欧洲可以成为美中竞争的强大调解者
https://www.noemamag.com/china-europe-relations-are-ritic-to-world-peace/
随着美国和中国陷入可能持续数十年的斗争,欧洲有机会发挥稳定者和调解者的重要作用。
作者:乔治·约利 2023 年 7 月 20 日
杨荣文在 2004 年至 2011 年期间担任新加坡外交部长。
本文改编自作者5月23日在佛罗伦萨欧洲大学研究所跨国治理学院的演讲。
近年来,欧洲的反华情绪不断高涨,不仅在欧洲领导人中,而且在普通民众中也是如此。 许多新加坡人很难理解为什么西方对中国的态度变得如此恶劣。 不同时期引用的理由不同——习近平主席的独裁、中国外交官的“战狼”行为、新疆涉嫌种族灭绝、香港国安法的出台、对台湾的威胁、南海的过度领土主张、 间谍活动、外国公司在中国受到不公平对待、盗窃知识产权、不公平贸易行为、孔子学院的恶意影响、隐藏有关新冠病毒起源的信息——这样的例子不胜枚举。 最近的一次可能是中国拒绝谴责俄罗斯入侵乌克兰并坚持对俄罗斯友好。
虽然每一个恩怨都值得讨论和辩论,但我们也应该知道,中国对西方也有自己的恩怨。 中国领导人和许多中国民众认为,西方对中国的消极态度的根本原因是不愿意平等地接受中国,并希望尽可能地拉垮中国。 多年担任中国驻美国大使的崔天凯在卸任后于2021年12月在北京发表讲话时表示,美国对中国的恶意是没有底线的。 他认为,美国人对中国的态度中存在强烈的种族主义成分。 G7国家一再发表的敌对言论让中国人想起了1900年八国联盟(德国、日本、俄罗斯、英国、法国、美国、意大利和奥匈帝国)入侵中国镇压义和团运动的侵略行为。 。
在遭受西方列强和日本数十年的苦难之后,中国领导人和人民决心对抗西方,特别是美国。然而,重要的是,中国并不将欧洲视为敌人,当然也不是欧洲的敌人。 欧洲和中欧关系对世界和平至关重要。
16世纪,当欧洲耶稣会士着手让中国皈依基督教时,他们没有枪支和炮舰来支持他们的事业。 他们必须运用理性和说服的力量。 要做到这一点,他们必须了解中国人的思想。 伟大的意大利耶稣会士利玛窦起初以为自己应该穿得像佛教僧人,却发现中国文人瞧不起僧人。 他很快了解到官员们尊重学术,而在这里,他如鱼得水。 他拥有百科全书般的记忆力和非凡的智力,掌握了汉语和经典。
但他的福传活动取得了有限的成功。 它每次都遇到障碍。 仅仅将 deus 翻译成中文就是一种智力练习——中国思维和哲学中不存在类似的想法。 耶稣会士出版的那个时代的天主教教义问答书籍将耶稣、玛丽和使徒描绘成中国人物。
欧洲人从耶稣会士那里了解了中国。 他们学会了如何通过考试组织精英公务员队伍。 根据科学家和历史学家约瑟夫·李约瑟的说法,伏尔泰和笛卡尔等法国百科全书学家从中国学到了如何在没有有组织的宗教的情况下建立道德秩序。 李约瑟认为这为启蒙运动和法国大革命奠定了思想基础。
后来,在 19 世纪,基督教传教士在军事力量的支持下到来。 耶稣和玛丽成为欧洲人。 基督教的上帝变成了外来的上帝。 欧洲已经决定不再向中国学习任何东西。
“欧洲已经决定不再向中国学习任何东西。”
中国的同质性
中国是一个异常同质的国家。 汉族人口占92%以上。 世界上没有任何一个民族,无论是现在还是过去,都拥有共同的文化和文明。中国的人口几乎是欧盟的两倍。与我心目中的欧盟仍然是一个部落国家联盟不同,汉族人民只有一种文学,承认同样的英雄。印度的人口已经超过了中国,但它没有中国的同质性——它的多样性也许更像欧洲。
中国的同质化并非偶然,也不是特定政策决定的结果。汉代统治者
几千年来,人们发现统治非汉族人很困难,因为他们的行为方式不同。正因为如此,中国的本能总是在自己周围筑起围墙,不是把自己的人关在里面,而是把外国人拒之门外。中国国歌谈到重建长城。中国为一切筑墙。不仅仅是实体墙:资本流动、文化进口、外国电影、教育材料、网络空间以及我们最近看到的细菌和病毒的墙。
两千多年前,秦朝统一了中国。 重量和尺寸已标准化。 写作被标准化了。 家庭被禁止拥有武器——甚至是超过一定尺寸的菜刀。 秦统治者是法家:法律执行严格、严厉。 由于精英和普通民众都无法承受这种严酷,王朝以第二个皇帝而结束。
随后的汉朝持续了四百年,与西欧的共和帝国和罗马帝国大致同时期,统治哲学从法家转向儒家。 儒家思想非常注重礼仪和正确的行为。 君主、官员、父子如果行为得当,社会就会和谐。 《大学》中有一句名言:修己,齐家,治国,天下就和。 在这样的世界里,成长环境不同的非汉族人很难适应。 尽管不推荐使用武力,但可能必须使用武力。
纸张和象形文字提升了中华文明
对我来说,对中国同质性的众多解释中最重要的两个是纸张的发明和后来的印刷术。 中国在北宋时期发明了活字印刷术,比德国古腾堡发明的活字印刷术早了几个世纪,而我在新加坡的英国学校教科书却没有提到这一点。
纸张和墨水使中国能够以其他社会无法做到的方式存储和处理数据,并以复杂的分工组织大量的人类。 几个世纪以来,中国一直垄断着纸张,并将这项技术视为国家机密。 今天,中国可能会抗议美国拒绝其尖端技术的举动,但它从自己的历史中知道,很长一段时间以来,中国在造纸和火药技术方面也做了同样的事情。
我对中国历史连续性的第二个解释是书写系统,它不是基于字母而是基于象形文字。 孩子们比那些由字母组成的单词更早地阅读中文单词,因为它们是图画。 象形文字保持其价值,而字母文字则随着发音的不同而变化。 今天中国的一名高中生可以毫无困难地阅读2000多年前写成的中国经典,因为文字没有改变。 (理解所写内容当然需要更多时间。)在欧洲或印度你不能这样做。 象形文字赋予书面中文一种数字品质,因为其价值在时间和空间上都是固定的。
如果纸张代表了一种计算形式,那么程序员就是掌握书面语言的学者官僚。 历史学家将当时的中国描述为一个官僚国家。 今天仍然如此。 我们没有士大夫,而是共产党干部。 由于纸张的存在,中国的历史记录数量庞大,在其他任何地方都无可比拟。 每个朝代都有编纂前朝正史的传统。 总共有 24 部官方历史,非常准确地记录了事件、地点、日期和人物。
这种对数据收集和记录保存的痴迷在 21 世纪的中国仍在继续。 中国可以说已经成为世界上数据最密集的社会,大量利用信息技术。 西方的一个普遍观点是,中国没有隐私——国家侵入生活的各个领域。 这是合法的,但仅提供了部分情况。
如今的中国利用数据分析来改善治理并减少腐败。 当通过多维矩阵收集如此多的数据并不断与其他城镇、城市和省份进行比较时,腐败就更难被掩盖。
中国目前拥有近300万个5G基站,一直延伸到珠穆朗玛峰大本营。 有了如此多的可用带宽,新产品和服务正在推出,例如无人驾驶汽车和机器人。 不久前的上海车展展示了中国电动汽车行业的发展程度,令许多业内人士感到震惊。 中国拥有世界约六分之一的人口,但拥有世界三分之一的机器人。 去年,全球近一半的新机器人安装是在中国进行的。
与此同时,西方对华为的制裁导致许多国家阻碍5G的引入,以及随之而来的新产业部门的增长。
“今天,中国可能会抗议美国拒绝向其提供尖端技术的举动,但它从自己的历史中知道,很长一段时间以来,中国在纸张和火药方面也做了同样的事情。”
美中关系
美国和中国陷入了一场可能持续数十年的旷日持久的斗争。 到2050年,中国的名义经济规模可能会比美国大得多。 一些经济学家认为,届时中国经济规模将相当于美国和欧盟经济规模的总和。 这样一个中国的前景令许多美国人望而却步。
如果没有核战争,中国在全球舞台上的重新崛起是无法阻止的。 当中国恢复这一地位后将如何表现,我们可以从其历史中看出这一点——这并不是世界第一次见证这种情况。 中国的邻国看到了过去的重演,并正在相应地重新调整自己的立场。 他们都曾与中国早期有过接触,能够借鉴过去的经验和积累的智慧。
美国担心中国正在寻求取代其全球霸主地位。 中国的策略要微妙得多。 它当然无意取代美国成为全球警察,也不希望将其军舰和军机派往世界遥远的地方。 然而,它希望保护自己在贸易和外交方面的利益,为此它需要军事资产。 中国的治国方略和战略思维更倾向于使用非军事手段来实现政治目标。 中国经常被指责使用经济胁迫,这并非没有道理。
中国可以利用其市场规模,通过经济奖励和惩罚来影响其他国家,特别是邻国的行为。 中国是迄今为止世界上一体化程度最高的经济体,按实际价值计算已经是最大的经济体。 世界上大多数经济体对中国的依赖程度超过了中国对它们的依赖程度。 中华帝国与许多邻国保持着朝贡体系。 这种朝贡关系并不是欧洲通常理解的那种朝贡国向霸权国支付金钱以寻求保护或保持自治的关系,就像莫斯科公国与金帐汗国或杜布罗夫尼克与奥斯曼帝国的关系一样。 就中国而言,朝贡国通过承认中国的资历(包括其代表必须向皇帝或空王位磕头),获得巨额贸易利益作为回报。 在东南亚,各个王国相互争夺对华贸易的更大份额。
当它想奖励一个友好的邻居时,只需把门开大一点就可以了。 当它需要惩罚任性的邻居时,它会关上一点门以造成痛苦。 在中国人看来,经济上的胡萝卜加大棒是比军事力量更好的处理外交关系的方式。 在孙子的《孙子兵法》中,优越的战略是无需战争即可实现战略目标。
“双循环经济”支撑了这一战略。 它是在 2020 年提出的,但其实并不是什么新鲜事。 中国历史上,内部循环始终比外部循环重要得多。 习近平领导下的中国政府所做的是逐步降低其他国家以特定技术、产品或原材料向中国勒索的能力。 中国的能源来源十分多样化,锂、钴、镍和铜等关键矿产的进口也是如此,尽管其对澳大利亚铁矿石的依赖引起了一些担忧。
美国收紧对华先进技术产品出口,以减缓中国在人工智能、量子计算等领域的发展。 “芯片战”可能会拖慢中国的步伐,但最终会让中国变得更加强大。 1960年,随着赫鲁晓夫和毛泽东关系恶化,苏联科学家和工程师突然被撤出中国,导致几个重大基础设施项目未完成。 苏联也停止帮助中国研制原子弹。 中国逐步克服了所有这些障碍。 1964年,它爆炸了第一颗原子弹。 当勃列日涅夫威胁对中国发动核战争时,毛泽东下令分散战略产业,并在每个主要城市地下挖掘隧道群。 近年来,中国人民已经做好了与美国长期对峙、包括爆发战争的心理准备。
如今,强烈的反华情绪在美国造成了现实。 如果南海发生事件导致美国人丧生,美国政界和媒体的热情可能会势不可挡,迫使美国陷入一场无意识的战争。 如果美国无法利用常规武器取胜(正如多次兵棋推演所表明的那样),那么使用核武器的诱惑可能会变得太强烈。
“中国无意取代美国成为全球警察,也不想结束其军舰和军用飞机飞往世界遥远地区的情况。”
欧洲、中国和多极化
我觉得当今一些欧洲领导人在没有仔细考虑中国的性质或欧洲自身切身利益的情况下支持美国对中国施压的方式令人不安。 这是一个战争与和平的问题。 无论哪种方式,欧洲的立场都可能使美中关系的天平发生倾斜。
欧洲自然必须考虑自身利益。 跨大西洋联盟建立在共同文明传承的基础上。 北约为欧盟的繁荣建立了安全框架。 没有它,第二次世界大战结束后欧洲的长期和平就不可能实现。
这种和平现在已经被打破,但如果跨越 11 个时区的俄罗斯分裂,情况可能会变得更糟。 如果发生这种情况,欧亚大陆将出现数十年的混乱。 然后,中国可能会被迫采取行动,并可能决定收回其在衰弱时失去的土地。 这对于欧洲来说并不是一个好的结果。
展望未来,欧洲必须决定如何与俄罗斯这个邻居相处。 自然有一系列的观点。 最终,欧洲必须在保留跨大西洋联盟本质的同时决定自己的立场。 欧洲面临的危险在于,乌克兰的长期对峙将破坏建立当今欧洲的谨慎共识。
中国与俄罗斯的密切关系是可以预料的,因为两国都受到美国的巨大压力,他们不是天然的朋友。 20世纪60年代和70年代初,他们曾一度接近核战争。 今天,俄罗斯需要中国,中国也不希望看到俄罗斯战败。 希望或指望中国在乌克兰战争中谴责俄罗斯并支持西方是不现实的。 与此同时,中国不想在战争中支持俄罗斯——这不是中国的战争。
中国提出的和平计划是一种化圆为方的尝试。 事实上,这不是一个计划,而是一个原则声明。 然而,一旦开始认真讨论停火,它可能会变得有用。 现在双方都在给战争机会,这是悲剧性的。 我们不太可能在很长一段时间内看到和平协议。 西方不能让普京获胜,而俄罗斯已经付出了如此多的鲜血和财富,也不能承受失败。 没有政治解决方案的停火完全有可能像朝鲜、克什米尔和塞浦路斯那样持续数十年。 只要乌克兰没有和平协议,俄罗斯就会因为西方的经济制裁而需要中国。
中国很可能在帮助为结束乌克兰战争创造条件方面发挥重要作用。 时机尚未成熟。 只有当主角们筋疲力尽时,他们才会转向停火。 到那时,中国目前在欧洲和俄罗斯之间的中间地位可能会有所帮助。 中国只有在欧洲的支持下才能发挥作用。 然而,美国不希望看到中国扮演这样的角色。
“指望中国在乌克兰战争中谴责俄罗斯并支持西方是不现实的。 与此同时,中国不想在战争中支持俄罗斯——这不是中国的战争。”
台湾问题
中国社会的历史感使其文化高度保守。 它今天的行动不应以西方规范来衡量。 想想在台湾问题上的误解。 19 世纪,欧洲列强和日本从衰落的清朝(1644-1911)中为自己开辟了一块领土。 1842年鸦片战争后,香港失守。 到1862年,所有抵达中国沿海和长江上游港口的船只大多由英国人检查,英国人在扣除他们自己声称的东西后,将剩余的部分交给中国政府。
1894年,日本击败中国,占领台湾。 第一次世界大战期间,中国站在协约国一边,向欧洲提供了14万工人,期望德国战败后将德国在华租界归还中国。 相反,当德国向日本做出让步时,整个中国都感到愤怒。
1943年12月,蒋介石将军在开罗会见了罗斯福总统和丘吉尔首相。 《开罗宣言》承诺将台湾归还给中华民国。 几年后中国内战导致中华人民共和国成立,但如果不是朝鲜战争爆发,当时美国第七舰队出现在台湾海峡,中华人民共和国很快就会收复台湾。 阻止中华人民共和国军队渡河。 因此,中华民国今天仍在台湾继续存在。
因此,中国的统一是一项未完成的、充满感情的事业。 北京的愿望是和平统一,这也是习近平准备2015年在新加坡与前总统马英九平等会面的原因。但如果台湾走独立之路,北京也不能像伦敦一样放弃使用武力的可能性 或者
如果苏格兰或加泰罗尼亚单方面宣布独立,马德里就可以。
只要没有外部介入,和平统一最终就会实现——台湾经济与更大的中国经济的联系越来越紧密。 绝大多数台湾人在文化意义上自觉是中国人,尽管许多人不想成为中华人民共和国公民。 他们有相似的仪式,庆祝相同的节日,崇拜相同的神灵。
当欧洲领导人在台湾问题上采取无视中国历史的立场时,这会激怒中国,而且没有任何战略目的。 对中国来说,台湾问题不是文字游戏或礼仪细节,而是历史正义问题。 中国认为,其对台湾的主张比许多国家的主权或领土主张更有更有力的法律依据。
尽管一再重申“一个中国”以及中华人民共和国是中国的唯一合法代表,美国仍与台湾保持着牢固的政治和军事联系,包括提供先进的军事装备。 毫不奇怪,中国认为美国正在将台湾视为更大的地缘政治棋盘上的一个棋子,并希望无限期地阻止统一。 美国自然希望欧洲在这场游戏中站在自己一边。
台湾是欧中关系的关键问题。 相比之下,所有其他的都是次要的。 欧洲人在这个问题上并不团结,中国知道许多人觉得他们必须站在美国一边。 今年4月,德国外长贝尔博克访华时,王毅国务委员表示,希望德国像中国支持德国统一一样支持中国统一。 德国因为是侵略者而四分五裂,而中国则因为是受害者而依然分裂。
法国总统马克龙本月早些时候访问中国时,与习近平进行了热情的会面。 他身边有一个庞大的商业代表团。 在随后接受 Politico 采访时,他表示欧洲决不能“陷入不属于我们的危机,这会阻碍其建立战略自主权”。 与此形成鲜明对比的是,欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表何塞普·博雷尔撰文呼吁欧洲海军在台湾海峡巡逻,“以表明欧洲对这一绝对关键地区航行自由的承诺”。 不出所料,中国提出了抗议。 台湾海峡的航行自由从来就不是问题。
“中国的统一是未完成的、令人深感激动的事情。”面对欧洲可以稳定美中关系
多极世界的结晶是不可避免的。 如果美国试图维持全球主导地位,我担心它会耗尽自己的精力。 美国在世界各地维持数百个军事基地需要花费大量资金。 通过印钞来支付这些基地的费用,美国实际上是在向我们所有人征税来支付这笔费用。 然而,美国将金融体系和美元武器化的方式正在鼓励俄罗斯、中国、印度和其他一些国家积极努力减少世界对美元和美国控制的全球金融体系的依赖 。 当美元失去主导地位时,巨大的飞轮就会朝相反的方向转动,给每个人带来巨大的后果。
美国最好在多极化正在结晶时塑造它,并成为同行中的第一。 这是完全可以实现的。 由于其文化的性质,中国无法承担这一角色。 欧洲或印度也不能。 美国拥有适合多极化的文化。 虽然我们不能公开承认,但在某种程度上,将欧盟凝聚在一起的文化和将东盟凝聚在一起的文化都源自美国。 因此,帮助实现一个以美国为首的多极世界符合欧洲的利益。 中国和俄罗斯不会喜欢它,但没有真正的选择。
欧洲在塑造这一结果方面的作用是决定性的。 欧洲要么可以助长美国对永久全球主导地位的渴望,要么可以迫使美国采取更现实的议程。 在中国问题上,欧洲应该采取自己的立场。 双方都不是对方的天敌。
在许多问题上,欧洲采取更加深思熟虑的立场可以稳定其他地区。 在中东和非洲,欧洲有着持久的兴趣。 据估计,到2050年,世界上四分之一的人将是非洲人,三分之一的人将是穆斯林。 届时出生的婴儿中大约 40% 是非洲人,50% 是穆斯林。 严峻的事实是,如果非洲经济在未来几年不腾飞,这片面积是美国三倍的大陆将会发生政治动荡,欧洲几乎不可能阻止难民持续涌入 ,其中许多人将是穆斯林。
非洲经济要发展,就需要基础设施。 眼下,国家在做
为非洲提供基础设施的最有力支持者是中国。 中国与非洲的联系正在稳步发展。 展望未来,欧洲和中国有必要共同努力帮助非洲,使非洲大陆健康发展。
在国际贸易体系的许多领域——比如电动汽车、造船和土木工程——中国都是第一世界国家。 2001年底中国加入时商定的世界贸易组织规则必须进行修改,以考虑到过去20年的变化。 中美之间分歧太大,谈判不易进行。 欧洲可以弥合这一差距。 令人高兴的是,我们有一位意志坚定的总干事恩戈齐·奥孔乔-伊韦阿拉。
欧洲困境的核心是其战略自主权问题。 中国当然希望欧洲对美国行使高度战略自主权,但知道这是不可能的。 强势欧元当然符合中国的利益。 中国深知跨大西洋联系是持久的,因为它们植根于历史和西方文明。
“欧洲要么可以助长美国对永久全球主导地位的渴望,要么可以迫使美国采取更现实的议程。”
共产党就像天主教会
欧洲领导人和知识分子应该追随利玛窦及其耶稣会士的脚步,认真研究中国。 今天,我可以公正地说,中国比欧洲更了解中国。 2003年,中国政府委托开展了一项关于大国崛起的研究。 从葡萄牙和西班牙开始,该系列继续广泛地报道了荷兰、法国、德国、英国、日本、俄罗斯、苏联和美国的崛起。几乎没有道德判断,也没有叙述中国在二战中所遭受的苦难。 他们的手。 相反,我们对他们崛起的关键原因以及每个人的个人特征进行了提炼。 例如,关于英国的剧集引用了温斯顿·丘吉尔的评论,即威廉·莎士比亚对大英帝国的价值比对整个印度更有价值。 关于法国的这一事件始于法国议会关于大仲马入选万神殿的辩论。 关于俄罗斯的故事始于彼得大帝亲眼目睹自己儿子被处决。 我什至可以说,对于每一个大国,中国纪录片都表达了一定的钦佩。
对于试图了解中国的欧洲人,我建议使用所有欧洲人都熟悉的天主教会的棱镜。 在很多方面,中国的制度运作方式与天主教堂相似。 它是分层的。 没有道德召唤,任何演讲都是不存在的。 大多数演讲都很无聊,因为它们重复教条和过去的先例。 对于两者来说,保存记录都很重要。 其一,精英由神职人员组成;其二,精英阶层由教士组成。 另一方面是干部。 两者都面临着致命的腐败挑战。 教皇方济各和习近平几乎在同一天就任领导人。 他们各自认为,打击腐败是一场生死攸关的斗争。 会众的规模大致相等。 他们的团结是通过对教义的严格控制来维持的。 天主教的辅助原则被认为是欧洲建设的基础,它相当于中国的党的路线,由于当地条件的巨大差异,允许相当大的灵活性。 梵蒂冈和中国都具有很强的延续性,并且本质上都是保守的。
我在梵蒂冈工作多年,曾六度担任梵蒂冈经济委员会成员。 在罗马举行一次会议之前,我参观了梵蒂冈天文台和罗马大学,并听取了关于一个名为“伽利略-徐光启会议”的有趣项目的介绍,该项目由国际相对论天体物理学中心组织。
徐光启是一位中国天文学家和政府官员,在南京由利玛窦皈依天主教。 在创造了我们现在使用的公历的耶稣会士的帮助下,徐光启修正了中国历法,将阴历周期记录在太阳历中。 旧的中国日历已经不同步了。 农历新年不是在新月开始,中秋不是满月,这对宫廷天文学家来说是一个巨大的尴尬。 徐和伽利略都是同时代的人。 两人都是数学家和天文学家。
在会上,我遇到了一群来自欧洲、中国和其他地方的才华横溢的年轻科学家,他们研究地球不断从不同方向接收到的宇宙爆发。 在那种环境下,一个人的国籍并不重要。 今年2月,一位中国科学家被任命为ICRA主席。 在欧洲和中国之间,我们需要采取多种此类举措,为我们所有人创造更美好的未来铺平道路。
Europe Can Be A Powerful Mediator In The U.S.-China Rivalry
https://www.noemamag.com/china-europe-relations-are-critical-to-world-peace/
With the U.S. and China locked in a struggle that may last decades, Europe has an opportunity to play a vital role as stabilizer and mediator.
George Yeo was Singapore’s minister of foreign affairs from 2004 to 2011.
This essay is adapted from the author’s speech at the European University Institute’s School of Transnational Governance in Florence on May 23.
Anti-China sentiments in Europe have risen in recent years, not just among European leaders but also among ordinary people. It is hard for many Singaporeans to understand why the Western attitude toward China has become so much worse. Different reasons are cited at different times — President Xi Jinping’s autocracy, Chinese diplomats behaving like “wolf warriors,” alleged genocide in Xinjiang, introduction of the national security law in Hong Kong, threats against Taiwan, excessive territorial claims in the South China Sea, spying, unfair treatment of foreign companies in China, theft of intellectual property, unfair trading practices, the baleful influence of Confucius Institutes, hiding information about the origin of Covid — the list goes on. The most recent is probably China’s refusal to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and its persistence in being friendly to Russia.
While each grievance is worthy of discussion and debate, we should also know that China has its own grievances against the West. Chinese leaders and many Chinese people believe that underlying Western negativism towards China is an unwillingness to accept China as an equal and a desire to pull China down if possible. Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the U.S. for many years, said in a speech in Beijing in December 2021 after his retirement that there was no bottom line to America’s ill will for China. He believed that there was a strong element of racism in Americans’ attitudes toward China. Repeated hostile statements made by G7 countries remind the Chinese of the aggression of the Eight-Nation Alliance (Germany, Japan, Russia, Britain, France, the U.S., Italy and Austria-Hungary) that invaded China in 1900 to put down the Boxer Rebellion.
After suffering for decades at the hands of Western powers and Japan, China’s leaders and people are determined to stand up to the West, and particularly the U.S. Importantly, however, China does not see Europe as an enemy, and is certainly not an enemy of Europe, and China-Europe relations are critical to world peace.
When European Jesuits set out to convert China to Christianity in the 16th century, they did not have with them guns and gunboats to support their cause. They had to use reason and the power of persuasion. To do this, they had to understand the Chinese mind. The great Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, thought at first that he should dress like a Buddhist monk, only to discover that the Chinese literati looked down on monks. He learned quickly that the mandarins respected scholarship and, here, he was in his element. Blessed with an encyclopedic memory and extraordinary intelligence, he mastered the Chinese language and classics.
But his evangelization had limited success. It met obstacles at every turn. Just translating deus into Chinese was an intellectual exercise — no equivalent idea existed in Chinese thinking and philosophy. Catholic catechism books of that era published by the Jesuits portrayed Jesus, Mary and the Apostles as Chinese figures.
From the Jesuits, Europeans learned about China. They learned how to organize an elite civil service based on examinations. According to the scientist and historian Joseph Needham, the French encyclopedists like Voltaire and Descartes learned from China how it was possible to have a moral order without organized religion. Needham argued that this laid the intellectual basis for the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.
Later, in the 19th century, Christian missionaries arrived backed by military power. Jesus and Mary became European. The Christian God became a foreign god. Europe had decided it no longer had anything to learn from China.
“Europe had decided it no longer had anything to learn from China.”
China is an unusually homogeneous country. More than 92% of its population is Han. There is no comparable nationality in the world, now or in the past, which in huge numbers share a common culture and civilization. China’s population is almost twice that of the European Union. Unlike the EU which in my mind remains a confederation of tribal nations, the Han people have only one literature and acknowledge the same heroes. India’s population has overtaken China’s but it does not have China’s homogeneity — it is perhaps more like Europe in its diversity.
China’s homogeneity did not happen by chance, but neither was it the result of particular policy decisions. Han rulers for millennia have found it difficult to govern non-Han people because they behave differently. It is for this reason that China’s instinct is always to build walls around itself, not to keep its people in, but to keep foreigners out. The Chinese national anthem talks about rebuilding great walls. China builds walls for everything. Not just physical walls: walls for capital flows, cultural imports, foreign movies, educational material, cyberspace and, as we saw recently, bacteria and viruses.
Over 2,000 years ago, the Qin Dynasty unified China. Weights and measures were standardized. Writing was standardized. Households were forbidden to have weapons — even kitchen knives beyond a certain size. The Qin rulers were legalists: Laws were enforced rigidly and harshly. The dynasty ended with the second emperor because both elite and ordinary people could not take the severity.
The succeeding Han Dynasty, which lasted 400 years and was roughly contemporaneous with republican and imperial Rome in Western Europe, changed the ruling philosophy from legalism to Confucianism. Confucianism put great stress on rituals and proper behavior. If the emperor, the official, the father and the son behave in the proper way, society will be in harmony. A famous line in “The Great Learning” goes: cultivate the self, raise the family, govern effectively and the world will be in harmony. In such a world, non-Han people who were brought up differently could not fit it easily. Force, though not preferred, may have to be used.
To me, the two most important of the many explanations for China’s homogeneity are the invention of paper and later of printing. China invented moveable-type printing during the Northern Song Dynasty, centuries before Gutenberg did so in Germany, something that my British school textbooks in Singapore failed to mention.
Paper and ink enabled China to store and process data in a way no other society could, and to organize large numbers of human beings in a complex division of labor. For centuries, China had a monopoly on paper, protecting the technology as a state secret. Today, China may protest at U.S. moves to deny it cutting-edge technologies, but it knows from its own history that it did the same with paper and gunpowder technology for a long time.
My second explanation for China’s historical continuity is the writing system, which is based not on alphabets but on pictographs. Children can read words in Chinese earlier than those whose words are composed of alphabets because they are pictures. Words written as pictographs keep their value while words written in alphabets change with different pronunciations. A high school student in China today can read Chinese classics written over 2,000 years ago without too much difficulty because the characters have not changed. (Understanding what is written takes more time of course.) You can’t do this in Europe or in India. Pictographs give written Chinese a digital quality as the value is fixed across time and space.
If paper represented a form of computing, the programmers were the scholar mandarins who mastered the written language. Historians have described China during that time as a bureaucratic state. It remains so today. Instead of scholar mandarins, we have Communist Party cadres. Because of paper, the corpus of historical records on China is enormous and has no parallel anywhere else. There is a tradition of every dynasty compiling an official history of the previous one. In all, there are 24 official histories that record with great accuracy events, places, dates and personalities.
This obsession with data collection and record-keeping continues in 21st-century China. China has arguably become the most data-intensive society in the world, making use of information technology in a huge way. A common Western perspective is that there is no privacy in China — the State intrudes into every sphere of life. This is legitimate but provides only a partial picture.
China today makes use of data analytics to improve governance and reduce corruption. It is much harder for corruption to be hidden when so much data is collected through a multi-dimensional matrix and constantly being compared to other towns, cities and provinces.
China now has close to 3 million 5G stations extending right up to Mount Everest base camp. With so much bandwidth available, new products and services are being rolled out, like driverless vehicles and robotics. The recent Shanghai auto show showed how much the electric car industry has developed in China and was a shock to many in the industry. While China has about a sixth of the world’s population, it has a third of the world’s robots. Last year, almost half the world’s new robot installations were carried out in China.
Meanwhile Western sanctions against Huawei caused many countries to hold back the introduction of 5G, and with it the growth of new industry sectors.
“Today, China may protest at U.S. moves to deny it cutting-edge technologies, but it knows from its own history that it did the same with paper and gunpowder for a long time.”
U.S.-China Relations
The U.S. and China are locked in a protracted struggle that may extend for decades. By 2050, China will probably have a much larger economy than the U.S. in nominal terms. Some economists think that China’s economy at that time will be the size of the U.S. and EU economies put together. The prospect of such a China is daunting to many Americans.
Short of nuclear war, China’s re-emergence on the global stage cannot be prevented. How China will behave when it recovers that position can be discerned in its history — this is not the first time the world has witnessed it. China’s neighbors see a replay of the past and are re-triangulating their positions accordingly. All of them had encounters with China in its earlier incarnations and are able to draw on past experiences and accumulated wisdom.
The U.S. fears that China is seeking to dislodge and replace it as global hegemon. China’s strategy is much more subtle. It certainly has no wish to replace the U.S. as global policeman and to send its warships and military aircraft to distant parts of the world. It will however want to protect its own interests in trade and diplomacy, for which it needs military assets. Chinese statecraft and strategic thinking much prefer to use non-military means to achieve political objectives. China is often accused of using economic coercion, which is not unjustified.
By making use of the size of its market, China is able to influence the behavior of other countries, especially its neighbors, through economic reward and punishment. China has by far the most integrated economy in the world, which is already the largest in real terms. Most economies in the world are more dependent on China than China is on them. Imperial China maintained a tributary system with many of its neighbors. This tributary relationship is not what is commonly understood in Europe, where a tributary state pays money to a hegemon either for protection or to keep its autonomy, like the relationship of Muscovy to the Golden Horde or Dubrovnik to the Ottomans. In the case of China, the tributary state, by acknowledging China’s seniority, which included its representative having to kowtow to the emperor or to an empty throne, receives huge trading benefits in return. In Southeast Asia, kingdoms vied with one another for a greater share of the China trade.
When it wishes to reward a friendly neighbor, it only needs to open the door a little wider. When it needs to punish a wayward neighbor, it shuts the door a little to inflict pain. In the Chinese mind, economic carrots and sticks are a much better way to manage foreign relations than military force. In the “Art of War” by Sun Tzu, superior strategy is the achievement of strategic objectives without the need for war.
The “dual circulation economy” supports such a strategy. It was put forward in 2020 but is really nothing new. In its history, China’s internal circulation was always much more important than its external circulation. What the Chinese government did under Xi Jinping was to progressively reduce the ability of other countries to hold China to ransom on particular technologies, products or raw material. China’s energy sources are well-diversified, and so too its import of critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper, though its dependence on Australia for iron ore causes some concern.
The U.S. has tightened exports of advanced technology products to China in order to slow down China’s development of AI, quantum computing and other areas. The “chip war” may slow China down but it will, in the end, make China more formidable. In 1960, following deteriorating relations between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, Soviet scientists and engineers were suddenly pulled out of China, leaving several major infrastructural projects unfinished. The Soviet Union also stopped helping China develop an atomic bomb. China progressively overcame all those obstacles. In 1964, it exploded its first atomic bomb. When Brezhnev threatened nuclear war on China, Mao ordered the dispersal of strategic industries and had tunnel complexes dug under every major city. In the last few years, the Chinese people have been psychologically preparing for a prolonged stand-off with the U.S., including the possibility of war.
The strength of anti-China sentiment creates its own reality in the U.S. today. If there is an incident in the South China Sea that causes the loss of American lives, the passions of the U.S. body politic and media may be unstoppable and force the U.S. into an unintended war. If the U.S. is unable to prevail with conventional weapons, which is what repeated war games demonstrate, the temptation to use nuclear weapons may become too strong.
“China has no wish to replace the U.S. as global policeman and to send its warships and military aircraft to distant parts of the world.”
I find it troubling the way some European leaders today support U.S. pressure on China without careful consideration of China’s nature or Europe’s own vital interests. This is a matter of war and peace. Europe’s stance can tilt the balance in U.S.-China relations either way.
Europe must naturally calculate in its own self-interest. The Trans-Atlantic Alliance is based on a common civilizational inheritance. NATO establishes the security framework for the EU to flourish. Without it, the long peace in Europe following the end of the Second World War would not have been possible.
That peace has now been shattered but could get much worse if Russia, which spans 11 time zones, breaks up. If that happens, there will be mayhem in Eurasia for decades. China may then be forced to move and may decide to reclaim land it lost when it was weak. This would not be a good outcome for Europe.
Looking forward, Europe has to decide how it wants to live with Russia as a neighbor. There is naturally a range of views. In the end, Europe has to decide its own position while preserving the essence of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. The danger for Europe is that a prolonged standoff in Ukraine will undo the careful consensus that had created the Europe of today.
China’s close relationship with Russia is to be expected because both have come under great pressure from the U.S. They are not natural friends. They were close to nuclear war in the 60s and early 70s. Today, Russia needs China, and China does not want to see Russia defeated. It is not realistic to hope or expect China to condemn Russia and support the West in the Ukraine War. At the same time, China does not want to support Russia in the war — this is not China’s war.
China’s proposed peace plan is an attempt to square a circle. In reality, it is not a plan but a statement of principles. Nevertheless, it may become useful once serious discussion for a ceasefire begins. Right now, both sides are giving war a chance, which is tragic. We are not likely to see a peace agreement for a long time. The West cannot allow Putin to win while Russia, having expended so much blood and treasure, cannot afford to lose. It is entirely possible that a ceasefire without political resolution can go on for decades like in Korea, Kashmir and Cyprus. For as long as there is no peace agreement in Ukraine, Russia will need China because of Western economic sanctions.
China may well play an important role in helping to create conditions for an end to the Ukraine War. The time is not yet ripe. Only when the protagonists are exhausted will minds turn toward a ceasefire. At that point, China’s current intermediate position between Europe and Russia may become helpful. China can only be effective with European support. The U.S., however, would not like to see China playing such a role.
“It is not realistic to expect China to condemn Russia and support the West in the Ukraine War. At the same time, China does not want to support Russia in the war — this is not China’s war.”
The sense of the past in Chinese society makes its culture highly conservative. Its actions today shouldn’t be measured against Western norms. Consider the misunderstanding over Taiwan. In the 19th century, the European powers and Japan carved out pieces of territory for themselves from a declining Qing China (1644-1911). Hong Kong was lost in 1842 after the Opium War. By 1862, all ships arriving at ports on the China coast and up the Yangtze River were inspected mostly by the British, who after deducting what they claimed for themselves gave the remainder to the Chinese government.
In 1894, Japan defeated China and took Taiwan. During the First World War, China was on the side of the Allied Powers and supplied to Europe 140,000 workers, expecting that German concessions in China would be returned to China after Germany was defeated. When, instead, the German concessions were given to Japan, there was outrage throughout China.
In December 1943, General Chiang Kai-shek met President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Cairo. The Cairo Declaration promised the restoration of Taiwan to the Republic of China. The civil war in China a few years later resulted in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, but the PRC would have recovered Taiwan soon enough but for the outbreak of the Korean War, when the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait prevented PRC military forces from moving across. Thus the ROC continues in Taiwan today.
China’s reunification is therefore unfinished, deeply emotional business. Beijing’s wish is for peaceful reunification, which was the reason Xi was prepared to meet former President Ma Ying-jeou as an equal in Singapore in 2015. But Beijing cannot abjure the possible use of force if Taiwan takes the road of independence any more than London or Madrid could if Scotland or Catalonia were to declare independence unilaterally.
As long as there is no external involvement, peaceful reunification will eventually take place — the Taiwanese economy is increasingly tied to a larger Chinese economy. The great majority of Taiwan’s people are self-consciously Chinese in a cultural sense, even though many do not want to be citizens of the PRC. They share similar rituals, they celebrate the same festivals, they worship the same deities.
When European leaders take positions on Taiwan that disregard Chinese history, it irritates China and serves no strategic purpose. For China, the issue of Taiwan is not a play of words or protocol niceties — it is about historical justice. China believes that its claim on Taiwan has a stronger legal basis than many countries’ sovereignty or territorial claims.
Despite repeatedly affirming “One China” and that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China, the U.S. maintains strong political and military links with Taiwan, including the supply of advanced military equipment. It is not surprising that China believes that the U.S. is playing Taiwan as a piece on a larger geopolitical chessboard and wants to prevent reunification indefinitely. The U.S. naturally wants Europe on its side in this game.
Taiwan is the key issue in Europe-China relations. All others are minor in comparison. Europeans are not united on it, and China knows that many feel like they have to take the U.S. side. When German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock visited Beijing in April, State Councilor Wang Yi expressed the hope that Germany would support Chinese reunification the way China had supported German reunification. Unlike Germany, which was broken up because it was an aggressor power, China remains divided because it was a victim.
When President Emmanuel Macron visited China earlier that month, he had warm meetings with Xi. He had with him a large business delegation. In a subsequent interview with Politico, he said that Europe must not get “caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy.” In sharp contrast, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell wrote an article where he called for European navies to patrol in the Taiwan Strait “to show Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.” As expected, China protested. Freedom of navigation has never been an issue in the Taiwan Strait.
“China’s reunification is unfinished, deeply emotional business.”FaceEurope Can Stabilize U.S.-China Relations
The crystallization of a multipolar world is inevitable. If the U.S. tries to maintain global dominance, I fear it will exhaust itself. It costs a fortune for the U.S. to maintain hundreds of military bases around the world. By printing money to cover the cost of these bases, the U.S. is, in effect, taxing all of us to cover the expense. However, the manner in which the financial system and the dollar are being weaponized by the U.S. is encouraging Russia, China, India and a number of other countries to actively work to reduce the world’s dependence on the dollar and the U.S.-controlled global financial system. When the dollar loses its dominance, a great flywheel will turn in the opposite direction with huge consequences for everyone.
It is better for the U.S. to shape multipolarity as it is crystallizing, and be primus inter pares (first among equals). That is completely achievable. China cannot take on that role because of the nature of its culture. Neither can Europe or India. The U.S. has a culture suited for multipolarity. Although we can’t openly admit it, to some extent, the culture that binds the EU together and the culture that binds ASEAN together are both derived from America. It is therefore in Europe’s interest to help bring about a multipolar world with the U.S. as first among equals. China and Russia won’t like it but there is no real alternative.
Europe’s role in shaping such an outcome is decisive. Europe can either fuel American desire for perpetual global dominance or it can force on the U.S. a more realistic agenda. On China, Europe should take its own position. Neither is a natural enemy of the other.
On a number of issues, a more thoughtful European stance can stabilize other regions. In the Middle East and Africa, Europe has an abiding interest. It has been estimated that in 2050, one in four human beings in the world will be African and one in three will be Muslim. Roughly 40% of babies born then will be African and 50% Muslim. The stark fact is that if African economies in the coming years do not take off, there will be political upheavals on a continent three times the size of the United States and it will be well-nigh impossible for Europe to prevent a steady influx of refugees, many of whom will be Muslim.
For African economies to grow, infrastructure is needed. Right now, the country doing the most to help provide Africa with infrastructure is China. China’s links with Africa are growing steadily. Looking ahead, it behooves Europe and China to work together to help Africa so that the continent can develop in a healthy way.
In many sectors of the international trading system — like electric vehicles, shipbuilding and civil engineering — China is a first-world country. World Trade Organization rules, which were agreed to when China acceded at the end of 2001, have to be amended to take into account the changes of the last 20 years. Differences between China and the U.S. are too sharp for negotiations to be easily carried out. Europe can bridge that gap. Happily, in Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, we have a determined director-general.
At the heart of Europe’s dilemma is the issue of its strategic autonomy. China would of course prefer a Europe that exercises a high degree of strategic autonomy from the U.S. but knows that this is not possible. It is certainly in China’s interest to have a strong euro. China is well aware that the transatlantic links are enduring because they are rooted in history and Western civilization.
“Europe can either fuel American desire for perpetual global dominance or it can force on the U.S. a more realistic agenda.”
Following in the footsteps of Matteo Ricci and his fellow Jesuits, European leaders and intellectuals ought to study China seriously. Today, I can fairly say that China understands Europe more than the other way around. In 2003, China’s government commissioned a study of the rise of the great powers. Beginning with Portugal and Spain, the series went on to cover in broad strokes the rise of Holland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, the Soviet Union and the U.S. There was little moral judgment and no recounting of how China suffered at their hands. Instead, there was a distillation of the key reasons for their rise and the individual characteristics of each. For example, the episode on Great Britain cited Winston Churchill’s remark that William Shakespeare was more valuable to the British Empire than all of India. The episode on France began with a debate in the French Parliament on the induction of Alexandre Dumas into the pantheon. The one on Russia began with Peter the Great witnessing the execution of his own son. I would even say that, for each great power, the Chinese documentary expressed a certain admiration.
For Europeans trying to make sense of China, I suggest using the prism of the Catholic Church which all Europeans are familiar with. In many ways, the Chinese system operates like the Catholic Church. It is hierarchical. No speech is made without moral invocations. Most speeches are boring because they repeat dogmas and past precedents. For both, record-keeping is important. In one, the elite is composed of clergy; in the other, of cadres. Both face corruption as a mortal challenge. Pope Francis and Xi Jinping became leaders almost on the same day. Separately, each decided that tackling corruption was a life-and-death struggle. The congregations are roughly of equal size. Their unity is maintained by tight control over doctrine. The Catholic principle of subsidiarity, which is supposed to be the basis of the European construction, is equivalent to the Party line in China, where considerable flexibility is allowed because of vastly differing local conditions. Both the Vatican and China have a great sense of continuity and are conservative in their deep nature.
I was involved with work in the Vatican for years, serving for six as a member of the Vatican Council for the Economy. Before one of my meetings in Rome, I visited the Vatican Observatory and the University of Rome and was briefed on an interesting project called the Galileo-Xu Guangqi meeting, which was organized by the International Center for Relativistic Astrophysics.
Xu Guangqi was a Chinese astronomer and government official who was converted to Catholicism by Matteo Ricci in Nanjing. With the help of the Jesuits, who had created the Gregorian Calendar we now use, Xu Guangqi corrected the Chinese calendar, which inscribes lunar cycles within the solar calendar. The old Chinese calendar had gone out of sync. It was a huge embarrassment for the court astronomers when Chinese New Year did not begin on the new moon and when the moon was not full in mid-autumn. Both Xu and Galileo were contemporaries. Both were mathematicians and astronomers.
At the meeting, I met a group of brilliant young scientists from Europe, China and elsewhere who study the cosmic bursts that the Earth is constantly receiving from different directions. In that environment, it did not matter what a person’s nationality was. In February this year, a Chinese scientist was appointed president of ICRA. Between Europe and China, we need a multiplicity of such initiatives to pave the way to a better future for all of us.