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【原创翻译】1982年黎巴嫩战争中的叙利亚坦克猎手
轩辕春秋： MP586
译者按：这篇文章是一篇比较老的反映1982年黎巴嫩战争的文章，来自ACIG.org archives网站，早先曾经被国内多家知名军事期刊发掘并翻译转载，在北京出版的《兵器》杂志2010年12月号还发表该文为基础，作者署名“远懿”的《贝卡谷地坦克战》一文。
由于国内对于1982年黎巴嫩战争仍然缺乏相关的外文研究资料，因此这篇文章对国内军事爱好者们来说目前依然有重要的参考价值，所以笔者尝试翻译此文，仅供感兴趣的军事爱好者参考。
另外，特别感谢sc论坛“观星者”网友提供原文链接。
译文：
Syrian-Tank-Hunter in Lebanon,1982
1982年黎巴嫩战争中的叙利亚坦克猎手
One of little-known aspects of the Lebanon War, fought between Israel, PLO, and Syria, in June 1982, was a complex anti-tank battle fought by helicopters of both sides. While at least some details about Israeli attack helicopters were published ever since, almost nothing is known about the Syrians, regardless how interesting and innovative some their tactics was.
了解一点黎巴嫩战争常识的人都知道，1982年6月发生在以色列、巴解组织、叙利亚之间的战斗，一场复杂的反坦克战来自双方的直升机，当少数一些有关以色列武装直升机在战争中的细节早早被披露，叙利亚的方面的情况却鲜为人知，无论如何，它们某些战术是创新和有趣的。
Syrian Attack Helicopters
In the early 1980s the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) operated one brigade with four squadrons of SA.342L/M Gazelles (976, 977, 988, and an unknown unit – probably 989 Sqn), and one wing of three squadrons equipped with Mi-25s (765, 766, and 767). Both brigades had units based at Marj al-Sultan and al-Jdaydeh airfields, but part of Mi-24s was permanently deployed to Sueda AB as well.
叙利亚武装直升机
在1980年代的早期叙利亚阿拉伯空军有一个旅下辖4个中队SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，（976、977、988，和一个不明单位的989中队） 还有一个旅有三个配备mi-25s的中队（第765、766、767中队），两个旅的基地分别位于Marj al-Sultan 和 al-Jdaydeh机场，但部分mi-24s长期作为预备队部署在sueda.
Syria was a relatively new operator of combat helicopters, having obtained the first 18 French-built Aérospatiale SA.342 Gazelles only in 1977, in response to Israeli acquisition of Bell AH-1 Cobras. These 18 Gazelles entered service with the 976 Attack Helicopter Squadron, based at al-Jdaydeh AB, and were originally equipped with AS.12 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Later on, additional SA.342s were supplied, enabling the SyAAF to organize a full brigade of three squadrons, and one unit used for liaison and cooperation with police. Also supplied to Syria by France were HOT ATGMs. HOT is essentially a French-German equivalent to the US-made TOW, this designation actually standing for “Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube” – or “high-subsonic optical remote-guided fired from a tube”, with semi-automatic command-to-line of sight (SACLOS) guidance, with guidance inputs being transferred via a thin wire connecting the missile with the helicopter. As delivered to Syrians, the HOT was considered one of the most advanced ATGMs world-wide, claimed as capable of penetrating 700mm of steel armour at 0° and 288mm armour at 65°. The missile was delivered in tubes, of which each Gazelle could carry four, mounted on stubs behind the cockpit.
叙利亚比较新式的武装直升机，在1977年已获得第一批18架法国宇航公司制造的SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，以对付以色列购买的贝尔AH-1眼镜蛇 武装直升机，这批“小羚羊”配属给第976攻击直升机中队，基地位于al-Jdaydeh机场，原本配备AS-12反坦克导弹，稍后，额外的 SA.342S到货，可动用叙利亚空军一个包括三个中队的满编旅，以及一个和警方共同联络合作的部队，同时提供法制“霍特”反坦克导弹，“霍特”是由法国 和德国联合研制的，与美制“陶”式反坦克导弹相当，这其实是指“Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube”-或者“高亚音速光学制导发射筒”，采取半自动目视导线制导方式(SACLOS)引导，指令通过导线传送给机载导弹，作为交付给叙利亚人的“霍 特”，被认为是当时世界上最先进的反坦克导弹之一，据称能以0°法线角击穿700mm的钢装甲，或者以65°法线角击穿288 mm的钢装甲。导弹存储在发射筒交付，每架“小羚羊”能够携带4枚，安装在驾驶舱后根部。
Given that SyAAF purchased no Western-built aircraft or helicopters already since the late 1950s, the acquisition of Gazelles was quite surprising for many observers in the West. But, the fact was that this deal came as a result of Saudi efforts to orient as many Arab states towards West as possible, as well as Soviet inability to supply the number of Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) helicopters required by Syria. The Soviets needed any Hind they could get at the time for their units based in East Germany. Nevertheless, once the French started delivering Gazelles to Syria, the Soviets followed the suit, and in spring of 1981 the first squadron of four - later to rise to 12 - Mi-25s was organized at al-Mezzeh AB, near Damascus, followed by another unit, then based in al-Ladahiqiyah. The Mi-25 was considered a “monkey” version of the Mi-24, a downgraded variant supplied to “less reliable” customers. Its main anti-tank armament was the 9M17 Skorpion from the Falanga family of ATGMs (ASCC-Code “AT-2 Swatter”). This was a relatively primitive but simple ATGM with MCLOS radio-guidance. Each Mi-25 could mount four Swatters on launch rails mounted bellow wing-tips. The AT-2 was supplied in several variants, of which the B was sold to Syria. This version could reach targets out to a range of 3.500m, and had a claimed capability of armour penetration of over 500mm at 0°. Arabic Mi-25-pilots in generaly considered it useless, foremost because of its poor reliability. In addition, the Mi-25 was equipped with the YakB-12,7 machine-gun, mounted in a barbette underneath the front cockpit, as well as UB-32-57 rocket launchers for unguided rockets.
鉴于叙利亚阿拉伯空军在1950年代后期以来没有购买过西方制造的固定翼飞机或直升机，因此购买“小羚羊”在西方观察家看来十分意外，但实际上，作为这项 交易的努力的后果，沙特阿拉伯最大可能的促进了阿拉伯国家的团结，同时由于苏联无力提供叙利亚所要求的具有同等性能Mi-24直升机，他们需要优先保证他 们在东德的基地，不过，一旦法国开始向叙利亚提供“小羚羊”，苏联会紧随其后，在1981年的春季，第一个4架编制的mi-25s中队，（后来增至12 架）被部署在al-Mezzeh机场，在首都大马士革附近还部署有另一个单位，当时基地设在al-Ladahiqiyah，mi-25被认为是mi-24 的“猴”版（或称简化版），一类低档版被提供给“不可靠”的用户，它的主要反坦克武器是9M17“Skorpion”，来自Falanga家族的反坦克导 弹，（北约绰号AT-2”蝇拍”），这是一种相对落后但却简单的反坦克导弹，采取无线电指令制导，每架mi-25能够携带4枚”蝇拍”，在发射导轨上接受 指令提示，AT-2包括几种改进型，其中“B”型被出售给叙利亚，这种型号有效射程为3500m,有说法称其能以0°法线角击穿超过500mm的钢装甲， 但一般驾驶mi-25的阿拉伯飞行员不相信这种说法，首先是因为它的可靠性差。另外，mi-25配备了yak-B12.7mm机枪，安装在座舱下方的炮塔 内，其他武备包括多联装32mm或57mm无制导火箭发射器。
After closely monitoring the Iraqi experiences with Mi-25s, the Syrians relatively early dropped the use of AT-2 almost completely, and were arming their Mi-25s with machine-guns and unguided rockets, or bombs only. For various reasons that stood in no relation directly to the SyAAF, the introduction of Gazelles and Mi-25s in service with SyAAF was not entirely complete by spring of 1982. In fact, eventually the Syrian Hinds were not to see any kind of combat service during the fighting against Israelis. Consequently, although there is a number of reports of the contrary – especially in the Russian and Ukrainian, but also in specialized Western publications - the SyAAF Mi-25s did not fly even a single combat sortie in 1982: when it comes to the SyAAF anti-tank operations Gazelles fought almost alone.
在密切关注了mi-25在伊拉克的使用经验之后，叙利亚人很早就放弃了使用AT-2，并为他们的mi-25s安装了机枪和火箭发射器，还有炸弹，这些情况 对叙利亚空军没有多少影响，引进“小羚羊”和mi-25s的任务在1982年春天没能够完全完成，实际上，最终叙利亚没能看到它们在与以色列战争中的每一 次战斗中都出场，因此，虽然存在某些相反的报告---尤其是来自俄罗斯和乌克兰的，但在西方的专门出版物中，在1982年叙利亚的mi-25s却无法战斗 执勤甚至没有一个战例，叙利亚空军的反坦克作战中“小羚羊”几乎是单独作战。
Hunter-Killer Tactics
By early 1982 the Syrians were expecting some kind of a new Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Their commanders calculated that the IDF would most likely launch an attack similar to the Operation “Litani”, from 1978, when the Israelis drove only some 40km deep into Lebanon in a search for Palestinian terrorists. However, the Syrians knew that in the case the Israelis would not stop on the Litani River a major clash with IDF was inevitable. Yet, with most of Syrian Army important units being deployed either along the Golan Heights or in Damascus, and given the burden of sustaining a sizeable force inside Lebanon already since 1976, as well as because of their commitment in the local civil war, Damascus lacked assets and space to build a strong front-line stretching over whole width of Lebanon. In fact, by early June 1982 the majority of Syrian units in Lebanon was deployed in centre of the country, between Beirut and Zahle, with established defences only around specific points of interest - along the highway Beirut-Damascus, and especially in the area of the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta.
猎杀者的战术
1982年初，叙利亚期待以色列在南黎巴嫩的新行动，他们的指挥者估计以色列国防军将发起一次类似1978年“利塔尼”行动的进攻，当时以军仅仅因为搜索 巴勒斯坦恐怖分子而开进了黎巴嫩境内纵深大约40km,然而，叙利亚人清楚，他们将不可避免的在利塔尼河一线与以军发生大规模的冲突，为此，许多叙利亚精 锐部队沿戈兰高地至大马士革一线部署；而自从1976年以来，叙利亚便在黎巴嫩驻扎着相当数量的部队，这是由于他们介入黎巴嫩内战的承诺，大马士革缺少金 钱和空间建设一条强大的前线以涵盖整个黎巴嫩，实际上，在1982年的6月初，多数叙利亚部队部署在这个国家的中部，在贝鲁特和扎赫勒之间，建立防御仅围 绕着具体的问题沿戈兰—贝鲁特—大马士革一线，特别在坦塔的as-Sultan Yac'ub一带的乡村地区。
Studying the local terrain, roads, dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and possible routes along which the Israelis could approach, the Syrians developed simple but effective tactics. This called for co-ordination between SyAAF helicopters and specially trained “hunter-killer teams” of the Syrian Army. The aim was to ambush and tie down Israeli mechanized formations by ground-forces, preferably at short range and within urban areas, and then hit them by attack helicopters that would approach using local hilly terrain.
研究该地区的地形、道路、南黎巴嫩的数十个村庄和以色列能够采用可能的途径，叙利亚制定了简单但有效的策略，这就是叙利亚直升机和受过专门训练的叙利亚陆 军的“猎杀小组”协调一致，目的是凭借地面部队伏击和牵制以色列的装甲部队，最好在近距离和城市地区，然后凭借当地的丘陵地形用武装直升机攻击以军。
By early June 1982 the SA had the whole 20 Commando Battalion with a total of 50 hunter-killer teams deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the areas south and west of Beirut, but also in eastern and southern suburbs of the city. Each of Syrian teams consisted of between four and six men, armed with some of the best Western and Soviet anti-tank weapons of the time, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s (disposable 64 mm antitank rocket launcher), AT-4 Spigot ATGMs (only early-production 9P135 units), and MILAN ATGMs from France. Usually there were two shooters and two loaders in each team. Every six-man team had two additional members equipped with SA-7 MANPADS. Syrian anti-tank troops were older, more experienced soldiers of the SA, showing strong military skills and determination, and were later described by the Israelis as having a very professional attitude towards their mission. They operated with predilection in urban areas, where narrow streets of Lebanese towns and villages could easily be turned into shooting galleries for Israeli tanks.
在1982年6月初，叙利亚陆军有合计20个突击营与总共50个猎杀小组部署在黎巴嫩，主要分布在西贝鲁特及其以南地区，但在城市的西郊与南郊也有部署， 每个叙利亚猎杀小组包括4-6人，拥有当时西方和苏联最好的反坦克武器，包括RPG-7s，RPG-18s（一次性使用的64mm反坦克火箭发射 器），AT-4“塞子”反坦克导弹（仅有早期生产的9P-135型号）和来自法国的“米兰”反坦克导弹，通常在每个小组有两名射手和两名装填手，每个6人 小组配备2名携带SA-7便携式防空导弹的成员，叙利亚反坦克小组都是老兵，有很多经验的士兵
流露出较强的军事素养和战斗意志，战后以色列人描述他们对他们的任务有着专业的态度，他们偏爱在城区出击，因为黎巴嫩城镇与乡村狭窄的街道能够轻而易举的变成攻击以色列坦克的射击场。
Of conventional fighting forces the major Syrian units in Lebanon were the 10th and the 3rd Armoured Divisions. The 10th Armoured Division was deployed south of the Beirtu-Damascus road, and inside Beirut, and consisted of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades – equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s – and the 85th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-55s and BTR-60s. This division was in control of the 20 Commando Battalion as well. The 3rd Armoured Division included the 58th Mechanized Brigade and the 62nd Brigade, as well as two armoured brigades with T-62 tanks. This unit controlled an additional Commando Battalion, and defended the Beirut-Damascus road, as well as three SAM-brigades with a total of 19 SAM-sites, deployed mainly in the area near Zahle, along the Syrian border.
叙利亚在黎巴嫩的主要作战部队是第10和第3装甲师，第10装甲师部署在拜耳图-大马士革公路以南，在贝鲁特，包括76和第91装甲旅—装备t-62s坦 克和BMP-1s步兵战车，以及第85机械化旅，装备t-55s坦克和BTR-60s装甲输送车。第10装甲师负责指挥第20突击营，第3 装甲师包括第58机械化旅和第62旅，以及2个装备T-62坦克的装甲旅，这支部队控制另一个突击营，负责防守贝鲁特-大马士革公路，还有总计拥有19个 SAM导弹营的3个SAM导弹旅，沿着叙利亚边境部署在扎赫勒附近。
The Three Days Battle: Day One, 8 June
The war actually began already on 1 June 1982, with massive Israeli air strikes against PLO bases and ammunition depots along the Mediterranean coast. On the ground, however, the Israelis drove into southern Lebanon only around 11:00hrs of 6 June.
三日战役：第一天，6月8日
实际上，战争在1982年6月1日已经开始，以色列大规模空袭地中海沿岸的巴解基地和弹药库，不过，在地面，以色列军队直到6月6日上午11时才开进南黎巴嫩。
For Syrian troops stationed in the country, however, the fighting began two days later, near Jazzin, in central Lebanon, as the IDF Task Force Vardi – a specially configured task force under command of Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi, the task of which was to take Jazzin and then push north along the eastern side of Lake Qaroun towards the Beirut-Damascus highway – attacked positions of the 76th Syrian Tank Brigade.
因为叙利亚军队驻扎在黎巴嫩，然而，战斗在两天后才开始，在黎巴嫩中部的杰津附近，作为以色列国防军vardi特遣队---一支在巴拉克.丹尼.瓦迪指挥 下的特别部队，任务是拿下杰津，然后向北沿着可卡鲁恩湖的西岸向贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路推进---攻击叙利亚第76坦克旅。
While Vardi's force opened the attack on the 76th Brigade, in his rear Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan’s 162 Ugda was moving along narrow roads from south towards south-west, passing Jazzin with objective Beit en-Din, in the Shouf Mountains. Hampered by several massive traffic jams and fuel shortages Einan had experienced massive difficulties in organizing his movement so far and now his problems were to increase by a magnitude: shortly after 14:00hrs, the two lead columns of his unit that travelled on two parallel roads opened fire at each other in a case of mistaken identity. The results of this clash remain unknown, but it took Einan at least an hour to solve the chaos.
当vardi特遣队开始进攻叙利亚第76装甲旅时，在其后方的贝尔格.梅纳赫姆.埃南的162师级战斗队，沿着狭窄的道路向从南向西南方向推进，经过杰津 前往目标Beit en-Din，在舒夫山脉，埃南的162师级战斗队受阻于交通拥堵和燃料短缺，他在组织调动方面遇到了很大的困难，他的麻烦增加了，稍后在14:00，他 的部队中在两条平行道路上前进的前两列纵队开火误击了另一个自己人的基地，冲突的原因仍然鲜为人知，但它让埃南花了至少半小时解决混乱。
Barely that the 162 Ugda began to move again, around 15:30hrs, several of its vehicles suddenly received heavy hits. Four SA.342s of the 977 Sqn SyAAF approached Einan’s columns flying between hills and trees before taking positions and then firing their HOTs before their presence was ever detected. An unknown number of Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers was hit in this attack, but the IDF subsequently reported only slight casualties (four injured, one of which seriously). Barely one hour later, Task Force Vardi was also attacked by SyAAF fighter bombers, the pilots of which reported, "leaving several tanks afire".
162师级战斗队刚开始再次移动，大约15:30，有几部车辆受到了重击，4架叙利亚空军977中队的“小羚羊”突然在以军反应之前，在山和林木之间飞近 埃南的行军纵队，然后在现场的人们发现它们之前发射它们携带的“霍特”反坦克导弹，一些数目不详的以军坦克和装甲输送车在此次袭击中被击中，但以色列后来 的报道称只有轻微的伤亡，（4人受伤，其中1人重伤）仅仅一小时后，vardi特遣队也遭到叙利亚空军战斗轰炸机的袭击，叙利亚空军飞行员报告，有数辆坦 克起火。
In fact Einan's Ugda was attacked by only the second section of SyAAF helicopters that had a contact with enemy on that day. The first section was active over Lebanon already around 14:00hrs. It sneaked upon the Israelis by flying at low level along the canyons on north-western side of Mt. Hermon/Mt. Jabel Sheikh, and then attacked a column of the Special Manoeuvre Force, commanded by Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled, which consisted of two brigades of paratroops and infantry configured for anti-tank operations, and had a task of reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway along the Syrian border, thus outflanking Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian helicopters launched their attack when the Israelis were stopped by elements of the 91st Syrian Tank Brigade on the road from Hasabaiya towards Rashayya, but its results remain unknown.
实际上，埃南师级战斗队遭遇袭击仅仅是叙利亚直升机当天第二次与对手接触，首次行动是在黎巴嫩当地时间大约14:00，它们沿着马特-赫蒙/马特-宰赫谢 山谷的西北侧 低空潜入以军纵队上空，然后攻击以军由贝尔格.贝纳佩莱德指挥包括两个空降旅和配属的反坦克步兵的特遣队，该部的任务是沿着叙利亚边境贝鲁特-大马士革高 速公路向纵深推进，包抄叙利亚部署在贝卡谷地的部队，当以军被叙利亚精锐的第91坦克旅从哈塞拜亚到热撒亚一线的公路上所阻止时，叙利亚直升机发动了进 攻，但战果仍然不详。
The final Gazelle strike of the day was delivered around 17:30hrs, by two pairs that executed a pincer attack against mechanized IDF units on the road from Shab’a to Rashayya and from Barouch to Ayn Dara. The results of all these operations remain unknown, but in general the Israelis denied suffering any losses.
这一天“小羚羊”最后的进攻在17:30进行，两队出动对以军机械化纵队进行了夹击，从沙巴到热撒亚和Barouch到安达，所有的行动结果均不详，但一般以色列否认受到任何损失。
Day Two, 9 June
Around midnight of 9 June, the 162 Ugda reached the Druze village Ayn-Zhalta, in the middle of the Shouf Mountains, and only some 15km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. With this, the two armoured brigades of the Syrian 10th Division south of Lake Karoun were encircled. However, as the leading M-60s of 162 Ugda rolled down the road into the village they suddenly detected several T-62s: within seconds a fierce battle at close quarters developed in which a number of tanks from both sides - including three T-62s - was hit. As the Israelis pulled back to re-group the Syrian commandos attacked, engulfing the column in a barrage of RPGs. Namely, Einan’s Ugda drove directly into the centre of the Syrian 58th Mechanized Brigade, part of the the 3rd Armoured Division. The results of this initial clash are uncertain, then there is no reliable data about the Israeli casualties: the Syrians are said to have lost at least three T-62s and 20 soldiers, while the Israelis pulled back to Barouch. Certain is also that the Syrian resistance was fierce enough to cause the IDF in the morning to move a part of the Task Force Vardi with help of CH-53D helicopters behind the right flank of the Syrian position. As the Israeli paras - driving M-151 jeeps armed with TOW-ATGMs – were concentrating along the Ayn Zhalta–Barouch road, around 09:30hrs they were hit by the next SyAAF Gazelle attack that left several M-151 jeeps destroyed. However, Vardi managed to reorganize his force and deploy it in three blocking positions north and east of Barouch. At least in theory, Vardi’s force was now also only 15km away from the Beirut-Damascus highway. If it could reach it, it would not only cut off the Syrian units in the Beirut area from supply bases in Syria, but also have an open way into the rear of the 1st Syrian Armoured Division.
第二天，6月9日
6月9日全天，162师级战斗队搜索德鲁兹村庄Ayn-Zhalta，在舒夫山脉的中央，距离贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路以南仅15公里，叙利亚第十装甲师 的两个装甲旅卡鲁湖以南被包围，作为拥有m-60s的师级战斗队，开下公路进入村庄之后，突然遭遇几辆T-62s,并发生了短暂的近距离战斗，双方的一些 坦克，包括3辆T-62s被击中，以军回撤过程中再遭叙利亚突击队的袭击，行军纵队被一连串RPG攻击，换句话说，162师级战斗队闯进了叙利亚第3装甲 师一部—第58机械化旅的中央，这场战斗的结果无法确认，因为没有以色列伤亡的统计数据，叙利亚承认至少失去了3辆T-62s和20名士兵，而以军折回 barouch,叙利亚激烈抵抗的是因为vardi特遣队当天早晨在ch-53直升机的帮助下向叙利亚军队右翼侧背的运动取得了一些进展，随以军开进的 M-151吉普，携带“陶”式反坦克导弹，被集中于Ayn-Zhalta-barouch沿途，9:30，它们中掉队的车辆遭遇了下一波叙利亚“小羚羊” 的攻击，然而，vardi重组了他的部队，部署在barouch的西面和南面的三道拦阻阵地里，至少理论上，vardi特遣队现在仅距贝鲁特-大马士革高 速公路仅仅15km,假如它能控制它，那它不仅能够切断在贝鲁特叙军与叙利亚后勤基地的联系，还能够打开一条进入叙利亚第一装甲师后方的通路。
The problem was that the Israelis could not advance, at least not immediately: the 162 Ugda continued battling Syrians in Ayn Zhalta – in part because of another Gazelle-attack that left six Israeli tanks destroyed - until evening. It was only then that Einan’s units broke through towards Ayn Dara, a village only few kilometres south of the strategic highway. However, while advancing the Israelis were first ambushed by elements of the Syrian 51st Brigade and several anti-tank teams that went after M-60s and Merkava tanks for the most part: in a series of sharp clashes they hit a number of vehicles.
但问题是，以军无法前进，至少不能马上做到，162师级战斗队继续在Ayn-Zhalta与叙军交战，部分原因是另外的“小羚羊”攻击，左翼六辆坦克在晚 间被摧毁，这只是到那时，埃南的部队才打通达拉泉，一个仅仅距离战略高速路几千米的村庄，然而，前进中的以军首次被叙利亚第51旅的部队和反坦克小分队伏 击，通常尾追m-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，这一系列的冲突中，他们击毁了一些车辆。
Meanwhile, furhter to souther-east, two Syrian armour brigades encircled south of Lake Karoun were fighting for their naked survival, keeping the main group of Israeli forces busy. In the words of Syrian officers that survived this battle, the fighting was savage: the two front T-62-companies from his battalion were completely destroyed, and his company lost several tanks as well. In return, the Syrians destroyed six and captured three M-60s. By the noon, their situation worsened when surviving Syrian tanks began to run out of ammunition and fuel while under increasing Israeli pressure. Concerned with the situaiton of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades, the Syrian General Headquarters ordered a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72 tanks, and moving along the road from Damascus towards the Lebanese border, to move straight ahead, cross the border and hit the right flank of the Israeli units advancing along the eastern side of Beka'a.
与此同时，进一步朝西南方向扩展，两个叙利亚装甲旅正在卡鲁恩湖的南面进行处境艰难战斗，忙碌的以军纵队保持主要编队，在幸存的叙利亚军官的回忆中，这一 战是惨烈的：来自他的营的两个先头连的T-62被彻底摧毁，他的连也失去了好几辆坦克，作为回报，叙利亚摧毁6辆并击伤3辆m-60s,到了中午，当以色 列的压力越来越大，当幸存的叙利亚坦克耗尽了他们的弹药和燃料后，他们的情况恶化了，关注着第76和第91坦克旅情况的叙军总部命令第1装甲师的一个装备 T-72坦克的装甲旅，沿着大马士革的公路朝黎巴嫩边界移动，径直前行，穿越边界后打击沿着贝卡谷地东侧前进的以军的右翼。
The Syrian counterattack that came from east towards west, passing few kilometres north of Rashayya, is described as the "most savage tank battle of the whole war" by Syrian veterans. The T-72s clashed with several companies of M-60s, destroying some of these in process while suffering only a few losses in exchange: in fact, the officer in command of one of leading Syrian companies was subsequently decorated for his unit successfully penetrated the Israeli ring around the 76th and 91st Brigades, without loosing a single tank in the process. During the Syrian breakthrough south and east of Lake Karoun, on the afternoon of 9 June, several officers noticed an Israeli F-16A falling in flames behind the Israeli lines, the pilot ejecting in the process - only to be recovered by IDF ground troops. The cause of this loss remains unclear until today, but no local air-defence units claimed any kills, while a number of Syrian veterans - interviewed independently - recall this event very vividly.
叙利亚的反击是从东朝西，经过Rashayya北面的附近，被叙利亚退伍军人描述为“整个战争中最激烈的坦克战”， T-72与几个连的m-60s展开战斗，摧毁了它们中的一些，在这个交换过程中仅遭受了一点损失：实际上，一位叙利亚指挥官因为他的部队成功突破以军对 76和91装甲旅的包围而做了夸张，叙军在突破卡鲁恩湖的东面和南面期间没有损失一辆坦克，在6月9日的下午，几位叙利亚军官注意到，一架着火的以色列 F-16A战斗机坠落在以军战线的后方，在这一过程中飞行员弹出，仅仅被以色列陆军所救回，损失的原因被以色列解释为非战斗损失，但没有一个当地防空部队 声称击落，这是几名接受独立采访的叙利亚退伍军人非常生动的回忆。
Despite the Syrian success, and the fact that the two armoured brigades managed to escape throught the corridor that remained open for several hours, the 10th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army paid a heavy price, losing almost 200 T-62s in the course of the fighting. At least 90 of these were captured intact. Eventually, this unit has had to be pulled back and swiftly re-armed with T-55 tanks from strategic reserve stocks. In turn, the 1st Armoured Division was ordered back behind the Syrian border, to regroup and continue its trip to Zahle.
In the meantime, around 12:30hrs of 9 June, a strike package of four SyAAF MiG-23BNs bombed the Israeli HQs set up in Samaqiyah, which was detected by tracking Israeli radio communications and already under heavy pressure by Syrian artillery. Additional Syrian strikes were flown in support of the 1st Armoured Division's counterattack to relieve the armoured brigades besieged south of the Karoun Lake.
尽管叙利亚取得了成功，两个装甲旅通过这个开放了几个小时的走廊事实上逃脱了，但叙军的第10装甲师却付出了沉重的代价，在战斗过程中损失了差不多200 辆T-62s,它们中至少有90辆被完整的俘获，这支部队被调回并用来自战略储备物资的T-55坦克迅速重新武装，反过来，第1装甲师被命令返回叙利亚边 界后方，重组后继续继续它前往扎赫勒的行程，在那个重要时刻，6月9日的12:30，一攻击波共4架叙利亚空军的米格-23BN战斗机轰炸了设置在萨玛奇 亚的以军总部，通过检测被跟踪的以军无线电通讯，得知已经受到了叙利亚炮兵的重压，另外的叙还以的空中打击支援了叙军第1装甲师营救卡鲁恩湖南侧两个装甲 旅的行动。
Syrian-Tank-Hunter in Lebanon,1982
1982年黎巴嫩战争中的叙利亚坦克猎手
One of little-known aspects of the Lebanon War, fought between Israel, PLO, and Syria, in June 1982, was a complex anti-tank battle fought by helicopters of both sides. While at least some details about Israeli attack helicopters were published ever since, almost nothing is known about the Syrians, regardless how interesting and innovative some their tactics was.
了解一点黎巴嫩战争常识的人都知道，1982年6月发生在以色列、巴解组织、叙利亚之间的战斗，一场复杂的反坦克战来自双方的直升机，当少数一些有关以色列武装直升机在战争中的细节早早被披露，叙利亚的方面的情况却鲜为人知，无论如何，它们某些战术是创新和有趣的。
Syrian Attack Helicopters
In the early 1980s the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) operated one brigade with four squadrons of SA.342L/M Gazelles (976, 977, 988, and an unknown unit – probably 989 Sqn), and one wing of three squadrons equipped with Mi-25s (765, 766, and 767). Both brigades had units based at Marj al-Sultan and al-Jdaydeh airfields, but part of Mi-24s was permanently deployed to Sueda AB as well.
叙利亚武装直升机
在1980年代的早期叙利亚阿拉伯空军有一个旅下辖4个中队SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，（976、977、988，和一个不明单位的989中队） 还有一个旅有三个配备mi-25s的中队（第765、766、767中队），两个旅的基地分别位于Marj al-Sultan 和 al-Jdaydeh机场，但部分mi-24s长期作为预备队部署在sueda.
Syria was a relatively new operator of combat helicopters, having obtained the first 18 French-built Aérospatiale SA.342 Gazelles only in 1977, in response to Israeli acquisition of Bell AH-1 Cobras. These 18 Gazelles entered service with the 976 Attack Helicopter Squadron, based at al-Jdaydeh AB, and were originally equipped with AS.12 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Later on, additional SA.342s were supplied, enabling the SyAAF to organize a full brigade of three squadrons, and one unit used for liaison and cooperation with police. Also supplied to Syria by France were HOT ATGMs. HOT is essentially a French-German equivalent to the US-made TOW, this designation actually standing for “Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube” – or “high-subsonic optical remote-guided fired from a tube”, with semi-automatic command-to-line of sight (SACLOS) guidance, with guidance inputs being transferred via a thin wire connecting the missile with the helicopter. As delivered to Syrians, the HOT was considered one of the most advanced ATGMs world-wide, claimed as capable of penetrating 700mm of steel armour at 0° and 288mm armour at 65°. The missile was delivered in tubes, of which each Gazelle could carry four, mounted on stubs behind the cockpit.
叙利亚比较新式的武装直升机，在1977年已获得第一批18架法国宇航公司制造的SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，以对付以色列购买的贝尔AH-1眼镜蛇 武装直升机，这批“小羚羊”配属给第976攻击直升机中队，基地位于al-Jdaydeh机场，原本配备AS-12反坦克导弹，稍后，额外的 SA.342S到货，可动用叙利亚空军一个包括三个中队的满编旅，以及一个和警方共同联络合作的部队，同时提供法制“霍特”反坦克导弹，“霍特”是由法国 和德国联合研制的，与美制“陶”式反坦克导弹相当，这其实是指“Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube”-或者“高亚音速光学制导发射筒”，采取半自动目视导线制导方式(SACLOS)引导，指令通过导线传送给机载导弹，作为交付给叙利亚人的“霍 特”，被认为是当时世界上最先进的反坦克导弹之一，据称能以0°法线角击穿700mm的钢装甲，或者以65°法线角击穿288 mm的钢装甲。导弹存储在发射筒交付，每架“小羚羊”能够携带4枚，安装在驾驶舱后根部。
Given that SyAAF purchased no Western-built aircraft or helicopters already since the late 1950s, the acquisition of Gazelles was quite surprising for many observers in the West. But, the fact was that this deal came as a result of Saudi efforts to orient as many Arab states towards West as possible, as well as Soviet inability to supply the number of Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) helicopters required by Syria. The Soviets needed any Hind they could get at the time for their units based in East Germany. Nevertheless, once the French started delivering Gazelles to Syria, the Soviets followed the suit, and in spring of 1981 the first squadron of four - later to rise to 12 - Mi-25s was organized at al-Mezzeh AB, near Damascus, followed by another unit, then based in al-Ladahiqiyah. The Mi-25 was considered a “monkey” version of the Mi-24, a downgraded variant supplied to “less reliable” customers. Its main anti-tank armament was the 9M17 Skorpion from the Falanga family of ATGMs (ASCC-Code “AT-2 Swatter”). This was a relatively primitive but simple ATGM with MCLOS radio-guidance. Each Mi-25 could mount four Swatters on launch rails mounted bellow wing-tips. The AT-2 was supplied in several variants, of which the B was sold to Syria. This version could reach targets out to a range of 3.500m, and had a claimed capability of armour penetration of over 500mm at 0°. Arabic Mi-25-pilots in generaly considered it useless, foremost because of its poor reliability. In addition, the Mi-25 was equipped with the YakB-12,7 machine-gun, mounted in a barbette underneath the front cockpit, as well as UB-32-57 rocket launchers for unguided rockets.
鉴于叙利亚阿拉伯空军在1950年代后期以来没有购买过西方制造的固定翼飞机或直升机，因此购买“小羚羊”在西方观察家看来十分意外，但实际上，作为这项 交易的努力的后果，沙特阿拉伯最大可能的促进了阿拉伯国家的团结，同时由于苏联无力提供叙利亚所要求的具有同等性能Mi-24直升机，他们需要优先保证他 们在东德的基地，不过，一旦法国开始向叙利亚提供“小羚羊”，苏联会紧随其后，在1981年的春季，第一个4架编制的mi-25s中队，（后来增至12 架）被部署在al-Mezzeh机场，在首都大马士革附近还部署有另一个单位，当时基地设在al-Ladahiqiyah，mi-25被认为是mi-24 的“猴”版（或称简化版），一类低档版被提供给“不可靠”的用户，它的主要反坦克武器是9M17“Skorpion”，来自Falanga家族的反坦克导 弹，（北约绰号AT-2”蝇拍”），这是一种相对落后但却简单的反坦克导弹，采取无线电指令制导，每架mi-25能够携带4枚”蝇拍”，在发射导轨上接受 指令提示，AT-2包括几种改进型，其中“B”型被出售给叙利亚，这种型号有效射程为3500m,有说法称其能以0°法线角击穿超过500mm的钢装甲， 但一般驾驶mi-25的阿拉伯飞行员不相信这种说法，首先是因为它的可靠性差。另外，mi-25配备了yak-B12.7mm机枪，安装在座舱下方的炮塔 内，其他武备包括多联装32mm或57mm无制导火箭发射器。
After closely monitoring the Iraqi experiences with Mi-25s, the Syrians relatively early dropped the use of AT-2 almost completely, and were arming their Mi-25s with machine-guns and unguided rockets, or bombs only. For various reasons that stood in no relation directly to the SyAAF, the introduction of Gazelles and Mi-25s in service with SyAAF was not entirely complete by spring of 1982. In fact, eventually the Syrian Hinds were not to see any kind of combat service during the fighting against Israelis. Consequently, although there is a number of reports of the contrary – especially in the Russian and Ukrainian, but also in specialized Western publications - the SyAAF Mi-25s did not fly even a single combat sortie in 1982: when it comes to the SyAAF anti-tank operations Gazelles fought almost alone.
在密切关注了mi-25在伊拉克的使用经验之后，叙利亚人很早就放弃了使用AT-2，并为他们的mi-25s安装了机枪和火箭发射器，还有炸弹，这些情况 对叙利亚空军没有多少影响，引进“小羚羊”和mi-25s的任务在1982年春天没能够完全完成，实际上，最终叙利亚没能看到它们在与以色列战争中的每一 次战斗中都出场，因此，虽然存在某些相反的报告---尤其是来自俄罗斯和乌克兰的，但在西方的专门出版物中，在1982年叙利亚的mi-25s却无法战斗 执勤甚至没有一个战例，叙利亚空军的反坦克作战中“小羚羊”几乎是单独作战。
Hunter-Killer Tactics
By early 1982 the Syrians were expecting some kind of a new Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Their commanders calculated that the IDF would most likely launch an attack similar to the Operation “Litani”, from 1978, when the Israelis drove only some 40km deep into Lebanon in a search for Palestinian terrorists. However, the Syrians knew that in the case the Israelis would not stop on the Litani River a major clash with IDF was inevitable. Yet, with most of Syrian Army important units being deployed either along the Golan Heights or in Damascus, and given the burden of sustaining a sizeable force inside Lebanon already since 1976, as well as because of their commitment in the local civil war, Damascus lacked assets and space to build a strong front-line stretching over whole width of Lebanon. In fact, by early June 1982 the majority of Syrian units in Lebanon was deployed in centre of the country, between Beirut and Zahle, with established defences only around specific points of interest - along the highway Beirut-Damascus, and especially in the area of the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta.
猎杀者的战术
1982年初，叙利亚期待以色列在南黎巴嫩的新行动，他们的指挥者估计以色列国防军将发起一次类似1978年“利塔尼”行动的进攻，当时以军仅仅因为搜索 巴勒斯坦恐怖分子而开进了黎巴嫩境内纵深大约40km,然而，叙利亚人清楚，他们将不可避免的在利塔尼河一线与以军发生大规模的冲突，为此，许多叙利亚精 锐部队沿戈兰高地至大马士革一线部署；而自从1976年以来，叙利亚便在黎巴嫩驻扎着相当数量的部队，这是由于他们介入黎巴嫩内战的承诺，大马士革缺少金 钱和空间建设一条强大的前线以涵盖整个黎巴嫩，实际上，在1982年的6月初，多数叙利亚部队部署在这个国家的中部，在贝鲁特和扎赫勒之间，建立防御仅围 绕着具体的问题沿戈兰—贝鲁特—大马士革一线，特别在坦塔的as-Sultan Yac'ub一带的乡村地区。
Studying the local terrain, roads, dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and possible routes along which the Israelis could approach, the Syrians developed simple but effective tactics. This called for co-ordination between SyAAF helicopters and specially trained “hunter-killer teams” of the Syrian Army. The aim was to ambush and tie down Israeli mechanized formations by ground-forces, preferably at short range and within urban areas, and then hit them by attack helicopters that would approach using local hilly terrain.
研究该地区的地形、道路、南黎巴嫩的数十个村庄和以色列能够采用可能的途径，叙利亚制定了简单但有效的策略，这就是叙利亚直升机和受过专门训练的叙利亚陆 军的“猎杀小组”协调一致，目的是凭借地面部队伏击和牵制以色列的装甲部队，最好在近距离和城市地区，然后凭借当地的丘陵地形用武装直升机攻击以军。
By early June 1982 the SA had the whole 20 Commando Battalion with a total of 50 hunter-killer teams deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the areas south and west of Beirut, but also in eastern and southern suburbs of the city. Each of Syrian teams consisted of between four and six men, armed with some of the best Western and Soviet anti-tank weapons of the time, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s (disposable 64 mm antitank rocket launcher), AT-4 Spigot ATGMs (only early-production 9P135 units), and MILAN ATGMs from France. Usually there were two shooters and two loaders in each team. Every six-man team had two additional members equipped with SA-7 MANPADS. Syrian anti-tank troops were older, more experienced soldiers of the SA, showing strong military skills and determination, and were later described by the Israelis as having a very professional attitude towards their mission. They operated with predilection in urban areas, where narrow streets of Lebanese towns and villages could easily be turned into shooting galleries for Israeli tanks.
在1982年6月初，叙利亚陆军有合计20个突击营与总共50个猎杀小组部署在黎巴嫩，主要分布在西贝鲁特及其以南地区，但在城市的西郊与南郊也有部署， 每个叙利亚猎杀小组包括4-6人，拥有当时西方和苏联最好的反坦克武器，包括RPG-7s，RPG-18s（一次性使用的64mm反坦克火箭发射 器），AT-4“塞子”反坦克导弹（仅有早期生产的9P-135型号）和来自法国的“米兰”反坦克导弹，通常在每个小组有两名射手和两名装填手，每个6人 小组配备2名携带SA-7便携式防空导弹的成员，叙利亚反坦克小组都是老兵，有很多经验的士兵
流露出较强的军事素养和战斗意志，战后以色列人描述他们对他们的任务有着专业的态度，他们偏爱在城区出击，因为黎巴嫩城镇与乡村狭窄的街道能够轻而易举的变成攻击以色列坦克的射击场。
Of conventional fighting forces the major Syrian units in Lebanon were the 10th and the 3rd Armoured Divisions. The 10th Armoured Division was deployed south of the Beirtu-Damascus road, and inside Beirut, and consisted of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades – equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s – and the 85th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-55s and BTR-60s. This division was in control of the 20 Commando Battalion as well. The 3rd Armoured Division included the 58th Mechanized Brigade and the 62nd Brigade, as well as two armoured brigades with T-62 tanks. This unit controlled an additional Commando Battalion, and defended the Beirut-Damascus road, as well as three SAM-brigades with a total of 19 SAM-sites, deployed mainly in the area near Zahle, along the Syrian border.
叙利亚在黎巴嫩的主要作战部队是第10和第3装甲师，第10装甲师部署在拜耳图-大马士革公路以南，在贝鲁特，包括76和第91装甲旅—装备t-62s坦 克和BMP-1s步兵战车，以及第85机械化旅，装备t-55s坦克和BTR-60s装甲输送车。第10装甲师负责指挥第20突击营，第3 装甲师包括第58机械化旅和第62旅，以及2个装备T-62坦克的装甲旅，这支部队控制另一个突击营，负责防守贝鲁特-大马士革公路，还有总计拥有19个 SAM导弹营的3个SAM导弹旅，沿着叙利亚边境部署在扎赫勒附近。
The Three Days Battle: Day One, 8 June
The war actually began already on 1 June 1982, with massive Israeli air strikes against PLO bases and ammunition depots along the Mediterranean coast. On the ground, however, the Israelis drove into southern Lebanon only around 11:00hrs of 6 June.
三日战役：第一天，6月8日
实际上，战争在1982年6月1日已经开始，以色列大规模空袭地中海沿岸的巴解基地和弹药库，不过，在地面，以色列军队直到6月6日上午11时才开进南黎巴嫩。
For Syrian troops stationed in the country, however, the fighting began two days later, near Jazzin, in central Lebanon, as the IDF Task Force Vardi – a specially configured task force under command of Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi, the task of which was to take Jazzin and then push north along the eastern side of Lake Qaroun towards the Beirut-Damascus highway – attacked positions of the 76th Syrian Tank Brigade.
因为叙利亚军队驻扎在黎巴嫩，然而，战斗在两天后才开始，在黎巴嫩中部的杰津附近，作为以色列国防军vardi特遣队---一支在巴拉克.丹尼.瓦迪指挥 下的特别部队，任务是拿下杰津，然后向北沿着可卡鲁恩湖的西岸向贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路推进---攻击叙利亚第76坦克旅。
While Vardi's force opened the attack on the 76th Brigade, in his rear Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan’s 162 Ugda was moving along narrow roads from south towards south-west, passing Jazzin with objective Beit en-Din, in the Shouf Mountains. Hampered by several massive traffic jams and fuel shortages Einan had experienced massive difficulties in organizing his movement so far and now his problems were to increase by a magnitude: shortly after 14:00hrs, the two lead columns of his unit that travelled on two parallel roads opened fire at each other in a case of mistaken identity. The results of this clash remain unknown, but it took Einan at least an hour to solve the chaos.
当vardi特遣队开始进攻叙利亚第76装甲旅时，在其后方的贝尔格.梅纳赫姆.埃南的162师级战斗队，沿着狭窄的道路向从南向西南方向推进，经过杰津 前往目标Beit en-Din，在舒夫山脉，埃南的162师级战斗队受阻于交通拥堵和燃料短缺，他在组织调动方面遇到了很大的困难，他的麻烦增加了，稍后在14:00，他 的部队中在两条平行道路上前进的前两列纵队开火误击了另一个自己人的基地，冲突的原因仍然鲜为人知，但它让埃南花了至少半小时解决混乱。
Barely that the 162 Ugda began to move again, around 15:30hrs, several of its vehicles suddenly received heavy hits. Four SA.342s of the 977 Sqn SyAAF approached Einan’s columns flying between hills and trees before taking positions and then firing their HOTs before their presence was ever detected. An unknown number of Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers was hit in this attack, but the IDF subsequently reported only slight casualties (four injured, one of which seriously). Barely one hour later, Task Force Vardi was also attacked by SyAAF fighter bombers, the pilots of which reported, "leaving several tanks afire".
162师级战斗队刚开始再次移动，大约15:30，有几部车辆受到了重击，4架叙利亚空军977中队的“小羚羊”突然在以军反应之前，在山和林木之间飞近 埃南的行军纵队，然后在现场的人们发现它们之前发射它们携带的“霍特”反坦克导弹，一些数目不详的以军坦克和装甲输送车在此次袭击中被击中，但以色列后来 的报道称只有轻微的伤亡，（4人受伤，其中1人重伤）仅仅一小时后，vardi特遣队也遭到叙利亚空军战斗轰炸机的袭击，叙利亚空军飞行员报告，有数辆坦 克起火。
In fact Einan's Ugda was attacked by only the second section of SyAAF helicopters that had a contact with enemy on that day. The first section was active over Lebanon already around 14:00hrs. It sneaked upon the Israelis by flying at low level along the canyons on north-western side of Mt. Hermon/Mt. Jabel Sheikh, and then attacked a column of the Special Manoeuvre Force, commanded by Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled, which consisted of two brigades of paratroops and infantry configured for anti-tank operations, and had a task of reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway along the Syrian border, thus outflanking Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian helicopters launched their attack when the Israelis were stopped by elements of the 91st Syrian Tank Brigade on the road from Hasabaiya towards Rashayya, but its results remain unknown.
实际上，埃南师级战斗队遭遇袭击仅仅是叙利亚直升机当天第二次与对手接触，首次行动是在黎巴嫩当地时间大约14:00，它们沿着马特-赫蒙/马特-宰赫谢 山谷的西北侧 低空潜入以军纵队上空，然后攻击以军由贝尔格.贝纳佩莱德指挥包括两个空降旅和配属的反坦克步兵的特遣队，该部的任务是沿着叙利亚边境贝鲁特-大马士革高 速公路向纵深推进，包抄叙利亚部署在贝卡谷地的部队，当以军被叙利亚精锐的第91坦克旅从哈塞拜亚到热撒亚一线的公路上所阻止时，叙利亚直升机发动了进 攻，但战果仍然不详。
The final Gazelle strike of the day was delivered around 17:30hrs, by two pairs that executed a pincer attack against mechanized IDF units on the road from Shab’a to Rashayya and from Barouch to Ayn Dara. The results of all these operations remain unknown, but in general the Israelis denied suffering any losses.
这一天“小羚羊”最后的进攻在17:30进行，两队出动对以军机械化纵队进行了夹击，从沙巴到热撒亚和Barouch到安达，所有的行动结果均不详，但一般以色列否认受到任何损失。
Day Two, 9 June
Around midnight of 9 June, the 162 Ugda reached the Druze village Ayn-Zhalta, in the middle of the Shouf Mountains, and only some 15km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. With this, the two armoured brigades of the Syrian 10th Division south of Lake Karoun were encircled. However, as the leading M-60s of 162 Ugda rolled down the road into the village they suddenly detected several T-62s: within seconds a fierce battle at close quarters developed in which a number of tanks from both sides - including three T-62s - was hit. As the Israelis pulled back to re-group the Syrian commandos attacked, engulfing the column in a barrage of RPGs. Namely, Einan’s Ugda drove directly into the centre of the Syrian 58th Mechanized Brigade, part of the the 3rd Armoured Division. The results of this initial clash are uncertain, then there is no reliable data about the Israeli casualties: the Syrians are said to have lost at least three T-62s and 20 soldiers, while the Israelis pulled back to Barouch. Certain is also that the Syrian resistance was fierce enough to cause the IDF in the morning to move a part of the Task Force Vardi with help of CH-53D helicopters behind the right flank of the Syrian position. As the Israeli paras - driving M-151 jeeps armed with TOW-ATGMs – were concentrating along the Ayn Zhalta–Barouch road, around 09:30hrs they were hit by the next SyAAF Gazelle attack that left several M-151 jeeps destroyed. However, Vardi managed to reorganize his force and deploy it in three blocking positions north and east of Barouch. At least in theory, Vardi’s force was now also only 15km away from the Beirut-Damascus highway. If it could reach it, it would not only cut off the Syrian units in the Beirut area from supply bases in Syria, but also have an open way into the rear of the 1st Syrian Armoured Division.
第二天，6月9日
6月9日全天，162师级战斗队搜索德鲁兹村庄Ayn-Zhalta，在舒夫山脉的中央，距离贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路以南仅15公里，叙利亚第十装甲师 的两个装甲旅卡鲁湖以南被包围，作为拥有m-60s的师级战斗队，开下公路进入村庄之后，突然遭遇几辆T-62s,并发生了短暂的近距离战斗，双方的一些 坦克，包括3辆T-62s被击中，以军回撤过程中再遭叙利亚突击队的袭击，行军纵队被一连串RPG攻击，换句话说，162师级战斗队闯进了叙利亚第3装甲 师一部—第58机械化旅的中央，这场战斗的结果无法确认，因为没有以色列伤亡的统计数据，叙利亚承认至少失去了3辆T-62s和20名士兵，而以军折回 barouch,叙利亚激烈抵抗的是因为vardi特遣队当天早晨在ch-53直升机的帮助下向叙利亚军队右翼侧背的运动取得了一些进展，随以军开进的 M-151吉普，携带“陶”式反坦克导弹，被集中于Ayn-Zhalta-barouch沿途，9:30，它们中掉队的车辆遭遇了下一波叙利亚“小羚羊” 的攻击，然而，vardi重组了他的部队，部署在barouch的西面和南面的三道拦阻阵地里，至少理论上，vardi特遣队现在仅距贝鲁特-大马士革高 速公路仅仅15km,假如它能控制它，那它不仅能够切断在贝鲁特叙军与叙利亚后勤基地的联系，还能够打开一条进入叙利亚第一装甲师后方的通路。
The problem was that the Israelis could not advance, at least not immediately: the 162 Ugda continued battling Syrians in Ayn Zhalta – in part because of another Gazelle-attack that left six Israeli tanks destroyed - until evening. It was only then that Einan’s units broke through towards Ayn Dara, a village only few kilometres south of the strategic highway. However, while advancing the Israelis were first ambushed by elements of the Syrian 51st Brigade and several anti-tank teams that went after M-60s and Merkava tanks for the most part: in a series of sharp clashes they hit a number of vehicles.
但问题是，以军无法前进，至少不能马上做到，162师级战斗队继续在Ayn-Zhalta与叙军交战，部分原因是另外的“小羚羊”攻击，左翼六辆坦克在晚 间被摧毁，这只是到那时，埃南的部队才打通达拉泉，一个仅仅距离战略高速路几千米的村庄，然而，前进中的以军首次被叙利亚第51旅的部队和反坦克小分队伏 击，通常尾追m-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，这一系列的冲突中，他们击毁了一些车辆。
Meanwhile, furhter to souther-east, two Syrian armour brigades encircled south of Lake Karoun were fighting for their naked survival, keeping the main group of Israeli forces busy. In the words of Syrian officers that survived this battle, the fighting was savage: the two front T-62-companies from his battalion were completely destroyed, and his company lost several tanks as well. In return, the Syrians destroyed six and captured three M-60s. By the noon, their situation worsened when surviving Syrian tanks began to run out of ammunition and fuel while under increasing Israeli pressure. Concerned with the situaiton of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades, the Syrian General Headquarters ordered a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72 tanks, and moving along the road from Damascus towards the Lebanese border, to move straight ahead, cross the border and hit the right flank of the Israeli units advancing along the eastern side of Beka'a.
与此同时，进一步朝西南方向扩展，两个叙利亚装甲旅正在卡鲁恩湖的南面进行处境艰难战斗，忙碌的以军纵队保持主要编队，在幸存的叙利亚军官的回忆中，这一 战是惨烈的：来自他的营的两个先头连的T-62被彻底摧毁，他的连也失去了好几辆坦克，作为回报，叙利亚摧毁6辆并击伤3辆m-60s,到了中午，当以色 列的压力越来越大，当幸存的叙利亚坦克耗尽了他们的弹药和燃料后，他们的情况恶化了，关注着第76和第91坦克旅情况的叙军总部命令第1装甲师的一个装备 T-72坦克的装甲旅，沿着大马士革的公路朝黎巴嫩边界移动，径直前行，穿越边界后打击沿着贝卡谷地东侧前进的以军的右翼。
The Syrian counterattack that came from east towards west, passing few kilometres north of Rashayya, is described as the "most savage tank battle of the whole war" by Syrian veterans. The T-72s clashed with several companies of M-60s, destroying some of these in process while suffering only a few losses in exchange: in fact, the officer in command of one of leading Syrian companies was subsequently decorated for his unit successfully penetrated the Israeli ring around the 76th and 91st Brigades, without loosing a single tank in the process. During the Syrian breakthrough south and east of Lake Karoun, on the afternoon of 9 June, several officers noticed an Israeli F-16A falling in flames behind the Israeli lines, the pilot ejecting in the process - only to be recovered by IDF ground troops. The cause of this loss remains unclear until today, but no local air-defence units claimed any kills, while a number of Syrian veterans - interviewed independently - recall this event very vividly.
叙利亚的反击是从东朝西，经过Rashayya北面的附近，被叙利亚退伍军人描述为“整个战争中最激烈的坦克战”， T-72与几个连的m-60s展开战斗，摧毁了它们中的一些，在这个交换过程中仅遭受了一点损失：实际上，一位叙利亚指挥官因为他的部队成功突破以军对 76和91装甲旅的包围而做了夸张，叙军在突破卡鲁恩湖的东面和南面期间没有损失一辆坦克，在6月9日的下午，几位叙利亚军官注意到，一架着火的以色列 F-16A战斗机坠落在以军战线的后方，在这一过程中飞行员弹出，仅仅被以色列陆军所救回，损失的原因被以色列解释为非战斗损失，但没有一个当地防空部队 声称击落，这是几名接受独立采访的叙利亚退伍军人非常生动的回忆。
Despite the Syrian success, and the fact that the two armoured brigades managed to escape throught the corridor that remained open for several hours, the 10th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army paid a heavy price, losing almost 200 T-62s in the course of the fighting. At least 90 of these were captured intact. Eventually, this unit has had to be pulled back and swiftly re-armed with T-55 tanks from strategic reserve stocks. In turn, the 1st Armoured Division was ordered back behind the Syrian border, to regroup and continue its trip to Zahle.
In the meantime, around 12:30hrs of 9 June, a strike package of four SyAAF MiG-23BNs bombed the Israeli HQs set up in Samaqiyah, which was detected by tracking Israeli radio communications and already under heavy pressure by Syrian artillery. Additional Syrian strikes were flown in support of the 1st Armoured Division's counterattack to relieve the armoured brigades besieged south of the Karoun Lake.
尽管叙利亚取得了成功，两个装甲旅通过这个开放了几个小时的走廊事实上逃脱了，但叙军的第10装甲师却付出了沉重的代价，在战斗过程中损失了差不多200 辆T-62s,它们中至少有90辆被完整的俘获，这支部队被调回并用来自战略储备物资的T-55坦克迅速重新武装，反过来，第1装甲师被命令返回叙利亚边 界后方，重组后继续继续它前往扎赫勒的行程，在那个重要时刻，6月9日的12:30，一攻击波共4架叙利亚空军的米格-23BN战斗机轰炸了设置在萨玛奇 亚的以军总部，通过检测被跟踪的以军无线电通讯，得知已经受到了叙利亚炮兵的重压，另外的叙还以的空中打击支援了叙军第1装甲师营救卡鲁恩湖南侧两个装甲 旅的行动。
Two hours later, in order to be able to better support their ground troops in fighting Syrians, the IDF/AF launched the Operation Drugstore – a concentrated attack against the Syrian SAM-sites in the area between Zahle and the Syrian border. This operation was highly successful and resulted not only in the neutralization of the Syrian SAMs, but also in downing of 23 SyAAF fighter-bombers scrambled into the Lebanese skies.
两个小时以后，战斗中的叙利亚陆军得到了更好的支援，以色列陆军和空军开始了行动方案，一次密集针对性的攻击叙利亚位于扎赫勒和叙利亚边界之间的萨姆导弹 阵地，这次行动获得了圆满成功，结果不仅瓦解了叙利亚的萨姆防空导弹网，还击落了进入黎巴嫩领空的23架叙利亚战斗轰炸机。
With Syrian SAMs neutralized, an IDF corps under command of Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, consisting of Ugdas 90 and 252, opened a major, three-pronged offensive against the remnants of the 10th Syrian Armoured Division, as well as forward elements of the 3rd Armoured Division in the Beka’a Valley.
随着叙利亚萨姆防空网的瓦解，以军指挥官Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal下达命令，以第90和第252师级战斗队的全部，进行一次大规模的三管齐下的攻击，进攻叙利亚第10装甲师的残部，以及在贝卡谷地的叙利亚第3装甲师的小股部队。
Day Three, 10 June
By the morning of 10 June Einan’s 162 Ugda – supported by vicious attacks of IDF/AF fighter-bombers and attack helicopters - broke through the positions of the 51st Syrian Brigade at Ayn Dara, destroying a number of T-62 tanks in the process. In return, it was hit by several Gazelle- and attacks by SyAAF fighter-bombers between 07:15 and 08:30hrs, losing additional vehicles in the process. Namely, the SyAAF has sent a large number of Gazelles into “search and destroy” missions over Lebanon, as the Syrian army was unable to confirm location of enemy units due to a very fluid situation. The Gazelle-crews were thus roaming deep over the Beka’a Valley, searching for suitable targets. Several times they were successful, in other cases not: as by the time the IDF started deploying M-163 Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft guns with its forward mechanized units, their task became extremely dangerous. One of the Gazelles was indeed badly damaged by 20mm AAA after attacking a column of Israeli tanks and claiming four direct hits. The pilot was badly injured but flew his smoking SA.342 back to al-Mezzeh and laded it safely: he was immediately hospitalized and managed to recover only after emergency surgery.
第3天 ，6月10日
埃南的162师级战斗队，在以色列陆军和空军的战斗轰炸机和武装直升机猛烈攻击的支援下，突破了叙利亚军第51步兵旅在达拉泉的防御，在这一过程中摧毁了 一定数量的T-62坦克，但在7:15至8：30分之间，受到了“小羚羊”和叙利亚空军的战斗轰炸机的攻击，损失了不少车辆，换句话说，叙利亚空军起飞了 大批的“小羚羊”进入黎巴嫩执行搜索与摧毁的任务，出于叙军对于无法确定敌军位置的不明朗局势，“小羚羊”的乘员们驾驶飞机在贝卡谷地的深处游弋，搜索合 适的目标。有时他们是成功的，其他情况下：当以军伴随前进的机械化纵队开始部署有M-163“火神”自行高炮后，它们的任务变得极其危险，一架“小羚羊” 被以军装甲纵队随行的20mm“火神”自行高炮击中后严重受损，据称还有4架被击中。受重伤的飞行员驾驶它冒烟的飞机飞回了al-Mezzeh并安全着 陆，他被立即送往医院，设法恢复后做了急诊手术。
The last in this series of attacks, executed around 09:00hrs near the Hill 1943, reportedly left a number of Israeli vehicles afire. Simultaneously, another Gazelle-attack was flown against the Task Force Vardi, in the area between Ayn Zhalta and Azzoniyeh, and two hours later Gazelles of the 977 Squadron attacked also a column of Israeli tanks moving from Barouch towards Ayn Zhalta. Eventually, Einan’s advance was stopped cold only few kilometres short of his objective: it remains unclear if this happened due to fierce Syrian counterattacks or because Einan was ordered to turn and attack towards east. Certainly, the IDF was interested in capturing at least a section of the Beirut-Damascus highway and thus splitting Syrian forces in Lebanon in two, as well as advancing into the rear of the 1st Armoured Division. There must have been a strong reason for them not to attempt doing this.
在这一系列的攻击之后，在9:00左右在1943高地附近执行任务，据报道，以色列留下了一定数目的着火车辆，其他的“小羚羊”攻击了vardi特遣队， 在Ayn Zhalta 和Azzoniyeh之间的地区，两个小时之后，第977“小羚羊”中队也攻击了一队自Barouch向Ayn Zhalta移动的以色列坦克，埃南的推进停止在距离他的目标仅仅几千米的地方，仍然不清楚，是发生了叙利亚军队的激烈抵抗还是因为埃南决定转向向西攻 击，当然，以军得兴趣在夺得贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路的至少一段，将在黎巴嫩的叙利亚军队分割为两部分，以及推进到叙利亚第1装甲师的后方，一定有重要的 原因使他们不愿做这样的尝试。
Meanwhile, the 252 Ugda was moving as well, despite very difficult terrain and poor roads, and by the noon its leading elements were in full advance towards north. However, around 15:30hrs it was hit by an attack of SyAAF Gazelles while struck in a traffic jam near the Hill 1794, north of Shab’a. As the helicopters targeted one tank and APC after the other, firing their missiles outside the range of Israeli machine-guns, a chaos broke out. Syrians claimed seven M-113s and M-60s destroyed during this attack. Ignoring his difficult situation Ben Gal was pushing his units forward, reorganizing 252 Ugda for an advance by night.
与此同时，第252师级战斗队继续运动，尽管复杂的地形和较差的路况，到中午它的前锋，全面朝北推进，但在15:30它在1794高地附近的交通堵塞中被 叙利亚空军的“小羚羊”一次攻击所打击，shab’a的北面，随着直升机针对一辆坦克和后面的装甲运兵车后，在以军机枪的射程外发射它们的导弹，一阵混乱 之后，叙利亚声称7辆M-113s和M-60s在这次攻击中被摧毁。忽略了他的困难局面的本加尔督促他的部队前进，提前一夜重组了252师级战斗队。
To the right of the Ugda 252, after overruning vacated positions of the Syrian 91st Tank Brigade, the Task Force Peled reached Yanta, near the Syrian border, where it was stopped by the Syrian 21st Mechanized Brigade – the second element of the 1st Armoured Division that was still on march from Damascus. The leading elements of the 90 Ugda joined Peled after a fighting march through Beka’a Valley. Despite fierce air battles raging overhead, in the afternoon Yanta and the newly-set-up local Israeli HQs was hit by a tremendous attack by several waves of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22s, in which the IDF vize-Chief of Staff, Gen. Yekotai Adam, was killed as well (according to Israeli sources, Adam was killed by a Palestinian boy, using an RPG-7).
在第252师级战斗队的左翼，叙利亚军第91坦克旅的位置腾空之后，佩莱德特遣队搜索了在叙利亚边界附近的yanta，在那里它被叙利亚第21机械化旅所 阻止—这是从大马士革行军赶来的第1装甲师的第2个旅，加入佩莱德特遣队的第90师级战斗队的先头在一场行进中的战斗之后穿过了贝卡谷地，尽管激烈的空战 在天空进行，在下午yanta,新建立的以军指挥部被叙利亚空军的苏霍伊苏-22战斗轰炸机的几波猛烈的攻击所击中，当时以军总参谋长维泽、将军雅各达. 亚当也被打死（以色列方面的记录，亚当被一名巴勒斯坦少年使用RPG-7火箭筒击毙）
Gazelles followed in the wake of the fighter-bombers, hitting a number of M-60s and M-113s along the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. Given that this communication is running parallel to the Syrian border and only few kilometres away from it, the SyAAF now had it very easy to deploy an increasing number of attack helicopters. 12 Israeli tanks were reportedly hit during this attack alone and a number of other vehicles was destroyed as well.
“小羚羊”在战斗轰炸机的轰鸣声中跟进，在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上击中了一些m-60s坦克和m-113装甲车，鉴于以军这种通讯情况是并行的，并且距离叙利亚边界仅有几千米，叙利亚空军掌 握了它非常容易去部署增加一定数目的武装直升机，据报12辆以军坦克被击中，还有一定数目的车辆被摧毁。
Clearly, until today the Israelis deny any such Syrian strikes, and none of their sources mentions large tank battles in the area south and south-east of Lake Karoun: according to their reports issued to Pentagon their whole force in Lebanon suffered only four injured troops on that day. However, the following comment from an IDF/AF F-16-pilot who scored the only kill against a Syrian Su-22 of that war, on 11 June 1982, is clearly indicating what must have happened at Yanta:
- Of all the four kills I made, downing the Su-22 gave me the greatest satisfaction because I saw the horrendous results of a Sukhoi attack on our ground forces a day earlier.
很明显，直到今日以色列否认某些叙利亚的打击，它们的来源无一提到在卡鲁恩湖南面和西南面的区域的大规模的坦克战：它们提交给五角大楼的报告记录中，它们 的整个部队在当天在黎巴嫩仅仅有四名士兵受伤，但是，来自以色列F-16战斗机飞行员的之后评论---整个战争期间只有击落一架苏-22的成绩，在 1982年6月11日，清楚的说明在yanta肯定发生了：我制造了全部4个损失，坠落的苏-22给我很强的通讯，因为我看见过骇人听闻的结果，那天早些 时候，一架苏-22攻击了我们的特遣队。
Another Gazelle-raid then hit the Peled’s Special Manoeuvre Force on the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. These attacks bought sufficient time for the Syrians not only to pull back the survivors from the 10th Armoured Division back behind the border, but also to deploy reinforcements in anti-tank commandos by Mi-8 helicopters into the Ghazzah area: despite the supposed “total” IDF/AF air superiority, not a single of at least a dozen of involved SyAAF helicopter was detected by the Israelis. Nevertheless, the SyAAF did lose a Mi-8 to Israeli anti-aircraft fire during another operation.
另一些“小羚羊”空袭，在在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上袭击佩莱德特遣队，这些攻击带来了足够的时间不仅使得叙利亚第10装甲师的幸存者回到边界的后方，而且也将由米-8运输的反 坦克突击队进入Ghazzah地区以增强防御。尽管假定以军的空中优势，但参与的叙利亚至少一打的直升机没有一架被以色列发现，不过，在另一次行动中一架 叙利亚米-8直升机被以色列防空炮火击落。
The Syrian air strikes and fierce artillery attacks against all known forward Israeli headquarters, as well as a fluid situation in Lebanon now obviously resulted in a critical mistake of the Israeli leadership. The situation on the battlefield was far from clear, then the two opponents were deeply wedged into each other. But, at least the IDF/AF should have been in possession of air superiority, enabling Israeli reconnaissance assets to find the enemy and track the Syrians down. Strangely enough, this was obviously not the case. The Israelis either completely failed to notice or misunderstood that the Syrians were reorganizing their units after the battering experienced by their 10th Armoured Division. This elements of this unit that were originally surrounded south of the Lake Karoun were pulled out of Lebanon, regroupped and - as already mentioned - later re-equipped with T-55 tanks. The rest of this division pulled back towards the north. Simultaneously, two armoured brigades of the 3rd Armoured Division were moved towards south from the Beirut-Damascus road, with intention of closing the gap that came into being through the collapse of 10th Armoured Division's front south of them. The 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72s and still fresh despite the fighting along the border, was then to enter Lebanon along the Beirut-Damascus road and replace the 3rd. The Syrians were therefore not falling back, just replacing their units: however, the IDF considered the movement of the 1st Armoured Division towards north for a general withdrawal. Consequently, the Israelis immediately pushed their units into “pursuit” towards north. The IDF was to pay a high price for this mistake.
叙利亚的空中打击和猛烈的炮火朝位置已知的以军指挥部攻击，而在黎巴嫩一个不确定的情况，以军指挥部犯了一个关键的错误，虽然战场的情况不确定，交战双方 犬牙交错，但是至少以军拥有空中优势，可以启用以军的侦察资料去发现敌军和打击叙利亚人，很奇怪的是，事实并非如此，以军完全忽略或者误判了重组的叙利亚 第10装甲师的战斗经验，这支原本一部被包围在卡鲁恩湖南侧的撤出黎巴嫩后，重新组织，前面已经提到它重新装备了T-55s坦克，该师的其余朝北拉回，同 时，叙利亚第3装甲师的2个装甲旅沿贝鲁特-大马士革公路朝南运动，它们意图封闭因为叙利亚第10装甲师南面阵地的崩溃而造成的缺口，第1装甲师装备T- 72s坦克，刚刚沿边界进行了战斗，尔后它们沿贝鲁特-大马士革公路进入黎巴嫩，接替第3装甲师，叙军因此不用后撤，刚刚重组的部队，以军研究认为第1装 甲师朝南的运动只是一般的后撤，因此，以军马上调动它的部队朝南追赶，以军因为这个错误付出了高昂的代价。
Chaos of "Sultan Yacoub": 11 June
On the evening of 10 June, Ben Gal once again rushed his troops forward. To the north of them was an area known as well-fortified by the Syrians. Nevertheless, the Israelis considered their opposition as weak: only two commando battalions of 250 men each, and few tanks was what – at least in theory – was standing between them and the Beirut-Damascus road in this part of Lebanon. “In theory”, then the Israelis were already informed about deployment of a strong Syrian mechanized force along the strategic highway, from east towards West. Obviously, the IDF HQs concluded that the Syrians were rather preparing for a “last-ditch” counterattack, then bringing serious reinforcements to the frontlines.
“苏坦 亚库布”的混乱：6月11日
在6月10日清晨，本.加尔再一次命令他的部队前进，目标是他们北面一个被叙利亚加强的区域，不过，以军认为他们抵抗不强：仅有每营250人的2个突击 营，和一些坦克---至少在理论上---挡在他们与黎巴嫩境内的贝鲁特-大马士革公路之间，“在理论上”，后来以军已经得知一支强大的叙利亚装甲部队沿战 略高速公路部署，由东朝西，显然，以军指挥部断定叙军在为“最后一搏”的反击而准备，于是认真的向前线增援。
The task of leading this final advance fell on 90 Ugda; a unit that was previously successful in fighting the Syrian 91st Armoured Brigade, and destroying no less but 35 Syrian tanks in exchange for five own losses. Commander of the 90 Ugda, Brig.Gen. Giora Leo, received the corresponding order around 19:00hrs. Several hours later, its 362 Battalion, equipped with M48A-3 Magach-3 tanks, drove through the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta – only to receive strong fire of all calibres and have its leading element cut off deep inside the Syrian positions.
主导这一关键推进的任务落在第90师级战斗群的身上：一支早先成功战胜叙军第91装甲旅的部队，在战斗交换中摧毁不少于35辆叙利亚坦克，自身损失5 辆，90师级战斗群的指挥官是本.加尔.格拉.雷恩，在19:00收到相应的指令。晚了几个小时，它的第362战斗群，装备M-48A3马加奇3坦克，在 坦他行进穿过as-Sultan Yac'ub村，仅遇到各种口径的重火器射击，其先头部队深深切入叙军阵地内部。
By 01:30hrs in the morning of 11 June the trapped Israeli battalion was in a state of chaos, blocked in a narrow valley on the end of which was another village, drawing heavy direct- and artillery-fire from several sides. It was not until 04:00hrs that the situation slowly improved, although during the permanent contact with Syrians around it the unit lost several tanks and a number of crewmembers. Several Syrian Army anti-tank teams participated in this battle, attacking from very short ranges with RPGs, as well as Milan ATGMs. Early in the morning the Israelis were also strafed by two MiG-21s, but these dropped no bombs due to close proximity of their own troops. Eventually, the IDF was unable to mount a large-scale operation in time to recover the embattled battalion; the 90 and the nearby 880 Ugdas - deployed to Lebanon only a day earlier - were busy attempting to prevent the 3rd Syrian Armoured Division's attempt to advance towards the south, and preven the 1st Armoured Division from deploying along the Beirut-Damascus road towards west.
6月11日清晨1:30分，被困的以色列营处于混乱状态中，在最后被封锁在一条狭窄山谷的末端的另一个村庄面前，引出来自侧面的重要指向和炮火，直到 4：00情况慢慢好转，虽然期间保持通畅的联系，因为叙利亚的包围而损失了几辆坦克和一些成员，几个叙军反坦克小分队在战斗中参战，袭击来自近距离的 RPGs，同时还有“米兰”反坦克导弹。在早晨以军也受到了2架米格-21来自低空的扫射，但这些投下的炸弹没有靠近他的部队，最后，以军不能按时设置一 个大幅度运转换取营队的战斗序列，第90和附近的第880师级战斗队，在黎巴嫩仅仅在当天早晨才部署，试图预防叙利亚第3装甲师朝南前进的企图，以及预防 叙利亚第1装甲师沿贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路西面的布防。
Eventually, what was left of the 362 Battalion had to dash for Israeli lines in the course of the morning, with massive artillery support, but leaving some eight destroyed or abandoned M-48s behind.
最后，第362战斗营的左翼因为早晨以色列的直线路线被猛烈冲击，伴随强有力的炮火支援，但是，丢下8辆被摧毁或在后面掉队的m-48s。
There was a sense of urgency in extracting the remnants of the 362 Battalion from behind the Syrian lines, then meanwhile the final Israeli push towards north was in full swing, while the Syrian 1st Armoured was deploying along the highway from the border towards Beirut. Besides, the Israeli and Syrian governments agreed to a ceasefire, to start at noon of 11 June, and now both sides were in a rush to grab as much as they could.
这样一个紧急的判断在拉出叙利亚防线间的第362战斗营的残余，然后最终决定性的以军在完全的回转中推进朝北，当叙利亚第1装甲师沿着从边界朝贝鲁特的高速路部署时，以色列和叙利亚政府同意一次停火，自6月11日中午生效，现在两方在一次仓促中去抢夺他们尽可能多的东西。
两个小时以后，战斗中的叙利亚陆军得到了更好的支援，以色列陆军和空军开始了行动方案，一次密集针对性的攻击叙利亚位于扎赫勒和叙利亚边界之间的萨姆导弹 阵地，这次行动获得了圆满成功，结果不仅瓦解了叙利亚的萨姆防空导弹网，还击落了进入黎巴嫩领空的23架叙利亚战斗轰炸机。
With Syrian SAMs neutralized, an IDF corps under command of Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, consisting of Ugdas 90 and 252, opened a major, three-pronged offensive against the remnants of the 10th Syrian Armoured Division, as well as forward elements of the 3rd Armoured Division in the Beka’a Valley.
随着叙利亚萨姆防空网的瓦解，以军指挥官Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal下达命令，以第90和第252师级战斗队的全部，进行一次大规模的三管齐下的攻击，进攻叙利亚第10装甲师的残部，以及在贝卡谷地的叙利亚第3装甲师的小股部队。
Day Three, 10 June
By the morning of 10 June Einan’s 162 Ugda – supported by vicious attacks of IDF/AF fighter-bombers and attack helicopters - broke through the positions of the 51st Syrian Brigade at Ayn Dara, destroying a number of T-62 tanks in the process. In return, it was hit by several Gazelle- and attacks by SyAAF fighter-bombers between 07:15 and 08:30hrs, losing additional vehicles in the process. Namely, the SyAAF has sent a large number of Gazelles into “search and destroy” missions over Lebanon, as the Syrian army was unable to confirm location of enemy units due to a very fluid situation. The Gazelle-crews were thus roaming deep over the Beka’a Valley, searching for suitable targets. Several times they were successful, in other cases not: as by the time the IDF started deploying M-163 Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft guns with its forward mechanized units, their task became extremely dangerous. One of the Gazelles was indeed badly damaged by 20mm AAA after attacking a column of Israeli tanks and claiming four direct hits. The pilot was badly injured but flew his smoking SA.342 back to al-Mezzeh and laded it safely: he was immediately hospitalized and managed to recover only after emergency surgery.
第3天 ，6月10日
埃南的162师级战斗队，在以色列陆军和空军的战斗轰炸机和武装直升机猛烈攻击的支援下，突破了叙利亚军第51步兵旅在达拉泉的防御，在这一过程中摧毁了 一定数量的T-62坦克，但在7:15至8：30分之间，受到了“小羚羊”和叙利亚空军的战斗轰炸机的攻击，损失了不少车辆，换句话说，叙利亚空军起飞了 大批的“小羚羊”进入黎巴嫩执行搜索与摧毁的任务，出于叙军对于无法确定敌军位置的不明朗局势，“小羚羊”的乘员们驾驶飞机在贝卡谷地的深处游弋，搜索合 适的目标。有时他们是成功的，其他情况下：当以军伴随前进的机械化纵队开始部署有M-163“火神”自行高炮后，它们的任务变得极其危险，一架“小羚羊” 被以军装甲纵队随行的20mm“火神”自行高炮击中后严重受损，据称还有4架被击中。受重伤的飞行员驾驶它冒烟的飞机飞回了al-Mezzeh并安全着 陆，他被立即送往医院，设法恢复后做了急诊手术。
The last in this series of attacks, executed around 09:00hrs near the Hill 1943, reportedly left a number of Israeli vehicles afire. Simultaneously, another Gazelle-attack was flown against the Task Force Vardi, in the area between Ayn Zhalta and Azzoniyeh, and two hours later Gazelles of the 977 Squadron attacked also a column of Israeli tanks moving from Barouch towards Ayn Zhalta. Eventually, Einan’s advance was stopped cold only few kilometres short of his objective: it remains unclear if this happened due to fierce Syrian counterattacks or because Einan was ordered to turn and attack towards east. Certainly, the IDF was interested in capturing at least a section of the Beirut-Damascus highway and thus splitting Syrian forces in Lebanon in two, as well as advancing into the rear of the 1st Armoured Division. There must have been a strong reason for them not to attempt doing this.
在这一系列的攻击之后，在9:00左右在1943高地附近执行任务，据报道，以色列留下了一定数目的着火车辆，其他的“小羚羊”攻击了vardi特遣队， 在Ayn Zhalta 和Azzoniyeh之间的地区，两个小时之后，第977“小羚羊”中队也攻击了一队自Barouch向Ayn Zhalta移动的以色列坦克，埃南的推进停止在距离他的目标仅仅几千米的地方，仍然不清楚，是发生了叙利亚军队的激烈抵抗还是因为埃南决定转向向西攻 击，当然，以军得兴趣在夺得贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路的至少一段，将在黎巴嫩的叙利亚军队分割为两部分，以及推进到叙利亚第1装甲师的后方，一定有重要的 原因使他们不愿做这样的尝试。
Meanwhile, the 252 Ugda was moving as well, despite very difficult terrain and poor roads, and by the noon its leading elements were in full advance towards north. However, around 15:30hrs it was hit by an attack of SyAAF Gazelles while struck in a traffic jam near the Hill 1794, north of Shab’a. As the helicopters targeted one tank and APC after the other, firing their missiles outside the range of Israeli machine-guns, a chaos broke out. Syrians claimed seven M-113s and M-60s destroyed during this attack. Ignoring his difficult situation Ben Gal was pushing his units forward, reorganizing 252 Ugda for an advance by night.
与此同时，第252师级战斗队继续运动，尽管复杂的地形和较差的路况，到中午它的前锋，全面朝北推进，但在15:30它在1794高地附近的交通堵塞中被 叙利亚空军的“小羚羊”一次攻击所打击，shab’a的北面，随着直升机针对一辆坦克和后面的装甲运兵车后，在以军机枪的射程外发射它们的导弹，一阵混乱 之后，叙利亚声称7辆M-113s和M-60s在这次攻击中被摧毁。忽略了他的困难局面的本加尔督促他的部队前进，提前一夜重组了252师级战斗队。
To the right of the Ugda 252, after overruning vacated positions of the Syrian 91st Tank Brigade, the Task Force Peled reached Yanta, near the Syrian border, where it was stopped by the Syrian 21st Mechanized Brigade – the second element of the 1st Armoured Division that was still on march from Damascus. The leading elements of the 90 Ugda joined Peled after a fighting march through Beka’a Valley. Despite fierce air battles raging overhead, in the afternoon Yanta and the newly-set-up local Israeli HQs was hit by a tremendous attack by several waves of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22s, in which the IDF vize-Chief of Staff, Gen. Yekotai Adam, was killed as well (according to Israeli sources, Adam was killed by a Palestinian boy, using an RPG-7).
在第252师级战斗队的左翼，叙利亚军第91坦克旅的位置腾空之后，佩莱德特遣队搜索了在叙利亚边界附近的yanta，在那里它被叙利亚第21机械化旅所 阻止—这是从大马士革行军赶来的第1装甲师的第2个旅，加入佩莱德特遣队的第90师级战斗队的先头在一场行进中的战斗之后穿过了贝卡谷地，尽管激烈的空战 在天空进行，在下午yanta,新建立的以军指挥部被叙利亚空军的苏霍伊苏-22战斗轰炸机的几波猛烈的攻击所击中，当时以军总参谋长维泽、将军雅各达. 亚当也被打死（以色列方面的记录，亚当被一名巴勒斯坦少年使用RPG-7火箭筒击毙）
Gazelles followed in the wake of the fighter-bombers, hitting a number of M-60s and M-113s along the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. Given that this communication is running parallel to the Syrian border and only few kilometres away from it, the SyAAF now had it very easy to deploy an increasing number of attack helicopters. 12 Israeli tanks were reportedly hit during this attack alone and a number of other vehicles was destroyed as well.
“小羚羊”在战斗轰炸机的轰鸣声中跟进，在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上击中了一些m-60s坦克和m-113装甲车，鉴于以军这种通讯情况是并行的，并且距离叙利亚边界仅有几千米，叙利亚空军掌 握了它非常容易去部署增加一定数目的武装直升机，据报12辆以军坦克被击中，还有一定数目的车辆被摧毁。
Clearly, until today the Israelis deny any such Syrian strikes, and none of their sources mentions large tank battles in the area south and south-east of Lake Karoun: according to their reports issued to Pentagon their whole force in Lebanon suffered only four injured troops on that day. However, the following comment from an IDF/AF F-16-pilot who scored the only kill against a Syrian Su-22 of that war, on 11 June 1982, is clearly indicating what must have happened at Yanta:
- Of all the four kills I made, downing the Su-22 gave me the greatest satisfaction because I saw the horrendous results of a Sukhoi attack on our ground forces a day earlier.
很明显，直到今日以色列否认某些叙利亚的打击，它们的来源无一提到在卡鲁恩湖南面和西南面的区域的大规模的坦克战：它们提交给五角大楼的报告记录中，它们 的整个部队在当天在黎巴嫩仅仅有四名士兵受伤，但是，来自以色列F-16战斗机飞行员的之后评论---整个战争期间只有击落一架苏-22的成绩，在 1982年6月11日，清楚的说明在yanta肯定发生了：我制造了全部4个损失，坠落的苏-22给我很强的通讯，因为我看见过骇人听闻的结果，那天早些 时候，一架苏-22攻击了我们的特遣队。
Another Gazelle-raid then hit the Peled’s Special Manoeuvre Force on the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. These attacks bought sufficient time for the Syrians not only to pull back the survivors from the 10th Armoured Division back behind the border, but also to deploy reinforcements in anti-tank commandos by Mi-8 helicopters into the Ghazzah area: despite the supposed “total” IDF/AF air superiority, not a single of at least a dozen of involved SyAAF helicopter was detected by the Israelis. Nevertheless, the SyAAF did lose a Mi-8 to Israeli anti-aircraft fire during another operation.
另一些“小羚羊”空袭，在在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上袭击佩莱德特遣队，这些攻击带来了足够的时间不仅使得叙利亚第10装甲师的幸存者回到边界的后方，而且也将由米-8运输的反 坦克突击队进入Ghazzah地区以增强防御。尽管假定以军的空中优势，但参与的叙利亚至少一打的直升机没有一架被以色列发现，不过，在另一次行动中一架 叙利亚米-8直升机被以色列防空炮火击落。
The Syrian air strikes and fierce artillery attacks against all known forward Israeli headquarters, as well as a fluid situation in Lebanon now obviously resulted in a critical mistake of the Israeli leadership. The situation on the battlefield was far from clear, then the two opponents were deeply wedged into each other. But, at least the IDF/AF should have been in possession of air superiority, enabling Israeli reconnaissance assets to find the enemy and track the Syrians down. Strangely enough, this was obviously not the case. The Israelis either completely failed to notice or misunderstood that the Syrians were reorganizing their units after the battering experienced by their 10th Armoured Division. This elements of this unit that were originally surrounded south of the Lake Karoun were pulled out of Lebanon, regroupped and - as already mentioned - later re-equipped with T-55 tanks. The rest of this division pulled back towards the north. Simultaneously, two armoured brigades of the 3rd Armoured Division were moved towards south from the Beirut-Damascus road, with intention of closing the gap that came into being through the collapse of 10th Armoured Division's front south of them. The 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72s and still fresh despite the fighting along the border, was then to enter Lebanon along the Beirut-Damascus road and replace the 3rd. The Syrians were therefore not falling back, just replacing their units: however, the IDF considered the movement of the 1st Armoured Division towards north for a general withdrawal. Consequently, the Israelis immediately pushed their units into “pursuit” towards north. The IDF was to pay a high price for this mistake.
叙利亚的空中打击和猛烈的炮火朝位置已知的以军指挥部攻击，而在黎巴嫩一个不确定的情况，以军指挥部犯了一个关键的错误，虽然战场的情况不确定，交战双方 犬牙交错，但是至少以军拥有空中优势，可以启用以军的侦察资料去发现敌军和打击叙利亚人，很奇怪的是，事实并非如此，以军完全忽略或者误判了重组的叙利亚 第10装甲师的战斗经验，这支原本一部被包围在卡鲁恩湖南侧的撤出黎巴嫩后，重新组织，前面已经提到它重新装备了T-55s坦克，该师的其余朝北拉回，同 时，叙利亚第3装甲师的2个装甲旅沿贝鲁特-大马士革公路朝南运动，它们意图封闭因为叙利亚第10装甲师南面阵地的崩溃而造成的缺口，第1装甲师装备T- 72s坦克，刚刚沿边界进行了战斗，尔后它们沿贝鲁特-大马士革公路进入黎巴嫩，接替第3装甲师，叙军因此不用后撤，刚刚重组的部队，以军研究认为第1装 甲师朝南的运动只是一般的后撤，因此，以军马上调动它的部队朝南追赶，以军因为这个错误付出了高昂的代价。
Chaos of "Sultan Yacoub": 11 June
On the evening of 10 June, Ben Gal once again rushed his troops forward. To the north of them was an area known as well-fortified by the Syrians. Nevertheless, the Israelis considered their opposition as weak: only two commando battalions of 250 men each, and few tanks was what – at least in theory – was standing between them and the Beirut-Damascus road in this part of Lebanon. “In theory”, then the Israelis were already informed about deployment of a strong Syrian mechanized force along the strategic highway, from east towards West. Obviously, the IDF HQs concluded that the Syrians were rather preparing for a “last-ditch” counterattack, then bringing serious reinforcements to the frontlines.
“苏坦 亚库布”的混乱：6月11日
在6月10日清晨，本.加尔再一次命令他的部队前进，目标是他们北面一个被叙利亚加强的区域，不过，以军认为他们抵抗不强：仅有每营250人的2个突击 营，和一些坦克---至少在理论上---挡在他们与黎巴嫩境内的贝鲁特-大马士革公路之间，“在理论上”，后来以军已经得知一支强大的叙利亚装甲部队沿战 略高速公路部署，由东朝西，显然，以军指挥部断定叙军在为“最后一搏”的反击而准备，于是认真的向前线增援。
The task of leading this final advance fell on 90 Ugda; a unit that was previously successful in fighting the Syrian 91st Armoured Brigade, and destroying no less but 35 Syrian tanks in exchange for five own losses. Commander of the 90 Ugda, Brig.Gen. Giora Leo, received the corresponding order around 19:00hrs. Several hours later, its 362 Battalion, equipped with M48A-3 Magach-3 tanks, drove through the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta – only to receive strong fire of all calibres and have its leading element cut off deep inside the Syrian positions.
主导这一关键推进的任务落在第90师级战斗群的身上：一支早先成功战胜叙军第91装甲旅的部队，在战斗交换中摧毁不少于35辆叙利亚坦克，自身损失5 辆，90师级战斗群的指挥官是本.加尔.格拉.雷恩，在19:00收到相应的指令。晚了几个小时，它的第362战斗群，装备M-48A3马加奇3坦克，在 坦他行进穿过as-Sultan Yac'ub村，仅遇到各种口径的重火器射击，其先头部队深深切入叙军阵地内部。
By 01:30hrs in the morning of 11 June the trapped Israeli battalion was in a state of chaos, blocked in a narrow valley on the end of which was another village, drawing heavy direct- and artillery-fire from several sides. It was not until 04:00hrs that the situation slowly improved, although during the permanent contact with Syrians around it the unit lost several tanks and a number of crewmembers. Several Syrian Army anti-tank teams participated in this battle, attacking from very short ranges with RPGs, as well as Milan ATGMs. Early in the morning the Israelis were also strafed by two MiG-21s, but these dropped no bombs due to close proximity of their own troops. Eventually, the IDF was unable to mount a large-scale operation in time to recover the embattled battalion; the 90 and the nearby 880 Ugdas - deployed to Lebanon only a day earlier - were busy attempting to prevent the 3rd Syrian Armoured Division's attempt to advance towards the south, and preven the 1st Armoured Division from deploying along the Beirut-Damascus road towards west.
6月11日清晨1:30分，被困的以色列营处于混乱状态中，在最后被封锁在一条狭窄山谷的末端的另一个村庄面前，引出来自侧面的重要指向和炮火，直到 4：00情况慢慢好转，虽然期间保持通畅的联系，因为叙利亚的包围而损失了几辆坦克和一些成员，几个叙军反坦克小分队在战斗中参战，袭击来自近距离的 RPGs，同时还有“米兰”反坦克导弹。在早晨以军也受到了2架米格-21来自低空的扫射，但这些投下的炸弹没有靠近他的部队，最后，以军不能按时设置一 个大幅度运转换取营队的战斗序列，第90和附近的第880师级战斗队，在黎巴嫩仅仅在当天早晨才部署，试图预防叙利亚第3装甲师朝南前进的企图，以及预防 叙利亚第1装甲师沿贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路西面的布防。
Eventually, what was left of the 362 Battalion had to dash for Israeli lines in the course of the morning, with massive artillery support, but leaving some eight destroyed or abandoned M-48s behind.
最后，第362战斗营的左翼因为早晨以色列的直线路线被猛烈冲击，伴随强有力的炮火支援，但是，丢下8辆被摧毁或在后面掉队的m-48s。
There was a sense of urgency in extracting the remnants of the 362 Battalion from behind the Syrian lines, then meanwhile the final Israeli push towards north was in full swing, while the Syrian 1st Armoured was deploying along the highway from the border towards Beirut. Besides, the Israeli and Syrian governments agreed to a ceasefire, to start at noon of 11 June, and now both sides were in a rush to grab as much as they could.
这样一个紧急的判断在拉出叙利亚防线间的第362战斗营的残余，然后最终决定性的以军在完全的回转中推进朝北，当叙利亚第1装甲师沿着从边界朝贝鲁特的高速路部署时，以色列和叙利亚政府同意一次停火，自6月11日中午生效，现在两方在一次仓促中去抢夺他们尽可能多的东西。
Final clashes occurred in two sectors. Early in the morning, the 81st Syrian Armoured Brigade, equipped with T-72 tanks, reached Shtawrah - where a forward repair shop was set - and then turned south along two parallel roads – driving directly into positions of the 409 Israeli Anti-Tank battalion (originally part of the Task Force Peled), and M-60s of the 767 Armoured Brigade. The Syrian tankers, emboldened by their first success from 9th of June, advanced without careful reconnaissance of the area in front of them. In a short but sharp clash that occurred in the late morning, the Israelis hit 12 T-72s with TOWs, forcing the Syrian brigade to pull back to Beirut-Damascus highway. This vital communication, however, remained in Syrian hands: in fact, the Syrians also claimed up to ten M-60s destroyed during this battle while collecting their destroyed and badly damaged T-72s back in Shtawrah.
最后的冲突发生在两部分，在黎明时分，叙利亚第81装甲旅，装备T-72坦克，搜索shtawrah—一个在建的修理店—然后转南面沿着两条平行路线行驶 马上进入以色列第409反坦克营（来自佩莱德特遣队组成）和装备M-60s的767装甲旅的位置，叙利亚的坦克，受到他们6月9日一次成功攻击的鼓励，前 进中没有仔细侦察它们正前方的区域，在深夜一次短暂而又激烈的冲突中，以色列以“陶”式反坦克导弹击中了12辆T-72，迫使叙军拉回贝鲁特-大马士革高 速路，这是重大的讯息，然而，仍然没有在叙利亚传递：实际上，叙利亚也声称10辆M-60s在这次战斗中被摧毁，当时他们损毁和受伤的T-72s回到 shatawrah.
Meanwhile, in the Beka’a Valley 7th Armoured Brigade of Eitan’s 162 Ugda engaged T-62s of the 58th Syrian Brigade due south of Jub Jnin: in exchange for two destroyed Merkavas, the Israelis knocked out at least a dozen of T-62s. The Syrians claimed destruction of 21 to 30 Israeli armoured vehicles during this battle - which culminated shortly before noon, with attacks of attack helicopters from both sides. Israeli AH-1s and MD.500 Defenders claimed destruction of 15 T-62s and few T-72s near Zahla. However, they encountered fierce anti-aircraft fire and were not able to execute their attacks as expected. One of Defenders was badly damaged by explosion of a shell nearby, so that it crashed on the ground in front of Syrian positions: the navigator was heavily injured but the pilot pulled him out of wreckage and both were recoered by an AB.212. Another Defender was apparently lost to anti-aircraft fire from Israeli armoured units after being misidentified as a Syrian Gazelle: obviously, after previous experiences with SA.432s the Israeli gunners were exceptionally nervous by the time. In return, the Merkavas of the 7th Israeli Brigade shot down at least one Gazelle using their 105mm cannons, and another Syrian SA.342 should have been shot down by a long-range TOW-shot from an Israeli Cobra helicopter.
当然最主要的，在贝卡谷地的埃南的162师级战斗队的第7装甲旅遇上了在jub jnin以南的叙利亚第58旅，在被摧毁了2辆“梅卡瓦”之后，以军击毁了至少一打的T-62s,叙利亚声称在这场战斗在中午之前的短暂激战中摧毁了 21-30辆以色列装甲车辆，同时双方的武装直升机也参与了进攻，以色列的AH-1s和md.500“卫士”声称摧毁了扎赫勒附近的15辆T-62s和几 辆T-72s，可是，他们遇到了猛烈的防空炮火，不能执行他们预期的攻击任务，一架“卫士”被附近一阵防空炮火的轰击严重损坏，使得他坠毁在叙利亚阵地前 方的地面上：领航员严重受伤，但飞行员将其拉出飞机残骸，两人都被AB-212营救，另一架“卫士”的损失显然被以色列装甲部队的防空炮火误当做一架叙利 亚的“小羚羊”：显然，有了以往与“小羚羊”的经验后，以色列炮手到时候异常紧张，作为回报，以色列第7装甲旅的“梅卡瓦”用105mm主炮击落了至少一 架“小羚羊”，另一架“小羚羊”应该是被以军“眼镜蛇”武装直升机用一枚远程发射的“陶”式导弹击落。
How fierce and bitter the fighting on the group was shows the fact that - according to contemporary reports in Israeli press - in the fierce fighting of this day a single Israeli Brigade suffered a loss of 18 KIA - including its commander, Col. Avigdor Shriper - 87 injured, and 22 tanks destroyed.
显露怎样在团队中进行激烈和严酷的战斗的事实，根据以色列现代的新闻报告，在这一天的激烈战斗中，一个以色列旅遭受了18人阵亡的损失—包括它的指挥官vigdor Shriper上校，87人受伤，22辆坦克损毁。
Mixed Results
Despite the ceasefire, the fighting was to resume several days later: in fact, by the end of 1982 there were to be no less but eleven additional ceasefires agreed between the Israelis and Syrians.
综合结果
尽管停火了，战斗却又在几天后恢复：事实上，直到1982年末，以色列和叙利亚之间达成了不少于十一次停火协定.
Bean-counting began already on the afternoon of 11 June, of course. On a press conference in early July 1982, the representants of the Syrian Ministry of Defence stated that SA hunter-killer AT-teams destroyed 23 Israeli tanks during the first three days of fighting (between 8 and 11 June) for only minor losses to themselves (overall, the Syrians claimed destruction of “more than 120 Israeli tanks, APCs and mine-clearing vehicles by their ATGMs by the time). Subsequent studies proved that Syrian "hunter-killer" teams in fact hit a total of some 60 Israeli M-60s and Merkavas. However, no less but half of these remained operational, while only few of the others were completely destroyed (some sources state that SA anti-tank teams destroyed only two IDF tanks). As well-known, the Merkavas were heavily armoured and had very good anti-detonation as well as fire-protection equipment, while M-60s, M-48s and Centurions were heavily protected by explosive-reactive-armour (ERA). Although the IDF subsequently concluded that the ERA on their tanks needed improvement, and that at least two Merkavas were indeed destroyed by Syrian anti-tank teams (the IDF lost a total of seven Merkava Mk.1s written-off during this war), it is obvious that these tanks were extremely problematic opponents. The situation with M-113s was less satisfactory: these APCs apparently suffered such losses in the first few days of the war, that by the time the IDF reached Beirut the Israelis were doing their best to avoid deploying them in combat first of all. The Israeli infantry therefore marched beside its APCs for the best part of their way into Lebanon.
统计开始已经在6月11日下午，当然，在1982年6月初的一次记者招待会上，叙利亚外交部和国防部的声明的描述中，叙利亚空军猎杀者和地面反坦克部队在 头三天的战斗中（6月8日至11日）共摧毁以军坦克23辆，自身只有轻微的损失（总体上，叙利亚声明摧毁“超过120辆坦克、装甲运兵车和扫雷车在这段时 间被叙军的反坦克导弹摧毁）随后研究证明叙利亚“猎杀者”分队实际击中以军60辆M-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，可是，他们中不少于大约一半仍能使用，而其 他的仅有几辆被完全摧毁。（有消息称叙利亚反坦克部队仅摧毁2辆以军坦克），众所周知，“梅卡瓦”是重装，有非常好的抑爆以及防火装备。而“百夫长”、 m-60s和m-48s被爆炸式反应装甲（era）严密保护，虽然以军后来断定他们的era需要改善，至少2辆“梅卡瓦”被叙利亚反坦克部队摧毁，（以军 在战争期间总共损失7辆“梅卡瓦”1）很明显，这些坦克是很厉害的对手，M-113装甲车的情况则不令人满意，这些装甲运兵车在战争的头几天很容易遭受损 失。在那段时间，以军到达贝鲁特后，最大程度的避免在战斗第一线部署它们。因此以色列步兵在进军黎巴嫩的道路上最大限度的在装甲运兵车旁边做游行式的行 军。
Nevertheless, the fact was also that the Israelis were swift to adapt tactics of their mechanised formations against Syrian AT-teams. They would use 20mm M-163 Vulcan guns to spray their possible positions and TOW-missiles to hit them precisely – usually with deadly results. To counter such weapons the Syrians preferred fighting at shorter range and using lighter anti-tank weapons. This forced the Israelis to deploy their commandos in order to tackle the Syrian anti-tank snipers: much more often than expected the Syrians had the unpleasant experience of being hunted instead of hunting. The resulting clashes were extremely bitter and brutal. This is at best illustrated by the fact that only between 10 and 15% of Syrian anti-tank hunters survived this war. Very few were captured alive, including only one officer: 1st Lt. Mehdi fell into Israeli hands in a badly injured condition, but defied all the IDF efforts to break his spirit before being returned to Syria. As Captain he was later to fight against the Iraqis, in 1991, together with US forces.
不过，事实上以军迅速适应它们的机械化编队反击叙利亚反坦克部队的战术，它们会使用20mm“火神”高炮扫射可疑目标，用“陶”式导弹准确打击它们--- 通常是致命的结果。对付这种武器叙利亚首选是在近距离使用轻型反坦克武器的白刃战，这迫使以军部署它们的突击队去对付叙利亚反坦克狙击手：叙利亚人有比预 期更多的被猎杀而非狩猎的不愉快经历。战斗的结果非常痛苦和残酷，最好的证明是这场战争中仅有10%-15%的叙利亚反坦克小组在战争中幸存，很少被俘 获：其中只有一名成员：一位名叫迈赫迪的中尉在身负重伤的情况下落入以军手中，但他在回到叙利亚之前却挫败了以色列所有摧垮他的精神的努力。作为队长，他 在1991年他与美军一起参加了反对伊拉克的战争。
Despite immense problems, quite a few surprises, and losses, the Israelis were eventually satisfied with results of the conventional part of the war in Lebanon: in four days of battles they claimed destruction of 81 Syrian tanks, and capturing 41 (mainly T-62s), losing only eight M-48s and two Merkavas in return. Supposedly, one of destroyed Merkavas was subsequently salvaged and repaired. Pictorial evidence exists for a number of additional M-60s being destroyed as well, while the losses of M-113s were obviously so heavy that they were not deployed in forward lines until much later, when most were equipped with additional protection against anti-tank missiles.
尽管有很大的问题，不少的惊喜和损失，以色列最终对黎巴嫩常规战部分中成果感到满意，在4天的战斗中，他们声称摧毁了81辆叙利亚坦克，俘获41辆（主要 是T-62s）,回报是仅仅损失了8辆m-48s和2辆“梅卡瓦”，据说，一辆被摧毁的“梅卡瓦”随后被回收和修理，以及在画报上的一个额外数目的被摧毁 的m-60s的证据，而m-113s的损失明显很重，直到很久以后都不能部署到前线，且大部分增强防护抵御反坦克导弹。
The Syrians were not entirely satsified, even if their local commanders showed great initiative and tactical skill on the battlefied, proving that the additional training and decentralization of the command system of the SA were proper decisions. The main problem of the SA was that some of its larger units failed to fully exploit the poor situation of several Israeli units: there was a number of situations in which Syrian brigades and battalions stopped and started digging-in instead of advancing towards south where they could establish better defensive positions. Consequently, they did not manage to deploy the 3rd Armoured into the old positions of the 10th Armoured Division. Nevertheless, they fought with vigour and ferocity surpassing anything seen before from a Syrian soldier, and eventually stopped the Israeli advance. In fact, the IDF failed to reach its objectives in the Beka'a Valley as by the ceasefire on 11 June the Syrians still held the Beirut-Damascus highway after fighting an opponent that was superior in numbers and quality: the IDF deployed an equivalent of five divisions with something like 1.000 tanks against only something like two Syrian.
叙利亚人不完全满意，即使他们现场的指挥员显露出了不起的主动性，和在战火中的战术技巧，以证明叙利亚空军正确的安排了加强训练和权力下放的指挥系统，叙 利亚空军的主要问题是它的大机群未能充分利用几支以军的困境：在叙利亚旅和突击队停止前进并开始深挖的情况下，反而朝南前进，那里他们能够建立更好的防御 阵地。因此，他们不能调动部署第3装甲师进入第10装甲师的旧有阵地，不过，它们凶猛灵活的战斗超越了一名叙利亚士兵以往所见。最终阻止了以军的前进，事 实上，以色列抵达它在贝卡谷地目标的努力失败了，在6月11日停火的时候，叙利亚在与一个数量和质量都占优势对手激战之后仍然保有贝鲁特-大马士革高速公 路，以军调动相当于5个师的兵力，以及相当于叙利亚2倍的大约1000辆坦克。
The SyAAF, of course, came away in a very bad shape, losing between 85 and 87 fighters and 24 or 27 pilots (Syrian sources differ on this issue) in air battles and to Israeli ground defences between 6 June and 8 July 1982. Yet, the Syrians were proud with performance of their attack helicopter- and fighter-bomber-crews. Although flying well over 150 attack sorties, only two Gazelles were shot down by the Israelis (both crews were killed). Two other examples were badly damaged during the fighting and subsequently captured by the Israelis: one of these was rebuilt and test-flown in Israel (for comparison, the IDF/AF lost only one Defender). At least an additional SA.342 was badly damaged but flown back to Syria. In exchange the SyAAF claimed destruction of 95 ground targets by Gazelles, including 71 tanks, five APCs, three trucks, two artillery pieces, nine M-151 jeeps, and five tanker trucks. While these figures are usually considered as exaggerated, a closer examination of all known reports about IDF losses as published in the Israeli media, shows that the Israelis very likely did lose as many tanks, and certainly many more APCs and other vehicles. Besides, one should not forget that attack helicopters are considered extremely effective by most armies of the world, and that this fact was proved not only in a number of exercises, but also in several wars.
当然，叙利亚空军在一个情形很糟时刻离开，损失了85-87架战斗机和24-27名飞行员，（叙利亚的损失由不同的说法）但在空战和对以军地面攻击的 1982年6月6日至8日，叙利亚武装直升机和战斗轰炸机乘员的表现令人骄傲，出动超过150架次，仅有2架“小羚羊”被击落（机组人员全部丧生），2架 “小羚羊”因严重受损被以色列俘获，其中一架被以色列修复并测试，（作为对照，以色列仅损失了一架“卫士”）至少还有其他一些“小羚羊”严重受损但飞回叙 利亚降落，作为交换，叙利亚空军声称“小羚羊”摧毁95个地面目标，包括71辆坦克，5辆装甲运兵车，3辆卡车，2门大炮，9辆m-151吉普，5辆油罐 车，当然，这些数字通常视为夸大，仔细观察以色列媒体所有出版的有关以军损失的报告，透露出以色列很可能失去了很多坦克，和肯定更多的装甲运兵车和其他车 辆，另外，一个不应忘记的事实是，武装直升机被世界大多数军队认为非常有效的，这个事实不仅被很多演习，而且也被几场战争所证明。
Overall it is sure that the Syrian Gazelles proved their worth during this war beyond any doubt. When they were pulled from the battlefield, in the wake of the cease-fire from 11 June, the SA.342s were badly missed by remaining Syrian troops in Lebanon. For the rest of that war the Syrian Army's anti-tank teams had to fight alone.
总而言之，叙利亚的“小羚羊”在战争中毫无疑问的证明了它们的价值，当它们在战地起降时，在6月11日的停战中停止行动，“小羚羊”与叙利亚其他在黎巴嫩的军队失之交臂，因为停战，叙利亚的反坦克部队不得不孤军奋战。
最后的冲突发生在两部分，在黎明时分，叙利亚第81装甲旅，装备T-72坦克，搜索shtawrah—一个在建的修理店—然后转南面沿着两条平行路线行驶 马上进入以色列第409反坦克营（来自佩莱德特遣队组成）和装备M-60s的767装甲旅的位置，叙利亚的坦克，受到他们6月9日一次成功攻击的鼓励，前 进中没有仔细侦察它们正前方的区域，在深夜一次短暂而又激烈的冲突中，以色列以“陶”式反坦克导弹击中了12辆T-72，迫使叙军拉回贝鲁特-大马士革高 速路，这是重大的讯息，然而，仍然没有在叙利亚传递：实际上，叙利亚也声称10辆M-60s在这次战斗中被摧毁，当时他们损毁和受伤的T-72s回到 shatawrah.
Meanwhile, in the Beka’a Valley 7th Armoured Brigade of Eitan’s 162 Ugda engaged T-62s of the 58th Syrian Brigade due south of Jub Jnin: in exchange for two destroyed Merkavas, the Israelis knocked out at least a dozen of T-62s. The Syrians claimed destruction of 21 to 30 Israeli armoured vehicles during this battle - which culminated shortly before noon, with attacks of attack helicopters from both sides. Israeli AH-1s and MD.500 Defenders claimed destruction of 15 T-62s and few T-72s near Zahla. However, they encountered fierce anti-aircraft fire and were not able to execute their attacks as expected. One of Defenders was badly damaged by explosion of a shell nearby, so that it crashed on the ground in front of Syrian positions: the navigator was heavily injured but the pilot pulled him out of wreckage and both were recoered by an AB.212. Another Defender was apparently lost to anti-aircraft fire from Israeli armoured units after being misidentified as a Syrian Gazelle: obviously, after previous experiences with SA.432s the Israeli gunners were exceptionally nervous by the time. In return, the Merkavas of the 7th Israeli Brigade shot down at least one Gazelle using their 105mm cannons, and another Syrian SA.342 should have been shot down by a long-range TOW-shot from an Israeli Cobra helicopter.
当然最主要的，在贝卡谷地的埃南的162师级战斗队的第7装甲旅遇上了在jub jnin以南的叙利亚第58旅，在被摧毁了2辆“梅卡瓦”之后，以军击毁了至少一打的T-62s,叙利亚声称在这场战斗在中午之前的短暂激战中摧毁了 21-30辆以色列装甲车辆，同时双方的武装直升机也参与了进攻，以色列的AH-1s和md.500“卫士”声称摧毁了扎赫勒附近的15辆T-62s和几 辆T-72s，可是，他们遇到了猛烈的防空炮火，不能执行他们预期的攻击任务，一架“卫士”被附近一阵防空炮火的轰击严重损坏，使得他坠毁在叙利亚阵地前 方的地面上：领航员严重受伤，但飞行员将其拉出飞机残骸，两人都被AB-212营救，另一架“卫士”的损失显然被以色列装甲部队的防空炮火误当做一架叙利 亚的“小羚羊”：显然，有了以往与“小羚羊”的经验后，以色列炮手到时候异常紧张，作为回报，以色列第7装甲旅的“梅卡瓦”用105mm主炮击落了至少一 架“小羚羊”，另一架“小羚羊”应该是被以军“眼镜蛇”武装直升机用一枚远程发射的“陶”式导弹击落。
How fierce and bitter the fighting on the group was shows the fact that - according to contemporary reports in Israeli press - in the fierce fighting of this day a single Israeli Brigade suffered a loss of 18 KIA - including its commander, Col. Avigdor Shriper - 87 injured, and 22 tanks destroyed.
显露怎样在团队中进行激烈和严酷的战斗的事实，根据以色列现代的新闻报告，在这一天的激烈战斗中，一个以色列旅遭受了18人阵亡的损失—包括它的指挥官vigdor Shriper上校，87人受伤，22辆坦克损毁。
Mixed Results
Despite the ceasefire, the fighting was to resume several days later: in fact, by the end of 1982 there were to be no less but eleven additional ceasefires agreed between the Israelis and Syrians.
综合结果
尽管停火了，战斗却又在几天后恢复：事实上，直到1982年末，以色列和叙利亚之间达成了不少于十一次停火协定.
Bean-counting began already on the afternoon of 11 June, of course. On a press conference in early July 1982, the representants of the Syrian Ministry of Defence stated that SA hunter-killer AT-teams destroyed 23 Israeli tanks during the first three days of fighting (between 8 and 11 June) for only minor losses to themselves (overall, the Syrians claimed destruction of “more than 120 Israeli tanks, APCs and mine-clearing vehicles by their ATGMs by the time). Subsequent studies proved that Syrian "hunter-killer" teams in fact hit a total of some 60 Israeli M-60s and Merkavas. However, no less but half of these remained operational, while only few of the others were completely destroyed (some sources state that SA anti-tank teams destroyed only two IDF tanks). As well-known, the Merkavas were heavily armoured and had very good anti-detonation as well as fire-protection equipment, while M-60s, M-48s and Centurions were heavily protected by explosive-reactive-armour (ERA). Although the IDF subsequently concluded that the ERA on their tanks needed improvement, and that at least two Merkavas were indeed destroyed by Syrian anti-tank teams (the IDF lost a total of seven Merkava Mk.1s written-off during this war), it is obvious that these tanks were extremely problematic opponents. The situation with M-113s was less satisfactory: these APCs apparently suffered such losses in the first few days of the war, that by the time the IDF reached Beirut the Israelis were doing their best to avoid deploying them in combat first of all. The Israeli infantry therefore marched beside its APCs for the best part of their way into Lebanon.
统计开始已经在6月11日下午，当然，在1982年6月初的一次记者招待会上，叙利亚外交部和国防部的声明的描述中，叙利亚空军猎杀者和地面反坦克部队在 头三天的战斗中（6月8日至11日）共摧毁以军坦克23辆，自身只有轻微的损失（总体上，叙利亚声明摧毁“超过120辆坦克、装甲运兵车和扫雷车在这段时 间被叙军的反坦克导弹摧毁）随后研究证明叙利亚“猎杀者”分队实际击中以军60辆M-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，可是，他们中不少于大约一半仍能使用，而其 他的仅有几辆被完全摧毁。（有消息称叙利亚反坦克部队仅摧毁2辆以军坦克），众所周知，“梅卡瓦”是重装，有非常好的抑爆以及防火装备。而“百夫长”、 m-60s和m-48s被爆炸式反应装甲（era）严密保护，虽然以军后来断定他们的era需要改善，至少2辆“梅卡瓦”被叙利亚反坦克部队摧毁，（以军 在战争期间总共损失7辆“梅卡瓦”1）很明显，这些坦克是很厉害的对手，M-113装甲车的情况则不令人满意，这些装甲运兵车在战争的头几天很容易遭受损 失。在那段时间，以军到达贝鲁特后，最大程度的避免在战斗第一线部署它们。因此以色列步兵在进军黎巴嫩的道路上最大限度的在装甲运兵车旁边做游行式的行 军。
Nevertheless, the fact was also that the Israelis were swift to adapt tactics of their mechanised formations against Syrian AT-teams. They would use 20mm M-163 Vulcan guns to spray their possible positions and TOW-missiles to hit them precisely – usually with deadly results. To counter such weapons the Syrians preferred fighting at shorter range and using lighter anti-tank weapons. This forced the Israelis to deploy their commandos in order to tackle the Syrian anti-tank snipers: much more often than expected the Syrians had the unpleasant experience of being hunted instead of hunting. The resulting clashes were extremely bitter and brutal. This is at best illustrated by the fact that only between 10 and 15% of Syrian anti-tank hunters survived this war. Very few were captured alive, including only one officer: 1st Lt. Mehdi fell into Israeli hands in a badly injured condition, but defied all the IDF efforts to break his spirit before being returned to Syria. As Captain he was later to fight against the Iraqis, in 1991, together with US forces.
不过，事实上以军迅速适应它们的机械化编队反击叙利亚反坦克部队的战术，它们会使用20mm“火神”高炮扫射可疑目标，用“陶”式导弹准确打击它们--- 通常是致命的结果。对付这种武器叙利亚首选是在近距离使用轻型反坦克武器的白刃战，这迫使以军部署它们的突击队去对付叙利亚反坦克狙击手：叙利亚人有比预 期更多的被猎杀而非狩猎的不愉快经历。战斗的结果非常痛苦和残酷，最好的证明是这场战争中仅有10%-15%的叙利亚反坦克小组在战争中幸存，很少被俘 获：其中只有一名成员：一位名叫迈赫迪的中尉在身负重伤的情况下落入以军手中，但他在回到叙利亚之前却挫败了以色列所有摧垮他的精神的努力。作为队长，他 在1991年他与美军一起参加了反对伊拉克的战争。
Despite immense problems, quite a few surprises, and losses, the Israelis were eventually satisfied with results of the conventional part of the war in Lebanon: in four days of battles they claimed destruction of 81 Syrian tanks, and capturing 41 (mainly T-62s), losing only eight M-48s and two Merkavas in return. Supposedly, one of destroyed Merkavas was subsequently salvaged and repaired. Pictorial evidence exists for a number of additional M-60s being destroyed as well, while the losses of M-113s were obviously so heavy that they were not deployed in forward lines until much later, when most were equipped with additional protection against anti-tank missiles.
尽管有很大的问题，不少的惊喜和损失，以色列最终对黎巴嫩常规战部分中成果感到满意，在4天的战斗中，他们声称摧毁了81辆叙利亚坦克，俘获41辆（主要 是T-62s）,回报是仅仅损失了8辆m-48s和2辆“梅卡瓦”，据说，一辆被摧毁的“梅卡瓦”随后被回收和修理，以及在画报上的一个额外数目的被摧毁 的m-60s的证据，而m-113s的损失明显很重，直到很久以后都不能部署到前线，且大部分增强防护抵御反坦克导弹。
The Syrians were not entirely satsified, even if their local commanders showed great initiative and tactical skill on the battlefied, proving that the additional training and decentralization of the command system of the SA were proper decisions. The main problem of the SA was that some of its larger units failed to fully exploit the poor situation of several Israeli units: there was a number of situations in which Syrian brigades and battalions stopped and started digging-in instead of advancing towards south where they could establish better defensive positions. Consequently, they did not manage to deploy the 3rd Armoured into the old positions of the 10th Armoured Division. Nevertheless, they fought with vigour and ferocity surpassing anything seen before from a Syrian soldier, and eventually stopped the Israeli advance. In fact, the IDF failed to reach its objectives in the Beka'a Valley as by the ceasefire on 11 June the Syrians still held the Beirut-Damascus highway after fighting an opponent that was superior in numbers and quality: the IDF deployed an equivalent of five divisions with something like 1.000 tanks against only something like two Syrian.
叙利亚人不完全满意，即使他们现场的指挥员显露出了不起的主动性，和在战火中的战术技巧，以证明叙利亚空军正确的安排了加强训练和权力下放的指挥系统，叙 利亚空军的主要问题是它的大机群未能充分利用几支以军的困境：在叙利亚旅和突击队停止前进并开始深挖的情况下，反而朝南前进，那里他们能够建立更好的防御 阵地。因此，他们不能调动部署第3装甲师进入第10装甲师的旧有阵地，不过，它们凶猛灵活的战斗超越了一名叙利亚士兵以往所见。最终阻止了以军的前进，事 实上，以色列抵达它在贝卡谷地目标的努力失败了，在6月11日停火的时候，叙利亚在与一个数量和质量都占优势对手激战之后仍然保有贝鲁特-大马士革高速公 路，以军调动相当于5个师的兵力，以及相当于叙利亚2倍的大约1000辆坦克。
The SyAAF, of course, came away in a very bad shape, losing between 85 and 87 fighters and 24 or 27 pilots (Syrian sources differ on this issue) in air battles and to Israeli ground defences between 6 June and 8 July 1982. Yet, the Syrians were proud with performance of their attack helicopter- and fighter-bomber-crews. Although flying well over 150 attack sorties, only two Gazelles were shot down by the Israelis (both crews were killed). Two other examples were badly damaged during the fighting and subsequently captured by the Israelis: one of these was rebuilt and test-flown in Israel (for comparison, the IDF/AF lost only one Defender). At least an additional SA.342 was badly damaged but flown back to Syria. In exchange the SyAAF claimed destruction of 95 ground targets by Gazelles, including 71 tanks, five APCs, three trucks, two artillery pieces, nine M-151 jeeps, and five tanker trucks. While these figures are usually considered as exaggerated, a closer examination of all known reports about IDF losses as published in the Israeli media, shows that the Israelis very likely did lose as many tanks, and certainly many more APCs and other vehicles. Besides, one should not forget that attack helicopters are considered extremely effective by most armies of the world, and that this fact was proved not only in a number of exercises, but also in several wars.
当然，叙利亚空军在一个情形很糟时刻离开，损失了85-87架战斗机和24-27名飞行员，（叙利亚的损失由不同的说法）但在空战和对以军地面攻击的 1982年6月6日至8日，叙利亚武装直升机和战斗轰炸机乘员的表现令人骄傲，出动超过150架次，仅有2架“小羚羊”被击落（机组人员全部丧生），2架 “小羚羊”因严重受损被以色列俘获，其中一架被以色列修复并测试，（作为对照，以色列仅损失了一架“卫士”）至少还有其他一些“小羚羊”严重受损但飞回叙 利亚降落，作为交换，叙利亚空军声称“小羚羊”摧毁95个地面目标，包括71辆坦克，5辆装甲运兵车，3辆卡车，2门大炮，9辆m-151吉普，5辆油罐 车，当然，这些数字通常视为夸大，仔细观察以色列媒体所有出版的有关以军损失的报告，透露出以色列很可能失去了很多坦克，和肯定更多的装甲运兵车和其他车 辆，另外，一个不应忘记的事实是，武装直升机被世界大多数军队认为非常有效的，这个事实不仅被很多演习，而且也被几场战争所证明。
Overall it is sure that the Syrian Gazelles proved their worth during this war beyond any doubt. When they were pulled from the battlefield, in the wake of the cease-fire from 11 June, the SA.342s were badly missed by remaining Syrian troops in Lebanon. For the rest of that war the Syrian Army's anti-tank teams had to fight alone.
总而言之，叙利亚的“小羚羊”在战争中毫无疑问的证明了它们的价值，当它们在战地起降时，在6月11日的停战中停止行动，“小羚羊”与叙利亚其他在黎巴嫩的军队失之交臂，因为停战，叙利亚的反坦克部队不得不孤军奋战。
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