人谦卑的体验。看到人类同胞的能力真是令人惊叹。每当有运动员打破之前的世界纪录时,我都会欢呼。但和大多数观看这些赛事报道的美国人一样,我当然不是中立的。我会注意哪些国家的运动员赢得了金牌,哪些国家的运动员没有。我很高兴听到我们的国歌在颁发奖牌的领奖台上首先响起,而且响得最频繁。

在本届奥运会上,就像当今世界上的大多数其他比赛一样,有两个超级大国——而且只有两个:中国和美国。截至 8 月 9 日,美国赢得了 30 枚金牌,而中国则获得了 32 枚。在总奖牌数上,美国运动员目前已获得 104 枚,而中国选手则获得了 77 枚。下周日将颁发 987 枚奖牌中的最后一枚,届时法国东道主将竭尽全力打出与开场一样震撼的收官战,美国夺得第一名的几率约为 80%。但当然,正如尤吉·贝拉教导我们的那样:“不到最后一刻,比赛就不算结束。”正如一位狂热的体育迷、恰好是中国国家主席习近平所说:“不可预测性正是体育比赛……激动人心的原因。”

中国从无名小卒一跃成为奥运会上美国的主要竞争对手,这几乎反映了它在所有其他方面的崛起,成为 21 世纪决定性的地缘政治对手。直到四十年前,中国还从未在现代奥运会上获得过奖牌。它的第一枚奖牌是在 1984 年洛杉矶奥运会上获得的。四分之一世纪后,在 2008 年北京奥运会上,中国赢得了 48 枚金牌,而美国获得了 36 枚。如图 1 所示,美国迅速反击。在 2021 年的东京奥运会上,美国获得了 39 枚金牌,共计 113 枚,而中国则获得了 38 枚和 89 枚。

图 1:奥运奖牌数

资料来源:国际奥委会,奥运会奖牌统计

在 2020 年的总统竞选期间,我和埃兹拉·沃格尔担任主席的一组哈佛学者被要求为 2020 年大选后上任的政府的过渡团队准备一系列报告。具体来说,我们的任务是“记录过去二十年中美之间一系列竞争中实际发生的事情”。目标是提供一个客观的数据库,作为政策制定者对中国挑战进行根本战略重新评估的基础。(这些大竞争报告后来以贝尔弗讨论文件的形式发表)。这些报告深入探讨了美国和中国在五个核心领域的竞争:经济、技术、军事、外交和意识形态。在每一份报告中,我们都确定了评估每场竞争的标准、指标以及每个主题的最佳可用数据来源。每份报告都总结了 21 世纪前 20 年发生的事情,并对每个国家在 2020 年的立场进行了坦率的判断。

五份报告的底线都是相同的:一个在本世纪初无法在我们的后视镜中看到的国家,现在正与我们并驾齐驱,在某些情况下甚至领先于我们。我们得出的结论是,国家情报局坚持不情愿地将中国称为“越来越接近的竞争对手”是一个怀旧的错误。问问参加奥运会的运动员。中国必须被视为全方位的竞争对手。

图 2:全球 GDP 份额(PPP)

来源:IMF,《2024 年世界经济展望》

如图 2 所示,按照美国中央情报局和国际货币基金组织采用的衡量国家经济的最佳标准,中国现在是世界上最大的经济体。根据美国中央情报局的数据,2023 年底,按购买力平价计算,中国的 GDP 为 31.2 万亿美元,而美国为 24.6 万亿美元。许多美国人发现这与他们内心深处的认知相悖,根本无法相信。他们指出,按照以市场汇率衡量经济体的传统标准,美国仍位居第一。他们提醒我们,中国的人口是美国的四倍,因此人均 GDP 仍然远远落后。但正如图 3、4 和 5 所示,在超越美国成为最大经济体的过程中,中国已经取代了竞争对手,失去了其惯常的贸易第一大国地位。

中国是世界制造工厂和高科技产品出口国。

图 3:全球贸易份额

来源:世界银行数据

图 4:全球制造业份额

来源:经合组织贸易增加值 (TiVa) 数据库

图 5:全球高科技出口份额

来源:世界银行数据

技术竞赛更难总结。当然,美国仍然处于先进技术的前沿,随着美国人工智能公司不断推进前沿技术的发展,这在未来十年可能最为重要。目前美国对先进半导体出口以及制造先进半导体的设备的限制使中国处于不利地位。但在从太阳能、风能到电动汽车的下一代绿色技术方面,中国已经确立了主导地位,至少在未来十年,西方的绿色未来将是红色的。

在军事竞争中,美国主导的时代已经结束。是的,华盛顿作为全球军事超级大国的地位依然独一无二——几乎在每个大陆都有条约盟友和基地。然而,中国现在是一个严重的军事对手。中国的反介入/区域拒止系统已经改变了其地理边缘地区的游戏规则,其中包括台湾、南海和东海。在五角大楼为模拟台海战争而设计的最逼真的战争游戏中,比分是十八比零。而这十八人不是美国队。用前参谋长联席会议主席马克·米利将军的话来说,当“所有牌都摊在桌面上”时,美国在国防开支方面不再胜过中国。

1996 年,中国公布的国防预算是美国的三十分之一。到 2020 年,按购买力平价计算,中国的支出将超过美国的一半,并有望与美国持平。此外,中国军队可以用更少的钱做更多的事情。中国现役军人的平均成本仅为美国士兵年度成本的四分之一。尽管中国的核武库比美国小得多,但其核力量足以确保相互保证摧毁(MAD)。

图 6:国防开支(PPP)

来源:贝尔弗中心,《伟大的军事竞争:中国与美国》

因此呢?五个要点值得进一步思考。

首先,正如传统奥运会横幅所宣称的:“更快、更高、更强”。竞争激励对手跑得更快、跳得更高,并在掷铁饼或铅球时展现出比个人单独奔跑更大的力量。正如亚当·斯密教导我们的那样,专注于竞争优势和贸易的国家之间的竞争会创造更大的蛋糕,每个国家都可以分得更大的一块。用习近平最喜欢的一句话来说,这是一个“双赢”。

其次,正如所有奥运选手所知,在每个项目中,只有一个人能赢得金牌。大多数人永远无法进入胜利者的圈子。因此,一方面,任何有资格参加比赛的运动员都是奥运选手,因此是胜利者,另一方面,这些胜利者中的大多数人将在争夺奖牌的比赛中成为失败者。在博弈论中,双赢的一个经典案例是猎鹿游戏,只有通过合作,两个人才能捕获一头鹿。但捕获鹿后,他们必须决定如何分配鹿。在零和博弈中,一方获得的份额较大,另一方获得的份额较小。同样,在生产电动汽车或半导体等贸易产品时,如果一个国家能够建立主导地位,它就有能力影响其他国家。

第三,与中国外交官经常拒绝美国坚持承认中美是竞争对手的标准谈话要点相反,在体育领域,中国是一个热情而坚定的竞争对手。杨洁篪(前外交部长)告诫中美“应合作共赢,不应竞争”,前(已下台)外交部长秦刚则警告说:“美国所谓的‘竞争’是全方位的遏制和压制。”现任大使谢锋也强调,“国与国之间的竞争应该像在赛场上争夺卓越,而不是在摔跤场上互相击败。”但中国国家主席习近平本人就是一名拳击手。正如习近平所说,在拳击比赛中,“耐力、力量和在擂台上的控制力”是最重要的。在拳击场上,中国迄今已获得一枚金牌和一枚银牌,而美国仅获得一枚铜牌。在摔跤比赛中,美国赢得了两枚金牌,中国获得一枚银牌和三枚铜牌。

美国和中国的政治家能否找到一种既是竞争又是伙伴关系的关系?拜登政府认为,其“竞争共存”战略是朝着这个方向迈出的一大步

作者:Graham Allison 在 Twitter 上关注 @GrahamTAllison
第四,虽然奥运会的赌注本质上是民族自豪感的问题,但

核心地缘政治竞争、国内生产总值、技术领先地位、军事力量和外交实力影响着国家安全甚至生存。包括本文作者在内的美国人认为,美国在二战后建立的国际安全秩序,以及此后几十年来一直守护的国际安全秩序,是人类历史上一个非凡的时代。这种前所未有的“长期和平”提供了稳定,不仅使美国人,而且使我们与之共享这个小星球的其他 80 亿人中的大多数人享受到比有记录的任何其他时代更大的收入、健康和福祉增长。中国的迅速崛起正在挑战美国在全球啄食顺序中的既定地位,这是典型的修昔底德式的竞争。大多数修昔底德式的竞争都以战争告终。

第五,正如 2021 年东京奥运会采用的新横幅所宣称的那样:“更快、更高、更强——一起。”同样,虽然美国和中国注定是有史以来最激烈的竞争对手,但两国都无法逃避这样一个事实:两国的竞争是由双方共同面临的生存挑战所决定的——如果没有对方的合作,任何一方都无法取胜。如今,两国都拥有核武库,如果在全面战争中使用,它们可能会将对方从地图上抹去。两国都生活在一个封闭的生物圈内的小星球上,两国都在向这个生物圈排放温室气体,其速度可能会让这个生物圈变得无法居住。

两国经济如此纠缠不清,以至于如果华盛顿和北京没有采取协调一致的刺激措施,2008 年的大衰退就会演变成一场全球性大萧条。虽然另一场大萧条对两国来说都不是“生存”问题,但当我们回想起 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条助长了法西斯主义、纳粹主义和共产主义的兴起,并最终导致第二次世界大战时,两国都不想再看到这样的事情发生。此外,除了这三项之外,将流行病、全球恐怖主义和核武器扩散等跨国威胁的危险限制在一定范围内也需要协调与合作。

各国能否同时成为激烈的竞争对手和认真的合作伙伴?这难道不是相互竞争甚至相互矛盾的命令吗?在一个非黑即白、非敌即友的非此即彼的世界里,似乎一方必须胜过另一方。然而,在商业世界中,领导者经常会进行所谓的“合作选择”。例如,苹果和三星在销售高端智能手机方面是残酷的竞争对手。但谁是苹果智能手机的主要零部件供应商?三星。当苹果首席执行官蒂姆·库克被问及他的一个主要竞争对手如何也能成为他的主要零部件供应商时,他说:“生活很复杂。”

美国和中国的政治家能否找到一种既是竞争又是伙伴关系的关系?拜登政府认为,其“竞争共存”战略是朝着这个方向迈出的一大步。拜登和习近平在去年 11 月的峰会上同意采用的战略概念或框架结合了三个要素:竞争、沟通和合作。在竭尽全力超越对方的同时,他们还保持着开放的渠道,就最微妙和最危险的问题进行定期、坦诚、私下的沟通。这不仅包括两国总统和他们信任的国家安全顾问之间的对话,还包括内阁官员和军事领导人之间的类似会议。他们还在台湾、气候、芬太尼、贸易等问题上进行合作,以符合两国的利益。

F. Scott Fitzgerald 写道:“一流智慧的考验是能够同时在头脑中持有两种相反的想法,并且仍然保持运作的能力。”我们必须希望像政府这样复杂的机构能够通过这一考验——并在未来几十年内做到这一点。

Graham Allison 博士是哈佛大学的 Douglas Dillon 政府学教授,他在哈佛大学任教已有五十年。艾利森是国家安全领域的顶尖分析师,特别关注核武器、俄罗斯、中国和决策。艾利森是哈佛大学约翰·肯尼迪政府学院的“创始院长”,并在 2017 年之前担任该学院贝尔弗科学与国际事务中心主任,该中心被评为全球“第一大学附属智库”。

图片:ProPhoto1234 / Shutterstock.com。

China vs. America: The Geopolitical Olympics

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-vs-america-geopolitical-olympics-212259

Can American and Chinese statesmen find their way to a relationship that is simultaneously a rivalry and a partnership? The Biden administration believes that its strategy of “competitive coexistence” is a big step in that direction

by Graham Allison  August 9, 2024  

Watching the extraordinary performance of athletes competing in the Paris Olympics is a humbling experience. It is amazing to see what fellow human beings are capable of. Each time an athlete beats the previous world record, I cheer. But like most Americans viewing coverage of these events, I’m certainly not neutral. I note which countries’ athletes win gold and which do not. I’m heartened to hear our national anthem played first and most often at the podium where the medals are awarded.

In this Olympics, as in most other races in the world today, there are two—and only two—superpowers: China and the United States. As of August 9, the United States has won thirty gold medals, compared to China’s thirty-two. In the total medal count, the U.S. athletes now have gained 104 and their Chinese competitors seventy-seven. When the last of the 987 medals are awarded next Sunday and the French hosts do their best to deliver a closing shock that matches their opening, the odds that the United States will emerge as number one are roughly 80 percent. But, of course, as Yogi Berra taught us: “it ain’t over till it’s over.” As one avid sports fan who also happens to be the President of China, Xi Jinping, has noted: “Unpredictability is what makes a sports match…exciting.”

China’s rise from essentially nowhere to become the leading rival of the United States in the Olympics mirrors its rise in virtually every other dimension to become the defining geopolitical rival in the twenty-first century. Until four decades ago, China had never won a medal in the modern Olympics. Its first medal came at the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. A quarter century later, at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China won forty-eight gold medals to the United State’s thirty-six. As Figure 1 shows, the United States snapped back. In Tokyo in 2021, the United States took home thirty-nine gold medals, a total of 113, compared to China’s thirty-eight and eighty-nine.

Figure 1: Olympic Medals Won

Source: International Olympic Committee, Olympic Games Medal Count

During the presidential campaign of 2020, a group of Harvard scholars chaired by Ezra Vogel and I was asked to prepare a series of reports for the transition teams planning for the administration that would take office after the 2020 election. Specifically, our assignment was “to document what has actually happened in the past two decades in the array of races between China and the US.” The goal was to provide an objective database that would serve as a foundation for policymakers’ fundamental strategic reassessment of the China challenge. (These Great Rivalry Reports were published later as Belfer Discussion Papers). The reports drilled down on the competition between the United States and China in five core arenas: economic, technological, military, diplomatic, and ideological. In each, we identified criteria, metrics for assessing each race, and the best available sources of data on each topic. Each report offered a summary of the evidence about what has happened over the first two decades of the twenty-first century and a candid judgment about where each nation stood in 2020.

The bottom line in each of the five reports was identical: a nation that at the beginning of the century could not be seen in our rearview mirror is now running right beside us or, in some cases, ahead. We concluded that the Office of National Intelligence’s persistence in grudgingly naming China just an “increasingly near-peer competitor” is a nostalgic mistake. Ask the athletes competing in the Olympics. China must be recognized as a full-spectrum peer competitor.

Figure 2: Share of Global GDP (PPP)

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2024

As Figure 2 shows, by the yardstick that both the CIA and the IMF have adopted as the single best measure of national economies, China now has the largest economy in the world. According to the CIA, China’s GDP in purchasing power parity terms at the end of 2023 was $31.2 trillion, compared to the United States’ $24.6 trillion. Many Americans find this so antithetical to what they know in their bones that they simply refuse to believe it. They note that by the traditional yardstick that measures economies by market exchange rates, the United States remains number one. They remind us that China is home to four times as many citizens as the United States and so remains far behind in per capita GDP. But as Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, in the process of overtaking the United States to become the largest economy, China has displaced its competitor from its accustomed position as the top trading nation, the manufacturing workshop of the world, and exporter of high-tech products.

Figure 3: Share of Global Trade

Source: World Bank Data

Figure 4: Share of Global Manufacturing

Source: OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVa) Database

Figure 5: Share of Global High-Tech Exports

Source: World Bank Data

The technology race is more difficult to summarize. Certainly, the United States remains at the forefront of advancing technology, which is likely to matter most in the next decade as American AI companies push the frontier. Current American constraints on exports of advanced semiconductors and the equipment with which to manufacture advanced semiconductors handicaps China. But in next-generation green technologies from solar and wind to EVs, China has established such a dominant lead that for at least the decade ahead, the West’s green future will be red.

In the military rivalry, the era of U.S. primacy is over. Yes, Washington’s position as a global military superpower remains unique—with a network of treaty allies and bases on almost every continent. Yet China is now a serious military rival. Chinese anti-access/area denial systems have changed the game in its geographical periphery, which includes Taiwan and the South and East China Seas. In the most realistic war games the Pentagon has designed to simulate war over Taiwan, the score is eighteen to zero. And the eighteen is not Team USA. In the words of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley, when “all the cards are put on the table,” the United States no longer bests China in defense spending.

In 1996, China’s reported defense budget was one-thirtieth the size of America’s. By 2020, when measured in PPP, China’s spending was over one-half of U.S. spending and on a path to parity. Furthermore, China’s military can do more with less. The average PLA active-duty soldier costs China one-quarter of an American soldier’s annual cost. And while China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller than the United States’, its nuclear forces are sufficiently capable to ensure mutually assured destruction (MAD).

Figure 6: Defense Spending (PPP)

Source: Belfer Center, The Great Military Rivalry: China vs the U.S.

Therefore what? Five takeaways deserve further reflection. 

First, as the traditional Olympic banner declares: “faster, higher, stronger.” Competition spurs rivals to run faster, jump higher, and demonstrate greater strength in throwing a discus or shot put than individuals would do running alone. As Adam Smith taught us, competition among nations that concentrate on their competitive advantages and trade creates a bigger pie of which each can have a bigger piece. In one of Xi Jinping’s favorite phrases, it is thus a “win-win.”

Second, as all Olympians know, in each event, only one person can win gold. Most never make it into the winner’s circle. Thus, while on the one hand, any athlete who qualifies to participate is an Olympian and thus a winner, on the other hand, most of these winners will be losers in the race for a medal. In game theory, a classic case of win-win is the stag hunt in which only by cooperating can two individuals capture a stag. But after they do, they must then decide how to divide the stag. A larger portion for one means less for the other in a game that is zero-sum win-lose. Similarly, when producing items for trade, like EVs or semiconductors, if a nation is able to establish a dominant position, it has power that it can exercise to influence other nations. 

Third, contrary to the standard talking points of Chinese diplomats who often reject the U.S. insistence on recognizing that China and the United States are competitors, in the athletic arenas, China is an enthusiastic and determined competitor. While Yang Jiechi (former foreign minister) cautioned the United States and China “should engage in win-win cooperation rather than hostile competition,” former (and ousted) Foreign Minister Qin Gang warned that “so-called ‘competition’ by the U.S. is all-round containment and suppression.” The current ambassador, Xie Feng, has also stressed that “competition between countries should be like competing with each other for excellence in a racing field, not beating one another in a wrestling ring.” But Chinese president Xi Jinping is himself a boxer. In boxing, as Xi says, “endurance, strength, and control in the ring” are most important. In the boxing arena, China has won one gold medal and one silver medal so far compared to America’s single bronze. In wrestling, the United States has won two golds to China’s one silver and three bronze. 

Can American and Chinese statesmen find their way to a relationship that is simultaneously a rivalry and a partnership? The Biden administration believes that its strategy of “competitive coexistence” is a big step in that direction

Fourth, while the stakes in the Olympics are essentially a matter of national pride, in the core geopolitical competitions, GDP, technological leadership, military power, and diplomatic prowess impact national security and even survival. Americans—including this author—believe that the international security order the United States constructed in the aftermath of World War II and has been the guardian of in the decades since then has been a remarkable era in human history. This unprecedented “long peace” has provided stability that has enabled not only Americans but most of the other eight billion souls with whom we share this small planet to enjoy greater increases in income, health, and well-being than in any other era of recorded history. China’s meteoric rise is challenging the United States’ established position at the top of the global pecking order in a quintessential Thucydidean rivalry. Most Thucydidean rivalries end in war.

Fifth, as the new Olympic banner adopted in 2021 in Tokyo declares: “faster, higher, stronger—together.” Analogously, while the United States and China are destined to be the fiercest rivals of all time, neither can escape the fact that their rivalry is shaped by existential challenges both face—and neither can defeat without the cooperation of the other. Today, both nations have nuclear arsenals that, if used in all-out war, could erase each other from the map. Both live on a small planet inside an enclosed biosphere, into which both have been emitting greenhouse gases at rates that could render it uninhabitable for both. 

The two economies are so entangled that the 2008 Great Recession would have become a global depression had Washington and Beijing not both responded with a coordinated stimulus. And while another Great Depression would not strictly be “existential” for either, when we recall that the depression in the 1930s fueled the rise of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism leading to the Second World War, neither want to see something like that again. Moreover, beyond these three, limiting dangers posed by transnational threats from pandemics and global terrorism to the spread of nuclear weapons requires coordination and cooperation.

Can nations be intense rivals and serious partners at the same time? Are these not competing and even contradictory imperatives? In an either-or world in which everything is black or white, friend or foe, it would seem that one would have to trump the other. However, in the business world, leaders often engage in what is called “co-optition.” For example, Apple and Samsung are ruthless competitors in selling high-end smartphones. But who is a major supplier of components for Apple’s smartphones? Samsung. When Apple’s CEO Tim Cook is asked how one of his major competitors can also be his major supplier of components, he says, “Life is complicated.”

Can American and Chinese statesmen find their way to a relationship that is simultaneously a rivalry and a partnership? The Biden administration believes that its strategy of “competitive coexistence” is a big step in that direction. The strategic concept or framework that Biden and Xi agreed to embrace at last November’s summit combines three Cs: competition, communication, and cooperation. While doing everything within their power to out-compete the other, they are also maintaining open channels for regular, candid, private communication about the most delicate and dangerous issues. These include not only conversations between the two presidents and their trusted national security advisers but also analogs in meetings between cabinet officers and military leaders. They are also cooperating on issues such as Taiwan, climate, fentanyl, trade, and others in ways that serve each nation’s interests.

F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.” We must hope that institutions as complex as governments can meet this test—and do so for decades ahead.

Dr. Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University, where he has taught for five decades. Allison is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. Allison was the “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and, until 2017, served as Director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, which is ranked the “#1 University Affiliated Think Tank” in the world.

Image: ProPhoto1234 / Shutterstock.com. 

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