丰岛海战7月25日  黄海海战 9月17日

1894年 甲午年（马年）；清光绪二十年；日本明治二十七年

大事记
6月11日——清军指挥官叶志超不战而走，致使日本军队占领平壤。
7月25日——丰岛海战爆发，是中日甲午战争的开始。

丰岛海战发生于1894年7月25日清晨，是一次日本首先挑起的战役，并因此清朝与日本正式宣战。

“济远”和“广乙”两艘中国军舰7月23日抵达牙山，掩护运送清军的运兵船在朝鲜牙山登陆后，25日拂晓离牙山返航，在朝鲜丰岛海面，遇上日本联合舰队第一游击队“吉野”、“浪速”及“秋津洲”这三艘以高航速和高射速为特征的军舰。（这三艘军舰在后来黄海海战中重创北洋舰队，立下头功）

7时20分，第一游击队望见“济远”和“广乙”两舰，即时下战斗命令。7时45分，第一游击队旗舰“吉野”首先开炮：这是日本在甲午战争不宣而战的开始。7时52分，中国军舰随后还击，两军展开激烈炮战。日本军舰在吨位、火炮、时速方面，较中国军舰占较大优势。福建船政局自制炮舰“广乙”企图逼近日本军舰发射鱼雷，在“秋津洲”“浪速”压倒性的火力打击下受重伤，无法发射鱼雷，船身倾斜，人员伤亡惨重。于是向海岸方向退出战斗，在朝鲜十八岛附近搁浅，纵火自焚。“济远”舰伤亡亦惨重（当时管带方伯谦与大副沈寿昌皆在舰桥上指挥，沈氏被日军击中，脑浆迸裂、血染方氏衣裳，不旋踵二副柯建章腹部亦被日军炮弹贯穿，足可见当时战斗之惨烈）。

8时10分日舰以时速22.5节的“吉野”号、“浪速”号穷追“济远”舰不舍，“济远”舰藉机西撤，并发尾炮攻击“吉野”号。8时30分，“济远”舰全速向西撤退。日舰猛追，“济远”舰悬起白旗。日舰追近，“济远”舰又加挂日本海军旗。“浪速”舰发出信号勒令“济远”舰立即停轮。

此时载有第二波増援朝鲜清军并悬挂英国国旗的英国“高升”号商轮和满载军械的“操江”舰先后驶来。“济远”舰抛下“高升”号而走，“吉野”号独自追击“济远”舰。12时38分，“吉野”渐次逼近“济远”。“济远”发尾炮三发炮弹命中，“吉野”受伤转舵撤走。日军三舰见“高升”号与“操江”舰，立即以“浪速”舰拦截“高升”号，以“秋津洲”舰拦截“操江”舰。9时15分“浪速”发出信号勒令“高升”号“停轮”，逼迫高升将船只驶往日本，以船上官兵作为“人质”，船上清军官兵大为愤怒，因为此时中日双方尚未开战，怎可无故俘虏船上官兵？便要求船长将船驶回大连或旅顺。正在双方僵持不下的时刻，日军突生红旗，要求船上洋员离船，旋即发炮进攻，清军亦据船以步枪迎敌。下午1时“高升”号被“浪速”击沉，此时日军竟用机枪扫射在海上漂浮的清军官兵，最后殉难者达七百余人。下午2时“操江”舰“秋津洲”追上也被俘虏。

“济远”舰驶抵威海，在《航海日志》中捏造战果：“船后台开四炮，皆中其要处，击死倭提督并官弁数十人，彼知难以抵御，故挂我国龙旗而奔”，并篡改海战时间，掩盖事实。而后丁汝昌误报“济远”舰击沉“吉野”号。但纵然如此，论战斗实力，莫说济远一船敌三舰，就是一船敌一舰，济远也无法迎敌（因为济远时速才十五海浬，日方三舰时速皆超过十八海浬，日舰亦皆配有速射炮，为济远所无），最后三舰济远击伤其二而脱困，其实已属难得。

7月28日夜，日本陆军进攻牙山清军，发生激战，清军不支，退向平壤。8月1日，中日双方正式宣战。

日本不宣而战，袭击中国租用外轮，违反国际法。英国驻日使节一度抗议，而“浪速”舰长东乡平八郎却一口咬定，“高升”号是被中国军队非法占据，日舰实行“临检”，该船不服从命令。而英国政府从自身利益政策，也出现种种指证日本无罪的舆论，此事件草草结束。

黄海海战是中日甲午战争中双方海军主力在黄海北部海域进行的战役规模的海战。亦称中日甲午海战、大东沟海战。此役北洋水师失利，自此退入威海卫，使黄海制海权落入日本联合舰队之手，对甲午战争的后期战局具有决定性影响。

甲午战争前夕中日两国的海军
1894年清朝海军分为北洋、南洋、福建和广东四支水师舰队。其中北洋水师实力最为强大，其他各支水师除广东水师的三艘小型巡洋舰滞留北洋参加撕Ｕ揭酝猓?蚴盗ζ度酰?谡秸?诩湮匏?魑???颖毖笏?Φ母餐觥?/P>

日本海军各支舰队于甲午战争爆发前夕统一整编为联合舰队，由伊东祐亨海军中将担任联合舰队司令。联合舰队的编队分为以下小队：本队第一小队、第二小队、第一游击队和第二游击队。

背景
1894年7月25日，日本联合舰队第一游击队的吉野、浪速、秋津洲三艘巡洋舰在丰岛海域突然袭击北洋水师的济远和广乙两艘巡洋舰，即丰岛海战，甲午战争爆发。北洋水师和联合舰队面临着相同的任务：护送援军、争夺朝鲜半岛附近海域的制海权。

北洋水师主要在威海至大同江口一线巡弋，8月10日，日本联合舰队迫近威海，清光绪皇帝责难北洋水师提督丁汝昌率“畏葸”，北洋大臣李鸿章不得不命丁汝昌赴黄海巡航以平息皇帝的愤怒和缓解舆论的压力。9月12日，北洋水师主力舰12艘由威海出发，赴鸭绿江口的大东沟，护送陆军登陆。

与北洋水师在战略上“保船制敌为要”不同，日本海军在战争之前就制定了以舰队决战夺取制海权的明确计划。当日本联合舰队护送援军登陆仁川的行动完成后，9月13日，联合舰队本队和第一游击队开赴鸭绿江口，搜寻向北洋水师主力决战。

虽然两军指挥为丁汝昌与伊东祐亨，但实际上海军作战不单设备现代，就连指挥方式亦为“技术语言”，非受过正规训练无法指挥。因此双方实际指挥官皆为副帅，中方为刘步蟾、日方为东乡平八郎，两人皆留学英国格林威治皇家海军学校，为同班同学。这场海战可说是两位“同学”间的对决。

海战经过
 

1894年9月15日  北洋水师主力在丁汝昌率领下到达大连湾，护送陆军4,000人搭乘的5艘运兵船。

9月16日北洋水师抵达鸭绿江口的大东沟。部分舰艇担任警戒，其余10艘主力舰在口外12海里的大鹿岛东南下锚。

9月17日

8时，运兵船卸载完毕。9时，北洋水师舰队开始“巳时操”。
10时23分，联合舰队第一游击队发现北洋水师。发出信号“东北方向发现三艘以上敌舰”。
10时30分，北洋水师镇远舰桅楼上的哨兵发现日本舰队。
12时05分，联合舰队第一游击队在先，本队在后，呈单纵阵，接近北洋水师。
12时20分，北洋水师在行进中由双纵阵改为横阵，旗舰定远位于中央，其余各舰在其左、右依次展开，舰队呈楔形梯队。同时丁汝昌还发出命令：“各小队须协同行动；始终以舰首向敌；诸舰务于可能之范围内，随同旗舰运动之。”
鸭绿江口外海，大鹿岛海域，集中了两国几乎全部主力舰艇。
12时50分，双方舰队相距5300米，北洋水师旗舰定远首先开炮。联合舰队第一游击队在距北洋水师5000米处即向左转弯，航向北洋水师右翼。联合舰队航向北洋水师右翼，冒险将舰队暴露于北洋水师阵前。
12时53分，联合舰队旗舰松岛开始发炮还击。定远主桅中弹，信号索具被炮火所毁，在飞桥上督战的丁汝昌身负重伤。
从此时起，北洋水师各舰除随定远进退之外，已经失去了指挥。
13时左右，第一游击队炮击北洋水师右翼超勇、扬威两舰。
13时20分，北洋水师超勇、扬威起火。联合舰队本队航速较慢的比睿、扶桑、赤城成为北洋水师的打击目标。比睿、赤城受重伤。第一游击队左转，回救两舰。本队右转，形成夹击阵势。
14时20分，日舰西京丸中弹起火退出战场。北洋水师超勇沉没，扬威重伤驶离战场搁浅(有记载被济远撞沉于浅海)。
14时30分，北洋水师平远命中日舰松岛，也被其所伤并引起火灾，暂时退避。
15时04分，北洋水师旗舰定远中弹起火。
15时20分，第一游击队集中打击北洋水师突前的致远。致远沉没。济远、广甲在致远沉没后，迳直驶回旅顺（广甲在途中触礁搁浅，两天后被日舰击毁）。北洋水师已无法保持战斗队形。
15时30分，联合舰队旗舰松岛被击中，并引起堆积在甲板上的弹药爆炸。
16时10分，北洋水师靖远、来远受伤，退向大鹿岛。联合舰队旗舰松岛发出了“各舰随意运动”的信号。
17时左右，北洋水师靖远、来远经抢修恢复战斗力。靖远代替旗舰升起队旗，收拢各舰。
17时30分，北洋水师经远沉没。联合舰队发出“停止战斗”的信号，脱离战斗。（海战结束）

海战结果
黄海海战历时5个多小时，北洋水师损失致远、经远、超勇、扬威以及触礁后被毁的广甲5艘军舰，来远受重伤，死伤官兵千余人；日本舰队松岛、比睿、赤城、西京丸4舰受重伤，死伤官兵600余人。

黄海海战以后，北洋水师退回旅顺、威海，“避战保船”不再出战，日本海军掌握了黄海制海权。

黄海海战中双方战斗序列

联合舰队舰艇
第一游击队

巡洋舰：吉野（第一游击队司令坪井航三海军少将旗舰，舰长大佐河原要一）、浪速（舰长大佐东乡平八郎）、高千穗（舰长大佐野村贞）、秋津洲（舰长少佐上村彦之丞）

本队

巡洋舰：松岛（联合舰队司令伊东祐亨海军中将旗舰，舰长大佐梶本知道）、严岛（舰长大佐横尾道昱）、桥立（舰长大佐日高壮之丞）、比睿（舰长少佐樱井规矩之左右）、千代田（舰长大佐内田正敏）
旧式铁甲舰：扶桑（舰长大佐新井有贯）
炮舰：赤城
武装商船（代用巡洋舰）：西京丸（日本海军军令部长桦山资纪的座舰）

北洋水师舰艇
铁甲舰：定远（北洋水师提督丁汝昌旗舰，管带右翼总兵刘步蟾）、镇远（管带左翼总兵林泰曾）
巡洋舰：来远（管带副将邱宝仁）、经远（管带副将林永昇）、致远（管带副将邓世昌）、靖远（管带副将叶祖圭）、济远舰（管带副将方伯谦）、广甲（管带都司吴敬荣）、超勇（管带参将黄建勋）、扬威（管带参将林履中）、平远（管带都司李和）、广丙（管带都司程璧光）
炮舰：镇南、镇中
鱼雷艇：福龙、左队一、右队二、右队三

影响
黄海海战是海军发展到铁甲舰时代后的一次大规模海上舰队决战，颇受世界各国海军人士的重视。

北洋海军的两艘铁甲舰显示了防御能力的优势，厚装甲无一处被击穿。战列舰依然是海军中不可替代的主力舰。安装重型火炮的相对小型战舰在海战中效用不高。
北洋海军在大口径火炮方面占优势，但射速较低。联合舰队各主力舰均装备了中口径速射炮，通过速射炮的密集炮火弥补了其大口径火炮的不足。对19世纪末海军的武备发展产生重大影响。此役后各国海军设计的战舰，均重视提高大口径火炮的射速，并强化中口径速射炮的火力。
海战双方都针对性选择了不同的阵型。联合舰队采用单纵阵有良好协调性。北洋海军各舰舰首向敌，因对准不同的军舰，出现阵形紊乱导致各自为战的局面。各国海军得出结论，海战中最重要的是阵型的整齐与协调；纵阵比横阵更适合发扬火力。
联合舰队在海战中机动性占有优势，第一游击队编队航速达到15海里，海战中进退自如，始终掌握着选择进攻目标与时机的主动权。

关于方伯谦的争论
黄海海战结束以后，8月24日，济远舰管带方伯谦被以“临阵退缩，致将船伍牵乱”的罪名斩首。

关于对方伯谦的评价，史界至今仍有争论。20世纪90年代以来，方伯谦家乡福建省出现了为方伯谦翻案的热潮。值得注意的是，福建省以外研究北洋海军史和甲午战争史的学者却表现出谨慎的沉默，很多著名学者认为以现有的史料，尚不足以翻案。事实上，方伯谦曾在丰岛海战时，曾以（济远）一船敌三舰（吉野、浪速、秋津州），表现优异。而在黄海海战时，济远舰的主炮还因发炮过多，导致炮盘融化（因为北洋舰队并无速射炮，两枚炮弹发射尚需隔一段时间。史学家唐德刚因此戏称清军是以“五分钟发一炮”的慢船敌“一分钟发五炮”的快艇，因为日军有速射炮，船速又远在北洋舰队之上），所以若是因为军中通讯中断，导致济远非得“自行撤退”的时候，反倒是应该嘉奖的。

影视作品与甲午海战
1960年由中国长春电影制片厂拍摄的电影《甲午风云》完成于1962年，是中国第一部有关北洋水师、甲午海战的影视作品，涉及了丰岛海战与黄海海战。由话剧演员李默然扮演的邓世昌的形象广为流传。
十二集电视连续剧《北洋水师》拍摄于1992年。其中三集内容涉及了黄海海战。

法制的日本战舰松岛号，在中日甲午战争中是日本联合舰队的旗舰。

The French-built Matsushima, flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy, during the battle of the Yalu River

Date September 17, 1894 Location Korea Bay, near the mouth of the Yalu River Result Decisive Japanese victory
Combatants
China	Empire of Japan
Commanders
Ting Ju ch'ang	Sukeyuki Ito
Strength
14 ships	12 ships
Casualties
5 vessels sunk, 3 damaged, 850 KIA, 500 WIA	4 ships damaged, 90 KIA, 200 WIA

黄海海战
中日甲午战争之一部份
1894年黄海海战经过
日期： 1894年9月17日 地点： 黄海 结果： 日军胜利，黄海制海权落入日本联合舰队之手 起因： {{{casus}}} 领土变更： {{{territory}}}
参战方
北洋水师	日本联合舰队
指挥官
丁汝昌	伊东祐亨
兵力
14艘船舰	12艘船舰
伤亡
5艘遭破坏 850人阵亡 500人受伤	4艘遭破坏 90人阵亡 200人受伤

The Battle of the Yalu River (黃海海戰, lit. Battle of the Yellow Sea), also called simply 'The Battle of Yalu' took place on September 17, 1894. It involved the Japanese and the Chinese navies, and was the largest naval engagement of the First Sino-Japanese War. The Yalu River is the border between China and Korea, though the battle was actually fought at the mouth of this river, in the Yellow Sea. A Japanese fleet under Admiral Sukeyuki Ito (伊東 祐亨) was attempting to disrupt the landing of Chinese troops protected by a fleet under Admiral Ding Ruchang (丁汝昌).

The engagement raged for most of the day, and while not the first engagement of pre-dreadnought technology on a wide scale (the Battle of Foochow in 1884 between the French and Chinese predates this) there were significant lessons for naval observers to consider.

Background
On paper, the Chinese had the superior ships, and included numerous ten-inch and eight-inch gun mounts. However, the Chinese had not seen fit to engage in gunnery practice in months prior, and the Chinese guncrews were somewhat unprepared for the stress of gunnery under fire. Corruption seems also to have played a role; many Chinese shells appear to have been filled with sawdust or water, some Chinese officers fled the engagement area, one vessel appears to have used its guns to store pickles, and in at least one case, a pair of 10-inch guns seem to have been hocked for cash on the black market.

At this time, the Japanese were confident in their own abilities. The Chinese, however, still had a number of foreign advisors and instructors. In particular, the German, Major von Hanneken, recently from Korea, was appointed as the naval advisor to Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang. W. F. Tyler, a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Navy Reserve and an Imperial Maritime Customs officer was appointed as von Hanneken's assistant. Philo McGiffen, formerly an ensign in the US Navy and an instructor at the Wei-Hai-Wei naval academy was appointed to Chen Yuen as an advisor or co-commander.

Prior to the battle with the Japanese, the vessels and armaments of the Chinese fleet were examined, and the ships were repainted. Philo McGiffin noted, at the time, that the Chinese vessels had been painted in 'invisible grey,' although contemporary photographs indicate a dark hull and a light superstructure, so perhaps only the white superstructures and the buff funnels were repainted gray, with the hulls remaining black. McGiffen also noted that many of the charges were 'thirteen years old and condemned.' The thin shields that had been covering the barbettes on some of the vessels were removed, as these had been found to splinter when hit by shells. The Tsi Yuen's return to port after recent action with the Japanese highlighted some of these problems.

The Battle
Admiral Sukeyuki Ito had his flag aboard the cruiser Matsushima with two dispatch vessels as escort; the converted-liner Sei-kyo or Saikyo, British Captain John Wilson commanding; and the gunboat Akagi. The Japanese Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Kabayama Sukenori was on a tour of inspection and aboard the Saikyo. The rest of the main body consisted of the cruisers Chiyoda, Itsukushima, Hashidate, Fusō and Hiei. A flying squadron, comprised of the cruisers Yoshino, Takachiho, Akitsushima and Naniwa, led the Japanese vessels.

The Japanese advanced on the Chinese with the flying squadron leading in line astern formation with the despatch vessels off to the port of the second squadron (where the flagship was). The Chinese were in two squadrons and in line abreast with the majority of the ships in a squadron, the "First Flying Squadron," consisting of Tsi Yuen, Kuang Chia, Chih Yuen, King Yuen, Ting Yuen, Chen Yuen, Lai Yuen, Ching Yuen, Chao Yung and Yang Wei. A second squadron, the "Principle Squadron," consisted of the Kuang Ping and Ping Yuen along with a couple of gunboats and torpedo boats.

The line abreast formation prevented the Chinese battleships in the center from firing because their smaller companions were between them and their opponents during this period. Simultaneously, the smaller, more lightly-armored ships were exposed to prolonged fire from the larger Japanese warships. Also, when the Japanese squadrons split, with the First Flying Squadron turning to the south of the Beiyang fleet while the slower Principal Squadron remained ahead of the Chinese, the main Chinese battleships were forced to divide their fire between the two groups.

Several different explanations have been put forward as to why the Beiyang fleet did not change their formation to react to the Japanese tactics more effectively. The account of Royal Navy Lieutenant William Ferdinand Tyler, an advisor on the Dingyuan, seems the best-qualified and corroborated. It states that “Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang ordered his ships to change course in such a way that would have exposed his ship, the flagship, but put the rest of the squadron in a good position to fire on the Japanese fleet.” Tyler reported, however, that Ting Yuen’s captain deliberately did not acknowledge this order or pass it on to the rest of the fleet.

Ting Yuen opened fire on the Japanese when the range between the vessels was about 6000 yards (5,500 m). This turned out to be a disastrous (and unnecessary) salvo from the Chinese flagship. When the German Navy took Ting Yuen out for gun trials in 1883 (Ting Yuen had been built in Germany) they noted that the main armament should not be fired on an ahead bearing. Firing on an ahead bearing resulted in the demolishing of the flying bridge, and Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang became a casualty of the battle from the opening shot of his own vessel, along with a number of officers also present on the bridge.

The Chinese fleet all opened fire on the Japanese fleet as they passed from port to starboard across the bows of the Chinese vessels. They failed to score any significantly damaging hits on the Japanese from their 12 inch (305 mm) and 8.2 inch (208 mm) guns. At about 3000 yards (2700 m) (the Chinese had been steadily closing the range), the Japanese concentrated their fire on the right hand end of the Chinese line, with devastating barrages poured into first Chao Yung and then Yang Wei.

Both those vessels burst into flames, which has been attributed to too much paint and varnish applied over the years. The Japanese had intended on swinging the flying division around the right flank of the Chinese line in an encirclement but the timely arrival of the Kuang Ping and Ping Yuen along with the two 'alphabetical' gunboats and torpedo boats Fu Lung (built at Schichau) and the Choi Ti, a Yarrow built vessel diverted this maneuver.

The Japanese fast cruisers veered to port and were then dispatched by Ito to go to the assistance of the Hiei, Saikyo and Akagi which had been unable to keep up with the main line and had then been engaged by the lefthand vessels of the Chinese line. Early in the battle the Ting Yuen had lost her signalling mast as well, which helped to cause more confusion with the Chinese vessels. The Chinese fleet, with some foresight, had anticipated something like this happening and formed into three pairs of mutually supporting vessels to carry the fight on.

The Japanese fleet, for its part, ravaged the Chinese and fought with fierce determination. Japanese shells set many Chinese ships aflame, and were responsible for sinking or seriously damaging eight of them, either during the battle or during later mopping up operations. Some of the Chinese ships, caked with many coats of flammable paint and varnish and manned by inexperienced crews, suffered horribly from the effect of superior Japanese gunnery.

The Aftermath
The Japanese sank five Chinese warships, severely damaged three more and killed about 850 Chinese sailors with 500 wounded. The Ting Yuen had most casualties of the Chinese vessels still afloat with 14 dead and 25 wounded.

The Chinese seriously damaged four Japanese warships — Hiei being severely damaged and retired from the conflict; Akagi suffering from heavy fire and with great loss of life; Saikyo, the converted liner, urged on by Admiral Kabayama Sukenori had been hit by four 12 inch (305 mm) shells and was sailing virtually out of control as a result, did cosmetic damage to two more, and killed about 90 Japanese sailors and wounded 200 more.

The Chinese fleet retired into Port Arthur and then to Weihaiwei, where it was finally destroyed by a combined land and naval attack. The Japanese withdrew possibly due to fear of a torpedo boat attack from the Chinese at night and also a lack of ammunition.

While the Japanese certainly did far more damage to the Chinese fleet, many foreigners at the time credited China with the victory. The Chinese had successfully carried out their troop landing, and the Japanese, for their part, had withdrawn after running low on ammunition. Many credit the prompt action of foreign advisers in the Chinese fleet (most notably McGiffin) for keeping even the most heavily damaged Chinese ships fighting till the very end of the engagement. Later research suggests that the Chinese ships fighting in pairs was something that had been planned ahead of time to cover the eventuality of communications being lost in the smoke and confusion of battle. At the same time, it is fair to note that the Chinese suffered more from poor quality munitions — some of the shells fired by the Ping Yuen, for example, hit the Japanese Matsushima but failed to explode, being filled with cement rather than high explosives as some corrupt officials created false shells in order to please higher officials. These were made at the Tientsin factories.

The Chinese Government laid the blame for the Chinese defeat squarely on the shoulders of Viceroy Li Hung-chang and Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang. However, on 27 October 1894, Admiral Freemantle, the British Commander-in-Chief met Ting in Wei-Hai-Wei with Ting "still lame from the burns received in the Yalu action" and described him as a "brave and patriotic man".

Despite these assessments, the Battle of the Yalu River is remembered by Chinese nationalists as a humiliating loss and marked the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The Japanese eventually won the First Sino-Japanese War which triggered outrage at China's weakness after the Self-Strengthening Movement and eventually rebellions led to the end of the Qing dynasty.

Ships involved
Japan
Flying Squadron:

Yoshino (4150 t, 20 knots, 4-6, 8-4.7) (Kawara, RA Tsuboi)

Takachiho (3650t, 15 knots, 2-10.2, 6-6) (Nomura)

Naniwa (3650 t, 16 knots, 2-10.2, 6-6) (Togo)

Akitsushima (3150 t, 16 knots, 4-6, 6-4.7) (Kamimura)

Main Fleet:

Matsushima (4277 t, 14 knots, 1-12.6, 12-4.7) (Omoto and Dewa, VA Ito) - Damaged

Chiyoda (2450 t, ?kts, 10-4.7) (Uchida)

Itsukushima (4277t, 14 knots, 1-12.6, 11-4.7) (Yoko-o)

Hashidate (as Itsukushima) (Hidaka)

Fusō (3718t, 11 knots, 4-9.4, 2-6) (Arai)

Hiei (2200t, 9 knots, 9-6) (Sakurai) - Damaged

Others:

Akagi (615t, 8 knots, 2-4.7) (Sakamoto)

Saikyo (merchantman, 2913, 10 knots, small guns) (Kano)

China
Yangwei (1350t, 6 knots, 2-10.2, 4-4.7)

Tchao Yung

Ching Yuan (2850 t, 14 knots, 3-8.2, 2-6) - Sunk

Lai Yuan (2830 t, 10 knots, 2-8.2, 2-6) - Damaged

Zhenyuan (7430t, 12 knots, 4-12, 2-5.9) (Lin)

Dingyuan (flag, Lin-Poo-Chin)

King Yuen (2850 t, 10 knots, 2-8.2, 2-6)

Chih Yuan (2300 t, 15 knots, 3-8.2, 2-6) (Tang) - Sunk

Kuang Chi (1290 t, 10.5 knots, 3-4.7)

Chi Yuan/Tsi Yuen (2355t, 15 knots, 2-8.2, 1-6) (Fong)

Ping Yuen (2100 t, 6/7 knots, 1-10.2, 2-6)

Kuang Ping (1000 t, 3-4.7)

? (torpedo-boat, 128 t, 15 knots, 3TT)

? (torpedo-boat, 69 t, 16 knots, 3TT)

References
The Imperial Japanese Navy (1904) - Fred T. Jane
The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945 (2000) - Richard N. J. Wright, Chatham Publishing, London, 2000, ISBN 1-86176-144-9
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 - Bruce A. Elleman, Routledge, London, 2001
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy - Sarah C.M. Paine, Cambridge, 2003
Various websites