政治经济学属于社会科学。社会科学的一个特点是不能重复验证，所以也就很难证明一种经济学观点是正确的还是错误的。

美国大萧条时期过去几十年了，美国经济学界仍然在争论：罗斯福总统当年的新政是延长了经济危机时间还是缩短了经济危机时间。邓小平的改革开放过去40年了，赞扬和批评邓小平的两组人势不两立。毛泽东去世四十多年了，赞美和批判毛的两派人武斗的心都有了。我不是想在这里说毛和邓的好坏，只是想说明，我们对经济学的看法，往往带着我们自己的观点。

最近关于中美经济的文章比较多，当然也是各说各话。我最近看到一篇关于中美关系的文章，感觉有些道理，就编译在这里。文章源自巴伦周刊（Barron’s, 2019.04.04, By Michael Pettis)。

What the U.S. Gets Wrong About China—and Why That Spells Trouble

By Michael Pettis April 4, 2019 8:31 a.m. ET

China’s ferocious economic growth in recent years has transformed U.S.-China relations—largely for the worse.

中国最近几年经济的快速发展，改变了中美关系，两国关系主要是朝着坏的方向发展。

The very difficult economic adjustment that China now faces will again change that relationship. Unfortunately, if history is a useful guide, it will take many years before policy makers in Washington recognize the changed circumstances and formulate an appropriate policy response.

中国现在面临的经济调整的艰难，最终会改变中美关系。不幸的是，如果历史经验可以借鉴的话，美国华盛顿需要许多年时间来理解中国现在所面临的情况，从而调整未来美国对中国的政策。

Just a few years ago, it was almost impossible to find anyone who doubted the inexorable rise of China’s economy, eventually to become the world’s largest and most powerful. Today, however, more analysts, both inside and outside China, recognize that its relative rise economically may have already peaked, or soon will, and that its real economic performance has been seriously overstated by the gross-domestic-product data.

仅仅是几年前，几乎没有人会怀疑，中国经济的无情崛起将取代美国成为世界第一超级大国。今天，无论在中国国内还是国外，大部分人都认识到，中国经济的相对强势发展的顶峰即使还没有过去，那么也很快会过去。中国的实际经济实力被表面的国民总产值严重高估。

This won’t be the first time we got it so wrong, and as in every previous case—most obviously that of the Soviet Union in the 1960s and Japan in the 1980s—it will probably take many years for American perceptions to change. But in whatever way events actually unfold, the China of the near future will no longer be the aggressively rising China of American fears, and the sooner we recognize this change, the less likely we are to engage in useless and costly confrontation.

美国人的这种误会不是第一次，以前曾经发生过。面对上世纪六十年代的前苏联和八十年代的日本，美国人都犯了同样的错误。但是，美国人需要许多年时间来认识到自己的错误。

不管中美关系怎么发展，中国在不久的将来，不会像美国人担心的那样快速崛起。美国人越早认识到这一点，就越会减少对中国的围堵。这种围堵既没有效果，成本还会很高。

The historical precedents for China tell a consistent story. Every country that enjoyed many years of an investment-driven economic “miracle” has faced the same difficult challenges that China now faces: how to resolve the deep demand imbalances and the ballooning debt that drove growth in its final stages. None have managed the transition without a significant, and probably inevitable, downgrading of longer-term economic, technological, and geopolitical prospects.

历史先例告诉我们同样的道理。每一个通过投资驱动的经济“奇迹”都会面临同样的挑战，也就是中国正在面临的挑战：怎样解决在经济发展的最后阶段，产能和消费市场的不平衡和不断增长的债务负担？没有一个国家能顺利处理好这样的挑战而不导致长期的经济衰退，及由此产生的科技和社会影响力的下降。

What can be certain is the China that emerges from this adjustment will be a very different country from the one we know today.

可以肯定的说，未来经过调整以后的中国，肯定会不同于我们现在知道的中国。

To understand the challenges that Beijing faces, it is helpful to understand the process that led to China’s current state. One of the biggest mistakes in understanding the nation’s development is to conflate the four decades since Deng Xiaoping began his historic reforms into a single, consistent growth model. It is much more useful to think about this period as consisting of four very different economic growth stages, the last of which, with great difficulty, we are only just entering.

要想理解中国面临的挑战，我们首先需要明白中国怎么走到当前的经济阶段的。理解中国经济发展的最大失误，就是把邓小平主导的改革开放以来的所有经济发展，作为一个单一的经济发展模式。如果我们把过去几十年的经济发展，分为四个不同的经济发展阶段，那么我们对现在中国面临的最后经济发展阶段，就会有更好的理解。

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?????? ???????????????The first stage began in political and economic crisis following the Cultural Revolution. By the end of the 1970s, China had lived through more than 40 years of Japanese conflict, civil war, and Maoist policies that had distorted its economy and left it underinvested. To prevent collapse, the economy had to be transformed in a way that eliminated the many constraints on Chinese economic productivity.

第一阶段始于文革以后的1970年代。1970年代末，中国人民经历了艰难的40年，其中包括日本侵略，国共内战，和毛时代的各种政策。中国经济被扭曲，基础建设投入不够。为了防止中国经济崩溃，当时的经济改革不可避免，阻碍经济发展的条条框框必须被打破。

Deng’s reforms did just that, and they were immediately successful. In 1977, the last year of the old regime, China’s GDP shrank 1.7%, but over the next decade, it soared, with China experiencing only one year of growth below 7%. In that decade, Beijing relaxed laws preventing unplanned economic activity, freed workers and farmers from their work units, and reduced the role of central planning in favor of localized planning. These reforms unleashed an explosion of economic activity that generated tremendous wealth creation.

邓小平的经济改革做的正是这样，并且立竿见影。1977年，中国旧体制的最后一年，中国经济下降了1.7%。但是在接下来的10年里，中国经济发生了翻天覆地的变化，中国经济只有一年的增长率低于7%。在这10年里，北京政府放松了计划经济，给工人和农民离开工作单位和农村的自由，减少了中央经济计划，让地方政府自己做主。这些改革措施释放了经济活力，创造了巨大财富。

But it is really not until the next stage, beginning in the early 1990s, that we can speak about the Chinese growth model, itself a version of the investment-driven growth model practiced by Japan and others. Rather than just eliminate growth constraints, Beijing put into effect new policies that set off rapid growth and development, and, as they always do, these policies began to generate the imbalances that the current administration must resolve.

但是直到中国经济发展的第二阶段，始于1990年代初，我们才可以讨论中国的经济增长模式，即投资驱动的增长模式。这种增长模式以前日本和其它国家都试过。它不是通过取消限制经济增长的约束（制度），而是引进新的投资政策来刺激经济的增长和发展。跟其它国家一样，这样的政策会导致经济发展不平衡，这就是中国政府需要解决的问题。

Among the most important of these imbalances is the extraordinarily low share of GDP retained by ordinary Chinese households. At 50%, this low share was not an accident. As in every other investment-driven growth “miracle” of the past century, the Chinese government forced up domestic savings and directed these savings into urgently needed investment. The most effective way of forcing up savings, i.e., forcing down consumption, is to repress the growth of household income relative to GDP by directly or indirectly taxing household wealth to subsidize government-directed investment.

这种经济发展不平衡的最严重指标，就是民众收入在国民总产值中的份额太低。中国民众收入只有50% GDP这种情况不是偶然的。 跟其它投资驱动的经济增长奇迹一样，政府强制民众储蓄，并把储蓄投放到急需的投资项目。增加储蓄，减少消费的有效措施，就是压制民众家庭收入的增长低于GDP的增长。政府通过各种税收来补贴政府支持的投资，从而压低民众的收入在国内生产总值的份额。

This Beijing did, adopting a number of mechanisms pioneered by Japan. As the total value of Chinese goods and services soared, household income grew by still-enviable, but much lower, rates. The household share of total GDP consequently dropped every year to become, in the past decade, among the lowest ever.

北京的办法，日本曾经实施过。过去几十年，虽然中国国内生产总值上去了，家庭收入也增长了，但是家庭收入在国内生产总值的占比却越来越低。家庭收入的GDP占比现在处于过去几十年的最低位。

?There are two important consequences of this model. First, because consumption accounted for such a low share of demand for the goods and services China produced, investment had to make up a disproportionately large share of total Chinese demand. In fact, at nearly 50%, the investment share of China’s GDP exceeds that of any of the other countries that had followed this growth model.

Second, the relationship between Beijing and the country’s elite was transformed. Deng’s original reforms had been strongly opposed by the Communist Party elite during the first stage, mainly because the reforms undermined their control of economic behavior. It is part of his genius that he nonetheless managed to force through his vision of a transformed China.

这种经济模式有两个不良后果。第一，因为民众的消费能力太低，政府必须通过投资来补偿经济增长。国内生产总值中50%的投资占比，超过其它任何采取类似经济模式国家的投资占比。

第二，北京政府和国家精英阶层的关系改变了。邓在改革开放的早期阶段，遭到了党内精英阶层的反对，因为改革剥夺了他们控制经济的权力。邓的改革成功，因为他的聪明手腕和改革开放的远见。

During this second stage of growth, however, Beijing’s development policies created a powerful new group, heavily overlapping with the old elite, that strongly supported government policies and competed to accomplish the objectives set out by Beijing. The more successful they were, the more they were rewarded in the form of subsidies, with access to extraordinarily cheap credit quickly becoming the most profitable resource in China.

在经济发展的第二阶段，北京的发展政策产生了新的利益集团。这些利益集团跟邓时期的精英集团大部分情况下是同一拨人。他们支持政府的政策，并争相完成政府的目标。他们越成功，得到政府的奖励越多。政府的奖励以各种形式的补助和低息贷款发给他们。

The third stage of Chinese growth, which probably began early in the last decade, was characterized by continued rapid GDP growth driven by investment. This was, however, underpinned by even more rapid growth in debt.

中国经济发展的第三阶段，大概始于2000年代初， 标志着国内生产总值的快速增长，但是同时也伴随着债务的快速增长。

This, too, is typical of countries that have followed this growth model. Undeveloped economies are usually poor not because they are underinvested, but because their social, legal, financial, and economic institutions constrain their ability to absorb high levels of investment productively. Typically, they encourage or require individuals and businesses to behave in ways that are not socially or economically beneficial.

这也是这种经济发展模式的典型结果。欠发达国家穷不是因为这些国家缺少投资来源，而是这些国家的社会，法律，金融和经济机构的条条框框，限制了投资效率。典型的情况是，这些管理机构的规则让投资不能产生相应的社会和经济效益，这样大家也就不愿意来投资。

In the early 1990s, these constraints did not seem to matter. The country so badly lacked infrastructure and manufacturing capacity that the only important constraint on productive investment was the pace at which savings could grow. An unsophisticated financial system that chose investment projects for political or other noneconomic reasons was not a serious problem: The best financial system was simply the one that expanded most rapidly.

在1990年代初，这些条条框框问题不大。那个时候，国家急需基础建设和生产能力的发展，条条框框产生的影响只是赚钱的速度大小问题。那个时候选择投资项目的金融系统虽然也关心政治性的和非合理的投资项目，但是问题不是很严重。那时发展最快的经济模式就是最好的经济模式。

But with its still-undeveloped social, legal, financial, and economic institutions, the amount of capital stock that businesses and workers in China could absorb productively was much lower than in advanced economies. Without substantial institutional reform, additional investment was unlikely to be economically justified, but these reforms were far too politically disruptive for Beijing to consider implementing them.

但是，在陈旧的社会，法律，金融和经济框架下，现在能产生好的经济效应的投资项目已经比不上发达国家了。如果没有根本的机构改革，未来投资难以赚钱。如果要做大的体制改革，政府又不能接受。

Still, China’s very low consumption share meant that rapid GDP growth required rapid investment growth, and because China’s financial system was designed to expand credit as rapidly as possible, this is what it got. What is more, because the costs of investing in infrastructure or manufacturing capacity were heavily subsidized by hidden transfers from households, it was easy to miss the problem. Without mechanisms to constrain, or even to identify, wasted investment, China, like all of its predecessors, began allocating investment increasingly into unproductive projects, much like Japan’s famous “bridges to nowhere” two decades earlier.

同时，中国的低消费能力意味着GDP增长必须依赖于投资增长。中国的银行系统对基础建设投资项目是大开绿灯，而这些投资项目又通过压低民众收入来补贴，所以很多没有经济效益的投资项目在进行，正像日本当年修“哪里也不通”的桥。

When this happens, the debt supporting the investment rises faster than the country’s debt-servicing capacity. With very high GDP growth rates needed to sustain employment and political stability, the gap between reported economic growth (i.e., GDP) and real economic growth widened, and, more worryingly, debt soared. Every country that has followed this model has suffered eventually from this unsustainable rise in debt, but in China debt rose faster than it ever has in history, leaving the country with an enormous burden of debt, equal by most estimates to more 300% of GDP.

这种投资项目的发展，就是债务增长速度超过国家的债务偿还能力。为了维持民众的就业率和政治稳定，政府必须要维持GDP的表面增长速度。结果就是表面经济（GDP）增长速度和实际经济增长速度（民众消费能力）的差距越拉越大。现在中国的债务负担，估计已经达到GDP的三倍，即300%。 

Today, China urgently needs institutional reforms that both rechannel bank lending and change its legal and other institutions in ways that raise the productivity of Chinese businesses and workers. China must, in other words, begin the fourth stage of its growth period. It must rein in credit growth and, with it, investment growth, but if it is to prevent growth from collapsing, consumption must take up the slack. This requires redistributing large amounts of wealth from local elites and local governments to ordinary Chinese households.

当前，中国经济必须进入第四增长阶段。政府急需进行机构改革，保证银行贷款和政府管理机制能产生经济效益。为了防止经济增长崩溃，民众的消费必须跟上。民众的消费能力必须来自中国的财富重新分配，就是把中国富人的钱和地方政府的资源，用来支持普通老百姓。

The historical precedents for such a transformation are grim. The only countries that have succeeded in redistributing wealth and power and rechanneling the financial system to such an extent without suffering political chaos have either been robust democracies, like the U.S. in the 1930s, or highly centralized autocracies, like China itself in the 1980s, and in both cases it took a crisis to force the change.

这种财富转移的改革前景不太乐观。历史上成功完成财富和权力重新分配的案例包括，高度民主化的美国在1930年代的大萧条时期的新政，和高度中央集权的中国在1980年代的经济改革。这两次变革，虽然避免了政治混乱（Political Chaos），但是也经历了强制变革带来的危机（Crisis）。

Will China pull it off? There are broadly three ways that China can manage its adjustment. The best way is if President Xi Jinping has been able temporarily to consolidate enough power to force through the necessary wealth transfers that raise household wealth quickly enough so that consumption can power growth as nonproductive investment is forced down. In this case, China’s share of global GDP—currently around 15% to 16%—will probably continue to rise, albeit more slowly than in the past, and the Chinese economy will end up with a much larger and more powerful household sector, more stable growth, and eventually a weaker government sector.

中国会完成这样的财富重新分配的变革吗？总的来说中国有三个途径去完成这样的变革。最好的办法，习临时取得足够的权力来强制推行财富分配。没有经济效益的投资项目被强制下马，取得财富的普通民众的消费增长才能支持中国的经济增长。这样中国可以维持它在世界经济中的份额（15%到16%之间）。未来中国经济会有一个强大的家庭消费经济和稳定的增长，政府的权力最后被减弱。

The sheer extent of the needed reforms make this an unlikely outcome. Still, it is not impossible: China managed an equally difficult transformation with Deng’s reforms in the 1980s.

这样大规模的变革一般不会实现。但是也不是不可能，邓在1980年代就做了这样规模的艰难改革。

The second way is if Beijing is able to stabilize the debt burden with smaller but more-manageable wealth transfers to Chinese households. In that case, Chinese GDP growth will drop to well below half of current levels, although household income growth by a lot less. China’s share of global GDP would probably drop, even if not as precipitously as its predecessors, but it runs the risk, like Japan, of failing to resolve its debt burden and so suffering many years of stagnation.

第二种方案是中国通过小规模的财富转移来稳定债务负担。这种情况下中国的GDP增长速度可能会降到现在的一半水平，但是老百姓的收入增长不够维持GDP增长。中国GDP在国际上的份额会下降，但是中国会面临日本那种沉重债务负担和长期经济停滞。

The third way is if Beijing is unable to gain control of credit growth in time and the economy runs up against debt-capacity limits, either in the form of a financial crisis, or by effectively monetizing new debt as it comes due. A crisis is very unlikely as long as the Chinese banking system remains closed and the regulators powerful, but either way Chinese GDP growth would drop sharply, to zero or even negative.

第三种情况，政府不能控制债务的持续增长，最后经济发展到债务的极限。这种极限可以是金融危机的形式，也可以是政府印钱还债形式。只要政府能够严格控制银行系统和经济监管，危机一般不会发生。但是中国经济增长可能变成零，甚至变成负数。

Each of these broadly different outcomes can occur in different ways, and clearly the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship will depend on how China manages its economic adjustment and how the U.S. manages its own high debt levels and income inequality. It will also depend on the outcome of the trade conflict, which will drag on for many years, far beyond President Donald Trump’s time in office.

以上的每一种方案都可能以不同的形式出现。其结果会受中美关系，中国的经济调控能力，以及美国自身的高债务水平和美国民众的收入不平衡等因素影响。中美贸易冲突会持续很多年，远远超过川普的总统任期。

The point, however, is that Washington is managing the relationship with an obsolete idea of China. To the extent that U.S. foreign policy concerning China is built around the need to contain a dangerously rising China, this policy will also soon become obsolete. China’s ferocious economic growth has ended, and very few serious economists, in or out of China, still think its high GDP growth rates accurately represent the performance of the underlying economy.

这里需要指出的是，美国政府仍然在用过时的理念来处理中美关系。表现在美国仍然使用围堵的战略来抑制崛起的中国。中国经济的猛烈发展势头已经到顶了。中国国内和国外的经济学界，没有几个人认为中国的国内生产总值水平代表中国的真正经济实力。真正经济实力低得多。

The U.S. has always had a good relationship with China, and that relationship will eventually return, but probably not for many years.

中美两国世代友好，这种友好关系最后仍然会回来，但是要在很多年以后。

One thing is certain. The adjustment period that has followed every growth miracle in history has always overturned expectations, especially the most seemingly obvious and widely accepted ones. It is safe to assume that it will happen again.

一件事是肯定的，每一个经济增长奇迹后的调整期都会超越人们的想象，特别会偏离那些比较明显的预测。这次中国的经济调整，也会出乎大家的预料。

我前面讲了，经济学家的观点是难以验证的，所以你不需要认可他的观点。他的文章在中美贸易谈判分裂前发表，应该还是有一定的预见性。我个人也认为，中美之间的矛盾，会持续很多年，并且将不局限在贸易方面，期望大家有思想准备。

Michael Pettis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.