美国安抚者的未来

https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/fa/fa_sepoct01/fa_sepoct01f.html
作者：约翰·米尔斯海默

约翰·米尔斯海默是芝加哥大学 R. 温德尔·哈里森政治学杰出服务教授。本文改编自他即将出版的《大国政治的悲剧》一书。

推卸责任

美国外交政策的核心目标传统上是主宰西半球，同时不允许另一个大国主宰欧洲或东北亚。美国不希望有同等的竞争对手。冷战结束后，美国政策制定者仍然坚定地致力于这一目标。五角大楼在 1992 年的一份重要规划文件中指出：“我们的首要目标是防止出现新的对手……其威胁程度堪比前苏联……我们的战略现在必须重新集中于阻止任何潜在的未来全球竞争对手的出现。”

为了实现这一目标，美国一直扮演着离岸平衡者的角色，只有当这些地区出现潜在霸权，而当地大国无法独自遏制时，美国才会向欧洲和东北亚派遣军队。实际上，美国一直奉行“推卸责任”的策略——置身事外，让其他国家承担遏制或打击侵略者的重担——直到它无法再安全地这样做为止。除非这种现实主义的行为模式发生根本性变化，否则美国对欧洲和东北亚军事承诺的未来将取决于这两个地区是否会出现一个只有美国才能遏制的潜在霸权。否则，驻扎在每个地区的十多万美军可能会在新世纪的头十年左右撤离。

但如果欧洲和东北亚目前的权力结构是良性的，那么这种结构不会持续太久。欧洲最有可能出现的情况是美国最终撤离，而德国则成为主导国家。实际上，该地区可能会从目前的两极（以美国和俄罗斯为两极）转变为不平衡的多极，这将导致欧洲大国之间的安全竞争更加激烈。

与此同时，东北亚权力结构的演变将取决于中国是否继续崛起。如果中国不成为潜在的霸权，美国可能会从该地区撤军，从而鼓励日本增强军事能力，再次成为大国。该地区体系将保持多极化和平衡，但安全竞争将比现在更加激烈。

然而，如果中国真的成为潜在的霸主，东北亚将陷入不平衡的多极化，美国将采取行动遏制中国的威胁。由于中国拥有如此巨大的潜在实力（由于其经济和人口规模），最后一种情况显然是最危险的……

The Future of the American Pacifier

https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/fa/fa_sepoct01/fa_sepoct01f.html

By John J. Mearsheimer

John J. Mearsheimer is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Passing the Buck

The central aim of American foreign policy has traditionally been to dominate the western hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia. The United States has not wanted a peer competitor. In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers remain firmly committed to this goal. An important Pentagon planning document stated in 1992, "Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival . . . that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. . . . Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor."

In pursuit of this goal, the United States has behaved as an offshore balancer, committing troops to Europe and Northeast Asia only when there was a potential hegemon in those neighborhoods that the local powers could not contain by themselves. In effect, the United States has followed a "buck-passing" strategy — remaining on the sidelines while getting others to bear the burden of deterring or fighting aggressors — until it could no longer do so safely. Unless this realist pattern of behavior changes radically, the future of the U.S. military commitments to Europe and Northeast Asia can thus be expected to hinge on whether a potential hegemon emerges in either region that can be contained only with American help. If not, the more than 100,000 U.S. troops based in each region will probably leave in the first decade or so of the new century.

But if the power structures that are now in place in Europe and Northeast Asia are benign, they are not sustainable for much longer. The most likely scenario in Europe is an eventual American exit coupled with the emergence of Germany as the dominant state. In effect, the region will probably move from its present bipolarity (with the United States and Russia as the poles) to unbalanced multipolarity, which will lead to more intense security competition among the European powers.

The evolution of the power structure in Northeast Asia, meanwhile, will depend on whether China's rise continues. If China does not become a potential hegemon, the United States is likely to pull its troops out of the area, thereby encouraging Japan to build up its military capability and become a great power once again. The regional system would remain multipolar and balanced, but security competition would be somewhat more intense than it is today.

If China does emerge as a potential hegemon, however, Northeast Asia will fall into unbalanced multipolarity and the United States will move to contain the Chinese threat. Because China has such vast latent power potential (due to the size of its economy and its population), this last scenario is clearly the most dangerous . . .

John Mearsheimer 大国政治的悲剧

2001 年，W.W. Norton & Company 出版了一本关于国际关系理论的书。米尔斯海默通过陈述其关键假设、从早期现实主义理论的演变及其预测能力来解释和论证他的“进攻性现实主义”理论。根据这本书改编的文章此前已由《外交事务》发表。[2]

米尔斯海默进攻性现实主义理论的五个基本假设是：

无政府状态：国际体系是无政府状态的；

进攻性军事能力：所有大国都拥有进攻性军事能力，它们可以用来对付彼此；

不确定性：国家不能确定其他国家不会使用军事能力对付它们；

生存：国家的首要目标是生存；

理性：国家是理性的单一行为体，它们战略性地思考如何实现其主要目标（生存）。

基于这些假设，米尔斯海默认为，国家将不断寻求积累权力，而国家之间的合作很难。大国政治的“悲剧”在于，即使是寻求安全的大国也将被迫参与竞争和冲突。

主要论点

陆权至上

米尔斯海默认为，一个国家在国际政治中的权力源于其军事实力，原因有二：陆军是现代占主导地位的军事力量，大片水域限制了陆军的力量投射能力。

水的制止力

米尔斯海默认为，世界上海洋的存在阻止了任何国家实现世界霸权。他认为，大片水域限制了军队的力量投射能力，从而自然而然地分割了全球的力量。

他以英吉利海峡为英国提供的孤立为例，这种孤立使英国能够充当欧洲大陆的离岸平衡者。他认为，英国从未有过控制或主宰欧洲大陆的野心。相反，它的目标只是维持权力平衡，确保没有任何国家能够强大到在大陆上实现地区霸权。在 19 世纪的大部分时间里，英国的工业能力使其能够轻松入侵和主宰欧洲大部分地区。

然而，英国选择不试图主宰欧洲大陆，部分原因是它认为，如果欧洲列强能够相互对抗，其实现安全的目标可以更便宜地实现。这样一来，欧洲列强就会被占领欧洲大陆，无法越过英吉利海峡挑战英国，也无法干涉英国在亚洲和非洲的经济利益。

因此，美国外交政策的核心目标是只成为西半球的霸主，并防止东半球出现类似的霸主。反过来，美国的正确角色是充当离岸平衡者，平衡欧亚霸权的崛起，并将战争作为阻止它的最后手段。

其他学者对水的制止力是否真的使征服变得更加困难提出了质疑。[4] 一位历史学家分析了这一说法：

不考虑最近（自公元 1492 年以来）发生的事件，这一假设是有道理的。1281 年，水和“好风”（神风特攻队）确实在前往日本的途中阻止了蒙古人。然而，后来，即使有各种各样的神风特攻队，水也停止了。1945 年，汉堡和德累斯顿、柏林和东京、广岛和长崎的市民（幸存者）不会将水力描述为阻止；当然不会将双重波巴库沙描述为那些 8 月 6 日在广岛幸存下来并在接下来的两天内设法到达长崎的人。如果米尔斯海默在 8 月 10 日安排了一次针对双重 habakushas 的民意调查，询问“您认为水力停止了吗？”，他将会收集到一致的否定回答，而这些回答不一定是字面意思。就在第一次神风特攻队周年纪念日（8 月 15 日）的前一天，日本宣布无条件投降。他们知道：水力不会停止。这次不会。[5]

国家生存战略

目标 1 – 地区霸权
除了生存这一主要目标外，大国还寻求实现三个主要目标。它们的最高目标是实现地区霸权。米尔斯海默认为，虽然实现全球霸权将为一个国家提供最大程度的安全，但这是不可行的，因为世界上有太多的海洋，阻碍了军事力量的投射。因此，在广阔的水域投射军事力量的难度使得大国不可能主宰世界。地区霸权国家强烈阻止其他国家实现地区霸权。

相反，他们试图维持地区权力的平衡，并采取行动

确保多个大国的存在，以使这些大国各自为政，而不是能够挑战地区霸权的利益，如果这些大国的利益没有被其邻近的竞争对手所占据，它们就可以自由地这样做。米尔斯海默以美国为例，美国在 19 世纪后期取得了地区霸权，然后试图干预任何看起来似乎其他国家可能在该地区取得霸权的地方：

第一次世界大战期间的德意志帝国
第二次世界大战期间的纳粹德国
第二次世界大战期间的日本帝国

冷战期间的苏联

目标 2 – 最大财富
大国寻求最大化其在世界财富中的份额，因为经济实力是军事实力的基础。大国寻求阻止竞争对手主宰世界财富生产地区。例如，美国试图阻止苏联主宰西欧和中东。如果苏联控制了这些地区，那么力量平衡将对美国产生重大影响。

目标 3 – 核优势

米尔斯海默断言，大国寻求对对手的核优势。大国存在于一个由多个核大国组成的世界，这些核大国拥有确保摧毁敌人的能力，这被称为相互保证摧毁 (MAD)。米尔斯海默不同意各国乐于生活在相互保证摧毁的世界，并且不会发展针对核武器的防御系统的说法。相反，他认为，大国不会满足于生活在相互保证摧毁的世界，他们会试图寻找方法来获得对核对手的优势。

美国力量的崛起；1800-1900 年
美国是美洲一个强大的扩张主义大国。米尔斯海默指出，亨利·卡伯特·洛奇 (Henry Cabot Lodge) 曾评论说，美国有着“19 世纪任何民族都无法比拟的征服、殖民和领土扩张记录”。 19 世纪 40 年代，欧洲人开始谈论维护美国的力量平衡和遏制美国进一步扩张的必要性。

然而，到 1900 年，美国已经取得了地区霸权，1895 年，美国国务卿理查德·奥尔尼告诉英国索尔兹伯里勋爵：“今天，美国实际上拥有这片大陆的主权，其对所辖臣民的命令就是法律……其无限的资源和孤立的地位使其能够掌控局势，并几乎不受其他任何大国的威胁。”

美国权力的未来
在《悲剧》倒数第二页，米尔斯海默警告说：

在对抗期间，无论是威廉德国、日本帝国、纳粹德国还是苏联，其潜在力量都远不及美国……但如果中国变成一个巨大的香港，其潜在力量可能约为美国的四倍，从而使中国获得对美国的决定性军事优势。

反响
作者接受了美国外交关系委员会旗下杂志《外交事务》的采访。[6]美国外交关系委员会的查尔斯·库普坎称这是一本“重要而令人印象深刻的书”，米尔斯海默在书中“优雅地阐述了他对国际政治研究的理论方法”。然而，他对米尔斯海默利用历史来充实自己的理论的方式提出了严厉批评。此外，库普坎谴责米尔斯海默对自己理论的坚信不疑，以及他无法“更开放地接受折衷主义来解释大国之间的政治”。[7]

麦吉尔大学的约翰·A·霍尔认为，这本书的论点因“严谨和连贯”而得到加强。[8]

哥伦比亚大学教授理查德·贝茨将《悲剧》与弗朗西斯·福山的《历史的终结与最后的人》（1992 年）和塞缪尔·亨廷顿的《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》（1996 年）并列为后冷战时代的三大著作之一。[9] 贝茨认为，“一旦中国实力全面发展”，米尔斯海默的书可能会在影响力方面领先于其他两部作品。

罗伯特·卡普兰为《悲剧》概述了类似的前景：

如果中国因社会经济危机而崩溃，或者以某种其他方式发展，消除了其作为威胁的潜在性，米尔斯海默的理论将因忽视国内政治而陷入严重困境。但如果中国继续成为一个强大的军事强国，重塑亚洲的力量平衡，那么米尔斯海默的悲剧将作为经典永垂不朽”。[10]

批评
一篇评论认为，19 世纪末英国和美国的和解以及欧盟在改变欧洲地缘政治格局方面取得的成功，使人们对平衡和破坏性竞争是国际体系不可避免的特征这一观点产生了严重怀疑。如果米尔斯海默分析了违背均势理论预测的持久和平事件，

他或许不太相信进攻性现实主义的普遍逻辑。[11]

对米尔斯海默观点的另一个批评是，这些观点忽视了跨国上层建筑，如资本主义、非国家行为体和国家内部的个别机构。米尔斯海默认为国内政治无关紧要，各国无法相互保证不怀有敌对意图。根据 R. 哈里森·瓦格纳的说法，米尔斯海默没有讨论民主、贸易或其他机制是否可以防止国家间发生战争，这一观点与康德和平三角的更广泛视角一致。[12]

米尔斯海默认为，国际体系中的两极分化是战争的根源。在存在潜在霸权的不平衡多极化中尤其如此。没有潜在霸权的平衡多极化权力分配不那么不对称，因此不那么令人恐惧。

在两极化中，人们最不担心的是两个主要国家之间的权力通常大致平衡。然而，战争的谈判模式[13]以战争代价高昂为由驳斥了这一说法。这一点以及各国都是理性行为者的事实，需要一些比两极化更积极的原因来推动各国承担战争代价。[14]

他的批评者的学术论文集[15]针对米尔斯海默在《悲剧》中的理论：“一些批评非常尖锐，证明米尔斯海默是政治科学界的顽童……”[16]

理查德·内德·勒博认为，“米尔斯海默对后冷战世界的所有预测都是错误的。”[17]

在第一本关于军事全球化的书中，历史学家马克斯·奥斯特洛夫斯基认为，水的制止力假设忽视了 1492 年以来的发展，1945 年德国和日本城市的公民不会将水力描述为制止力。[18]

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tragedy_of_Great_Power_Politics

A book of American scholar John Mearsheimer

On the subject of international relations theory published by W.W. Norton & Company in 2001. Mearsheimer explains and argues for his theory of "offensive realism" by stating its key assumptions, evolution from early realist theory, and its predictive capability. An article adapted from the book had previously been published by Foreign Affairs.[2]

The five bed-rock assumptions of Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism are:

Anarchy: the international system is anarchic;
Offensive military capabilities: all great powers possess offensive military capabilities which they can use against each other;
Uncertainty: states cannot be sure that other states will not use military capabilities against them;
Survival: the primary goal of states is survival;
Rationality: States are rational unitary actors who think strategically about how to pursue their primary goal (survival).
From these assumptions, Mearsheimer argues that states will constantly seek to accumulate power, and that cooperation between states is hard. The "tragedy" of great power politics is that even security-seeking great powers will nonetheless be forced to engage in competition and conflict with one another.[3]

Main arguments
Primacy of land power
A state's power in international politics, Mearsheimer argues, derives from the strength of its military for two reasons: because land force is the dominant military power in the modern era, and because large bodies of water limit the power projection capabilities of land armies.

The stopping power of water
Mearsheimer argues that the presence of oceans in the world prevents any state from reaching world hegemony. He posits that large bodies of water limit the power projection abilities of militaries and thus naturally divide up powers in the globe.

He uses the example of the isolation provided to Britain by the English Channel, which allowed it to act as an offshore balancer on mainland Europe. Britain, he argues, never had ambitions to control or dominate continental Europe. Instead it aimed only to maintain the balance of power and ensure that no state could become so powerful as to achieve regional hegemony on the continent. For much of the 19th century, Britain had an industrial capacity that would have allowed it to easily invade and dominate much of Europe.

However, Britain chose not to attempt domination of the continent, in part because it calculated that its aims of achieving security could be more cheaply achieved if the European powers could be played off against each other. By doing so, the European powers would be occupied on the European continent and unable to challenge Britain across the English Channel or interfere with Britain's economic interests in Asia and Africa.

Therefore, the central aim of American foreign policy is to be the hegemon in the Western Hemisphere only, and to prevent the rise of a similar hegemon in the Eastern Hemisphere. In turn, the proper role for the United States is as an offshore balancer, balancing against the rise of a Eurasian hegemon and going to war only as a last resort to thwart it.

Other scholars have disputed whether the stopping power of water actually makes conquest harder.[4] An Historian analyzed the claim:

Disregarding recent (since 1492 AD) events, the hypothesis makes sense. In 1281, water and the "good wind" (kamikaze) indeed stopped the Mongols on the way to Japan. Later, however, even with all sorts of kamikaze, water ceased to stop. In 1945, the citizens of Hamburg and Dresden, Berlin and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (those who survived), would not describe water power as stopping; certainly not the double habakusha—those who survived in Hiroshima on August 6 and within next two days managed to reach Nagasaki. Had Mearsheimer arranged a poll of double habakushas on August 10, "Does, in your opinion, water power stop?" he would have collected unanimous negative, not necessarily literal, replies. Just the day before the anniversary of the original kamikaze (August 15), the Japanese announced the unconditional surrender. They knew: water will not stop. Not this time.[5]

State strategies for survival
Objective 1 – Regional hegemony
In addition to their principal goal, which is survival, great powers seek to achieve three main objectives. Their highest aim is to achieve regional hegemony. Mearsheimer argues although achieving global hegemony would provide maximum security to a state, it is not feasible because the world has too many oceans which inhibit the projection of military power. Thus, the difficulty of projecting military power across large bodies of water makes it impossible for great powers to dominate the world. Regional hegemons try strongly to prevent other states from achieving regional hegemony.

Instead, they try to maintain an even balance of power in regions and act to ensure the existence of multiple powers so as to keep those multiple powers occupied among themselves rather than being able to challenge the regional hegemon's interests, which they would be free to do if they were not occupied by their neighboring competitors. Mearsheimer uses the example of the United States, which achieved regional hegemony in the late 1800s and then sought to intervene wherever it looked as though another state might achieve hegemony in a region:

Imperial Germany during World War I
Nazi Germany during World War II
Imperial Japan during World War II
Soviet Union during the Cold War
Objective 2 – Maximum wealth
Great powers seek to maximize their share of the world's wealth because economic strength is the foundation of military strength. Great powers seek to prevent rival powers from dominating wealth-producing regions of the world. The United States, for example, sought to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe and the Middle East. Had the Soviets gained control of these areas, the balance of power would have been altered significantly against the United States.

Objective 3 – Nuclear superiority
Mearsheimer asserts that great powers seek nuclear superiority over their rivals. Great powers exist in a world of multiple nuclear powers with the assured capacity to destroy their enemies called mutually assured destruction (MAD). Mearsheimer disagrees with the assertions that states are content to live in a MAD world and that they would avoid developing defenses against nuclear weapons. Instead, he argues that great powers would not be content to live in a MAD world and would try to search for ways to gain superiority over their nuclear rivals.

Rise of American power; 1800–1900
The United States was a strongly expansionist power in the Americas. Mearsheimer points to the comment made by Henry Cabot Lodge that the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization and territorial expansion unequaled by any people in the 19th century." In the 1840s, Europeans began speaking about the need to preserve a balance of power in America and contain further American expansion.

By 1900, however, the United States had achieved regional hegemony and in 1895 its Secretary of State Richard Olney told Britain's Lord Salisbury that "today the U.S. is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects within its interposition...its infinite resources and isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against all other powers."

Future of American power
On the penultimate page of Tragedy, Mearsheimer warns:

Neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union had nearly as much latent power as the United States had during their confrontations ... But if China were to become a giant Hong Kong, it would probably have somewhere on the order of four times as much latent power as the United States does, allowing China to gain a decisive military advantage over the United States.

Reception
The author was interviewed by Council on Foreign Relations owned magazine Foreign Affairs.[6] Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations called it an "important and impressive book" in which Mearsheimer "elegantly lays out his theoretical approach to the study of international politics". However, he is very critical of the way Mearsheimer uses history to compound his theory. Furthermore, Kupchan decries Mearsheimer's conviction in his own theory and his inability to be "more open to eclecticism in explaining politics among the great power".[7]

John A. Hall, of McGill University, found the book's arguments strengthened by "a tightness and coherence".[8]

The Columbia University Professor Richard Betts called Tragedy one of the three great works of the post–Cold War era, along with Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).[9] And, Betts suggested, "once China's power is full grown", Mearsheimer's book may pull ahead of the other two in terms of influence.

Robert Kaplan outlines a similar prospect for Tragedy:

If China implodes from a socioeconomic crisis, or evolves in some other way that eliminates its potential as a threat, Mearsheimer's theory will be in serious trouble because of its dismissal of domestic politics. But if China goes on to become a great military power, reshaping the balance of forces in Asia, then Mearsheimer's Tragedy will live on as a classic".[10]

Criticism
One review held that rapprochement between Britain and the United States at the end of the 19th century and the success of the European Union in transforming Europe's geopolitical landscape cast serious doubt on the notion that balancing and destructive rivalry are inescapable features of international system. If Mearsheimer had analyzed episodes of lasting peace that defy the predictions of balance-of-power theory, he would perhaps have been less convinced of the pervasive logic of offensive realism.[11]

Another critique of Mearsheimer's views is that they ignore transnational superstructures, such as capitalism, non-state actors, and individual institutions within states. Mearsheimer asserts domestic politics to be irrelevant and states to be unable to provide one another with guarantees that they do not harbor hostile intentions. According to R. Harrison Wagner, Mearsheimer does not address whether democracy, trade, or another mechanism could prevent states from fighting, a view that is consistent with the broader perspective of the Kantian Peace Triangle.[12]

Mearsheimer argues that polarity in the international system is the cause of war. That is especially true in unbalanced multipolarity in which there is a potential hegemon. Balanced multipolarity in which there is no potential hegemon has a less-asymmetrical distribution of power and so is less feared.

The fear is the least in bipolarity in which there is usually a rough balance of power between the two major states. However, the bargaining model of war[13] disputes that claim on the grounds that war is costly. That and the fact that states are rational actors, requires some other cause that is more positive than polarity to drive nations to incur the cost of war.[14]

A collection of his critics’ academic essays[15] takes aim at Mearsheimer's theories in Tragedy: "Some of the criticism is scathing, proving that Mearsheimer is the political-science world's enfant terrible...."[16]

According to Richard Ned Lebow, "All of Mearsheimer’s predictions about the post-Cold War world have been wrong."[17]

In the first book on military globalization, Historian Max Ostrovsky argues that the hypothesis of stopping power of water disregards developments since 1492 and that in 1945 the citizens of German and Japanese cities would not describe water power as stopping.[18]