经过收集历史资料， 大盘 是TARP和08刺激正策明朗后2009三月底反弹，确定，当欧洲出台和实行 欧洲版TARP时， 大盘很快就会见底反弹。




QE and QE2
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing#QE1.2C_QE2_and_QE3)

The US Federal Reserve held between $700 billion and $800 billion of Treasury notes on its balance sheet before the recession. In late November 2008, the Fed started buying $600 billion in Mortgage-backed securities (MBS).^[44] By March 2009, it held $1.75 trillion of bank debt, MBS, and Treasury notes, and reached a peak of $2.1 trillion in June 2010. Further purchases were halted as the economy had started to improve, but resumed in August 2010 when the Fed decided the economy wasn't growing robustly. After the halt in June holdings started falling naturally as debt matured and were projected to fall to $1.7 trillion by 2012. The Fed's revised goal became to keep holdings at the $2.054 trillion level. To maintain that level, the Fed bought $30 billion in 2-10 year Treasury notes a month. In November 2010, the Fed announced a second round of quantitative easing, or "QE2", buying $600 billion of Treasury securities by the end of the third quarter of 2011.^[45][46].









TARP
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troubled_Asset_Relief_Program)

On October 14, 2008, Secretary of the Treasury Paulson and President Bush separately announced revisions to the TARP program. The Treasury announced their intention to buy senior preferred stock and warrants from the nine largest American banks. The shares would qualify as Tier 1 capital and were non-voting shares. To qualify for this program, the Treasury required participating institutions to meet certain criteria, including: "(1) ensuring that incentive compensation for senior executives does not encourage unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (2) required clawback of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive based on statements of earnings, gains or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; (3) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden parachute payment to a senior executive based on the Internal Revenue Code provision; and (4) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive."^[12] The Treasury also bought preferred stock and warrants from hundreds of smaller banks, using the first $250 billion allotted to the program.^[13]

The first allocation of the TARP money was primarily used to buy preferred stock, which is similar to debt in that it gets paid before common equity shareholders. This has led some economists to argue that the plan may be ineffective in inducing banks to lend efficiently.^[14][15]

In the original plan presented by Secretary Paulson, the government would buy troubled (toxic) assets in insolvent banks and then sell them at auction to private investor and/or companies. This plan was scratched when Paulson met with United Kingdom's Prime Minister Gordon Brown who came to the White House for an international summit on the global credit crisis.^{[citation needed]} Prime Minister Brown, in an attempt to mitigate the credit squeeze in England, merely infused capital into banks via preferred stock in order to clean up their balance sheets and, in some economists' view, effectively nationalizing many banks. This plan seemed attractive to Secretary Paulson in that it was relatively easier and seemingly boosted lending more quickly. The first half of the asset purchases may not be effective in getting banks to lend again because they were reluctant to risk lending as before with low lending standards. To make matters worse, overnight lending to other banks came to a relative halt because banks did not trust each other to be prudent with their money.^{[citation needed]}

On November 12, 2008, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson indicated that reviving the securitization market for consumer credit would be a new priority in the second allotment.^[16][17]

On December 19, 2008, President Bush used his executive authority to declare that TARP funds may be spent on any program that Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson,^[18] deemed necessary to alleviate the financial crisis.

On December 31, 2008, the Treasury issued a report reviewing Section 102, the Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund, also known as the "Asset Guarantee Program." The report indicated that the program would likely not be made "widely available."^[19]

On January 15, 2009, the Treasury issued interim final rules for reporting and record keeping requirements under the executive compensation standards of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP).^[20]

On January 21, 2009, the Treasury announced new regulations regarding disclosure and mitigation of conflicts of interest in its TARP contracting.^[21]

On February 5, 2009, the Senate approved changes to the TARP that prohibited firms receiving TARP funds from paying bonuses to their 25 highest-paid employees. The measure was proposed by Christopher Dodd of Connecticut as an amendment to the $900 billion economic stimulus act then waiting to be passed.^[22]

On February 10, 2009, the newly confirmed Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner outlined his plan to use the remaining $300 billion or so in TARP funds. He intended to direct $50 billion towards foreclosure mitigation and use the rest to help fund private investors to buy toxic assets from banks. Nevertheless, this highly anticipated speech coincided with a nearly 5 percent drop in the S&P 500 and was criticized for lacking details.^[23]

On March 23, 2009, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced a Public-Private Investment Program (P-PIP) to buy toxic assets from banks' balance sheets. The major stock market indexes in the United States rallied on the day of the announcement rising by over six percent with the shares of bank stocks leading the way.^[24] P-PIP has two primary programs. The Legacy Loans Program will attempt to buy residential loans from bank's balance sheets. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will provide non-recourse loan guarantees for up to 85 percent of the purchase price of legacy loans. Private sector asset managers and the U.S. Treasury will provide the remaining assets. The second program is called the legacy securities program, which will buy residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) that were originally rated AAA and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) which are rated AAA. The funds will come in many instances in equal parts from the U.S. Treasury's TARP monies, private investors, and from loans from the Federal Reserve's Term Asset Lending Facility (TALF). The initial size of the Public Private Investment Partnership is projected to be $500 billion.^[25] Economist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman has been very critical of this program arguing the non-recourse loans lead to a hidden subsidy that will be split by asset managers, banks' shareholders and creditors.^[26] Banking analyst Meredith Whitney argues that banks will not sell bad assets at fair market values because they are reluctant to take asset write downs.^[27] Removing toxic assets would also reduce the volatility of banks' stock prices. This lost volatility will hurt the stock price of distressed banks. Therefore, such banks will only sell toxic assets at above market prices.^[28].



導讀：MarketWatch專欄作家馬克曼(Jon Markman)認為，蓋特納全力鼓吹的歐洲金融穩定基金擴張計劃，本質上其實是變相的量化寬鬆，將會為美國經濟提供巨大的幫助，只是這樣的幫助絶非全無代價。

　　以下即馬克曼的評論文章全文：

　　伴隨愈來愈多的投資者開始相信新推出的計劃能夠逐步穩定歐元區的金融情況，開始感到安心，市場本周也逐漸在震蕩中開始上行了。從這一計劃看來，華盛頓目前最看重的想法似乎就是，只要歐洲能夠將自己的銀行危機再拖延那麼幾周時間，華爾街就可以心無旁虻刈哌M10月，迎接傳統的盈利季節了。這就像是貴客來吃晚飯之前，想辦法把自家半瘋的大叔打發到電影院去，但歸根結底，該解決的問題遲早還是要解決的。

　　這一由美國財政部長蓋特納炮製出來的計劃，要旨就在勸服歐洲的領袖們大大增加緊急救援基金——即所謂歐洲金融穩定基金——的規模。他的預案將使用槓桿手段——比如舉債——來增加原本已經是舉債而來的資金，增幅達到十倍以上。

　　這聽起來多少有些難以置信，但卻是不折不扣的事實。歐洲金融穩定基金從歐元區各國籌措來的資金原本就是借來的，而現在，蓋特納居然要用借款做擔保，想要再借出十倍多的錢來。這簡直是匪夷所思，人家憑什麼會把錢借給這個計劃？

　　一切究竟是怎麼回事？要回答這個問題，我們最好還是先將腦子裡的時鐘撥回到2008年秋季。這樣我們就可以記起，在不良資産處置計劃誕生之前，美國也曾有過一個類似的，旨在救援金融系統的計劃，但是後來被認定為風險過高。從這個角度說來，似乎當時正擔任紐約聯儲總裁的蓋特納現在是正在和國際貨幣基金或者還有一些其他人在秘密製造“大規模金融殺傷性武器”，而將準星對準了歐洲債務危機。

　　當我們閉上雙眼，就這一概念冥思一陣，我們就會想到，這超級超級巨大的歐洲金融穩定基金其實很像是一個秘密的量化寬鬆計劃，或者也可以好聽點說，一個秘密的超級刺激計劃。除開巨大的規模之外，一切都是非常低調。聽起來是個很精明的設計，不是麼？

　　他們並沒有把歐洲金融穩定基金說成是刺激的手段，但是我們都知道，一旦這些資金真的流入歐洲銀行系統，填上希臘債券造成的缺口，則這些原本並不存在的資金就將沿着各渠道流向全球系統。接下來的進程有點複雜，但是姑且從宏觀角度來描述，伴隨着歐洲人持續購買美國的商品，這些資金遲早是要回到美國的。

　　當然，他們肯定不會這麼說。面上的說辭是，增大歐洲金融穩定基金的規模，將有助於預防法國、德國、芬蘭、斯洛文尼亞和其他歐元區國家的議會投票反對擴大救援行動。

　　然而事實卻是，蓋特納和拉加德本質上已經形成共郑?胍?@開美國和歐洲的立法機構，創造一支信貸衍生對沖基金，將大量金錢噴灑在乾涸的歐洲土地上，指望能夠長出些什麼果實來。

　　計劃至少也可以讓當地銀行的資本重新充足起來，這樣，哪怕希臘的違約導致放款方遭受50%的資本損失，也暫時能夠承受了。

　　這會成為現實嗎？某種程度上說來，這是否會成為現實，至少一段時間之內都是無所謂的。關鍵在於，相信這一幕會發生的想法可以造就希望和信心。就像孩子們做着正式舞會的白日夢一樣，預期甚至會比現實更加美好。周一晚些時候，德國人和其他時候一樣，以刺耳的語調表達了對美國任何提議都不屑一顧的態度，不過我猜測，他們最終還是會接受的。

　　現在，我們不妨先放下新聞媒體一切從事實出發的定律，試着去猜想一下——盡管這看上去像是糟糕的設想，但是要德國人和法國人願意自己下大力氣去救援歐元區和希臘，是否真的有什麼隱藏的，有效的理由呢？

　　所有人都知道，正如默克爾所說，支持雅典的金融家們，其實也就是在輓救德國的銀行。不過，我還有一個猜想，即在前面那冠冕堂皇順理成章的原因之外，其實德國和法國也不希望破産專家有機會去研究希臘的資産負債表，有機會去弄清楚那些失去的財富到底是怎麼回事。

　　實話實說，希臘將借來的錢揮霍掉，這可能性也是存在的。可是，如果說，在過去幾年當中，確實存在着一個類似龐氏騙局的安排，希臘政府或者銀行的官員們一直在偷偷轉移那些資金，將其藏在對客戶資料守口如瓶的歐洲銀行那裏，那麼又會是怎樣呢？

　　當然，我根本就沒有任何證據。这只是一種直覺，但直覺的背後也有邏輯——誘惑是如此巨大，而監管卻是如此稀鬆，也有事實——要手腳緊縛的德國和法國去為南歐的狂歡者們買單，確實存在問題。

　　要實現計劃，還有着大量的障礙需要克服。周一晚些時候，德國憲法法院首腦福斯屈勒就表示，如果沒有一部新的憲法，沒有全面的公民投票，是不會有任何國家會直接將財政命呱辖粴W洲的，這不啻於一道詛咒。大家都相信，這樣的評論必然會使得將歐洲金融穩定基金規模擴大到2萬億歐元的計劃變得更加複雜起來，任何顯示默克爾和其他歐洲領導人試圖繞開憲法法院解決問題的跡象都將變成政治上的毒藥。

　　根據英國《電訊報》的報道，德國頂級大法官先生對法蘭克福的一份報紙表示：“要將核心權力交給歐盟，時間所剩無幾。如果有人想要超越現在的界線——或許，這在政治上說來是合乎情理的和可取的——那麼德國就必須有一部新的憲法。全民公決是必要的。沒有人民的表態，什麼也做不到。”

　　簡而言之，超級巨無霸版的歐洲金融穩定基金，其誕生還遠不確定。不過，若是它真的出現，這個龐然大物就會讓所有的童話都顯得太過缺乏想象力，並且為第四季度股市的強勢上漲奠定基礎。

　　當然，債上加債，以債償債本質上總不是靠譜的事情，因此，哪怕是這一切成為現實，我們也不能因此而高枕無憂。